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HISTORY



BY

JAMES GRANT DUFF, Esq.

CAPTAIN IN THE 1ST REGIMENT OF BOMBAY INFANTRY,
AND MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT AT CALCUTTA.

ON THE HISTORY OF INDIA.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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THE SECOND VOLUME.

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A
HISTORY
OF
THE MAHRATTAS.

CHAP. I.

FROM A. D. 1740 TO A. D. 1749.

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THE army which entered the Carnatic, under the command
 A. D. 1740. of Rughoojee Bhonslay, was composed of troops
 belonging to the Raja, the Peishwa, the Pritee
 Needhee, Futih Sing Bhonslay, and various chiefs of less note.
 The Ghorepurays of Sondoor and Gooty were invited to join,
 by letters from Shao and the Peishwa; and Moorar Rao,* the
 grand nephew of the famous Suntajee Ghorepuray, and adopted
 son and heir of Moorar Rao of Gooty, appeared under the
 national standard for the first time, since the death of his dis-
 tinguished and ill-reputed relation. He demanded his rank
 as Senaputtee, or commander in chief, of the Mahratta army,
 but consented to waive it on obtaining a promise of three dis-
 tricts near the Toongbuddra.† According to Mahratta manu-
 scripts, the whole force which entered the Carnatic amounted to
 fifty thousand men.‡ They descended by an unfrequented road,
 appeared in the rear of Dost Ally, in the neighbourhood of the
 Damulcherry pass, attacked and slew him, defeated his troops,
 and took his dewan, Meer Assud, prisoner. They commenced
 levying contributions all over the province, until bought off by
 Sufdur Ali, the son and heir of the late Nabob, with whom before
 retiring they entered into a secret compact, to return and crush
 Chunda Sahib, then in possession of Trichinopoly, whose popula-
 rity and power had for some time excited the jealousy and appre-
 hension of Sufdur Ali and Meer Assud. No bait could be more
 alluring to the Mahrattas than Trichinopoly, and the troops only
 retired two hundred and fifty miles towards Maharashtra, to pre-
 pare for the promised conquest, and lull suspicion of an attack.§

* This is the *Moorari Row*, so often mentioned by Mr. Orme in his admirable war of Coromandel.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ They are stated at 100,000 by Orme; but any large army is reported to be a *lakh*.

§ Orme. Wilks.

Whilst the main body of his army remained encamped on the Sew Gunga, Rughojee Bhonslay returned to Satara, and endeavoured to prevent Ballajee Bajee Rao's succession as Peishwa, by proposing Bappojee Naik* of Barramuttee, a connection, but an enemy of the late Peishwa, for the vacant office. Bappojee Naik was possessed of great wealth, and his enmity to Bajee Rao arose from a very common cause, that of having lent money, which his debtor could not repay. Rughojee's party used the irritated creditor as their tool, and very large sums were offered to Shao on condition of Bappojee's being raised to the vacant Peishwaship.

The Pritee Needhee, although adverse to the supremacy of the Peishwa, was yet more inimical to the pretensions of Rughojee, and as he did not engage in the intrigue, Ballajee Bajee Rao assisted by his uncle Chimnajee, was at last invested in August, 1740. A more serious cause of uneasiness to Ballajee Bajee Rao arose from his being answerable for his father's debts, and Bappojee Naik enforced his demand with all the importunity and harassing pertinacity which is often exercised by the Mahratta creditor.† From this persecution

* Bramin soucarts and money changers assume the appellation of Naik.

† The mode of recovering a debt is by a species of dunning called tuqazu, the most common practised is to hire a few of those men, who make it a trade. They sit at the debtor's door, follow him wherever he goes, and crave with humility, or demand with insolence, according to time and circumstance. By the invariable rule of the country the debtor is obliged to subsist the duns thus placed upon him, and as they are adepts in the art of tormenting, protected also by the great power of opinion, they soon contrive to render the debtor sufficiently miserable. But if the debtor be obstinate, and the creditor think himself equal to the task, he may undertake the tuqazu by placing his debtor in dhurna; the creditor seats himself by his debtor, or at his door, during which whilst the former abstains from food, it would be accounted infamous and dishonorable for the latter to eat or drink. Bappojee Naik practised first the tuqazu, and afterwards the dhurna. I refer my English readers to an account of dhurna (dherna) given by Lord Teignmouth in the 4th volume of the Asiatic Researches, and quoted in Mr. Mills's History of India. I have known the dhurna practised, but never very rigorously; and I do not think that fear of the creditor's starving himself to death would have much effect on a Mahratta debtor; his stomach would be much sooner affected than his conscience.

Ballajee was relieved by the influence and credit of his dewan, Mahadajee Punt Poorundbhuree, a service of which the Peishwa ever after retained a grateful recollection.

Rughoojee, on finding his schemes abortive, carried Bappoojee Naik with him towards the Carnatic, and returned to reap the expected harvest at Trichinopoly, accompanied by Sreeput Rao, the Pritee Needhee, and Futili Sing Bhonslay. In regard to the subsequent operations of the Mahrattas in the Carnatic, very little illustrative of what has already been so ably recorded,* has fallen within my observation in the Mahratta country. It appears, however, that the Tanjore state, though then agitated by factions, entered into a friendly correspondence with their countrymen, but whether to avert attack, or to afford assistance, is not mentioned. Trichinopoly surrendered 26th March, 1741, and Chunda Sahib† was brought a prisoner to Satara, where he remained in custody of an agent of Rughoojee Bhonslay, for about seven years ; his complete enlargement having been effected in the year 1748. Moorar Rao Ghorepuray was left in command of the fort of Trichinopoly, and a part of his garrison was composed of infantry belonging to the Peishwa. Their expences were defrayed by Shao ; besides which it was settled that 20,000 rupees of the share of tribute from the province of Arcot should be annually paid to Ballajee Bajee Rao.‡

On the death of Bajee Rao the government of Malwa, being considered disposable, was conferred on Azim Oolah Khan ; but this appointment proved merely nominal. One of the first acts of the new Peishwa was to forward petitions to Delhi respecting various promises made to his predecessor. These applications were transmitted through Jey Sing and Nizam Ool Mook. A supply of ready money was what Ballajee most earnestly

* Orme and Wilks.

† Better known in the Deccan by his less familiar name of Hussein Dost Khan. He does not appear to have been confined in the fort, nor to have endured a close imprisonment, but merely to have had an attendant guard wherever he went ; a supposition which is confirmed by the facility with which Dupleix appears to have intrigued with him when a prisoner.

‡ Mahratta MSS. and original paper.

eraved, and fifteen lakhs of rupees, as a free gift, were granted by the Emperor. Proposals for an agreement* were then drawn up, in the joint names of the Peishwa and Chimnajee Appa, wherein they request that they may receive the government of Malwa ; after which they promise to pay their respects personally to the Emperor ; to prevent every other Mahratta officer from crossing the Nerbuddah ; to send a body of five hundred horse under an officer of rank, to remain in attendance on the Emperor's person ; and to ask no more than the gift of money already bestowed. They agree to send four thousand horse for service, who will punish refractory zumeendars, as far as their numbers may enable them ; and they faithfully promise not to sequestrate the rent-free lands or jagheers, assigned for charitable or religious purposes. It does not appear

A. D. 1741. that any notice was taken of the application, but Ballajee, whose disposition was naturally conciliatory, was anxious to have the government of Malwa conferred as a right, according to treaty with his father ; and with this view, when Nizam Ool Mook was marching to the Deccan in order to suppress Nasir Jung's disobedience, (a subject to which we shall presently advert,) Ballajee paid him a respectful visit near the Nerbuddah, and sent a body of his troops to join him.† At this period he sustained a great loss in the death of his uncle, Chimmajee Appa, which happened in the end of January 1741. Eleven days previously to the event Kundojee Mankur, under Chimmajee's direction, had reduced Rewadunda,‡ the last place remaining to the Portuguese, between Goa and Damaun. Chimmajee Appa, from his successes against a European nation, has a greater reputation amongst the Mahrattas, as an officer, than he perhaps deserved. Impressed, from obvious circumstances, with an idea, which however true in most instances, it was dangerous

* There were several copies of papers similar to the purport of that which is quoted, found in the Poona records ; I have selected the one most explicit which appears to have been the ultimatum.

† Khuzaneh Amirah, &c. ; and original letter from Ballajee Bajee Rao.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

for his countrymen to entertain, he believed that the strength of an army lay in its infantry and guns. To this opinion of the father may probably be traced a prepossession on the part of the son, Sewdasheo Chimmajee Bhow,* then a boy of ten years old, which, strengthened by other circumstances, may have led to the injudicious conduct of that campaign, which twenty years afterwards terminated so fatally on the plains of Panniput.

On the demise of his uncle the Peishwa returned from the northern districts, and spent nearly a year in civil arrangements at Poona and Satara. Continuing to manifest the greatest apparent respect for the Raja, he obtained from Shao a grant by which the whole of the territory conquered from the Portuguese was conferred on him, and also with the exception of Guzerat, the exclusive right of collecting the revenues and of levying contributions north of the Nerbuddah.

At the present conjuncture the authority thus obtained was
 A. D. 1742. of considerable importance. We have briefly noticed in the preceding chapter the rise and progress of Aliverdy Khan in Bengal ; the defeat of Moorshed Koolee Khan, and the conduct of his dewan, Meer Hubeeb. It appears that immediately after his master's defeat, Meer Hubeeb had invited Bhaskur Punt, the dewan of Rughoojee Bhonslay, who was left in charge of the government of Berar during his master's absence in the Carnatic, to advance into the province of Kuttack ; but Bhaskur Punt, having found it necessary to apply for his master's permission, before an answer could be received, and the troops prepared, Aliverdy Khan had conquered the province, and Meer Hubeeb had submitted to his authority.† Another opportunity, however, soon presented itself to Bhaskur Punt of carrying his arms to the eastward ; and no sooner had he set out on his expedition than the Peishwa, eager to establish his power over those territories, for which the authority obtained from the Raja was, as

* *Bhow*, brother, is applied also by Mahrattas to a cousinerman. Hence, as the Peishwa's cousin, he was commonly styled *Bhow Sahib*, and the *Bhow*, as well as *Sewdasheo Rao Bhow*.

† Mahratta MSS.

usual, assumed as a right, marched, though late in the season, towards Hindoostan, and made himself master of Gurrah and Mundelalh, before the monsoon. He was obliged to encamp on the banks of the Nerbuddah during the rainy season, and probably meditated an expedition into Allahabad, when he was called upon to defend his rights in Malwa, invaded by Dum-majee Gaekwar and Baboo Rao Sewdasheo.

This inroad seems to have been instigated by Rughoojee, merely to obstruct the Peishwa's progress to the eastward : and on Ballajee's arrival in Malwa the army of Guzerat retired. On this occasion Anund Rao Powar, to whom Bajee Rao never became reconciled, after his uniting with Trimbuck Rao Dhabaray, was permitted to pay his respects to Ballajee, and was by him confirmed in possession of Dhar and the surrounding districts ;* a politic measure which not only secured Powar in his interests, but opposed a barrier on the western side of Malwa, to incursions from Guzerat. Since the Peishwa's arrival at Mundelah a negotiation had been going on between him and the Emperor, through the mediation of Raja Jey Sing, supported by Nizam Ool Moolk. The chouth of the imperial territory was promised, and a khillut, more splendid than had ever been conferred on his father,† was transmitted to Ballajee. It does not, as may be here remarked, appear that any deed for collecting this general chouth was ever granted by Mohummud Shah ; sums of money and convenient assignments were the mode of payment. The object in the pending treaty was, on the part of the Peishwa, to obtain sunnuds for the promised government of Malwa ; on that of the court of Delhi, to procrastinate, and to widen the breach between the Peishwa and Rughoojee Bhonslay.

In the mean time Bhaskur Punt had invaded Bahar : he was induced to make that province the theatre of his first operations, in the expectation of finding the country drained of troops, owing to an insurrection in Kuttack, which had burst forth in consequence of the tyranny and misconduct of the grand-

* Mahratta MSS.

† Articles enumerated in an original letter from the Emperor.

nephew* of Aliverdy Khan, whom he had left as governor of the province. Aliverdy Khan, as Bhaskur Punt had anticipated, returned to Kuttack for the purpose of quelling the disturbance, which, however, he speedily effected; and in the month of April was already on his march returning to Moorshedabad, when news was suddenly brought to him that the Mahrattas had entered Bahar; emerged from the hills and woods near Ramgurh, turned to the right, and had fallen upon the district of Pachet, in their usual manner of plundering and extorting.

The Mahratta army consisted of ten or twelve thousand† horse, and report had swelled their numbers to nearly four times that amount.‡ Aliverdy Khan, although only at the head of three or four thousand cavalry, and four thousand infantry, resolved to oppose them; but the Mahrattas attacked him with great success, surrounded his army, carried off most of his baggage, and reduced him to great distress. Many of his men deserted or were killed, the whole of what remained amounted only to three thousand, but with these he determined rather to die, than submit to the severe demands which the Mahrattas would have exacted. Although sorely harassed for several days, he fought his way, and made good his retreat to Cutwa. In one of the first attacks Meer Hubeeb, who was in the army of Aliverdy Khan, having been made prisoner, joined the Mahrattas, and exerted himself so much as to gain the confidence of Bhaskur Punt. That officer proposed retiring for the rains, which Meer Hubeeb opposed, but as Bhaskur Punt could not at first be persuaded to remain, Meer Hubeeb requested command of a detachment, with which he marched to Moorshedabad, rescued his brother, who resided in the city, plundered the banking-house of Juggut Sett Alumchund, of the enormous sum of two millions and a half sterling, overtook Bhaskur Punt, and at length succeeded in convincing him that it was better to remain in Bengal, and that it would be

* The notorious Shujah ud Doulah, who afterwards confined the English in the black hole, on the capture of Calcutta, 20th June, 1756.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ In the Scyr Mutuakhereen their numbers are more moderately estimated at 25,000; but still that exceeds their actual numbers twofold.

preposterous to quit so rich a harvest as he might expect to reap. Accordingly, he wheeled about, and through the aid of Meer Hubeeb, obtained possession of the town of Hooghly by stratagem. Most of the places from Cutwa to the neighbourhood of Midnapoor fell into his hands, and the swelling of the Hooghly alone prevented the Mahrattas from entering the district of Moorshedabad. Whilst affairs were in this state an officer from the imperial court arrived on the frontiers of the province of Bengal to demand the arrears of tribute due by the Nabob. Aliverdy Khan represented his situation and the impossibility of satisfying these just demands, until he could expel the Mahrattas; he at the same time earnestly solicited a reinforcement. Aliverdy Khan likewise applied to the Peishwa, and with a view of inducing him to invade Rughojee Bhonslay's districts in Berar, dispatched a considerable sum as a subsidy for that purpose: the convoy, however, was cut off by the order or connivance of Sufdur Jung, the Governor of Oude.

But, whilst thus negotiating for every succour he could devise, Aliverdy Khan wisely placed his chief dependence on his own exertions; he assembled every man he could command, and made vigorous preparations for attacking Bhaskur Punt's camp at Cutwa, as soon as the season should permit. Before the rivers had fallen he prepared a bridge of boats, which, in the night, he threw first across the Hooghly, and then over the Adjee, which enabled him to gain the opposite bank; although, in consequence of a break in the fastening which had laced the boats together, fifteen hundred men were plunged into the Adjee, and totally lost, before the accident was discovered. The Mahrattas, by whom this attempt was quite unexpected, did not oppose the Nabob, but fled eastward, until they had misled their pursuers in the hills and jungles of Bahar, when they again re-entered the district of Midnapoor. But Aliverdy Khan soon recovered their track, and with the most active of his troops continued to pursue them. They seldom turned except to skirmish, and having lost all confidence, in consequence of an indecisive action which took place at Ballasore, they fled from Bengal, and returned through the province of

Orissa to Berar. Rughoojee Bhonslay had arrived with his army from the Carnatic some time before his fugitive dewan appeared, and having resolved to support his pretensions in Bengal, advanced towards the province by the same route as that by which Bhaskur Punt had entered.

In the mean time the Emperor, on being apprized of the irruption into Bengal, ordered Sufdur Jung, Nabob of Oude, to drive out Bhaskur Punt; and at the same time applied to Ballajee Bajee Rao to afford his aid. As inducements to the Peishwa, an assignment on Aliverdy Khan, for the arrears of chouth due from Azimabad, was sent to him by the Emperor, and an assurance of confirming him in the government of Malwa.

The reward was prized too highly, and the service was too desirable to be refused. Having quitted Malwa, the Peishwa proceeded through the province of Allahabad, and marched straight on Boglipoor. In order to prevent injury to the country he avoided high roads in the neighbourhood of cultivation, but to the great alarm of the timid inhabitants, who were in terror of an army even of Mahratta friends, he arrived

at Moorshedabad.

A. D. 1743. Rughoojee Bhonslay, with a powerful army, was advancing as an enemy from the eastward, and as Ballajee well knew that princes are most liberal at such seasons, he pressed the settlement of accounts with Aliverdy Khan before he would take the field. Payment being promised, Rughoojee, who had by that time arrived between Cutwa and Burdwan, decamped as soon as he heard that a settlement had taken place, and retreated towards the hills. Aliverdy Khan instantly marched in pursuit; but Ballajee, who intended to act according to his agreement, seemed to have a poor opinion of the Nabob's ability to pursue Mahrattas. He therefore took another road, soon passed the Bengal troops, and in a few days overtook, attacked, and defeated Rughoojee's army.* Bhaskur Punt, who was at the head of a party in reserve, immediately retreated through Orissa; but

* The best account of Ballajee Bajee Rao's campaign in Bengal, to which I have had the benefit of access, is the Seyr Mutuakheneen, which is my authority for the greater part of the Bengal transactions at this period, assisted, however, in several parts by Mahratta MSS. and letters.

Ballajee Rao, after his victory, returned to Malwa, in order to secure the long-promised government.

The conduct of the Peishwa in the late campaign left no reasonable excuse on the part of Mohummud Shah for refusing to perform the engagement ; but to save the credit of the imperial name, the feeble palliative of conferring the appointment on the Peishwa, as the deputy of Prince Ahmud, the Emperor's son, was adopted at the suggestion of Jey Sing and Nizam Ool Mookl, through whom the transaction was concluded.*

The rest of the treaty differs little from the former proposition, made in the joint names of Ballajee and his uncle, Chimnajee, as already detailed ; but instead of four thousand Ballajee promised to furnish twelve thousand horse, the expence of the additional eight thousand being payable by the Emperor.†

From the period of Ballajee Rao's accession the most friendly intercourse subsisted between him and Jey Sing ; several written agreements are preserved, containing mutual assurances of alliance and support. Jey Sing was guarantee for the observance of the treaty with Mohummud Shah, and there is another remarkable reservation for the imperial dignity affixed to the treaty in question, by bringing forward Mulhar Rao Holkar, Ranoojee Sindia, and Peelajee Jadow, as the securities ; who in due form declare that should the Peishwa recede from his duties they will quit his service. An absurd pledge for the fulfilment of an agreement from those whose interest lay in dissolving it ; and which does not so much prove the consequence to which those commanders had attained,

* The following is the substance of the firman received by Bajee Rao upon his appointment. From the Emperor Mohummud Shah, 22d Jummaadee Ool Uwul, in the 24th year of the reign. "The dignity of the Shahzadu's Deputy in Malwa, together with the income attached to that situation, having been conferred on you, proper arrangements must be made in that province so as to afford the subjects, paying revenue to government, due favor and protection, and to punish all such as are evil disposed and disaffected. You must prevent the use of intoxicating drugs and spirituous liquors ; and you must administer justice equally, so that the strong shall not oppress the weak, and that no species of violence be tolerated." (Original from the Poona Records.)

† Original papers.

as the state of humiliation to which the Emperor was reduced. There might be political design mixed with this plan of security, for feeble governments are full of far-fetched artifice ; but the imperial court, if it thus projected its own salvation by dissensions among its enemies, did not reflect on their relative situations, nor perceive that Mahratta combination was likely to be ensured, until the Moghul empire was totally subverted.

The Peishwa returned to Satara to pay his respects, and go through the form of producing his accounts of the revenue. These accounts were made out by the Peishwa, as a general in command of a body of the Raja's troops ; the receipts, disbursements, and balance were set forth ; and it is a remarkable fact that after the Rajas of Satara had become perfect ciphers in the Mahratta government, the Peishwa's accounts continued to the last to be made out in the manner described.

But other reasons of great importance required Ballajee's presence at this juncture. A. D. 1741. Rughoojee Bhonslay, after his defeat, had sent Wukeels to the Peishwa, assuring him of his sincere desire of reconciliation, and of his being now fully convinced that the plans of Bajee Rao were those best suited to his own, and the real interests of the Mahratta nation. He continued the same professions with apparent sincerity, but as he was on full march towards Satara, the Peishwa thought it necessary to be on his guard, particularly as Dummajee Gaekwar was also approaching. The Pritee Needhee had become infirm by sickness, but his Moota-liq, Yemmajee Sewdeo, was an active, able man, adverse to the Peishwa's supremacy, and although not leagued with Rughoojee, was intimately connected with the faction of Dhabaray. Under these circumstances Ballajee Bajee Rao had to make his election between a war with the Mahratta chiefs, or the resignation of Bengal to Rughoojee Bhonslay. The question did not admit of hesitation, he chose the latter ; but it being understood that the country north of the Maha-Nuddee as well as the Nerbuddah was comprehended in his agreement with the Emperor, he made a merit of conceding his right of levying tribute to Rughoojee, and a secret compact, in which the Raja was used as mediator, was finally concluded.

The object of the contracting parties seems avowedly to have been not so much an alliance as an agreement to avoid interference with each other. The Raja's authority was in this instance convenient to both. A sunnud was given to the Peishwa, conferring on him his original Mokassa; all the jagheers bestowed on himself, or acquired by his father and grandfather; the governments of the Concan and Malwa; and the shares of revenue or tribute from Allahabad, Agra, and Ajimere; three talooks in the district of Patna, twenty thousand rupees from the province of Arcot, and a few detached villages in Rughojee's districts. On the other hand, it was settled that the revenues and contributions from Lucknow, Patna, and Lower Bengal, including Bahar, should be collected by Rughojee Bhonslay. The latter was also vested with the sole authority of levying tribute from the whole territory from Berar to Kuttack.

It was agreed that Dummajee Gaekwar should be obliged to account to the Peishwa for the amount of the contributions he had levied in Malwa, but nothing was urged at this time respecting the large arrears due by Dhabaray to the head of the government. It does not appear that any settlement was concluded, but Dummajee seems to have remained some time in the Deccan, although his presence was much required in Guzerat. The Peishwa's southern and eastern boundaries in Hindoostan were well defined by the Nerbuddah, the Soane, and the Ganges; but the sunnud delivered on this occasion authorized him to push his conquests to the northward as far as practicable.*

With these domestic arrangements of the Mahrattas Nizam Ool Mook had no interference. We have already mentioned that he quitted Delhi in consequence of the meditated rebellion of his son Nasir Jung. On returning to the Deccan in the beginning of 1741, Nizam Ool Mook used every endeavour to induce his son to submit without coming to hostilities. At last Nasir Jung sent messengers to treat, which so alarmed his partizans, that most of them endeavoured to make the best

* Original papers and Mahratta MSS.

terms they could. Nizam Ool Mook gradually drew them over, continued to use fair words towards his son, until, in an emotion of generosity, Nasir Jung hastily sent back the whole of the park of artillery. This concession might have obtained an unreserved pardon, but as soon as Nizam Ool Mook had him in his power, he wished to humble him completely. Nasir Jung, assuming the garb of a fuqeer, retired in penitence to Rozu, near Doulutabad, but his father continued to manifest the same stern behaviour; till at last the young man was so much piqued, that he listened to the suggestions of Futih Yab Khan, one of his companions, by whom he was persuaded that he might still compel his father to submit to any terms.

Nizam Ool Mook, according to his custom, had cantoned his troops for the rains; a part at Aurungabad, and the rest at different towns in the neighbourhood. Futih Yab Khan suggested to Nasir Jung that they must first seize some strong fort; and undertook to surprise Molheir, of which Mutuwussil Khan, Nasir Jung's brother-in-law, was governor. Futih Yab Khan succeeded in the enterprize, and Nasir Jung immediately joined him. Nizam Ool Mook did not expect this attempt, but made no preparation in consequence. Apprized of his supineness, Futih Yab Khan proposed to surprise him in Aurungabad. Nasir Jung advanced from Molheir with seven thousand horse, reached Doulutabad before intelligence of his march had been received, and had he pushed on, would probably have succeeded in taking his father prisoner. He seems, however, to have been seized with some compunction for the part he was acting, and passed the day in prayer at the shrine of a celebrated Saint; whilst Nizam Ool Mook, apparently serene, but much alarmed, was calling in his detachments; his gun bullocks were all at a distance grazing, and very few men were in readiness; but he immediately pitched his tents, and moved out from the city. Before next morning, which was the 23rd July, he had a respectable force drawn up, with which he coolly awaited the approach of his son, who advanced at the head of his followers, and was repulsed. Finding his troops giving way, Nasir Jung impetuously charged his father's standard, pushed on towards his elephant, and slew three of

his bravest attendants, one after the other. The driver of his own elephant being killed, Nasir Jung sprang into his place; when his brother-in-law, Mutuwussil Khan, approaching him, drew an arrow to the head, which must have transfixed him, had not his son Heedayet Moideen Khan, who sat on the same elephant, stayed his hand, and saved his uncle's life: at that moment, Syud Lushkur Khan, an officer of experience, who knew Nasir Jung, and the pride as well as the generosity of his disposition, pushed his elephant close by the side of his, saluted him, and respectfully made room on the seat of his elephant; when, overcome by this act of courtesy, Nasir Jung took the place, and was thus carried prisoner to Aurungabad. Shah Nuwaz Khan, who, as well as Sur Lushkur Khan, was destined to act a conspicuous part in Deccan affairs, had embarked with his friend Nasir Jung in this desperate enterprize, stood by him to the last, and must have been cut down, but one of his friends in the army of Nizam Ool Mook, after Nasir Jung was taken, opening a way by which he might escape, called to him to desist and save himself. He followed this advice, and to the concealment and obscurity in which he was for seven years obliged to live, Indian history is indebted for his valuable biography, the Muasir Ool Oomrah.

Nizam Ool Mook was exceedingly gratified by his son's preservation, but he threw many of his adherents into confinement, and to mark his sense of Nasir Jung's rebellion, imprisoned him for a short time in the fort of Kandhar, near Nandere, but relieved him before proceeding on an expedition to the southward: his motives for that undertaking we shall now explain.

Whilst the affairs of Bengal occupied the Mahrattas, the attention of Nizam Ool Mook was directed to the Carnatic, and in his protracted absence from the Deccan may be perceived the reason of his conciliatory conduct to Ballajee Rao, in aiding his pretensions to the government of Malwa. The murder of Sufdur Ali, Nabob of Arcot, by his brother-in-law, Mortiza Khan, in 1742; and the general confusion existing in the Moghul territories south of the Kistna, presented a favorable opportunity for Nizam Ool Mook's interference, to establish his power and to restore tranquillity to the country. He

ecordingly marched from Hyderabad at the head of an immense army in January, 1743, and upwards of a year was spent in concluding the arrangements he had contemplated. To obtain possession of Trichinopoly was an object of importance, but as matters stood with the Mahrattas, as the acquisition was much prized by them, it must have been an affair of some political management. The family of Ghorepuray, however, was never firmly united with their countrymen after the murder of Suntajee; it is true they would rather have joined the Mahrattas, but superior advantages, and the chance of plunder, would induce them to fight on the side of Moghuls or Europeans. Moorar Rao was recognized as Chief of Gooty by Nizam Ool Mook,* and evacuated the Carnatic with all his troops in August, 1743.†

The Mahratta armies which assembled at Satara in the beginning of 1744 were probably contemplated with some anxiety by Nizam Ool Mook, whose march was soon directed towards Hyderabad, having left Anwar-ud-deen-Khan, at his own request, in charge of the Government of the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut, and appointed his own grandson, Heedayet Moideen Khan, better known by his title of Muzuffir Jung, to the Carnatic Bala Ghaut (or Carnatic Proper), conferring on him the district of Adonee, in Jagheer, and fixing his head station at Beejapoore, whilst that of Anwar-ud-deen, continued, as in the time of Daood Khan, and the Newayeteh Nabobs,‡ at the long established capital of Arcot. Nizam Ool Mook, finding he had nothing to apprehend from the Mahrattas, directed his attention to affairs of internal government, and reduced several forts, the Killidars of which were in rebellion.

The Mahrattas were too much occupied in their own schemes to think of taking advantage of the Nizam's absence. Rughoojee-Bhonslay was intent on recovering his lost footing in

* Orme and Wilks.

† Orme.

‡ The Newayeteh Nabobs is the appellation by which Sadut Oollah Khan, Dost Ally, and Sufdur Ali are known in the Deccan. The Newayetehs are a distinct race of Mahomedans, and said to have been driven from Arabia, to seek refuge on the western shores of India, in the eighth century. See Wilks vol. i. page 212.

Bengal, and the Peishwa, in order to excuse himself to the Emperor, for not acting against Rughoojee, remained in the Deccan. Rughoojee had returned to Berar in the rains, but as soon as the season opened, Bhaskur Punt, Alee Kurawul, and several officers of note,* supported by twenty thousand horse, were sent into Bengal by the route of Orissa. Aliverdy Khan prepared his troops, but on pretence of coming to an agreement, opened a negotiation with Bhaskur Punt, invited him to a ziafut, or entertainment, with twenty of his principal officers, and most treacherously murdered them. One Surdar, named Rughoojee Gaekwar, who remained in charge of the camp, was the only one out of twenty-two principal officers, who escaped this perfidious massacre : he conducted the retreat of the army to Berar by the same route they had come, but many of the Mahratta stragglers were cut off by the exasperated peasantry.

An opportunity, however, soon occurred of renewing the incursions. An insurrection against Aliverdy Khan's government by the Afghans in his service obliged him to leave Orissa in some degree exposed, and in charge of a Hindoo governor. Rughoojee Bhonslay, apprized of the state of the province, by certain Gosaeens whom he entertained as spies, invaded Orissa, obtained possession of several districts, and demanded thirty millions of rupees, as the price at which he would spare the remainder, and quit the country. Aliverdy Khan contrived to amuse him until he had suppressed the rebellion, when he sent a vaunting message to Rughoojee, which put an end to all negotiation. After the rains hostilities commenced, but ceased for a time, after a partial defeat of the Mahrattas, at Cutwa;† Rughoojee being obliged to return to his own territories, in consequence of a disputed succession to the principality of Deogurh, in Gondwaneh, where the sons of a Raja, named Bukht Boolund, converted by Aurungzebe to Mahomedanism, had quarrelled, and one of them, named Wullee Shah, not only confined his two brothers, Akbar Shah and Boorhan Shah, but, on being assisted by Neelkunt

* Mahratta MSS.

† Seyr Ool Mutuakhercen and Stewart's History of Bengal.

Shah, another Hindoo renegado, Raja of Chandah, Wullee Shah refused to pay either chouth or surdeshmookhee to the Mahrattas; Akbar Shah was desirous of obtaining assistance from the Nizam, but Boorhan Shah courted the Mahrattas.

The insurrection of Wullee Shah and Neelkunt Shah ended in the subjugation of their territory. Deogurh and Chandah were both annexed to the possessions of Rughoojee, but Rutunpoor was assigned to Boorhan Shah, the brother of Wullee Shah, with an income for his support, and his posterity still reside at the Court of Nagpoor, in the enjoyment of a part of it. Akbar Shah died a pensioner of the Nizam's government.*

Shortly after Rughoojee had entered Bengal, during the

A. D. 1745. Afghan insurrection, Ballajee Bajee Rao arrived

at Belsah, in Malwa, from which place he addressed letters to the Emperor, full of assurances of perpetual fidelity, but excusing himself from paying his respects in the royal presence. He expressed surprise at Aliverdy Khan's inactivity in not repulsing Rughoojee, which the Emperor in his reply accounts for by charging Ballajee with not having stopped the ghauts in Rughoojee's rear as preconcerted. But the agreement which had taken place with Rughoojee precluded all interference; the Peishwa evaded the discussion, and on pretence of business in the Deccan, after making his annual collections, speedily returned to Poona.†

In the following year he sent his cousin, Sewdasheo Chim-

A. D. 1746. najee Bhow, accompanied by Sukaram Bappoo,‡

the Carcoon of Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, on an expedition into the Carnatic, to punish some of the Desh-mookhs, who had driven out the Thannas of the Peishwa's old creditor, Bappoojee Naik Barramutteekur. That person, by the interest of Rughoojee Bhonslay, had obtained the chouth and surdeshmookhee between the Kistna and Toongbuddra,

* Mahratta MSS.

† Original Letters, and Mahratta MSS.

‡ Sukaram Bhugwunt Bhokeel, Koolkurnee of Hewra, and the descendant of Puntojee Gopinat, who betrayed Afzool Khan into the hands of Sivajee, was the principal minister at the period when the British Government first took an active part in the politics of the Poona Durbar, and is best known by his familiar name of Sukaram Bappoo.

in farm, from the Raja, for the annual sum of seven lakhs of rupees; but the opposition he experienced, and the heavy charges for maintaining the troops, totally ruined him in a few years. The expence of the present expedition, which he was compelled to defray, added to his embarrassments, but he would not consent to relinquish the contract in favor of the Bhow, as was proposed to him. Sewdasheo Chimnajee levied contributions as far as the Toongbuddra, and reduced the fort of Bhadur Benda, to which the Mahrattas had a claim of long standing.* On Sewdasheo Chimnajee's return from this expedition he was invested by the Raja with the same rank as had been enjoyed by his father,† and being ambitious and bolder than his cousin the Peishwa, he began to assume considerable power. He chose as his carcoons Wasdeo Joshee and Rughoonath Huree, two able men who had been brought up under Kanhojee

A. D. 1747. Angria. The Peishwa himself concluded a new and more specific agreement with the Rajas of Buncleund, by which after deducting the district of Ryhlee, which had been wholly ceded to the late Peishwa, one-third of the territory, estimated at sixteen and a half lakhs of rupees,‡ was made over to Ballajee Bajee Rao, besides a like share from the profits of the diamond mines of Pannah.

The Peishwa during this period of comparative tranquillity in the Deccan gave encouragement to agriculture, protected the villagers and grain merchants, and improvement was everywhere visible. But events occurred about this time in Hindooostan, the Deccan, and Carnatic, which were the forerunners of fresh troubles, and great revolutions in every part of India.

The season of 1747-48 is memorable in Hindooostan by its being the period of the first invasion of Ahmed Shah Abdallee, King of the Afghans, who are distinguished in India by the various appellations of Dooranee, Abdallee, and Giljya.§

* Mahratta MSS.

† Second in command under the Peishwa.

‡ Rupees 16,51,636. (Original papers.)

§ I mention these names as necessary in common conversation with the natives of India. A native of Maharashtra, for instance, only knows them by the name of Giljya, whilst Afghans generally are merely distinguished as Patans.

Ahmed Abdallee, the person who was now their acknowledged sovereign, was son of a chief of a tribe of Afghans, named Abdallee, settled in the province of Herat, when it was conquered by Nadir Shah. Ahmed from being the prisoner, became a military follower of Nadir, and was gradually promoted to considerable rank. On the assassination of Nadir Shah, Ahmed left the Persian army with the whole of his tribe, who were in camp, and retiring to Herat, which he occupied, was soon acknowledged as King by the whole Afghan nation, and now possessed the eastern half of the dominions of Nadir Shah.

One of the nephews of Kummur-ud-deen Khan, the Vizier, who had taken charge of the governments of Mooltan and Lahore, in prejudice to his elder brother, was advised by a treacherous Moghul, named Adina Beg Khan, to unite his fortunes with the rising Ahmed Shah Abdallee, an advice which he had no sooner begun to put in practice, than Adina Beg informed his uncle of the circumstance, and the nephew, ashamed of his conduct, returned to his allegiance; but the traitor, Adina Beg, had already gone so far in the negotiation with Ahmed Shah that the latter was not to be interrupted in his progress; his troops advanced, and he obtained possession of Mooltan and Lahore, almost without resistance, and pro-

A. D. 1748. ceeded towards Delhi. He was, however, at this time successfully opposed by the Moghul army, sent forward by the Emperor, under his son, Prince Ahmed, and the Afghan army retreated towards Cabul. On this service, Kummur-ud-deen Khan, the Vizier, having been killed, his son, Meer Mumnoo, received the governments of Mooltan and Lahore, and set out to take charge of those provinces. Prince Ahmed returned towards Delhi, but before he reached the capital the Emperor had breathed his last. On the Prince's accession to the throne, by the title of Ahmed Shah, in the end of April, he bestowed the office of Vizier on Sufdur Jung, Nabob of Oude.* He had offered the Viziership to Nizam Ool Mook, but he excused himself on account

* Seyr Mutuakhoreen.

of his great age, and only survived Mohummud Shah a very short time, having died at Burhanpoor, in his 104th year, on the 19th June, 1748.

Nizam Ool Mook left six sons, namely, Ghazee-ud-deen, Nasir Jung, Sulabut Jung, Nizam Ally, Mohummud Shureef, and Meer Moghul. The two first were of the same mother, all the others were of different mothers. Ghazee-ud-deen being at Delhi, where he held the rank of Umeer Ool Oomrah at the time of his father's death, Nasir Jung assumed the government.*

A few months after the death of Nizam Ool Mook the Emperor wrote a letter with his own hand, inviting Nasir Jung in a very pressing manner to come to court, and the latter had arrived at the Nerbuddah, when the invitation, for some reason not satisfactorily explained, was withdrawn.

A. D. 1749. This circumstance appeared at the time fortunate to Nasir Jung, as news of an alarming nature had just reached him of a rebellion, headed by his nephew Muzuffir Jung, and aided by Chunda Sahib, with a body of French troops. Very shortly afterwards intelligence was received of the defeat and death of Anwar-ud-deen, Governor of the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut, at the battle of Ambour, on which Nasir Jung applied to Rughojee Bhonslay for a body of his troops, promising to grant some cessions of territory as the reward of their service.† He also summoned the whole of the Moghul dependents and tributaries in the Carnatic to be prepared to join his army, as he advanced to the southward. Moorar Rao Ghorepuray, as Jagheerdar of Gooty, the Raja of Mysore, the Nabobs of Kurpa, Kurnoul, and Savanoor, and Mohummud Ally, second son of the late Anwar-ud-deen, with his supporters, the President and Council of the English settlement at Madras, were the principal authorities who joined, or sent their troops to accompany Nasir Jung.

The Deccan, thus completely drained of troops, presented an inviting field to the Peishwa, but domestic arrangements of the utmost importance demanded his presence at Satara. The Raja

* Khuzanch Amirah, &c.

† Mahratta MSS.

Shao had, for some years, been in a state of mental imbecility,* brought on, it is said, in consequence of the death of his youngest wife, Sagoona Bye Mohitey ; but as his health declined, he recovered the use of his intellect,† and the dependents of the Peishwa about his person urged him to adopt a son. The Raja on the loss of his only child, some time before his derangement, had declared, contrary to all his former invectives against him, that he would adopt Sumbhajee, Raja of Kolapoore, provided he had issue ; but as this was not the case, it was now proposed that he should institute an inquiry for some of the lineal descendants of Wittoojee, the brother of Mallojee, and uncle of Shahjee. Search was accordingly made, but none were discovered ; and it was then suggested to receive the son of some respectable Sillidar, of that Patell family, of which there were a great number. This proposal, however, Shao said he had a strong reason for declining, and at last told Mahadajee Punt Poormadhuree and Govind Rao Chitnees that Tara Bye, who was still alive, and residing in Satara, had somewhere concealed her grandson Rama, the son of the second Sivajee, who was born in 1712, after the death of his father. It is not known by what means Shao became possessed of this secret ; and the subject, intricate in itself, has been so studiously involved in mystery as to excite a suspicion that the Peishwa was con-

* He was for some time afflicted with that harmless silly madness, which is sometimes ludicrous, even whilst it excites commiseration. It first appeared, on an occasion when he had to receive a visit from two Mahratta surdars in full durbar, by his dressing out his favourite dog in gold brocade, covered with jewels, and putting his own turban on the dog. He never resumed any covering for his head after he recovered his senses. This dog had once saved his life when hunting a tiger, and amongst other freaks, he issued summons conferring a Jagheer upon him, and entitling him to use a palanquin, in all which the Raja was humoured, and the palanquin establishment literally kept up.

† Shao had some wit, and his reply to a letter received about this time from Raja Jey Sing, of Jeypoor, shows that he retained it to the last. The Raja asks what he had performed for the Hindoo faith, and what charities he had bestowed ; " I have," replies Shao, " conquered from the Mussulmans the whole country from Rameshwur to Delhi, and I have given it to the Bramins."

vinced of the legitimacy of Ram Raja, and found it necessary for the purpose of rendering him insignificant, to invent or at least to connive at the insinuation, that the whole was a trick of state. Tara Bye, on hearing of the intended adoption of Sumbhajee of Kolapoor, was heard to say, "I will prevent that;" and on being now closely questioned and encouraged declared the existence of her grandson. The eldest surviving wife of Shao, Suckwar Bye Sirkay, true to the inherent violence and ambition of her family, on becoming acquainted with this declaration on the part of Tara Bye, which deprived her of all chance of the power she expected, by seeing a minor placed on the throne under her own care, immediately opened a communication with Sumbhajee, inciting him to oppose the pretensions of the alleged grandson of Tara Bye, whom she declared an impostor. She promised to aid Sumbhajee with her utmost means; she engaged Yemmajee Sewdeo in her cause, and Jug Jeewun, the younger brother of Sreeput Rao, who had been appointed Pritee Needhee, on the death of the latter in 1747, also promised her all the support in his power. Dunmajee Gaekwar gave his assent to the proposal, and emissaries were dispatched into the Ghant Mahta and Concan, a tract ever prone to insurrection, to raise men and be prepared for her purpose. Ballajee Bajee Rao repaired to Satara, with an army of thirty-five thousand men; but so cautious was he of committing any act which might outrage the Mahratta feeling, already jealous of Brahm power, that he did not attempt to separate Suckwar Bye from her husband, or to impose any restraint likely to arouse the active enmity of her relations. But although he knew the extent of her plots, and was also aware that Suckwar Bye had a plan to assassinate him, he was at the same time suspicious of Tara Bye; and the known enmity of the latter to Ballajee Bajee Rao is indeed the principal evidence of the truth of her extraordinary story. The pregnancy of Bhowanee Bye, the wife of the second Sivajec, was strongly suspected by Rajis Bye, the younger wife of Raja Ram, at the time of Sivajee's death, and it required all the care and circumspection of Tara Bye to preserve the infant from destruction. She, however, found means to convey the child from the fort of Panalla, and having given him in

charge to the sister of Bhowanee Bye, he was carried to Tooljapoore, and thence to Barsee, where he was reared in obscurity.

The Peishwa was at a loss what to do, and during three months spent at Satara before the Raja's death he was alternately swayed by ambition and apprehension : he sometimes thought of at once asserting his supremacy, by setting aside the Raja entirely,* but on the whole he considered it most expedient to support the assertion of Tara Bye ; yet, although he was scrupulous in every outward form of respect towards the prince whom he acknowledged, he was not afterwards desirous of suppressing a current report at Poona, already alluded to, of the whole being fictitious. When the power of the Peishwa was complete, and the end answered, such a pageant as the Raja was in some respects inconvenient to the usurper, and to countenance a belief of the imposture was the first step to his being wholly set aside, but the voice of the country was too strong, and an heir of the house of Sivajeo would have been joined by thousands in the tract where that chieftain first established himself.

Suckwar Bye, in order to conceal her plot, always gave out that in the event of Shao's death she would burn with the corpse ; this declaration proved her ruin, for the wily Branim affected to believe it ; and took care to circulate the report, until it became so general that its non-fulfilment would, in the eyes of the whole country, have become a reflection on the honour of her family.

Although Suckwar Bye seldom quitted the Raja, and kept him constantly surrounded by persons in her interest, Ballajee found means to obtain a private interview, at which he induced

* The following letter from Sewdashee Chimnajee to the Peishwa recommends his usurping the power at once. After compliments,—“ It seems impossible to judge of what will be the result of all this. The Bye's doings are not to be depended upon ; keep continually on your guard. The Bye is not a person to blunder in that which she sets about. Let nothing induce you to act contrary to what has hitherto been professed, or let anything appear respecting your intentions ; but in the event of the Raja's decease, you must take the upper hand of all. Whilst the Raja is in existence, do not allow so much as a grain of oil seed to appear different in your conduct. As matters proceed continue to write to me constantly. Despatched 16th Shuwal.”

the Raja to give him a deed, empowering the Peishwa to manage the whole government of the Mahratta empire, on condition of his perpetuating the Raja's name, and keeping up the dignity of the house of Sivajee, through the grandson of Tara Bye, and his descendants. This paper also directed that the Kolapoore state should always be considered an independent sovereignty; that the Jagheers, as now existing, were to be confirmed to the holders, leaving power with the Peishwa to conclude such arrangements with the Jagheerdars as might be beneficial for extending Hindoo power;* for protecting the temples of the gods, the cultivators of the fields, and whatsoever was sacred or useful.

The Raja had scarcely ceased to breathe when a body of horse galloped into the town of Satara, surrounded and seized the Pritee Needhee, and his Mootaliq Yemmajee Sewdeo; placed them in irons on the instant, and sent them off, strongly escorted, to distant hill forts. Every avenue about the town was occupied by troops, and a garrison of the Peishwa's was placed in the fort, whilst a party was detached to reinforce the escort of Ram Raja who had not arrived when Shao died.

Suckwar Bye had not recovered from the first emotions of consternation and rage at finding her whole plans unmasked and defeated, when the Peishwa sent her an insidious message, "begging that she would not think of burning with the corpse of her husband, for that he and all her servants were ready to obey her commands;" and not content with working on the mind of an angry woman, to incite her to self-destruction, he sent for her brother Koarjee Sirkay, represented the dishonour that threatened to attach to his house, and promised him a Jagheer in the Concan, on condition of persuading his sister to immolate herself, "not only for the honour of the family of Sirkay, but for that of all India, under the sway of the late Raja." By such arts Ballajee Bajee Rao secured his victim. But let not the reader suppose that those of his own countrymen, who know the secret history of this base transaction, and

* This of course, if once admitted, gave the Peishwa, as the Raja's delegate, entire power over many of the Jagheerdars, and in every instance of succession the right of investing the new Jagheerdar,

whose minds have not been perverted by the calm villainy of a Bramin court, attempt to palliate it, as a sacrifice in conformity with their faith; on the contrary, they mention it with much detestation, and say that even the ordinary mode of execution would have been far more manly and far less objectionable.

CHAP. II.

FROM A. D. 1750 TO A. D. 1751.

The Peishwa secures Rughojee Bhonslay in his interest.—Poona becomes the capital of the Mahrattas.—Arrangements made by the Peishwa on the will of the late Raja.—Insurrection of Yemmajee Sewdeo—suppressed by Sewdasheo Rao Bhow.—Agreement of Sangola between the Raja and the Peishwa.—A difference arises between the Peishwa and Sewdasheo Rao Bhow.—Origin and progress of Ramchundur Baba Shenwee.—The Peishwa supports Ghazee-ul-deen, the eldest son of Nizam Ool Mook.—Death and character of Nasir Jung.—Muzaffir Jung, supported by the French, assumes the riceroyalty of the Deccan.—Rise of Raja Rugonath Dass and Hyder Jung.—Death of Muzaffir Jung.—Elevation of Sulabut Jung.—The Peishwa, for the purpose of opposing Sulabut Jung and M. Bussy, proceeds to the Kistna, but is suddenly recalled to Satara, in consequence of an attempt to supersede his authority on the part of Tara Bye, supported by Dummajee Gaekwar.—Gaekwar circumvented;—treacherously seized and imprisoned.—Tara Bye retains possession of the Fort.—Rigid captivity of the Raja.—Peishwa attacks Sulabut Jung.—War carried into the Mahratta country.—Moghul army, directed by Bussy, penetrates as far as Korygaom on the Beema.—Negotiation broken off:—renewed.—Armistice concluded.—Raja Rugonath Dass assassinated.—Successful operations of Rughojee Bhonslay.—Death of Meer Hubeeb.—Affairs at the Imperial court.—Abdaltee —Rohillas.—Holkar and Sindia called in by the Nubob of Oude to assist in subduing the Rohillas:—conquest effected.—Holkar recalled to the Deccan:—his march suspended.—Approach of the Abdallee.—Mahrattas evacuate the Rohilla territory.—Mooltan and Lahore ceded to the Abdallee.—Ghazee-ul-deen, accompanied by Sindia and Holkar, commences his march for the Deccan.—Proceedings of Sulabut Jung.—Syud Lushkur Khan and Shah Nuwiz Khan brought into power.—Arrival of Ghazee-ul-deen at Aurungabad.—Extensive cessions granted by him to the Peishwa.—Ghazee-ul-deen is poisoned.—Sulabut Jung confirms the cessions made to the Peishwa.—Intrigues of Syud Lushkur Khan against the French.—Cessions made to the French for the support of their subsidiary force.—Affairs at Satara.—Expedition into the Carnatic and Guzerat.—History of Guzerat from the year 1735 until the capture of Ahmedabad in 1755.—Rugonath Rao proceeds to Hindooostan, and returns to Poona in the ensuing year.—The Peishwa sends another expedition into the Carnatic.—Death of Rughojee Bhonslay,—his sons.

e.—Janojee succeeds as Sena Sahib Soobch.—Affairs accommodated between the Peishwa and Tara Bye.—Progress of Janojee Bhonslay.—Affairs at Delhi.—Meer Shahaboden, son of the late Ghazee-ud-deen—his rise and progress at the imperial court—his unprincipled conduct;—calls in the aid of the Mahrattas;—is appointed Vizier—deposes the Emperor,—deprives him of sight,—and raises Jehanular Shah to the Throne.

PREVIOUSLY to Shao's demise, orders in his name had been sent to Yeswunt Rao Dhabaray and Rughoojee Bhonslay, requiring their presence at Satara. The former had become totally imbecile from habits of debauchery, and, as had probably been

A. D. 1750. foreseen, neither Dhabaray nor Dummajee Gaekwar, the commander of his army, attended. Most of the other Jagheerdars were present, but if any were disposed to resist the Peishwa's authority, they remained passive, until they should see what part Rughoojee Bhonslay would assume. But Rughoojee's ambition was now controlled by the caution of age, and the admonition of experience. He was not only intent on directing annual incursions into Bengal, but owing to the absence of his son Janojee, who accompanied Nasir Jung into the Carnatic, with ten thousand horse, and to the number of troops which he was compelled to leave in his own territories, he arrived at Satara in the month of January, 1750, with a force only estimated at 12,000 men. His disposition was pacific towards the Peishwa, but he made some demur in acknowledging Ram Raja. He required, in testimony of his being a Bhonslay, and the grandson of Raja Ram, that Tara Bye should first eat with him in presence of the east, depositing on the food they ate together, that Ram Raja was her grandson. On this being complied with in the most solemn manner, Rughoojee declared himself satisfied; and after a long conference with the Peishwa he gave his assent to the propriety of the plans submitted for his consideration. As a proof of the good understanding which subsisted between them, Ballajee took occasion to proceed in advance to Poona, leaving the Raja in Rughoojee's charge, and requesting that he would accompany him to Poona, with the whole of the Jagheerdars, for the purpose of concluding the arrangements made by the will of the late Raja. From this period Poona may be considered the capital of the Mahrattas.

Ballajee, in the success of his schemes, almost overlooked Tara Bye ; but although upwards of seventy years of age, she soon convinced him that it was dangerous to slight a woman of her spirit. On pretence of paying her devotions at the tomb erected over her husband's ashes, in the fort of Singurh, she went there, and endeavoured to persuade the Punt Suchew to declare for her as head of the Mahratta empire. Ballajee, after much persuasion, induced her to come to Poona, and having flattered her ambition with the hope of having a large share in the administration, at last obtained her influence with Ram Raja in confirming the many schemes he had now to carry into effect.

Rughoojee Bhonslay received new sunnuds for Berar, Gondwaneh, and Bengal ; and some Jagheer lands which had belonged to the Pritee Needhee, adjoining Berar, were transferred to him. The sunnuds for half of Guzerat were sent to Yeswunt Rao Dhabaray, which, as he had never yet accounted for a share of the revenue to the state, gave Dummajee Gaekwar to understand what he might expect from the increasing power of the Peishwa. Ranoojee Sindia died* about this period, and his eldest son Jyapa was confirmed in his Jagheer. The whole of Malwa, estimated at about one hundred and fifty lakhs of rupees of annual revenue, was, with the exception of about ten lakhs, divided between Holkar and Sindia ; that is, seventy-four and a half lakhs were conferred on the former, and sixty-five and a half lakhs on the latter. The remaining ten lakhs were held by various Jagheerdars, of whom Anund Rao Powar was the most considerable : all of them were subservient to the views of the Peishwa, and from them he had to apprehend no opposition.

Ballajee Rao, without intending to employ them, confirmed the eight Purdhans, and for a short time nominated Gungadlur Sree Newass as Pritee Needhee ; but, on the application of Rughoojee Bhonslay and of some other Jagheerdars, when

* I have not been able to ascertain the date of Ranoojee Sindia's death. By a history of Sindia's family, procured for me by Major Robert Close, the resident envoy with Doulut Rao Sindia, it appears that the event happened at Shujahalpoor, but the date is not recorded.

about to return to their respective districts, he made them a promise to release Jugjeewun Pureshram, and did accordingly restore him to his rank and liberty. But, as the Raja's establishment was to be much reduced, and it was necessary to secure in his interests such of his officers as he could not employ, the Peishwa reserved a great part of the Pritee Needhee's lands as Jagheers and assignments to the persons in question, particularly the tract west of Kurar, between the Oormooree and the Warna, where he apprehended an insurrection supported by the Raja of Kolapoore.

Futih Sing Bhonslay, the adopted son of Shao, was confirmed in the possession of his Jagheer in various minor claims on shares of revenue, and in the title of Raja of Akulkote, which, except the detached claims alluded to, are still enjoyed by his descendants. An appointment created by Shao for a relation of the Muntree, and which was termed *Ajahut Surdeshmookh*, or general agent for collecting the surdeshmookhee, was nominally preserved ; but Jagheer lands were assigned in lieu of the right of interference, in the collections of the ten per cent., on the six soobehs of the Deccan.

The appointment of Sur-Lushikur was taken from the family of Somwoushee, and given to Nimbajee Naik Nimbalkur. All these changes and appointments were made in name of the Raja, but it was now well understood that the Peishwa's authority was supreme in the state, and generally admitted without dissatisfaction.

But Yemmajee Sewdeo, who recovered his liberty at the same time with the Pritee Needhee, threw himself into the fort of Sangola, near Punderpoor, where he raised an insurrection, and made head against the Peishwa, until suppressed by Sewdasheo Chimmajee Bhow.

The Peishwa, in the measures which have been detailed, owed much of his success to his Dewan Mahadajee Punt, who, next to his cousin Sewdasheo Rao, possessed greater influence over Ballajee Bajec Rao than any other person. Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, on his expedition to Sangola, was accompanied by Ram Raja, for the purpose of giving Yemmajee Sewdeon no excuse for resistance ; and during their stay at that place, the Raja

agreed to renounce the entire power, and to lend his sanction to whatever measures the Peishwa might pursue, provided a small tract around Satara was assigned to his own management ; conditions to which Ballajee Rao subscribed, but they were never fulfilled. The Raja, under a strong escort, returned from Sangola to Satara, when an extraordinary difference arose between the Peishwa and his cousin Sewdasheo Rao, which had well nigh overturned the whole of the plan which Ballajee Rao had been labouring to establish.

Sewdasheo Rao had at this time connected himself with Ramehundur Baba Shenwee, a person to whom, although his conduct was extremely exceptionable, especially in the manner by which he obtained power, the Mahratta country is much indebted. This person, originally known by the name of Ramchundur Mulhar,* was Koolkurnee of the village of Aroolee subject to the Sawunts of Waree, from whose power he was obliged to flee as a defaulter in the revenues of his village. He came to Satara, where he was taken into the service of Kucheswur Baba Uteekur, and by him recommended to Bajee Rao, under whom he distinguished himself, both as a soldier and a man of business. Bajee Rao appointed him Dewan to Ranoojee Sindia, and it partly accounts for Ranoojee's proverbial poverty, that Ramchundur made a large fortune. At Ranoojee's death he bribed Sewdasheo Rao Bhow in hopes of being continued, by his interest, as the Dewan of Jyapa ; but as Jyapa disliked him, and Mulhar Rao Holkar opposed the arrangement, the Peishwa removed him from the situation. This circumstance, trifling as it appears, was the seed from which sprung much mischief. It was the foundation of enmity between Holkar and the Bhow, and between Ramchundur and the Peishwa. Sewdasheo Rao appointed Ramchundur his own Dewan, and at his suggestion applied to the Peishwa for the same share of authority as had been held by his father, Chim-

* When Bramins rise in the world they generally drop their father's name, unless they were very great men. For instance, Sewdasheo Chimnajee, had his father been a person of no note, would have styled himself Sewdasheo Punt ; Rumchundur dropped his father's name, Mulhar, when he became a great man.

Ballajee Appa. Ballajee refused, as it must occasion the supersession of Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, to whom he owed innumerable obligations. On which, Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, after his expedition to Sangola, made overtures to the Kolapooree Raja, was appointed his Peishwa, and obtained the cession of three forts, Pargurh, Knllanidhree, and Chundgurhree, together with a Jagheer of five thousand rupees a year. A war was prevented by the admirable conduct of Mahadajee Punt, who voluntarily resigned his situation, and Sewdasheo Rao, quitting his Peishwaship at Kolapooree, returned as prime minister to Poona.

The arrangements before and consequent to the Raja's death had, as already adverted to, prevented the Mahrattas from seizing an opportunity of enlarging their conquests in the Deccan, afforded by the absence of so great an army in the Carnatic. A negotiation with Ballajee Rao had been opened by Ghazee-ud-deen, the eldest son of Nizam Ool Mook, through Mulhar Rao Holkar. The Peishwa agreed to support his pretensions, and wrote to the Emperor, Ahmed Shah, requesting that Ghazec-ud-deen might be appointed Viceroy, assigning as a reason that the whole Deccan, from the absence of the army and the disorders in the Carnatic, would soon be overrun by independent plunderers.* In the meantime the Peishwa having prepared his troops moved towards Aurungabad, but before quitting Poona he prevailed on the Punt Suchew to give him the fort of Singurh in exchange for Toong and Tikona, and in order to soothe Tara Bye, whose great age had not rendered her less active and intriguing, he incautiously removed his own troops from the fort of Satara, and, having placed in it the Gurhkurees and old retainers, who had great respect for the widow of Raja Ram, gave up the entire management to her. The Raja was kept with a separate establishment in the town of Satara, but perfectly at large, and a splendid provision was assigned to him and his officers, the expence of which amounted to the annual sum of sixty-five lakhs of rupees.†

About the time that Ballajee Bajee Rao was summoned to Satara on account of Shao's illness, Nasir Jung proceeded on

* Mahratta MSS.

† Mahratta MSS.

the well known Carnatic expedition, which ended so disastrously for that prince. Moorar Rao Ghorepuray and some other Mahrattas continued in the Carnatic Payeen Ghant ; but Janojee Bhonslay, Rughoojee's son, left the army, either upon the defeat of Muzuffir Khan in March, 1750, or with Shah Nawaz Khan, who quitted Sulabut Jung, and repaired to Aurungabad during the siege of Kurnoul,* in March, 1751. The fall of Nasir Jung was wrought by the intrigues of M. Dupleix. He gained a Bramin, named Ramdass, a native of Sicacole, in the confidence of Nasir Jung, and through him raised seditions in the army, which Dupleix called into operation by an attack on the camp. Nasir Jung was treacherously shot on the 5th December, 1750, by Mohummud Khan, the Patan Nabob of Kurpa, one of the conspirators. Nasir Jung was totally destitute of his father's prudence, and if successful in his fortunes would probably have sunk into a Mahomedan sensualist ; but he was, in some respects, a superior person, and with a better education in a European country he had many of the qualities to form the gallant knight and the accomplished gentleman. He possessed bravery and generosity, a taste for poetry and literature, and as he came to an untimely end, his memory is cherished by the Deccan Moghuls, to whom he is known partly by his own writings, but principally from the works of his friend Meer Gholam Ally of Belgram.

Muzuffir Jung assumed the viceroyalty of the six soobehs of the Deccan by aid of his allies, the French. The traitor Ramdass, a fit instrument for the unprincipled ambition of Dupleix, was raised to the situation of prime minister, by the title of Raja Rugonath Dass. Nor must we omit to mention Abdool Rehman, the Dewan of Monsieur Bussy, better known by his title of Hyder Jung. The father of this man, a defaulter of revenue under the Nizam's government at Masulipatam, had, on several occasions, when in power, been friendly to the French, and in his distress fled to Pondicherry, where he was protected and treated with much kindness by Dupleix. His son Abdool Rehman, then a boy, soon acquired the French language, was useful to Dupleix in carrying on his intrigues with

* Khuzaneh Amirah, Suroo Azad, and Mahratta MSS.

Ramdass ; and upon the success of them accompanied Bussy when he marched with Muzuffir Jung : he was soon styled the French Dewan, and received, from the new made Nabob, the title of Hyder Jung. But the Patan Nabobs, dissatisfied at not receiving all they had expected by the death of his predecessor,

A. D. 1751. conspired against Muzuffir Jung, who, although victorious, fell in action in the end of January, 1751. Sulabut Jung, third son of Nizam Ool Mook, was chosen to succeed him.

Ballajee Bajee Rao, on the plea of requiring money to assist his ally, Ghazee-ud-deen, demanded a contribution from Syud Lushkur Khan,* then Governor of Aurungabad, the secret friend of Ghazee-ud-deen, which, on pretence of coercion, Syud Lushkur Khan levied to the amount of fifteen lakhs of rupees. On obtaining this supply, the Peishwa proceeded to the banks of the Kistna, in order to oppose Sulabut Jung, who, attended by the French corps under Monsieur Bussy, was advancing towards Hyderabad. The armies had scarcely come in sight of each other, when news from Satara, of an alarming nature, was received by the Peishwa, in consequence of which he closed with the first overtures made by Sulabut Jung, and returned to the westward with the utmost expedition.†

Tara Bye, when the Peishwa departed to Aurungabad, sounded Ram Raja, in regard to his assuming the control usurped by his servant Ballajee Bajee Rao, but not finding him fit for her purpose, she pretended to have had no serious intentions in the proposal, but despatched messengers to Dummajee Gaekwar, representing the unprotected state of the country, and recommending his immediate march to Satara, to rescue the Raja and the Mahratta state from the power of the Bramins. This request was immediately acceded to, and Tara Bye, as soon as certain accounts were received of Gaekwar's approach, invited the Raja into the fort of Satara, and made him prisoner. She then reproached him with his want of spirit; regretted that "she had ever rescued him from a life of obscurity, for which only he could have been destined; declared that he

* —— or Rookun-ud-dowlah.

† Mahratta MSS. Orme, Khuzanch Amirah, &c.

could not be her grandson, or the descendant of the great Sivajee; that he was neither a Bhonslay, nor a Mohitey, but a base born Gonedulae,* changed in the house where he had been first conveyed; that she would make atonement on the banks of the holy Kistna for ever having acknowledged him." She ordered the havildar to fire upon his attendants, most of whom, unconscious of what had happened, remained near the gate of the fort; and she directed the guns to be pointed at the houses in the town below, belonging to the partizans of the Coneanee Bramins. Trimbuck Punt, commonly called Nana Poorundhuree, Govind Rao Chitnees, and the officers in the Peishwa's interests at Satara, were at first disposed to ridicule this attempt as that of a mad old woman, but on hearing of the approach of Dummajee Gaekwar, from Sonegurh, they quitted the town, and assembled troops at the village of Arla, on the banks of the Kistna. On the advance of Gaekwar by the Salpee Ghaut, although they had twenty thousand, and their opponent only fifteen thousand men, they made an irresolute attack, and retired to Neemb, where they were next day followed up, attacked, and defeated, by the Guzerat troops. Dummajee Gaekwar immediately went to pay his respects to Tara Bye; and several forts in the neighbourhood were given up to her. Satara was well stored with provisions, and the Prittee Needhee promised to aid her cause. It was the intelligence of these proceedings which recalled the Peishwa; but before he returned, Nana Poorundhuree had redeemed his lost credit, by attacking and compelling the army of Dummajeo Gaekwar to retire to Jore Khora, where they expected to be joined by the Pritee Needhee from Kurar, and by troops from Guzerat. In this hope, however, they were disappointed; and as Shunkrajee Punt, Soobehdar of the Concan, was assembling troops in their rear, whilst the Peishwa's army, which had marched nearly four hundred miles in thirteen days, was close upon them, Dummajee sent a messenger to treat with Ballajee, who solemnly agreed to abide by the terms proposed, and enticed him to encamp in his neighbourhood, where, as soon as he got

* Gonedulaes are a low cast of musicians, in the house of one of whom Raja Ram had been first concealed.

him into his power, he demanded the payment of all the arrears due from Guzerat, and the cession of a large portion of his territory. Dummajee represented that he was but the Mootaliq of Dhabaray, the Senaputtee, and had no authority for complying with what was required. On this reply the Peishwa sent private orders to seize some of the family of Gackwar and of Dhabaray, residing at Tullygaom, and imprison them in the hill fort of Loghur; whilst, at a set time, he treacherously surrounded, attacked, and plundered the camp of Dummajee Gackwar, and sent him into confinement in the city of Poona.* The Peishwa next tried to induce Tara Bye to give up the fort and the Raja; but having assembled her garrison, she required an oath from every man that he would stand by her to the last; such of them, however, as chose were allowed the option of quitting the fort or joining in the solemn asseveration. Some of the Peishwa's troops became impressed with an idea that she was a Deo (or good spirit), and others that she was a Dyt (or evil spirit), but all the Mahrattas were so strongly of opinion that Tara Bye was the rightful regent, that Ballajee found there was more to be apprehended from proceeding to extremities than leaving her unmolested; although her party, to become formidable, only required a leader of reputation. Perplexing as the affair was, in the mean time, the conduct of Tara Bye proved in the end advantageous to the Peishwa, as it took from him the odium of being the first to confine the Raja to the fort of Satara. Tara Bye did not merely confine him to the fort; his prison, which still exists, was a damp stone dungeon, and his food was of the coarsest grain.

Dummajee Gackwar was the only person whom the Peishwa dreaded; but as he was a close prisoner at Poona, Ballajee now proceeded towards Aurungabad, in prosecution of his engagements with Ghazee-ul-deen, and wherever Sulabut Jung's authority was acknowledged, he carried on the usual Mahratta plan of contribution or plunder. Monsieur Bussy, who was the principal adviser in directing the movements of the

* In consequence of this treachery it is said that Dummajee ever after refused to salute the Peishwa, except with his left hand.

Moghul army, was himself at the head of a battalion of five hundred Europeans, and a body of five thousand disciplined Sepoys, and, as the best means of repelling these aggressions, recommended that the war should be carried into the Mahratta country. Sulabut Jung advanced accordingly to Ahmednugur, where he deposited his heavy stores and baggage, whilst Raja Rugonath Dass, his prime minister, opened a communication with Tara Bye,* and also with Sumbhajee, Raja of Kolapoort.† The Peishwa and his officers were not prepared for this unexpected plan of operations, and were proportionally disconcerted on finding their own schemes anticipated. They had intended, by supporting Ghazee-ud-deen or Sulabut Jung, according to circumstances, to weaken both ; to conquer the whole Deccan ; or to obtain large cessions, which, they foresaw, must at all events be granted to them by the one party or the other. To repel Sulabut Jung they had recourse to the Mahratta system, and with forty thousand horse surrounded and attacked the Moghul army in their usual desultory manner ; but the French artillery, consisting of eight or ten field pieces, galled them severely, and the Moghuls, supported by this powerful auxiliary, advanced towards Poona, totally destroying every village in their route. The Peishwa alarmed at their progress endeavoured to negotiate ; and, at the same time, to augment dissension and jealousy, which had already become considerable among Sulabut Jung's officers, in regard to the views of the French. Monsieur Bussy, as the best means of counter-acting such schemes, and securing his influence, exerted himself with judgment and energy. On one occasion he planned an attack on the Mahratta camp, and chose the night of the 22nd November, at the moment of an eclipse of the moon, when the Hindoos are employed in devotional exercises. The whole Mahratta army fled before him, and some valuable booty was taken, particularly some gold utensils belonging to the Peishwa. This exploit, although the Mahrattas sustained

* Original letter from a spy in the service of Tara Bye, to Govind Rao Chitnees.

† Copy of original letter to the Raja of Kolapoort.

very little loss,* made a great impression, and had, perhaps, more effect in raising the reputation of Bussy amongst the natives of India, than affairs of moment, where he displayed much ability and decision.

The Mahrattas, although surprised, appeared in the course of the ensuing day as active as ever, but the Moghuls continued to advance, plundered Ranjangaon, and totally destroyed Tullygaon (Dumdairey). At last, on the 27th November, they were attacked by the Mahrattas in the most determined manner, and nothing but the French artillery prevented a total defeat. The Mahrattas on this occasion were led by Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, the late Dewan, supported by two of the sons of Ranojee Sindia, Duttajee and Mahadajee, and Koneir Trimbuck Yekbootee. The last mentioned person performed feats of valour, obtained the distinguishing appellation of Phakray, or the heroic, and from that day bore a silver bangle on his horse's leg, which, among Mahrattas, implies that the rider is always to conquer or die.† This success did not prevent the advance of the Moghuls, but on their arrival at Korygaon, on the Beema, a spot which was afterwards to become so famous to the British arms, Raja Rugonath Dass, in consequence of overtures from the Peishwa, had an interview with Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, and an armistice would have taken place, but news arrived that one of the Mahratta officers had surprised the fort of Trimbuck, which

* The Mahratta army was encamped at Rajapore, on the bank of a river which I am inclined to think is Rajapoor on the Ghore river, not far from the spot which was long a cantonment of the Bombay army. Only one man of any consequence was wounded, Baboo Rao, the son of Rammajee Punt Mahdoobhanoo, by a cannon ball in the foot; from this circumstance, and the Mahrattas not having suffered materially, it is evident that their account is correct, and that the surprise was incomplete; if the French had got close they would have used grape or cannister, which, independent of the still more destructive musquetry, would have told both on the men and horses.

† This Koneir Trimbuck afterwards led the assault at Hooly Onore and escaped, but was shot through the head when standing with Sewdasheo Chimnajee Bhow, in Monsieur Bussy's batteries, before Savanoor, in May 1756. His relations were handsomely provided for by Jagheer assignments.

the Peishwa refused to restore, and Sulabut Jung insisted on immediately proceeding to retake it. The Moghul army returned to Ahmednugur to replenish their ammunition, and

A. D. 1752. take on their battering guns. They moved

towards Joonere, but the Mahrattas constantly harassed them : accounts of difficulties of the road for transporting their guns, and intelligence of Rughoojee Bhonslay's progress to the eastward, conspired, with other circumstances, to damp the hasty and short-lived ardour of Sulabut Jung. His troops were in arrears, and clamorous for their pay, and the more their services were required the more urgent they became : many of the principal officers were discontented, and it was at last determined, by Bussy's advice, to close with the Peishwa's overtures. An armistice was concluded, and the army of Sulabut Jung returned towards Hyderabad. But the symptoms of disaffection did not cease, Rungonath Dass, the Dewan, was assassinated at Balkee, on the 7th April, in a tumult, apparently created by the soldiery on account of their arrears.

But whilst these events were passing in the west, the experienced Rughoojee, whose operations have been alluded to, was engaged in making those acquisitions which closed his long and active life, with great reputation among his countrymen. His anxiety to return from Poona towards Berar in 1750 was owing to apprehended commotions in his own territory, and to his desire of seizing what he deemed a favourable conjuncture for prosecuting his views. His son Janojee, having returned from the army of Nasir Jung, was sent into Kuttack, to support Meer Hubeeb, and invade Bengal. That province had been freed from Mahratta ravages for a whole year, but they now returned with a keener desire to possess themselves of its resources ; and Aliverdy Khan, seeing no other relief, ceded the whole of the province of Kuttack, as far

A. D. 1751. north as Ballasore, which was granted in name of Meer Hubeeb, as the nominal deputy of the Nabob of Bengal, but as the real servant of Rughoojee Bhonslay. Meer Hubeeb did not long enjoy the situation thus acquired. Owing to the jealousy of his coadjutor, Janojee, he was, on pretence of having withheld balances of revenue,

confin'd until he should render an account, but unable to brook the disgrace, he rushed out with a few followers upon the guards placed over him, and was cut to pieces. Twelve lakhs of rupees in lieu of further claims was the amount which was settled for the chouth of Bengal and Bahar; but the reason of Rughoojee's accepting a sum so inadequate is found in the events which were passing in the Deccan. As soon as the Peishwa and Sulabut Jung went to war, Rughoojee surprised and took Gawelgurh and Nurnallah, made himself master of Manikdroog; occupied the districts dependent on these forts; and whilst Sulabut Jung, by Bussy's advice, advanced towards Poona, Rughoojee not only laid the whole country between the Payn Gunga and Godavery, under contribution,* but drove out the Moghul thannas, and established his own.

Before the succeeding events in the Deccan can be explained, it becomes necessary to revert to the eldest son of Nizam Ool Mook and to those affairs of the Imperial court in which the Mahrattas were engaged. Ghazee-ud-deen Khan, although desirous of proceeding to the Deccan, had been detained at Delhi since the death of his father, and it seems probable, from his commencing the negotiation with the Mahrattas, that bribes may have been employed by his brothers to insure his

A. D. 1718. being kept there. The Imperial court soon

after the accession of Ahmed Shah was subjected to a fresh alarm, by intelligence of the return of Ahmed Shah Abdallee, towards Lahore, of which, as well as of the province of Mooltan, Meer Munnoo, son of the late Vizier, Kunimurud-deen Khan, was Governor. Meer Munnoo purchased the forbearance of the Abdallee, by the cession of the revenues of four districts; and this expedient left the Vizier, Sufdur Jung, at liberty to follow up certain schemes, which he had in progress against the Rohillas. The growing power and encroachments of these adventurers excited the Vizier's particular jealousy, as they threatened to extend themselves over his own territories in the province of Oude. The death of Ali Mohummud Rohillah, which happened a short time before Sufdur Jung's appointment as Vizier, had afforded him

* Mahratta MSS.

an opportunity of raising dissensions amongst those who pretended to the succession, and, during the period when Ahmed Shah Abdallee threatened Lahore, civil war raged amongst the Rohillas.* At last, Sadoollah Khan, the third son of Ali Mohummud, by the abilities of Hafiz Rehmut, his guardian, became the successful competitor, and although his two elder brothers, who during the struggle were prisoners amongst the Abdallee, afterwards returned to claim their inheritance, Sadoollah Khan, whilst supported by Hafiz Rehmut, maintained the ascendancy he had gained.† But Suflur Jung, as soon as apprehensions from the Abdallee were tranquillized, marched into Rohilkund, reduced the territory to temporary obedience, and appointed one of his dependents, a Kaeeth, named Newul Raee, to be governor of his new conquests ; the Rohillas, however, soon rose upon Newul Raee, whom they defeated and slew. Sufdur Jung proceeding to punish their rebellion was also totally defeated, and therefore called to his aid Mulhar Rao Holkar, Jyapa Sindia, and the Jath Prince, Sooruj Mull. With these auxiliaries he soon overran the country of the Rohillas, forced most of them to seek refuge in the Kumaoon hills, and gave up the greater part of their territory as assignments, in lieu of subsidy, to Holkar and Sindia.‡ Whilst Mahratta affairs were in this prosperous state in Hindoostan, their capital in the Deccan was, as we have seen, endangered by the advance of Sulabut Jung. Rughnatli Rao, who had proceeded on an expedition to Surat, was recalled ; and Mulhar Rao Holkar received the most pressing letters from the Peishwa, to repair to the Deccan, with or without Ghazee-ud-deen. Holkar, then near the Kumaoon hills, immediately on receipt of these letters, moved to the southward, and had crossed the Ganges, when he was informed by the Vizier, and by news from Delhi, that peace had been concluded in the Deccan. Upon this intelligence Holkar wrote to the Peishwa, stating his readiness to advance to his aid, but that in consequence of these reports he should await further orders.§ In the mean time, the Vizier, Sufdur Jung,

* Seyr Mutuakhhereen. † Forster's Travels. ‡ Seyr Mutuakhhereen.

§ Mahratta MSS. where his letter is given.

was summoned to Delhi, in consequence of another invasion of Ahmed Shah Abdallee, who, on this occasion, made himself master of Mooltan and Lahore ; the entire cession of which was conferred upon him by the Emperor before Sufdur Jung could reach the capital. Had it not been for this precipitate measure the Vizier would have used every endeavour to expel the Abdallee, and had engaged Holkar and Sindia as auxiliaries, by promise of great rewards, the more necessary, as they were obliged to withdraw their troops from the lately assigned districts.*

On this occasion the Mahrattas, before they evacuated the districts, consistent with their usual policy of making the best bargain they can on both sides, are said to have exacted a bond for fifty lakhs of rupees from the subjugated Rohillas.†

When Sufdur Jung arrived in the neighbourhood of the capital, he heard of the irrevocable concession that had been made to the Abdallee, and was therefore at a loss how to employ or compensate his Mahratta auxiliaries;‡ but the Peishwa, who had only concluded an armistice, until a favourable opportunity of breaking it should offer, continued to urge the advance of Holkar and Sindia to his support, and carried on a close intercourse with Ghazee-ud-deen, both through Holkar and his own Wukeels at Delhi.§ It was therefore easy to satisfy all parties, by permitting Ghazee-ud-deen to proceed, accompanied by his Mahratta allies, to try his fortune on that field of adventure, the Deccan.

On the assassination of Raja Rugonath Dass, Sulabut Jung, who was at Hyderabad, sent for Syud Lushkur Khan and Shah Nuwaz Khan, the ablest and most popular men under his government, who were then residing at Aurungabad. Both were inimical to the French, the former secretly, the latter openly ; both, however, had latterly endeavoured to obtain the

* Seyr Mutuakhreem.

† Forster's Travels. The Mahratta MS. in this part merely says that Holkar interceded with the Vizier for the Rohillas, and made peace between them : the writer of a Mahratta MS. would probably leave the article of the bond, or some equivalent, to be understood as a thing of course.

‡ Seyr Mutuakhreem.

§ Mahratta MSS.

good opinion of Bussy, whose influence over Sulabut Jung was already paramount. By Bussy's advice Syud Lushkur Khan was raised to the office of Dewan, and Shah Nuwaz Khan was made Soobehdar of the province of Hyderabad. Syud Lushkur Khan was intimately connected with the Mahrattas, and secretly favoured the cause of Ghazee-ud-deen. When positive accounts reached Sulabut Jung, that Ghazee-ud-deen was on his route to the Deccan, Syud Lushkur Khan had the address to persuade Sulabut Jung and Bussy, that by his resigning his situation as Dewan, and pretending to go over to the Mahrattas, he should be able, from his influence with many of their chiefs, to induce a great number of them, either to join Sulabut Jung, as allies, or to remain neutral in the quarrel. Shah Nuwaz Khan was accordingly appointed to act as Vizier, whilst Syud Lushkur Khan proceeded to the residence of Janojee Nimbalkur at Kurnulla.* On the approach of Ghazee-ud-deen the Peishwa moved towards Burhanpoor. Syud Lushkur Khan and Janojee Nimbalkur had an interview with him, at which Syud Lushkur Khan, as if the envoy of Sulabut Jung, began by stating that his master had received letters from the Emperor, from which it appeared that Ghazee-nd-deen was merely to proceed to Aurungabad, settle the government in his own name, appoint his brother deputy, and return to Delhi. The Peishwa, however, perfectly understood that he intended to join Ghazee-nd-deen, and wished to obtain his support; but, however desirable it might be to have a fit minister at Hyderabad in his own interest, he was sensible of the abilities of Syud Lushkur Khan, and doubtful of what might be his conduct when he obtained power. He, nevertheless, wrote to Ghazee-nd-deen respecting these overtures. The letter was referred to his ministers, Syud Ashkar Khan, and Mohammad Anwar Khan, who dreading Syud Lushkur Khan more as a rival than an enemy, desired the Peishwa to detain both him and Nimbalkur, and bring them on to camp.† When the whole army, joined by the Peishwa,

* Mahratta MSS. and Khuzaneh Amirah.

† Mahratta MSS. Hudeeq-i-alum, Khuzaneh Amirah. Orme.

and the Moghul troops from Burhanpoor, who declared for September 12. Ghazee-ud-deen, arrived in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, it amounted to one hundred and fifty thousand men. Whilst both sides were preparing for the campaign, as soon as the rains subsided, negotiations began on the part of Sulabut Jung; and circumstances appeared, which rendered it as impossible to deny the validity of the elder brother's title from Delhi, as his undoubted claim by priority of birth. In the mean time the Peishwa required, and obtained from Ghazee-ud-deen, in behalf of himself and his officers, the entire cession of the territory west of Berar, from the Taptee to the Godavery.* There seemed to be a prospect of settling the claims of all parties, when Ghazee-nd-deen, in an evil hour, accepted an invitation to an entertainment provided in the city, partook of a poisoned dish prepared by the hands of the mother of Nizam Ally, and expired the same night.†

Sulabut Jung was thus left without a rival, and became desirous of withholding the cessions yielded by his brother to the Mahrattas; but having once admitted the validity of Ghazee-

* Mahratta MSS. Khuzaneh Amirah, &c.

† Mahratta MSS. Mr. Orme following a common but certainly an unnatural supposition, states that he was poisoned by his own mother, a mistake which may perhaps have arisen from not being aware that all Nizam Ool Moolk's sons were by different mothers, except Ghazee-ud-deen and Nasir Jung, who were full brothers. Colonel Wilks mentions that the poison was administered by the mother of Sulabut Jung; and Mr. Mill, without adverting to the relative situations of Aurungabad and the Moghul capital, because the author of the Seyr Mutuakhereen is better informed regarding the affairs of Delhi, and because the murder of Ghazee-ud-deen was favourable to the French, accuses both of patriotic credulity, and rejects the story of the poison. That the fact is not stated in Persian MSS. is easily accounted for; the authors wrote under the government of Nizam Ally, of whose mother, whether true or false, but especially if true, such a story would have cost them their lives. The Seyr Mutuakhereen may be cited as written far beyond the stretch of his power, but its information is avowedly derived from the works of Meer Ghoolam Ally, written in the Deccan.

The author of the Seyr Mutuakhereen, in some extracts regarding the Mahrattas, seemed to me to misunderstand the Khuzaneh Amirah, but as I never saw the entire original of the former, the supposed errors may be those of the translator, not of the author.

ud-deen's appointment, the whole Mahratta power being now collected, supported by Mohummud Anwar Khan, and the Burhanpoor chiefs, whose safety for the time lay in making common cause with Ballajee Row, Bussy saw that it was both consistent and necessary to avoid war, and the alienation of the provinces in question was confirmed by Sulabut Jung, on condition that Rughojee Bhonslay withdrew his garrisons beyond the Payn Gunga, with which he immediately complied.

After peace was thus restored the Mahratta armies proceeded A. D. 1753. to their respective territories, Holkar and Jyapa Sindia to Hindoostan, and the Peishwa to Poona.

Syud Lushkur Khan was reinstated as prime minister, and Sulabut Jung departed for Hyderabad. On the route to that place M. Bussy was taken ill, and was obliged to proceed to Masulipatam, on the sea coast, for the recovery of his health. Syud Lushkur Khan took that opportunity of weaning Sulabut Jung from Bussy's influence, and in the course of a few months artfully detached the French corps, and contrived to carry Sulabut Jung to Aurungabad, preparatory to the entire removal of Europeans from his territory. Bussy's illness was long and severe, but as soon as he could travel he collected his troops and repaired to Aurungabad, where he procured the dismissal of Syud Lushkur Khan, and the appointment of Shah Nuwaz Khan, as minister.

The excuse made for detaching his corps was the difficulty of raising funds, which was obviated for the future, by territorial cessions on the east coast, consisting of Sicacole, Rajamundree, and Ellore.* M. Bussy placed a body of one hundred and fifty Europeans, and two thousand five hundred Sepoys, to protect his new acquisitions, the gross revenue of which was afterwards extravagantly estimated by the French at upwards of thirty millions of rupees.† Bussy farmed the revenues to Vijyaram Raje, a principal Deshmookh, who had recommended himself by his ability. The rent was moderate, enforced without rigour, accurate accounts were prepared, and most of the hereditary officers, if not those possessing rent-free

* Orme. Hudeeq-i-alum, Khuzaneh Amirah.

† Orme.

'lands, were confirmed in their property;—facts which do Bussy and his nation great honour.*

The Peishwa had no sooner made the arrangements immediately necessary for the occupation of the districts ceded to him, and their appropriation amongst the chiefs, than he prepared a large force for an expedition into the Carnatic. The troops of Mysore were engaged as allies of the French, in the well known war of Coromandel, and the period was so favourable for recovering arrears of tribute, that he, on that account, deferred other plans which he had projected on the side of Guzerat. But before he took his departure in person Ballajee endeavoured to pave the way for effecting a compromise with Tara Bye. During his absence at Aurungabad she had occupied the districts of Wacee and Satara, aided by five or six thousand Mahrattas and Ramoosces, whom she had entertained in her service. A large force was therefore sent to invest Satara, and starve her into submission. Anund Rao Jadow, the havildar of the fort, convinced of the folly of resistance, had formed a design of carrying the Raja out of her power, but the circumstances coming to her knowledge, she ordered him to be beheaded, a sentence which the garrison executed on their own commander, as well as on several others subsequently implicated in a like scheme. Baboo Rao Jadow, a person unconnected with the late havildar, and a relation of the Jadows of Sindkheir, was appointed to the command of the fort. The Peishwa, on his way to the Carnatic, sent to assure Tara Bye, that if she would submit, the control of the Raja's person and establishment should remain at her disposal; but to this proposal Tara Bye would not listen, unless Ballajee Bajee Rao would come to Satara, acknowledge her authority, and give such personal assurances as should satisfy her on the subject.

The expedition into the Carnatic was the most profitable, in
A. D. 1751. regard to the recovery of tribute, of any in
which Ballajee Rao had been engaged. When
the Mahrattas proceeded beyond their boundary, to collect

* Grant's Political Analysis. The native historians do not agree with Mr. Grant respecting the French management of the northern circars, but his authority is quite conclusive.

revenue and to make war were synonymous ; whenever a village resisted, its officers were seized and compelled by threats, and sometimes by torture, more or less severe, to come to a settlement ; ready money was seldom obtained, but securities from bankers, with whom all the villages had dealings, were preferable, as they were exchanged by the holders for bills payable in any part of India. When the garrisons of fortified places made an unsuccessful resistance, they were put to the sword. On the present *Moolkgeeree*, (such was the name given to these expeditions,) Hooly Onore was taken by storm, and the Peishwa was bought off from attacking Seringapatam by a sum of money ; whilst professions of attachment and submission, and promises of greater regularity in the future payment of the Mahratta claims, were also tendered on the occasion. Ballajee Rao, content with this success, returned with his cousin Sewdasheo Chimmajee to Poona, in the month of June, and his brother Rungonath Rao, as soon as the rains abated, set off, accompanied by Duttajee Sindia and Sukaram Bappoo, on an expedition to Guzerat.

In regard to the history of that province it has been already mentioned that Nujecm-ud-Dowlah, Momin Khan, was appointed, by an order from the Imperial court, to the charge of its government, on the removal of Abhee Sing, in 1735. Nizam Ool Mook was re-appointed Soobehdar of Guzerat in 1737, when he returned to Delhi ; it proved, however, but an empty honour, as the confusion of the period left nothing but nominal authority to the Emperor in Guzerat. Baroach, which Nizam Ool Mook had assigned to himself as one of the districts of his personal jagheer, when he superseded Hyder Koolee Khan, was held by an officer named Abdoolah Beg, as Foujdar, under the government of Sur Boolund Khan, but when the latter was superseded by Abhee Sing, Abdoolah Beg placed himself under the authority of Nizam Ool Mook, from whom he received the title of Nek Alum Khan, and neither acknowledged Abhee Sing, nor admitted the pretensions of the Mahrattas.

In the mean time Momin Khan had been endeavouring to establish his authority, but the deputy of Abhee Sing, a native

of Marwar, named Ruttun Sing Bhandaree, continued to dispute the possession of Ahmedabad, until at last Dummajee, after making a treaty, and exchanging turbans with Momin Khan, sent a force along with him, under an agent named Rungajee, to expel Ruttun Sing. They were repulsed in an assault, but Ruttun Sing at last capitulated. Rungajee and Momin Khan obtained possession of Ahmedabad, about the 20th of May, 1737, and an equal share of the authority and the revenue was assigned to the Moghuls and the Mahrattas, which, as might have been expected, occasioned constant disputes.

Dummajee continued to levy all the usual Mahratta dues in Guzerat undisputed, and an annual tribute from Kattywar, until the death of Momin Khan, in February, 1743. Abdool Uzeez Khan, then at Aurungabad in the Deccan, was appointed his successor by an imperial firman, and immediately began to raise troops. After he had got together a few thousand men he departed to assume the charge of his new government; passed Surat, and arrived near Baroach; but he was suddenly attacked at Oklaseer by Dummajee, or one of his relations, and his party totally destroyed. Abdool Uzeez Khan was never after heard of, and Futih Yab Khan, the supporter of Nasir Jung's rebellion, was among the killed. Fukhir-ud-Dowlah was then sent from Delhi to take charge of Ahmedabad, in 1744. At that period Dummajee was obliged to repair to Satara, until the dispute with Rughojee Bhonslay and the Peishwa was settled; but a detachment of his troops, under his agent Rungajee, opposed Fukhir-ud-Dowlah, and prevented him from obtaining possession. Khundee Rao Gaekwar, taking advantage of his brother Dummajee's absence, made several important changes, removed Rungajee from Ahmedabad, and appointed an agent of his own in his stead. He also gave some support to Fukhir-ud-Dowlah, but Dummajee speedily returning, dissolved their connection before it proved injurious to the Mahratta cause, by giving up to Khundee Rao the fort of Boorsut, the valuable district of Neriad, and appointing him his deputy at Baroda. Dummajee, by this judicious management, preserved an ascendancy over the numerous members of his own family, which was probably more difficult than

other obstacles in maintaining his power in the province. He would not acknowledge Fukhir-ud-Dowlah, but supported Fidaee-ud-Deen Khan, the brother, and Mohtuffir Khan, the son of his old friend Momin Khan, in the government.

The precise period when Dummajee Gaekwar obtained a share of the revenue and customs of the town and port of Baroach has not been ascertained ; but in 1747, Kedarjee, the cousin of Dummajee, was invited to take a share in disputes among several competitors for authority in Surat, and was by one party promised three lakhs of rupees as the reward of his assistance. He accepted this offer, but the object having been effected without his interference, and the stipulated payment refused, he began to plunder the country in the vicinity. Syud Acheen, the person who had entered on the agreement, having no other means of satisfying him, offered one-third of the revenue of Surat, until the amount should be liquidated, a proposal which Kedarjee, at Dummajee's desire, accepted. Great disturbances continued to prevail in Surat when Dummajee was a prisoner at Poona, and this was one of many reasons which made Dummajee so anxious to procure his liberty. The Peishwa was desirous of effecting a general arrangement in Guzerat ; but before he would listen to Dummajee's overtures, he bound him down by the strongest securities. He fixed a sum of fifteen lakhs of rupees as an acquittance for the amount then due, which was far from immoderate ; but the lenity of the Poona government is accounted for by a bribe of one lakh of rupees, which was paid by Dummajee to Ramchundur Baba Shenwee for himself and his master, Sewdasheo Rao Bhow. The Peishwa also exacted a bond for an equal partition, both of the districts then held by the Gaekwar family in Guzerat, and of all future conquests. Dummajee agreed to give up half the territory, and after deducting his expences, to render a fair account of half the surplus, in all situations where tribute, shares of revenue, contributions, or prize property were realized. Dummajee also engaged to maintain ten thousand horse, and to assist the Peishwa when necessary ; to pay, as the Mootaliq of Dhabaray, Senaputtee, an annual tribute of rupees five lakhs and

twenty-five thousand for his share of the Guzerat province ; to contribute annually a certain sum for the support of the Raja's establishment ; to aid the Peishwa in establishing garrisons in the districts ceded by this agreement ; and finally, to join in enforcing their mutual claims to tribute over the whole peninsula of Guzerat. But, until a convenient period of fulfilling these conditions, Dummajee, though no longer closely confined, was kept a prisoner at large, attended by a guard of Ballajee's confidential troops. *

Of the port of Surat which was still accounted the chief emporium on the west of India, the Peishwa was very desirous of obtaining complete possession, and, at the time of the above agreement with Dummajee, was, as will be hereafter noticed, engaged for that purpose in negotiations with the English, who had views in the same quarter.

In 1751, in hopes of obtaining possession of it without the intervention of allies, Rugonath Rao was sent to Surat, but he was, as has been mentioned, recalled to the Deccan before his object could be effected. His second expedition, which brings us to the period at which we had arrived, was undertaken with the more extensive view of completing those general arrangements, comprehended in the settlement with Dummajee ; whose release appears to have taken place a short time previous† to the march of Rugonath Rao, as he joined him with

* The amount originally paid by Dummajee is invariably stated both in Persian and Mahratta MSS. at upwards of a crore, or ten millions of rupees ; but the above is extracted from the state accounts found at Poona. Besides the annual payment of 5,25,000 rupees, it appears, by these accounts, that Dummajee Gackwar paid, during the time he was at Poona, in the season of 1752-53, nuzurs and exactions amounting to 1,10,000 rupees ; of which one lakh was equally divided by the Peishwa, Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, Ramchundur Baba Shenwee, and Gopika Bye Rastia, the Peishwa's wife. Nana Poorundhuree got 5000 rupees, and 5000 rupees probably went amongst the inferior servants. In the ensuing year he paid in all 7,90,000 rupees.

† It is generally stated that Dummajee was not released until he gave up Dubhoy to Rugonath Rao ; but he was in Guzerat, and had prepared his troops by the time Rugonath Rao arrived, as appears by an original letter in the possession of Mulhar Ram Rao Chitnees at Satara.

his army soon after he entered the province, and they proceeded together, levying tribute, and reducing the country. Their progress was not interrupted until their arrival before the city of Ahmedabad. During Dummajee's confinement Juwan Murd Khan Babey, an officer originally appointed to the charge of the Moghul quarter by the brother of the deceased Momin Khan, had usurped the whole power of the city, but he permitted Dummajee's collector to realize his master's dues. When the Mahrattas arrived at Ahmedabad, Juwan Murd Khan Babey happened to be absent at Pulhaipoor, but hastening back, he was just in time to save the city from being carried by escalade. A new spirit was communicated to the garrison by his presence, and both the siege and defence were maintained with great resolution. Wittul Sewdeo, the ancestor of the great jagheerdars of Vinchoor, here greatly distinguished himself, and Naroo Shunkur, the person who built the strong fort of Malygaom in Candeish, was one of the most active of the assailants, having under his command a large body of Arab infantry. The conduct of Juwan Murd Khan Babey procured him an honourable capitulation, and on condition of his giving up the city, Puttun Burnugur, Radunpoor, Beejapoor, and several other districts north of Ahmedabad, situated between the Saburmattee and the Bunass, were conferred upon him in jagheer; but about ten years afterwards Dummajee took the greater part of these districts from him.

Ahmedabad, the capital of Guzerat, was finally taken possession of by the Mahrattas, in April, 1755.* The revenue was to be equally divided between the Peishwa and Gaekwar, but the whole garrison was furnished by the Peishwa, except one gateway, which was occupied by the troops of Dummajee; the latter, however, paid six thousand rupees annually to assist in

* Meera Ahmudee; but the date which that work gives, viz., April, 1753, is incorrect. I take the date from the Mahratta accounts; and since writing the above, I have been confirmed in my belief of its correctness, by observing that General Walker, formerly resident at Baroda, repeatedly mentions in his reports to the Bombay government that Ahmedabad was taken by Rugonath Rao and Dummajee in 1755.

defraying the expences. An officer, named Sreeput Rao, was left as the Peishwa's agent in Ahmedabad; when Rugonath Rao, having taken leave of Dummajee at Baroda, proceeded with Duttajee Sindia to Hindoostan, where he was joined by Khundee Rao, the only son of Mulhar Rao Holkar. They overran Ajimerc, levied the chouth and surdeshmookhee in the imperial territory, and insisted on receiving tribute from friend and foe. The Rajpoot states were compelled to pay a contribution, and the Jaths also yielded an acknowledgment, although they resisted the demand, and repulsed an attack on the fort of Kombhere, in which Khundee Rao Holkar was killed. Rugonath Rao did not return to the Deccan till 1756.*

Whilst the Peishwa's arms were thus successful to the northward in November, 1754, another expedition from Poona proceeded to the Carnatic, and levied contributions as far as Bednore. The Peishwa accompanied the army to Eroor on the Kistna, where he gave over the command to Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, and returned on a pilgrimage to the source of the Godavery, where the waters of the Ganges are supposed to emerge every thirteenth year, and where many thousands of Hindoo devotees repair for the purpose of bathing in the sacred stream.†

Ballajee Bajee Rao was naturally of an inactive disposition, and as he had agents on whom he placed dependence, habitual indolence was a natural consequence. The principal military arrangements were entrusted to his brother Rugonath Rao, whilst the whole weight of the civil administration devolved on his cousin Sewdasheo Chimnajee. The system of village government had always preserved the country from total anarchy, and some protection was now afforded from that general system of plunder and violence, which had been universal for a period exceeding the life of man. The com-

* I was less successful in recovering materials for elucidating the history of Rugonath Rao's expedition, after he quitted Guzerat, than I could have wished, especially as I think there must be some records of it in Hindoostan or Malwa, more satisfactory than anything to be found in the Deccan.

† The period is termed Shewhust, or frequently Singust, especially by Europeans.

mencement of a system of order is ascribed to Ramchundur Baba Shenwee, and after his death Sewdasheo Rao Bhow improved on his suggestions.

In regard to events in the eastern part of the Mahratta dominions in the Deccan, the most important was the demise of Rughoojee Bhonslay, which, after his great success in the war against Sulabut Jung, happened in the month of March, 1753. He divided his territory amongst his four sons, Janojee, Sabajee, Moodajee, and Bimbajee; the two elder sons, Janojee and Sabajee, were born of the younger wife, and the two younger sons, Moodajee and Bimbajee, born of the elder wife, were nephews of the late Ranee of Satara, Suckwar Bye Sirkay. Rughoojee, however, left the supremacy to Janojee, with the certain prospect of being confirmed as Sena Sahib Soobeh by the Peishwa. Rughoojee with his last breath recommended to his sons the advantage of preserving union in the Mahratta empire, and amongst each other; but precept, however solemn, carries no such weight as the most common experience. In the course of one month Janojee was compelled to reduce his brother Moodajee to obedience by force of arms, and owing to the time lost in operations, he was prevented from receiving his title and investiture, until the Peishwa's return from the Carnatic.

Encouraged by Janojee's approach to Poona, and on assurances of safety and protection from the Peishwa, Tara Bye, leaving the garrison of Satara, and the custody of the Raja's person to Baboo Rao Jadow, repaired to the Peishwa's capital, accompanied by Bimbajee Bhonslay, the youngest brother of Janojee, who had attached himself to her party, and married one of her relations of the Mohitey family. At Poona, Tara Bye was received with so much attention and consideration, that she agreed to the Peishwa's proposals, as formerly made, provided he would promise to accompany her to the temple of Jejoory, and there solemnly swear to abide by his present declarations. The Peishwa acquiesced on condition that Baboo Rao Jadow should be dismissed, to which Tara Bye reluctantly consented. Taking advantage of her obstinate temper, he gained his end of keeping the Raja a prisoner, by pretending a great desire to see him released.

Ram Raja was a prince deficient in ordinary ability, and the miserable thraldom he underwent, during a long confinement, under the circumstances we have described, entirely broke his spirit, and ruined his health.

Janojee Bhonslay, having agreed to the terms before subscribed by his father, of furnishing ten thousand horse when called upon for the service of the state, and of paying nine lakhs of rupees annually to defray the expenses of the Raja's establishment, obtained formal investiture as Sena Sahib Soobeh, and the concurrence of the Peishwa to those articles, concluded with Aliverdy Khan in regard to Orissa in 1751. He then took his departure for Berar, carrying with him Bimbajee, whose relationship to the Sirkays, and his new connection with the Mohitey family, excited jealous apprehension at the court of Poona. Janojee, on his route to the eastward, levied the tribute of Ghas-dana, both from the Mahratta and Moghul territory. This exaction excited the resentment of Sulabut Jung, on which Janojee began to plunder his districts; but being attacked by a very inferior force under a Moghul officer, who took his Dewan prisoner, he was compelled to restore a great part of his plunder, and to retire to Nagpoor.*

It was probably when smarting under this disappointment and disgrace that he accepted an invitation from Jaffeir Ali Khan, the dispossessed Soobehdar of Sieacole and Rajamundree, to invade those districts which he laid waste, and for a short time plundered with impunity, until troops were assembled to repel him. He then sent off an escort with his plunder; and to insure its safe retreat maintained a partial engagement with the troops of Vijyaram Raje, the zumeendar, who rented Sieacole and Rajamundree from M. Bussy. The zumeendar was supported by a body of French troops, but Janojee secured the object for which he fought, and the booty reached his own territories in safety.†

Affairs at Delhi were not long exempted from Mahratta interference, owing to the dissensions of the court, which arose to a height greater than ever. Meer Shahabodeen, the son of

* Mahratta MSS.

† Orme.

the late Ghazee-ud-deen, bore a conspicuous part in the troubles and crimes of the period. This youth, on the news of his father's death, pretending to be absorbed in grief, a garb which wickedness frequently assumes, interested the Vizier so much in his apparently melancholy situation, that he obtained for him all his father's honours, the title of Ghazee-ud-deen,* and the post of Umeer Ool Oomrah. But no sooner were his ends attained, than he perfidiously conspired to ruin his benefactor, assisted to obtain the office of Vizier for Intizan-ud-Dowlah, the husband of his aunt,† and finally brought on a civil war between the late Vizier and the Emperor. This war continued in and about the capital for six months. Sufdur Jung, at the end of that time, relinquished the contest, and retired to his own territory at Lucknow.

During these troubles Meer Shahabodeen, who audaciously took the lead, had called to his aid Mulhar Rao Holkar and Jyapa Sindia, but they, arriving after the departure of Sufdur Jung, Meer Shahabodeen carried them with him to act against Sooruj Mull, whom he wished to punish for joining the late Vizier. The Jath Prince retired within his forts, but Meer Shahabodeen persevered in his plan, and applied to the Emperor for a train of artillery. Intizam-ud-Dowla, however, being aware of the unprincipled disposition of his relation, as well as of his talents and ambition, notwithstanding the services capriciously rendered to himself, dissuaded the Emperor from sending the guns; an advice which was supported by strong political remonstrances from Sooruj Mull. To counteract these representations Meer Shahabodeen sent an agent to Delhi, but he, finding the Emperor disposed to follow the advice of the Vizier, enticed away a number of the soldiers belonging to the artillery, and began to plunder the environs of the capital. The Emperor intending to succour Sooruj Mull, moved out from the city against Meer Shahabodeen and the Mahrattas.

* Meer Shahabodeen is frequently mentioned by his father's title of Ghazee-ud-deen, but to prevent confusion I shall retain his original name.

† Intizam-ud-Dowlah was married to the sister of Meer Munnoo, and was the son-in-law, not the son of Kummur-ud-deen Khan, as mentioned in the Seyr Mutuakhereen.

Mulhar Rao Holkar, who regarded Jyapa and Shahabodeen as young men whom he was not bound to consult on such occasions, without intimating his design, set off by himself, came upon the Imperial camp when totally unprepared, threw a few rockets which created such confusion that the whole army fled in terror, and Holkar gained all the advantages of a victory by the plunder of their baggage.—Meer Shahabodeen, on this success, joined Holkar at Delhi, and obtained from the Emperor the office of Vizier for himself, to the exclusion of Intizam-ud-Dowlah. He next deposed the Emperor, raised a grandson of Jehandar Shah to the Imperial dignity, by the title of Alumgeer the Second, in the end of May, 1754, when the unfortunate Ahmed Shah was confined and deprived of sight. This revolution was soon after followed by the death of the former Vizier, Sufdur Jung, who was succeeded by his son Shujah-ud-Dowlah in his government at Oude.* Violence, rapine, and anarchy continued to increase in Hindoostan ; but affairs of greater interest carry us back, for a series of years, to the detail of Deccan affairs, directly connected with the history of Maharashtra.

* Seyr Mutuakhereen. English Records.

CHAP. III.

FROM A. D. 1755 TO A. D. 1756.

The Peishwa's troops, assisted by the English, reduce a part of Angria's territory.—The Peishwa proceeds against Savanoor. A secret plot between the Peishwa and Shah Nuwaz Khan alluded to.—Particulars of the connection between Ballajee Bajee Rao and the English—their views on Surat.—Expedition against Angria under Cominodore James.—Capture of Severndroog.—Dastardly conduct of the Mahratta fleet.—Second expedition against Angria under Ramajee Punt and Khundoojee Mankur, on the part of the Peishwa; and under Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive, on the part of the English.—Previous successes of the Mahrattas.—Siege and capture of Gheriah.—Reprehensible conduct of the English in regard to the prize property.—They endeavour to retain possession of Gheriah.—Siege and reduction of Savanoor.—Plot developed.—M. Bussy's corps dismissed from the service of Sulabut Jung.—Bussy marches from Savanoor towards Mausulipatam—takes post at Hyderabad, is reinforced.—Influence re-established with Sulabut Jung.—Negotiation between the Bombay government and the Peishwa.—Treaty of Poona, A. D. 1756.

THE civil administration at the Mahratta capital continued under the management of Sewdasheo Chimnajee. A. D. 1755. The Peishwa remained at Poona for nearly a year, and during that time, by the assistance of the English, in the manner hereafter explained, his troops had reduced a part of Angria's country, including the important fortress of Severndroog. After the monsoon the Mahratta army in the Concan was strengthened in expectation of further aid from the Presidency of Bombay, but whilst the preparations were going forward, the Peishwa's presence was again required in the Carnatic. Muzuffir Khan, an officer who had commanded M. Bussy's sepoys, and had gone over to the Peishwa in 1752, accompanied the army sent by the Peishwa in the preceding year into the Carnatic under Mahadajee Punt. Having taken offence at some interference in the muster of his corps, he quitted the Peishwa's service, and proceeded to Seringapatam,

but afterwards joined the Nabob of Savanoor. As the Nabob refused to give him up, and was supported by his old allies the Ghorepurays of Gootee and Sondoor, the Peishwa assembled a great army, which was augmented by the junction of Janojee Bhonslay, with his contingent of ten thousand horse ; the whole force crossed the Kistna, took Bagulkote, and then proceeded to attack Savanoor. The prime minister of Hyderabad, Shah Nuwaz Khan, who was at this time, for a special purpose, in secret league with the Peishwa, observing this formidable assembly of troops on the part of the Mahrattas, with well disseminated alarm, collected troops for the avowed purpose of forming an army of observation on the Kistna. Wukeels were in due form sent by the Peishwa to declare his pacific intentions and to solicit aid against the Nabob of Savanoor, the subject of Sulabut Jung ; whose conduct he represented as hostile to both states, and his power, if not instantly crushed, of a nature to threaten the subjugation of the Carnatic. Sulabut Jung and Monsieur Bussy having been brought to accede to an alliance, the Moghul army marched to assist the Mahrattas, then besieging Savanoor.*

Leaving the combined army engaged in these operations, A. D. 1756. it is fit to revert to the affairs of the Concan, and the expeditions against Angria ; for although to the Mahrattas the transactions on the west coast appeared, and comparatively were insignificant, they acquire an importance, because they explain the first continental acquisitions of the English in Maharashtra, of which the whole population are now subjects of Great Britain, or politically under its control.

Mr. Richard Bourchier, on the 24th November, 1750, A. D. 1750. announced to the Peishwa that he had succeeded to the government of Bombay and its dependencies on the 17th of the same month ; and from that period a more intimate intercourse commenced between the Mahrattas and the English. They had for some years been mutually desirous of settling Surat, and suppressing the depredations of

* Mahratta MSS. Khuzaneh Amirah.

Toolajee Angria. Ballajee Bajee Rao, on the first service he had seen, in the year 1740, was impressed with a high idea of the English from their conduct when they relieved Mannajee Angria at Kolabah. The warfare in the Carnatic had greatly contributed to raise their military reputation, and their fidelity to their master (as Mohummud Ally was termed), whose cause they had once embraced, had much effect in raising their national character in the minds of the natives of India.

Ballajee had early promised to assist Mr. Bourchier in restoring order in Surat, where, from the weakness of the Moghul Government, there were three or four authorities besides the agents of Dummajee Gaekwar and the English factory.—Seedee Musaood, an officer of the Seedee of Jinjeera, who had command of that part of the Seedee's squadron, whose proper duty was to protect the trade of Surat, having part of the revenue assigned for that sole purpose, was a principal cause of the many broils which took place in that city. The English at Bombay had always maintained a friendly intercourse with the Seedees of Jinjeera, because theirs was the only territory in the vicinity from which they could procure beef for supplying their ships. In other parts of the Mahratta coast cows and bullocks were sacred; for to prey on human flesh would not be more revolting to the feelings of a European, than eating beef to the prejudices of a Hindoo. Seedee Musaood had taken advantage of the distractions in Surat, and the confusion in the government at Jinjeera, virtually to throw off his dependence on all authority; and like most of the African race, who have attained power in India, he was overbearing in his deportment and tyrannical in his behaviour.

The depredations of the pirates on the coast were still continued; for although Sumbhajee Angria was dead, and Mannajee remained in nominal obedience to the Peishwa, and generally pacific towards the English, Toolajee, who had succeeded to the territories of his half-brother Sumbhajee, situated between Bancoote and Sawunt Waree, disavowed the Peishwa's authority, and seized and plundered all ships not bearing his own passport, which he could overpower. The Raja of Kolapoore, and the Sawunts of Waree, followed a like system; and by the

English were indiscriminately termed Malwans; a name given to them from the fort of Malwan, or Sindeedroog, which commanded the principal fort on their coast, and belonged to the Raja of Kolapoore.

The war which took place between the Mahrattas and the Moghuls subsequent to the murder of Nasir Jung prevented the Peishwa from effecting the settlement in Surat. An agreement was made with the English for their co-operation against that place through Ramajee Punt, Sur-soobehdar of the Concan, at the time when Rugonath Rao was recalled, to assist in the war against Sulabut Jung. This derangement of

A. D. 1751. their plan was a great disappointment to the

Bombay government, after the expectations they had formed, and, therefore, that their expensive preparations might not be abandoned without some effort, they entered into an agreement,* independent of the Mahrattas, with Nek Alum Khan, Nabob of Baroach; but the scheme proved unsuccessful.

The occupation of Guzerat, the siege of Ahmedabad, and the Carnatic expeditions, prevented the Peishwa from joining to reduce Surat, or from co-operating in attacking Toolajee

A. D. 1755. Angria, until the beginning of the year 1755.

The Mahrattas had then a short interval of leisure, and the Presidency of Bombay, when unexpectedly called on, in the month of March, although such an expedition was to them in the highest degree desirable, began to start difficulties respecting the lateness of the season, though these objections may have been purposely raised, as they certainly made the Mahrattas more urgent in their application. Ramajee Mahdeo Furnuwees, the Sur-soobehdar of the Concan, was deputed by Ballajee to settle a plan of operations, and conclude the agreement. The council, although they had no king's ship at Bombay, resolved to make the attempt, and Commodore James, of the Company's Marine, was selected for the command of the expedition, which consisted of a forty-four gun ship, a ketch of sixteen guns, and two bomb vessels.

* Bombay Records, November, 1751.

Six or seven articles were subscribed by the contracting parties, by which the English were to have the command of the marine, but mutual approbation was necessary in the conduct of all operations. The vessels that might be taken from Angria were to be divided by the captors, but the guns and stores were to belong entirely to the Peishwa. Bancoote with the fort of Himmugurh, and the sovereignty of the river on which it stands, with five villages, were to be ceded in perpetuity to the English. But the President and Council seem to have considered these stipulations as pledging them too far, and therefore one of the articles guardedly states, that the English only engage to keep the sea, and prevent Angria's fleet from throwing succours into the northern forts of Severndroog, Anjenweel, and Jyegurh.

The strongest forts which Toolajee Angria possessed were Severndroog and Vizidroog. The latter, as already mentioned, was better known in those days by its Moghul name of Gheriah. On account of the approaching monsoon it was deemed inexpedient to reduce Gheriah, or any of the forts south of those three specified in the articles. The small squadron under Commodore James sailed from Bombay harbour in the evening of the 22nd March. A wanton delay on the part of the Mahratta fleet enabled Angria's vessels at Severndroog to avoid the English ships. Commodore James, after a fruitless chace as far as Jyegurh, returned to Severndroog, where he commenced operations on the 2nd April; stood close under the fortifications, and by noon of the fourth day from the commencement of the attack, was in possession of the four distinct forts of which Severndroog consists, without the loss of a man: an achievement, which from the previous idea entertained of the pirate Angria, and the strength of the fortifications, was matter of surprise even to those who accomplished it. The whole success was justly attributed to the vigour and judgment of Commodore James, and the resolution of his handful of troops and sailors. The Peishwa's fleet never ventured within gun-shot, and Naroo Punt, a carcoon of Sebundees, who commanded, being unaccustomed to the sea, although he had headed several assaults on land, behaved in the most dastardly

manner. Shumsher Buhadur, the Peishwa's half-brother, was sent down from Poona with a body of troops to reinforce Kamajee Mahdeo, and several of the forts in the neighbourhood of Severndroog surrendered to him. Elated by this success, the Mahrattas pushed on to Rutnaguiry, but the stay of the ships was limited to the end of April, and although subsequently directed, at the Peishwa's earnest solicitation, to continue till the 15th of May, the season was too far advanced to permit of their acting with effect, owing to the heavy swell which is caused by the setting in of the southerly winds, about a fortnight before the rains. Commodore James finally returned to Bombay on the 18th May. Severndroog was punctually made over to the Mahrattas; but Bancoote, by the wish of the English, was not given over till after the ensuing October, when they got possession. The reason of requiring this cession was to obviate that dependence on the Seedee, which has been explained. The Peishwa was assured by Mr. Bourchier that the assistance he desired should be granted at the opening of the season, when the expected arrival of the king's ships from the opposite coast, under Admiral Watson, would place more powerful means at his disposal.

Before that time, however, the Presidency obtained aid on which they had not calculated, by the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Clive, with a large detachment of soldiers from Europe. The French establishments in the Deccan had created a jealous alarm in England, and it was there projected to send a force to Bombay, with the view of entering into an alliance with the Mahrattas, which had for its object the expulsion of the French from their districts in the Deccan, and from the service of Sulabut Jung. The articles of the truce agreed to by Mr. Saunders and Monsieur Godeheu, in the preceding year, on the coast of Coromandel, precluded, in the opinion of the Bombay Government, the employment of this force on its original destination, until accounts should be received from Europe, approving or annulling the articles in question.* The

* Letters from Mr. Bourchier to Mr. Pigot, 25th September, 1755. Bombay consultations, 21st January, 1756. Letter to the Court of Directors, 31st January, 1756.

Madras Presidency were of a contrary opinion, but on this subject their arguments and their whole design certainly more resemble the sophistry and artifice of a Dupleix, than the strong straight forward sense, which distinguished the general conduct and deliberations of that government.*

The Governor of Bombay, in consultation with Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive, resolved to seize the opportunity afforded by the presence of so large an armament, to reduce Toolajee Angria. A commission, consisting of Mr. Hough, one of the members of council, Admiral Watson, and Colonel Clive was invested by the Governor in Council, with powers to conclude all necessary arrangements and agreements, according to instructions with which they were furnished. Three ships of the line, one ship of fifty, and another of forty-four guns, with several armed vessels belonging to the Bombay marine, amounting in all to fourteen sail, proceeded, in the month of February, on this expedition, having on board eight hundred European soldiers and one thousand Native infantry.

Since the month of November a body of the Peishwa's troops, under Khundoojee Mankur, had been successfully employed against Toolajee Angria, and had, with the exception of Gheriah, reduced the whole of his forts along the coast, to the northward of that place. No loss of any importance was sustained by them in the attacks, but at Rajapoor, one of the places which they took, after they had got possession, three hundred men were killed by an accidental explosion, owing to the careless manner in which the Mahrattas expose their gunpowder. When the English armament

* A.D. 1756. appeared off Gheriah, Toolajee repaired to the Mahratta camp for the purpose of making the best terms he could : Ramajee Punt, and Khundoojee Mankur, were negotiating for the surrender, which was deemed by the British authorities a violation of the agreement concluded in the preceding year; and therefore, in order to prevent their obtaining possession, Admiral Watson attacked the sea face on the 12th February, whilst Colonel Clive, landing with the

* Dispatch from the Madras Government to Bombay, 30th November, 1755.

troops the same night, invested it on the land side, so as to prevent the Mahrattas from having any communication with the garrison. If the Mahratta authorities intended to possess themselves of Gheriah, in the manner alleged, which, from several circumstances, as well as their known chicane, is more than probable, the British authorities might be deemed justifiable in anticipating them; but, on this point, and their subsequent attempt to keep the fort, the evidence is not so satisfactory as to allow our countrymen the merit of a decision entirely correct, or a disinterestedness wholly unimpeachable. Ramajee Punt had intimated, on the arrival of Admiral Watson, that he was in treaty, and promised to come on board for the purpose of obtaining the sanction of the commissioners. He did not come at the time appointed, and his caroon had the assurance to offer Mr. Hough a bribe of any sum, on condition that he could get the admiral to suspend operations. The admiral, therefore, was certainly justified in commencing the attack; but it appears that the property contained in Gheriah was well known, and a committee of ten officers, of which Admirals Watson and Pocoke, Mr. Hough and Colonel Clive, were members, had, before they left Bombay harbour, agreed to share the whole prize property without reference to their allies.* If the Mahrattas had intelligence of this proceeding, they had an equal right to anticipate the English. Ramajee Punt, when he found Colonel Clive had occupied a position between him and the fort, perceived what was intended, and endeavoured to get in a few of his men by any means. With this view he made secret overtures to Captain Andrew Buchanan, the officer on picket, offering him a bill on Bombay for eighty thousand rupees, if he would permit him and a few of his people to pass into the fort, an offer which was rejected as became a British officer, but it is a circumstance worthy of notice, as elucidating the character of the times, that the Bombay Government thought common

* Copy of their proceedings on the Bombay Records. The other officers who sign these proceedings are Captains Knowles, Latham, Speke, and Harrison, of the navy; Major Chalmers and Captain Skeddy of the military service.

honesty so rare, as to present Captain Buchanan with a gold medal in consideration of his extraordinary good behaviour.

Gheriah surrendered to Admiral Watson on the evening of the 13th February. During the bombardment a shell thrown amongst Angria's fleet, which lay at some distance up the river, burst in the Restoration a vessel Angria had taken from the Bombay Government, set her on fire, and the flames rapidly communicating, his whole fleet in the course of an hour was totally destroyed. The captors of Gheriah declared that the Mahrattas had no right to share in the prize property, and divided about ten lakhs of rupees, according to the plan agreed upon before they weighed anchor. Toolajee Angria's family were taken in the fort. Toolajee was also taken, put in irons, and thrown into one of the Peishwa's hill forts near Raigurh.

The President and Council on obtaining possession of Gheriah were unwilling to relinquish it. They wished to give back Bancoote in exchange for Gheriah ; but this offer the Mahrattas peremptorily refused, and urged their right in the clearest manner to its unreserved surrender according to the articles of agreement. The Peishwa in the course of his representations made repeated applications to Madras, and complaints to the King of England ; but to all these remonstrances Mr. Bourchier declared that the articles had been infringed by the Mahrattas, that they had not fixed the limits of the Bancoote cession, that Toolajee Angria had not been delivered up to them, and, worse than all, that the Peishwa had contracted for a supply of goods from the Dutch. This last objection alluded not to the agreement made by Ramajee Punt, but to that settled with the Raja Shao, through the agency of Chimnajee Appa, in 1739 ; the two first were evasive, the last did not relate to the point in question. Mr. Bourchier even condescended to present five thousand rupees to the Carcoon of Ramajee Punt, in order to induce him to persuade his master to accede to the exchange, and he agreed to waive the question of Toolajee Angria on the simple assertion of the Mahrattas that he should be well treated, and never receive any territory within forty miles of the sea. In one respect they kept their word : Toolajee Angria, after long

endurance of rigid captivity, in the fort of Wundun, near Satara, was removed to the fort of Sholapoore, where he died. Two of his sons made their escape twelve or fourteen years after their capture, and were protected at Bombay during the government of Mr. Crommelin.

In the early part of these discussions the Peishwa was employed at Savanoor. When he was urging Sulabut Jung to enter on that expedition, in order to excite the jealousy of Bussy, and blind his usual penetration, with regard to the design which was in progress, Ballajee Rao wrote to the Presidency of Madras for a supply of European artillery-men and guns. The members of that government were not quite certain who this Ballajee Rao was, "but as according to the best information they could obtain, he was said to be the head of all the Mahrattas;" they agreed to assist him, if he would send a detachment of his army, to meet and escort their troops to his camp.* The Peishwa's whole object consisted in the application, and there the matter of course dropped. The army of Sulabut Jung having joined the Mahrattas, Bussy, than whom no Frenchman better knew the art of display, prepared his artillery, and in the face of the two armies, amounting to one hundred thousand men, opened a fire on Savanoor, so heavy and efficacious as to intimidate the garrison and excite the lasting admiration of the besiegers. Prior to this the Peishwa, through the agency of Bulwunt Rao Mendlee,† one of his own officers had contrived to detach the Ghorepurays from the alliance,‡ and Moorar Rao, in consequence, it is said, of his former engagements with the French, procured the interposition of Bussy in his favour, with the government of Sulabut Jung,§ of which this Mahratta

* Letter from the Madras government, 14th April, 1756.

† One MS. states that Ghorepuray made his peace through the agency of Holkar.

‡ Mahratta MS. supported by a copy of a letter found in the Poona Records, from the Peishwa to Bulwunt Rao Gunput Mendlee, which alludes to his agency on that occasion.

§ Wilks.

chief was, it will be recollectcd, a dependant.* The Nabob of Savanoor was admitted to terms, and on giving up a part of his territory, and making due submission to Sulabut Jung and the Peishwa, a reconciliation took place. Muzufir Khan was entertained, probably at first secretly, in the service of Sulabut Jung, and Moorar Rao Ghorepuray, with his own and the Sondoor Mahrattas, returned to Gootee in the month of May.

A considerable part of these arrangements was preparatory to the secret scheme contemplated by the Peishwa† and Shah Nuwaz Khan, of compelling the French to quit the Deccan. Shortly after the fall of Savanoor it was intimated to M. Bussy that the services of his corps were no longer required by the Soobedhar of the Deccan. This unexpected communication at once laid open to Bussy the extent of the machinations against him, and he took his measures for counteracting them with admirable prudence and decision. Few Europeans in India have been placed in greater difficulties than those which were surmounted by M. Bussy on this occasion. His corps consisted of two hundred cavalry and six hundred infantry, all Europeans, five thousand sepoys, and a fine train of artillery, enough to have made the whole army of the Deccan pay dear for their treachery; but Bussy knew the influence of the deserter Muzuffir Khan over some of his oldest sepoys, and had great reason to doubt their fidelity. He was surrounded by a host of enemies in a part of the country where he was an entire stranger, and he at once adopted a plan which divided his enemies, secured his retreat, and enabled him to recover his power at the court of Sulabut Jung. He accepted his dismissal from the service, demanded passports to Maus-

June 14. lipatam, and marched straight to Hyderabad, where, immediately on his arrival, he occupied some strong buildings, and prepared for defence.

* Upon the surrender of Trichinopoly to Nizam Ool Mook, in 1743, he was confirmed as Jagheerdar of Gootee.

† The scheme, if we are to credit the evidence obtained by Mr. Speneer, who was at Poona as an envoy from Bombay, a few months afterwards, originated with the Mahratta court, and the whole intrigue was managed by Amrut Rao, the Wukeel of Bulwunt Rao Mendlee.

After he quitted the allied camp, his design having been suspected, a detachment was sent in pursuit of him, accompanied by six thousand of Sulabut Jung's Mahrattas, under Ramchundur, the son of Chunderseyn Jadow, and Janojee Nimbalkur (Rao Rumbha) of Kurmulla, but Bussy effected his purpose with little loss. One of his first acts on discovering the conspiracy was to write off an account of his situation to Pondicherry and Mausulipatam, where the French authorities used every possible exertion to reinforce him. He also expected a body of six hundred recruits, Arabs and Abyssinians, whom he had enlisted at Surat, but Janojee Nimbalkur hearing of their approach intercepted the party, and killed fifty of them before they submitted as prisoners.

Shah Nuwaz Khan was with Nasir Jung when he lost his life in the Carnatic, and although he had dissembled his enmity, he was never reconciled to the French. He had a better opinion of the English nation, and at his suggestion an application was made to Madras for a body of troops to assist in expelling Bussy. That Presidency would have taken advantage of an offer which accorded so entirely with their views, but the disastrous account of the capture of Calcutta, on the 20th June, by Shujah-ud-Dowlah, Nabob of Bengal, the grand nephew and successor of Aliverdy Khan, arrived at Madras in July, and obliged the English to send every disposable man to recover their lost settlement, and avenge the fate of their murdered countrymen.

In the meantime Bussy maintained his post at Hyderabad against the army of Sulabut Jung, and contrived to secure in his interests Ramchundur Jadow and Janojee Nimbalkur, the principal Mahrattas in the Moghul service. They did not oppose the advancing reinforcement from Mausulipatam, and although great efforts were made to cut them off, the troops joined Bussy in the middle of August.*

* I have here gone more into events already well known than may appear altogether necessary, but having deviated in some degree from Mr. Orme's account, and considerably from that of Colonel Wilks, where my authority is less clear than, under such difference of opinion, I could wish, I shall submit my reasons to the judgment of the reader. Colonel Wilks states

A reconciliation with Sulabut Jung immediately took place, and Bussy, for the time, attained greater power than ever. Muzaffir Khan was not surrendered to the French, as Bussy desired, but he was dismissed from the service, and shortly after appeared at Poona, where, on making humble apologies to the Peishwa, and many promises of future good behaviour, he was again entertained, contrary to the advice of Sewdasheo Chimnajee.*

The Peishwa returned to Poona on the 20th July, and, in a conciliatory letter, announces that event to Mr. Bourchier ; begs of him to send some gentlemen to Poona for the purpose of settling several points of importance, but requests that Gheriah may be immediately restored. He also informs the Governor of an unsuccessful attack by the Portuguese upon the fort of Ponda ; an attempt made, as afterwards appears, for the purpose of deterring the Mahrattas from the projected conquest of Goa, contemplated by Sewdasheo Rao Bhow. The Portuguese viceroy lost his life at Ponda by the misbehaviour of his troops, but other events prevented the Mahrattas from attacking Goa. Mr. Bourchier, amongst the arguments used* to induce the Peishwa to take back Bancoote in exchange for Gheriah, lays great stress on its advantageous

that the Peishwa made overtures to Bussy the day after he quitted the camp, and adduces arguments which, without evidence, do not appear to me satisfactory on this point. The Madras Presidency were apprehensive that the French might enter Ballajee Rao's service, as appears on the Bombay Records, but on what grounds is nowhere explained. Colonel Wilks also states that the Peishwa sent a corps to protect Bussy ; but the Mahrattas who followed him seem to have been entirely Moghul subjects. There is another point of some importance, as it regards a person whose character has always excited attention. Colonel Wilks mentions that M. Bussy was obliged by circumstances to take post at Hyderabad. If the fact be so it greatly detracts from M. Bussy's reputation. His great merit on that occasion certainly was, as a politician, in exerting the influence he had acquired to maintain his post, facilitate the march of the reinforcement, and preserve opinion in his favor. If he intended to retreat to Mausulipatam, why was one of his first steps to write off for reinforcements both to Pondicherry and Mausulipatam ? Had Bussy continued his march to Mausulipatam he could not have forced his way back to Hyderabad.

* Mahratta MSS.

situation as a barrier to the Mahrattas against the Portuguese. Ballajee in reply does not conceal his contempt for that nation, and artfully parries the argument, by hinting at an effectual method of obviating the necessity of a barrier, by at once assisting to expel them.*

As soon as the weather permitted, Mr. John Spencer, accompanied by Mr. Thomas Byfield, both members of the Bombay Council, proceeded to Poona according to the Peishwa's request. Although Mr. Spencer was junior to Mr. Byfield, the executive part of the mission was committed to him, and he conducted it with ability. He had a long interview with the Peishwa, in the beginning of October, at which Rugonath Rao and Sewdasheo Rao Bhow were present.† By that time the restoration of Bussy's influence at the Court of Hyderabad was known, and the Peishwa was sincere in a desire he expressed of obtaining the services of a body of English troops. But Mr. Spencer was instructed by the President in Council, who acted upon fresh orders from the Court of Directors, to evade any solicitation of this nature that might be made, and to decline entering upon the engagement for which troops had been sent out in the preceding season ; a scheme which was therefore never communicated to the court of Poona. Mr. Spencer told the Peishwa of the application which the Madras Presidency had received from Sulabut Jung for a body of English troops to assist in expelling the French, a connection of which Ballajee Rao unreservedly expressed his disapprobation.

A treaty was concluded with the Peishwa at Poona on the 12th October. The exclusion of the Dutch from October 12. the trade of the Mahratta dominions ; the surrender of Gheriah within twenty-four days after the departure of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Byfield from Poona ; and the cession of ten villages, including Bancoote, with the sovereignty of its river, to the East India Company ; are the substance of eighteen articles of which the agreement consists. The Peishwa

* Original letters, Bombay records.

† Mr. Spencer's report of his mission on the Bombay records.

also consents to waive all claims on the Honourable Company, up to the date of the treaty ; to give Toolajee Angria no territory below the Ghauts ; to settle an equivalent with the See-dee for one-fourth of the customs levied by him from the vessels in Bancoote river ; and to exact no additional inland duties on English merchandize.*

* English Records. This treaty was published in the appendix to the 5th Report from the Committee of Secrecy.

CHAP. IV.

FROM A. D. 1756 TO A. D. 1760.

Rugonath Rao proceeds on an expedition to Hindoostan.—Object of Ballajee Rao in his late treaty with the English.—Expedition to the Carnatic.—Attack on Seringapatam.—Affairs compromised.—District of Sera retaken,—the Peishwa returns to Poona.—Proceedings of Bulwunt Rao Mendlee, left in the Carnatic for the purpose of prosecuting the Peishwa's views.—Battle of Kuddapah.—Conduct of the Mysore government acting on the suggestions of Hyder Ally.—Designs of the Peishwa on Bednore and Mysore,—prevented by affairs of the Hyderabad court.—Plot for effecting a revolution, and expelling the French ;—particulars of that conspiracy, and of the circumstances connected with it.—Murder of Hyder Jung.—Death of Shah Nuwaz Khan.—Flight of Nizam Ally to Burhanpoor.—Bussy recalled to Pondicherry.—Remarkable instance of credulity in the Bombay government.—The English obtain possession of Surat Castle.—Proceedings of the Mahrattas in the Carnatic.—Proceedings of Nizam Ally—is attacked by Janojee Bhonslay at the instigation of Basalut Jung.—Nizam Ally is courted by the English.—Obtains the office of prime minister.—Sewdasheo Rao Bhow the minister of the Peishwa,—his character—dissensions in the Peishwa's family.—Altercation with Rugonath Rao.—Muzuffir Khan employs an assassin to murder Sewdasheo Rao ;—the assassin is seized and executed with his employer.—Ahmednugur betrayed into the hands of the Mahrattas.—Sewdasheo Rao takes command of the army, and Rugonath Rao becomes prime minister.—War with the Moghuls in the Deccan.—Cessions acquired by the Mahrattas as the price of peace.—Reflections on the pre-eminence to which the Mahrattas had attained.—Reverses in Hindooostan—affairs in that quarter.

As soon as the rains subsided, Rugonath Rao was sent into Hindooostan, accompanied, as before, by Sukaram Bap-poo, as his Dewan, and joined by Mulhar Rao Holkar. The Peishwa prepared a large army which was destined for the Carnatic, under his own command, but he did not cross the Kistna before the ensuing February.

In his negotiation with the Bombay Presidency the paramount object of Ballajee Rao was the possession of Gheriah; that obtained, as he had waved all claims on the East India Company, he still pretended a right to the recovery of the

treasure and stores carried off as prize by the captors. He again addressed a letter to the King, and forwarded it, as before, through the Madras government. His letter to that Presidency, accompanying the address to his Majesty, was not couched in the strain of frankness and cordial friendship he had assumed to Mr. Spencer : a change which is the first indication of European politics, in any degree influencing the conduct of the Mahrattas. It was occasioned both by the renewal of war between Great Britain and France, in the month of May preceding, and by the late misfortunes, and still uncertain state of affairs at Calcutta. This policy was adopted, not probably with any hope of restitution, but preparatory to demands for chouth and surdeshmookhee from the Moghul provinces of the Carnatic, Payeen Ghaut, in which the English had now so direct an interest.

Sixty thousand Mahrattas appeared before Seringapatam in the month of March, and demanded an enormous sum as arrears of tribute. On their march to that capital the independent principalities south of the Kistna had all, except the Nabob of Kurpa, made suitable submission, and the Ghore-purays attended their countrymen with a body of six thousand horse. As Nunjeraj, the minister of the Mysore state, who had usurped the powers of the administration, declared his inability to pay the contribution demanded from Seringapatam, a battery of thirty cannon was opened against it by Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, under the direction of Muzuffir Khan. Negotiation was for a time at an end, but a shot having struck the top of the Hindoo temple of Runga Swamy, and a gun happening at the same instant to burst in the battery, which killed several of the men* who worked it, the circumstance was accounted ominous by both parties ; a compromise ensued, by which the Mahrattas agreed to take thirty-two lakhs of rupees instead of a much larger sum demanded in the first instance.* Five

* The Mahratta MS. says thirty-six lakhs, but I here follow Colonel Wilks, as he probably had access to official papers on the subject. The Mahratta MSS. also differ in the account of the manner in which the amount was paid ; but although they are circumstantial, and state nothing respecting the subsequent interference of Hyder, I here also prefer trusting to Colonel Wilks.

lakhs of rupees were immediately paid in money and jewels, and districts assigned in trust for the remainder. The Peishwa next intended to retake the districts of Sera, Bangalore, Ouscotta, Balapoor, and Kolhar; to which the Mahrattas could claim a right, since the days of Shahjee, although they had been successively wrested from Venkajee, and his successor, of the house of Tanjore. The district of Sera was occupied, but on the approach of the monsoon the Peishwa returned towards Poona with the greater part of his army, and owing to the lateness of the season had great difficulty in recrossing the Kistna. Bulwunt Rao Mendlee was left with a large detachment for the purpose of reducing these ancient possessions, and with a power, somewhat discretionary, of levying the chouth and surdeshmookhee from Arcot. Bulwunt Rao took Ouscottah belonging to the Nabob of Kurpa, and Moolwaukil was given up. Kudapannattum was also taken, and peremptory demands made upon the Nabob of Arcot for the payment of arrears of chouth, which was after much discussion settled by the Nabob for two lakhs in ready money, and two and a half lakhs in assignments.* The members of the Madras government endeavoured to annul the agreement; they had, in the first instance, evaded the claim, by representing the disordered state of the province, the expences and the efforts they had made for the support of order and the preservation of the country, and the scanty revennes which the territory still yielded. They also endeavoured to divert the Mahrattas towards the French districts, or northern circars,† but Amrut Rao, Bulwunt Rao's Dewan, adhered firmly to his demands, and succeeded in obtaining them.

Moorar Rao Ghorepuray had retired to Gootee in consequence of not being put in possession of one of the captured forts, which appears to have been promised; the Peishwa had authorised Bulwunt Rao to comply with his wish, provided he was certain he could be depended upon,‡ but Moorar Rao had

* Orme.

† Letter from Mr. Pigot, Governor of Madras, to Bulwunt Rao, and the Peishwa.

‡ Letter from Ballajee Rao, September 1757.

joined a confederacy against his countrymen, by uniting with the Nabobs of Kurpa, Savanoor, Kurnoul, and others, to which the confederates solicited the support of the English; a want of troops, however, prevented the Presidency of Madras from availing themselves of an auxiliary force, which in any ordinary season would have induced them to resist the Mahratta demands. It is not ascertained whether Bulwunt Rao complied with the latitude allowed in favor of Ghorepuray, but Moorar Rao is not mentioned as having acted on either side in a battle, fought by the Mahrattas on the 24th September, near Kuddahpah,* against the Nabobs of Kurpa and Kurnoul, in which Bulwunt Rao Mendlee was victorious, the Nabob of Kurpa was killed,† and his capital plundered; but Abdool Nubee Khan, the cousin and heir of the late Nabob, still defended the country, and occupied the Mahrattas for a period much longer than they could spare. In the mean time, the Mysore government, by the advice of Hyder Ally, then rising into notice, having broken their agreement, refused to pay the stipulated contribution, and expelled the Mahratta agents from the districts assigned for that purpose. The Peishwa prepared a force under Gopaul Hurry at Poona, intended, ultimately, to unite with Bulwunt Rao against Mysore, supported by a body of ten thousand Mahrattas, which, towards the end of the monsoon, were employed‡ near the Godaverry, under the Peishwa's son Wiswas Rao. But, as Gopaul Hurry could not cross the Kistna before November, and might not be joined by Wiswas Rao, until the beginning of the year, the Peishwa directed Bulwunt Rao to reduce Bednore.§ He recommends him "to march to that place as soon as possible, that the garrison had been very sickly, that the Rana's son, as well as the Rana, was dead, and that the

* The town is known by both names, Kurpa and Kuddapah.

† Orme.

‡ The Peishwa in one of his letters says, in reducing a district called *Jo:hoo*, or *Noohooj*; but the word cannot be distinctly read, neither can the situation be ascertained, nor in whose hands the district was, when reduced by Wiswas Rao.

§ Copy of an original letter from the Peishwa to Bulwunt Rao Gunput Mendlee.

whole would fall into his hands, before the arrival of Gopaul Hurry, when they must conjointly attack Chittledroog."

If had this scheme been practicable at the time, it would in all probability have prevented the rise of Hyder Ally,* but Bulwunt Rao was detained in the districts of Kuddapah, or in levying contributions from Polygars, until the month of February, and before that date events had occurred at the court of Hyderabad which called Bulwunt Rao's force to the northward, and fully employed the attention of the Peishwa.

Sulabut Jung, by the advice of Shah Nuwaz Khan, had appointed his brothers, Nizam Ally and Busalut Jung, as Governors of provinces ; the former to Berar, and the latter to Beejapoore, whither they had proceeded in 1756. Bussy, in the end of that year, departed from Hyderabad, accompanied by his dewan Hyder Jung, to regulate the French districts to the eastward, and was thus employed, when an opportunity presented itself, of reducing some of the English factories in that quarter. Sulabut Jung, in the mean time, took the field, and his operations, at the suggestion of Shah Nuwaz Khan, were directed against Ramchundur Jadow, ostensibly, to call him to account for not keeping up his established quota of horse, but in reality to punish him for not acting against the French reinforcements, when marching from Mausulipatam to join Bussy at Hyderabad. Jadow was deprived of most of his Jagheer; the minister spent the season in revenue arrangements, and Sulabut Jung attended by his brother Busalut Jung from Adonee, cantoned for the rains at Aurungabad, after having taken the government of Doulutabad from Sadut Bokharn, the killidar, in whose family it had been from the time of Aurungzebe. It was now given in charge to a dependent of Shah Nuwaz Khan; and here began a scene of intrigue, as eventful and complicated as might occur to the fancy of a dramatist. The sum of the plot seems to have been to confine Sulabut Jung in Dowlutabad ; to place the government in the hands of Nizam Ally, or Busalut Jung, and to expel the French from the Decean. The Peishwa was

* See Wilks, chap. xii. vol. i.

probably in the first instance apprized of it,* and the real object of Wiswas Rao's march to the Godaverry may have been to aid the design. As late as the month of September he did not, as may be observed by his instructions to Bulwunt Rao, expect that it would obstruct his designs on the Carnatic.

In the month of August a pretended sedition was raised by the soldiery at Aurungabad on account of their arrears of pay. Shah Nuwaz Khan was beset by their clamours ; he neglected to satisfy their claims ; the troops insisted on his being removed from the administration ; demanded his dismissal from Sulabut Jung, and the appointment of Busalut Jung as minister in his stead. Although contrary to his own wishes Sulabut Jung yielded to their request ; but the troops were not to be satisfied, and Shah Nuwaz Khan was forced to seek safety in Doulatabad, where he prepared to defend himself against their unjustifiable violence. It is conjectured that the conspirators may have expected Sulabut Jung would pay the seemingly injured minister a visit of condolence in the fortress, but some of his immediate dependants, perhaps the European officer at the head of the French guard, suspected a snare, and induced Sulabut Jung to promise the minister protection, but to demand his submission. The exercise of a little common sense in upholding right rules often disconcerts the deepest cunning ; but the derangement of the plan only thickened the plot. Shah Nuwaz Khan, on being desired to surrender, fired on the troops. Nizam Ally was summoned from Berar by Busalut Jung to assist in the siege ; Shah Nuwaz Khan called in the assistance of the Mahrattas as allies, but some person about Sulabut Jung, who had more penetration than himself, prevailed on him to countermand the advance of Nizam Ally. The latter, however, declared he could not hear of his brother being so treated by a rebel minister without hastening to his support. He advanced accordingly, and troops from all quarters were called in by Busalut Jung. Still, however, the troops attached to Sulabut Jung,

* It is even probable that the Peishwa may have been a principal instigator in the whole conspiracy about to be detailed, although that does not rest on any direct evidence.

of whom two hundred were Europeans, and five hundred disciplined Sepoys left by Bussy, were not to be overpowered with impunity, and the conspiracy was aimed rather at the liberty than the life of Sulabut Jung. The Mahrattas began to plunder the country: the necessity of union was now much talked of, and Shah Nuwaz Khan suffered himself to be prevailed upon to submit. Great preparations were made to oppose the Mahrattas. Nizam Ally, to whom the office of minister had been resigned by Busalut Jung, made all the dispositions for the order of battle and of march. The humble post of protecting the baggage was assigned to Shah Nuwaz Khan. The friends of Sulabut Jung remonstrated against his allowing his brother to have the entire management of his army, and his pride and resentment being aroused, he told Nizam Ally that he could not submit to it. The latter at first affected indignation, but afterwards so completely soothed his brother by assurances that his welfare and honour were his only care, that Sulabut Jung forgave all, obliged him to take back the seal of state he had resigned, and bestowed on him their father's title of Nizam Ool Mook Asif Ja. Very shortly after this reconciliation intelligence was received that Ramchundur Jadow, proceeding to pay his respects and join the army of Sulabut Jung, was attacked, surrounded, and driven into the town of Sindkheir, where he was besieged by the Peishwa's troops.* Orders of march were instantly issued, but the same influence which hitherto had prevented Sulabut Jung from falling into the power of his enemies, once more frustrated their designs.—He would not move. Nizam Ally, however, proceeded to Sindkheir, went through the farce of rescuing Ramchundur Jadow, of beating the Mahrattas, and compelling them to make peace. Although the latter, with more show of reason, afterwards claimed the victory, the nominal defeat was a disgrace to which Ballajee Rao would willingly have submitted, in consequence of his having received a cession of

* The body of troops which attacked Ramchundur Jadow was commanded by Mahadajee Sindia, still a very young man, but who had already distinguished himself at the battle fought on the plain between Korygaom and Tullygaon Dundai-ray, 27th November, 1751. Mahratta MS.

territory, yielding an annual revenue of upwards of twenty-five lakhs of rupees.* How Nizam Ally could reconcile this transaction to his brother cannot be ascertained, and can only be accounted for by supposing that the agreement was secret. Ballajee Rao returned with Nizam Ally to Aurungabad as a friend ; but the arrival of Bussy, with a well appointed force, consisting of two hundred European cavalry, five hundred European infantry, five thousand Sepoys, and ten fieldpieces, besides his detachment with Sulabut Jung, threw the whole cabal into confusion ; and, except the audacious Nizam Ally, intimidated the rest of the conspirators. All were ready to pay their respects, and no one more prompt than the late minister Shah Nuwaz Khan. He had been led farther into the mazes of intrigue than he had contemplated ; he had seen enough of Nizam Ally to be assured that Sulabut Jung was a better man, and he was probably sincere in his desire to replace everything on its former footing ;—but once embarked, there is no saying where the current of factious guilt may drive, or who shall be absorbed in its whirlpool.

Bussy, with the measured manner which it became him, under such circumstances to assume, paid his respects to Sulabut Jung as the superior whom he served ; met the Peishwa half way in a tent prepared for the occasion ; visited Nizam Ally, but, as one whose designs were more than suspicious, accompanied by a strong escort ; received Busalut Jung ; but referred Shah Nuwaz Khan, who had descended from his rank as minister, to his agent Hyder Jung, for the double purpose of marking a distinction, and obtaining, through his keen-sighted Dewan, thus placed on an equality with the ex-minister, a complete insight into the views of the faction.

Thus far Bussy acted right, for he acted of himself ; but the disadvantages to a European in India, however honourable and upright his intentions, who suffers himself to be guided by natives beyond a proper regard to their opinions and prejudices, and who is dependant on them for the interpretation of the language, are exemplified in the subsequent events.

* The exact amount 2,508,223 rupees, 13 annas. Poona Records.

Shah Nuwaz Khan unfolded everything to Hyder Jung; but, as was likely under such circumstances, ascribed his motives rather to the weakness of Sulabut Jung than to his jealousy of the power of the French. The friends of Shah Nuwaz Khan had strongly advised him to put no confidence in Hyder Jung; and his conduct in this instance is attributed by his countrymen to that inexplicable predestination which is a rule of their faith. On being made acquainted with the scheme, under such colouring as Hyder Jung thought fit to give to it, Bussy was led to deceive Shah Nuwaz Khan by promises of forgiveness and restoration to the ministry. To have restored Shah Nuwaz Khan was now, perhaps, the wisest expedient that could be adopted. He was respected in the country, knew its resources, and notwithstanding the fictitious want of money he had created, the revenues under his management were in a state of progressive improvement. He had experienced the irresistible power of the French, the weakness and futility of faction, and he had seen the premature disposition to villainy in the bold mind of the young Nizam Ally.

Bussy, if he found it inconvenient to replace him in the ministry, had not even the excuse of necessity for stooping to duplicity, he had only to act on the broad principle of right, and trust to what was in his power, a strong arm and a good cause. But influenced, unfortunately, by the representations of an Asiatic, his conduct became entangled in the tricks and intrigue which true wisdom despises. His plans seem in this instance to have had no very definite purpose even in his own mind, though there is abundant ground to suspect that his Dewan may have contemplated his own elevation and played deep for the high place of Moghul minister in the Deccan.

Hyder Jung having corrupted the Killidar of Doulutabad, Bussy became the principal actor in a scheme by which he gained little honor from having obtained possession of that fortress.* Shah Nuwaz Khan was made prisoner, and the greater part of Nizam Ally's troops were debauched by bribes, amounting in all to eight lakhs of rupees, and came over to Hyder Jung. Of the number was Ibrahim Khan Gardee, who

* For particulars see Orme, vol. ii. book ix. page 345.

had been brought up as an officer of Sepoys under Bussy, and had gone over to Nizam Ally in Berar, in consequence of having incurred Bussy's displeasure. The Peishwa, who was very desirous of possessing Doulutabad, returned from a position fifty miles to the west of Aurungabad, and in vain used every argument with Bussy to prevail upon him to deliver it up to the Mahrattas. Nizam Ally, however, in the hope that the Peishwa would join him, after their late transaction, promised the fort of Doulutabad and many other cessions, as the price of an alliance, which should raise him to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, but Ballajee Rao saw no advantage from his overtures.

Busalut Jung, the present minister, was neither of a dangerous nor a formidable character, but he was capable of being made an instrument either for a good or a bad purpose. For some reasons it would have been ill-advised to remove him, especially as he had become secretly inimical to Nizam Ally, whose audacity pointed to extreme measures from which Busalut Jung recoiled; but the designs of Hyder Jung remained incomplete whilst Nizam Ally was at liberty, he therefore determined on placing him in confinement, as well as Shah Nuwaz Khan; and at first thought of immuring him in Doulutabad, but the influence of Nizam Ally, even with the soldiery who had quitted his service, was considerable, and the proximity of Doulutabad to the province of Berar made that fortress a fitter prison for Shah Nuwaz Khan than for Nizam Ally. Whether Bussy ever would have authorized his Dewan to take the steps he meditated is certainly very questionable; if he had, it is not improbable that Hyder Jung, in time, would have sacrificed his French friends to his own ambition. Hyder Jung and Nizam Ally had now each their own reasons for dissimulation; the one proffered friendship, and the other affected content. Hyder Jung wished Nizam Ally to accept the government of Hyderabad, that he might be nearer Golcondah, where he intended to imprison him. Nizam Ally received the proposal with much seeming satisfaction: intercourse was re-established, and everything was made ready for departure; Hyder Jung paid him a visit prior to his setting out, and Nizam Ally, having prepared for

his reception, murdered him in the tent. A great tumult ensued as soon as the event was known; the French line beat to arms,—Shah Nuwaz Khan who was confined under a guard of Europeans and Sepoys was supposed to be the instigator of Hyder Jung's murder, and a Hindoo Soobehdar* of French Sepoys, with all of whom Hyder Jung had been extremely popular, entered the tent during the uproar, and put Shah Nuwaz Khan, together with his son, and Yemen ad Dowlah, to death. Nizam Ally fled towards Burhanpoor the same night.† The tragedy was thus closed on the 11th May. The Peishwa with the Mahratta army returned to Poona, and Bussy, shortly after, not choosing to encourage Sulabut Jung in a war against Nizam Ally, bent his course towards Hyderabad. When on the march to that capital he received from M. Lally those peremptory orders of recal, which at once deprived his nation of the great power and influence he had established. The Mahrattas, like the rest of India, were unable to comprehend such an inexplicable measure;—the removal of the French garrison from Doulutabad, and the actual march of Bussy towards Pondicherry, was viewed by Ballajee Rao with wonder and with joy; but Sulabut Jung, to whom the departure of M. Bussy was equally unaccountable, saw in it the extinction of his last hope in the world, and, until soothed with assurances of the probability of his return, he continued in a state of perfect despair.

It has been stated that the Peishwa returned from a position fifty miles west of Aurungabad for the purpose of trying

* His name was Luximon, and the Moghul author exultingly informs his reader that the murderer of a Syud was afterwards killed in Sicacole; probably in the battle between Forde and Conflans, in December following, at Peddipore.

† I have come to the above judgment on these dark intrigues from a comparison of Orme, Wilks, Mahratta MSS., the life of Shah Nuwaz Khan, the Khuzanchi Amirah, Hudeequ-i-Alum, and all the authorities wherein the subject is mentioned. Both Mr. Orme and Colonel Wilks state that Shah Nuwaz Khan was under a guard of Sulabut Jung's troops; but though that mode of confinement might have been adopted to prevent unnecessary odium towards the French, and is, in the way Colonel Wilks has stated, very common; the Mahomedan authority is against them.

to prevail upon Bussy to give up Doulutabad ; but the reason of his having moved to the westward, in the first instance, remains to be explained. The Bombay Presidency, as we have seen, had long been urgent with the Peishwa to aid them in establishing their trade and privileges on a secure and respectable footing in the city of Surat, but finding they were not likely to obtain his aid, they, with abundant caution, proposed trying to effect the object themselves, and Mr. Ellis, the agent on the spot, arranged a plan which promised certain success. The Peishwa apprized of everything that was going forward, sent Shunkrajee Punt, the Soobehdar of Kallian, to amuse Mr. Bourchier, until he should find it more convenient than it was at that juncture, to detach a force to Surat ; but Shunkrajee Punt, judging by the president's indifference, and the preparations of the armament, that they would proceed to the execution of the enterprize by themselves, Ballajee Rao determined to prevent it, by making a feint of threatening the Presidency itself. With this view he moved from Aurungabad a few marches to the westward, and by means of the native agent employed by the English at Poona, he made them believe that he was about to march for Nassuck, and thence to Bassein with his army ; he also caused the agent to insinuate, that the Mahrattas were treacherous people, not to be depended on, and that it would be prudent to keep a strict guard on the island of Bombay. The Governor and Council, on receipt of this intelligence, *unanimously resolved*, not only to defer the expedition, but to desire Mr. Ellis to send down all the military and marine force he could possibly spare, to defend the settlement. This remarkable instance of credulity proves the great want

A. D. 1759. of experience of the Bombay Government;* they,
March 4. however, got possession of Surat castle, some
months afterwards, though with considerable
loss of officers and men.†

The Peishwa's first object on the opening of the season was to detach a force under Gopaul Hurry to Mysore for the

* Bombay records.

[†] Bombay records, and Grose's Voyage to the East Indies.

recovery of the districts, from whence the Mahratta agents had been expelled by Nunjeraj, at the suggestion of Hyder Ally. Gopaul Hurry established the Mahratta thannas, took Cenapatam by surprize, and besieged Bangalore. The Mahrattas were opposed by the Mysore army, which was on this service intrusted, for the first time, to the rising General, Hyder Ally ; and the campaign terminated in the payment of the thirty-two lakhs of rupees before stipulated, one half of which was paid in gold, and the other by bills on the security of bankers : after which the Mahrattas evacuated the pledged districts, and peace was concluded with the state of Mysore.* Gopaul Hurry then proceeded to the Damulcherry pass, whilst the French were besieging the English in Madras, and endeavoured to exact money from each of the belligerents, but he was treated with considerable contempt by both parties. To be revenged on the French he took possession of the temple at Tripittee, intending to have collected the offerings† at the ensuing festival, but the main body of his troops was recalled to Poona, and the garrison he left in the temple was driven out by troops belonging to the Nabob of Areot.

Sulabut Jung had appointed Busalut Jung his Dewan at the suggestion of M. Bussy ; their union was certainly the most likely mode of upholding the government of Sulabut Jung, and overawing the factious at his court ; but the party of Nizam Ally gained strength as soon as Bussy had departed for Pondicherry, and the only French troops in the Decean were confined to their own districts, the northern circars, under M. Conflans.

Nizam Ally, soon after he reached Burhanpoor, exacted a heavy contribution from that city, and Mohummud Anwar Khan, the person who forty years before had contributed by his advice to obtain the chouth and surdeshmookhee for the

* Wilks, and Mahratta MSS.

† Offerings which are made by Hindoo pilgrims, at stated periods, to the idols in many parts of India, and which are afterwards generally considered the acknowledged revenue of the state ; these festivals are termed Jatras, when the temples of celebrated deities are visited by votaries from all parts of the country.

Mahrattas, is said to have died in consequence of the harsh treatment to which he was subjected. With the money thus obtained Nizam Ally began to raise troops. He was shortly after again joined by Ibrahim Khan Gardee with his corps, when he quitted Burhanpoor, and took up a position about one hundred miles south of that city, at the town of Basum. The minister, Busalut Jung, instigated Janojee Bhonslay, Sena Sahib Soobeh, to attack his brother; accordingly, Bappoo Kurundeea, one of Janojee's officers, intercepted his artillery which was coming to join him from Burhanpoor, and took the whole of it. In consequence of this aggression Nizam Ally made a sudden march towards Ankolah, which he surprised and plundered, but being attacked by a superior force, under Janojee in person, he retired on Burhanpoor for the purpose of equipping some guns for Ibrahim Khan. As soon as he had furnished himself with this auxiliary, invaluable against Mahrattas, he returned, attacked, and completely defeated Janojee's army. His success soon obtained him friends; Janojee concluded an alliance with him, and he had received encouragement from the Peishwa. He had also been courted by the English, not in consequence of his victory, but as a son of Nizam Ool Mook, who, beyond reconciliation, had committed himself with their enemies the French. As soon therefore as he understood that Sulabut Jung had quitted Hyderabad, for the purpose of assisting the garrison of Mausulipatam, which was besieged by the English, Nizam Ally, after taking possession of Aurungabad, moved towards the capital.*

The advance of Nizam Ally hastened the conclusion of a treaty between Sulabut Jung and Colonel Forde, although Busalut Jung, who was partial to the French, endeavoured to obstruct the arrangement. The treaty did not provide for the assistance of the English against Nizam Ally; as every inducement on that point was resisted by Colonel Forde.† Sulabut Jung returned to Hyderabad, where, on the arrival of Nizam Ally, much dissension arose among the brothers, but Sulabut

* Mahratta MSS., Orme, Khuzaneh Amirah, and Hudeeq-i-Alum.

† Orme.

Jung was constrained to restore the office of Dewan to Nizam Ally, and Busalut Jung departed for his government, the seat of which was Adonee.

At the court of Poona the principal affairs of administration continued under the management of Sewdasheo Rao Bhow. His able co-adjutor, Ramchundur Baba Shenwee, had been dead for four or five years, and his wealth, which was great, had been left at the disposal of the Bhow, who appropriated one-third for charitable and religious purposes, and shared the remainder equally with the son of the deceased. Sewdasheo Rao was violent and avaricious, but active and vigorous : and though proud and unbending in his character, he had a large share of good nature and of good sense. He was corrupt ; but not in the opinion of his countrymen, for with them to take money for assistance or support in a good cause is legitimate and avowed ; a principle which if tolerated on whatever pretence, in any public officer of a government, must soon spread universal peculation, bribery, and misrule.

His friend Ramchundur warned him on his death-bed of the opposition and jealousy he might expect from Gopika Bye Rastia, the Peishwa's wife, as soon as her children became of an age fit to be intrusted with public affairs. To prevent these Sewdasheo Chimnajee was the first to propose that the Peishwa's eldest son, Wiswas Rao, should be early employed and he honourably endeavoured to instil into all the sons of his cousin the necessity of great acquirements for enabling them to fill the high stations to which they were born, and always recommended that they should be engaged in business and in war, as early as possible. The affection which Ballajee Rao had always shown towards his cousin Sewdasheo Rao received a severe shock, by his intended desertion when he went to Kolapoor ; and notwithstanding the conduct of Sewdasheo Rao, both towards her sons and in the administration, the seeds of hatred, perceived by Ramchundur in the mind of Gopika Bye, grew up the more rank, when the actions of the minister were such as defied detraction and ought to have silenced her jealous fears. The activity and diligence of Sewdasheo Rao were a reproach to the less energetic disposition of

the Peishwa; but independent of jealousy, where confidence has once been shaken, abundant materials for discord continually arise between a prince and his minister without the influence of a woman's wiles to blow it into flame.

The forms of courtesy and the appearance of perfect concord continued until the return of Rugonath Rao from Hindoostan, when the minister having found reason to blame the expenditure and arrangement that had taken place during the campaign, by which a debt was brought against the state, instead of booty to its coffers; Rugonath Rao told him "he had better take command of the next expedition himself," and abruptly quitted the apartment; their dissensions continuing, spread to the rest of the family, and soon became publicly known. Whether encouraged by the mere circumstance of their differences, without the connivance of any of the parties, or actuated solely by personal revenge, is not ascertained; but an attempt was made on the life of Sewdasheo Rao, instigated by Muzuffir Khan, the officer already mentioned as having been received into the Peishwa's service, after his dismissal from that of Sulabut Jung.

Sewdasheo Rao did not approve of his being readmitted by Ballajee Rao; and Nizam Ally having dismissed the corps of Ibrahim Khan Gardee, as a conciliatory concession to Sulabut Jung, they were immediately entertained by Sewdasheo Rao. Ibrahim Khan was the kinsman of Muzuffir Khan; but the latter, who had just returned from an expedition against a Koolee Raja near Surat, probably suspected that this measure was a prelude to his own supersession. The assassin he engaged, who was one of his own corps, attempted to strike the blow in a Durbar tent, pitched on the spot where the British troops are now cantoned, and where Sewdasheo Rao was seated for the transaction of public business. He would have effected his purpose; but Nagoojee Goozur, an active Sillidar, who stood behind the Bhow, seized the assassin's arm, and the point of the dagger caused but a slight wound in his back. The man was put to the torture, and confessed that he was employed by Muzuffir Khan. The latter, on being sent for, did not deny the fact; and without further enquiry he was instantly led

out to execution, and put to death, with the criminal he had hired.* A Purvoe, in the employ of Muzuffir Khan, being also implicated, was thrown into a hill fort, and never after heard of; the usual fate of state prisoners sent to hill forts by the Mahratta Government.

It having been determined that Sewdasheo Rao should take command of the army during the ensuing season, whilst the civil administration was committed to Rugonath Rao, the troops were assembled for the purpose of proceeding to the northward, when accounts arrived of the success of an intrigue for the surrender of Ahmednugur, which was betrayed into the hands of a Brainin agent of Sewdasheo Rao, by Kuwee Jung, the Moghul Killidar, for a sum of money. A war with Hyderabad immediately ensued. Sulabut Jung and Nizam Ally were ill-prepared for this event; their army was in arrears, and mutinous; an insurrection, caused by Soorya Rao, the Deshmookh of Neermul, had just been quelled; and the resources of the country, during the late factious intrigues, had been neglected or wasted. But the disgrace of relinquishing without a struggle the ancient capital of the Nizam Shahee Kings, the reduction of which a century and a half before had cost so much Moghul blood, prevailed over the sober dictates of prudence, and the main army, without preparation or equipment, but with a vast quantity of baggage and cumbersome artillery, moved towards Beder, and from thence to Dharoor. Sulabut Jung and Nizam Ally, attended by a small force of seven or eight thousand men, were moving towards Oodgeer.

The Peishwa in person proceeded to Ahmednugur with a large army, intended as a reserve, whilst Sewdasheo Rao moved in an easterly direction, took the fort of Buhadurgurh on the Beema, and was on the borders of the Moghul territory, when he received intelligence of the enemy's motions and position, as already described. He immediately detached a force in advance, when Sulabut Jung and Nizam Ally, instead of quitting the artillery which accompanied them, and pushing forward

* Mahratta MSS.

to their main body, took post at Oodgeer, and began to waste their ammunition in skirmishing with the Mahratta light troops. This injudicious conduct afforded Sewdasheo Rao leisure to bring up forty thousand horse ; whilst the regular corps of infantry, five thousand strong with a light artillery, under Ibrahim Khan Gardee, was advancing to reinforce him.

The brothers saw their error when too late ; but they moved

A. D. 1760. from Oodgeer in hopes of being able to join their main body, or that troops from Dharoor would be sent to their support. In both these expectations they were disappointed ; the troops at Dharoor, either entirely occupied in watching the motions of the Peishwa, or not apprized of their situation, made no effort to relieve them. The Moghul guns made little impression on the open straggling horse of the Mahrattas, but the constant skirmishing impeded the march, and in a few days Ibrahim Khan Gardee, with his infantry and guns, arrived. His artillery, which was served after the European manner, made great havoc on the crowded bodies of Moghul cavalry, and those who ventured to extend their order were immediately charged by the Mahrattas whilst their grain and forage were effectually cut off. Nizam Ally attempted to negotiate, but Sewdasheo Rao desired him to surrender, a disgrace to which neither of the brothers would submit. A desperate charge was made on Ibrahim Khan's corps, which was completely broken, eleven of his standards taken, and many of his men killed : but this success was but of short duration ; a body of Mahrattas attacked the right wing under Shoukut Jung, and cut nearly three thousand Moghuls to pieces.

Nizam Ally renewed his negotiations, and sent his seal of state as minister to Sewdasheo Rao, signifying that he left it to his generosity to make the terms. A treaty was accordingly concluded, by which the forts of Doulutabad, Sewneree, Asseergurh, and Beejapoore were given up to the Mahrattas, the possession of Ahmednugur was confirmed, and districts yielded, which included the province of Beejapoore, and a part of Beder ; together with the province of Aurungabad, excepting the city and two of its pergunnas, Hursoul and Sittarah. The annual

revenue of these cessions* amounted to upwards of sixty-two lakhs of rupees; and, according to an obvious policy, invariably observed by the Peishwas, forty-one lakhs were given over as military jagheer to his officers, who always shared in the advantage, or disadvantage, by territory acquired or lost. The Moghul possessions in the Deccan were now confined to an insulated space, which must, it seemed, be soon wholly overwhelmed. A compactness and power would thus be insured to the Peishwa's dominion, which promised to preserve the Bramin ascendancy, and spread the authority of Hindoos over the vast empire where they had, for many centuries, been a conquered people in their native land. The pre-eminence to which the Mahrattas had attained was animating and glorious; their right to tribute was acknowledged on the banks of the Coleroon, and the Deccan horse had quenched their thirst from the waters of the Indus. The Mahratta people felt a pride in the conquests of their countrymen; and action, enterprise, and wealth raised them in political consequence above the mass of that humble race, who, by a system of opinions, stand fettered among nations in the growth of wisdom, and are content to live and to die in the same occupation, and with equal apathy, as their thousand progenitors. How far this stimulus in Maharashtra might ultimately have improved them,

* Poonah records.

Sewdasheo Rao obtained these cessions in four separate deeds.

	Rs.	a.	p.
1. In his own name	1,97,499	5	0
2. In the name of the Peishwa's second son ...	20,44,115	14	1
3. In the name of the Peishwa's third son ...	35,02,247	14	0
It is not known in whose name the other sunnud was issued, but the districts and the amount of their revenue are recorded as follows:—			
Pergunna Meyhekur 1,73,269	15	2	
———— Durrucheegaom 35,500	0	0	
Boolundee Burhanpoor 1,75,000	0	0	
Pergunna Purboney 55,524	9	0	
Chaloo Pytun and Ambad 52,000	0	0	
	<hr/>		
Total amount of cession.....Rs. 62,36,157	8	3	

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or elevated them in the scale of human nature, may be left to the consideration of those who indulge in such speculations; but in their conquests, certainly, no other nation can sympathize: they were not animated by that patriotism which devotes itself merely for its country's weal, or its country's glory, the extension of their sway carried no freedom even to Hindoos, except freedom of opinion; and it rarely brought protection, or improved the habits and condition of the vanquished. Destruction, rapine, oppression, and tyranny were their more certain concomitants; and although entitled to the negative praise of not being bloodthirsty, they were unfeeling and ungenerous victors. The Mahratta people, however, who have not followed the profession of arms, and where families, unconnected with camps and courts, have lived content in the simple enjoyment of their hereditary rights and fields, are, except in one respect, their habitual disregard of truth, which is strangely contrasted with their probity in dealings with each other, a remarkably moral, kind, humane, and hospitable race.

Ballajee Rao had achieved a conquest by the exertions of his cousin, which afforded the highest gratification to his ambition; but it was not unalloyed. Accounts of great reverses were, about the same time, received from Hindoostan, which lead us back to notice the principal events that had taken place in that quarter.

CHAP. V.

FROM A. D. 1760 TO A. D. 1761.

Meer Shahabodeen seizes Mooltan and Lahore—is promptly expelled by Ahmed Shah, who advances into Hindooostan, plunders Delhi and Muttra, but is compelled to retire in consequence of a pestilence.—Meer Shahabodeen calls in the aid of Rugonath Rao against the Emperor and Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah—recovers possession of Delhi and of the Emperor's person.—Rugonath Rao conquers Mooltan and Lahore for the Peishwa—appoints Adina Beg Sur-Soobehdar, supported by the troops of Sindia—account of the sons of Ranoojee Sindia.—Duttajee is summoned from Rohileund which he had invaded at the instigation of Meer Shahabodeen to oppose the Abdallee.—Meer Shahabodeen puts the Emperor Alumgeer the Second to death.—Abdallee recovers Mooltan and Lahore—advances on Delhi—surprises Sindia's division—Duttajee and Jooteba are killed—Holkar surprised and routed.—Sevdusheo Rao Bhow marches from the Deccan to oppose the Afghans—is joined by large armies on his advance—takes possession of Delhi.—Rajpoots an' Jhats withdraw from the confederacy.—Sevdusheo Rao proclaims Mirza Juwan Bukht emperor—Storms Kunjpura.—Ahmed Shah crosses the Jumna—events from October till January.—Battle of Panniput, where the Malhattas sustain a dreadful defeat—barbary of the Afghans—consequences of the disastrous intelligence in Maharashtra.—Death and character of Baltajee Bajee Ruo.—State of the country under his government.

THE revolution at the fallen court of Delhi, which took place in the year 1754, did but increase the troublous A. D. 1751. and confusion in the northern parts of India. The new vizier,* after evincing much hardihood, during a mutiny of his troops, which he quelled by a merciless attack and plunder of all the body in which it broke out, having left Alumgeer the second, an Emperor he had raised to the throne, in the capital, departed with the Emperor's

* It may not be unnecessary to remind the reader that the person alluded to is Meer Shahabodeen, the son of Ghazec-ud-deen, and grandson of Nizam-ool-Moolk. He is often mentioned in the English records, and in various publications, as Ghazee-ud-deen II. I have thought it best to retain his original name, especially as it ought to be, Ghazee-ud-deen III.

son, the Prince Ali Gohur, towards Mooltan and Lahore ; provinces which he proposed to re-annex to the imperial throne. These vast tracts of territory were conquered, as has already been mentioned, by Ahmed Shah Abdallee;

A. D. 1758. and Meer Munnoo, who first defended them against him, afterwards accepted the government of them from the Abdallee king. Meer Munnoo died suddenly ; his son, though still a child, was confirmed in the government by Ahmed Shah, under the guardianship of the widow of Meer Munnoo. Great mismanagement ensued ; universal poverty and misrule drew many to swell the numbers of a sect which had subsisted for a considerable period under the name of Seiks, and whose rapid increase tended to augment the confusion of the country. The son of Meer Munnoo died ; and the widow, who still as guardian claimed the right of governing, after being confined for a time by one of her own officers, at last submitted to a compromise, and shared the authority with him. Under these circumstances, Meer Shahabodeen, the vizier, reasonably concluded that to obtain possession of the country would not be difficult ; but he did not extend his views to the defence which it would be necessary to prepare against the coming of the Abdallee to recover them. It appears that a daughter of Meer Munnoo had been betrothed to Meer Shahabodeen. To aid his projects he first gained the traitorous Adina Beg, who had been the first cause of the Abdallee invasion ; and, in consultation with him, Meer Shahabodeen, on his arrival in her neighbourhood, sent to the widow of Meer Munnoo, applying for his affianced bride, a request from the vizier which, on the part of the widow, was received with much satisfaction, and with which she readily complied. But Shahabodeen seized the government, conveyed the widow of Meer Munnoo to Delhi, and appointed Adina Beg to the charge of the provinces.

Ahmed Shah Abdallee, enraged at these proceedings, crossed the Attock* with a large army, the provinces were unresist-

* This was the fourth Abdallee invasion of Hindooostan, but Ahmed Shah was probably in the army of Nadir Shah, and if so, this was the fifth time he had crossed the Attock.

ingly again occupied, and the king marched onwards to Delhi. Meer Shahabodeen humbled himself, and Ahmed Shah condescended to forgive him; but Delhi was plundered, and its unhappy people again subjected to pillage, and its daughters to pollution. The city of Muttra shared a like fate, and Agra was only saved by the breaking out of a violent disease in the camp of the Afghans, which compelled their king to abandon his conquests, and hasten beyond the influence of pestilence to the more congenial climate of Cabul. He returned early in the year 1756. Prior to his quitting Delhi he had sent his own son Timoor Shah as viceroy of the Punjab, including Mooltan and Lahore, and had appointed Nujeeb-nd-dowlah, a Rohillah chief of reputation, to the office of Meer Bukhshec, and to the rank of Umeer Ool Oomrah, at the imperial court. Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, prior to the coming of the Abdallee, had attached himself to Meer Shahabodeen ; and the latter, displeased at his being set up as his own rival, and promoted without his concurrence, as soon as the Abdallee retired, stripped him of his honours, and conferred his rank and appointment on Ahmed Khan Bungush. The Emperor Alnmigeer, with Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, was in possession of Delhi ; and, as the one supported the other, Meer Shahabodeen determined to reduce them. For this purpose, on the advance of Rugonath Rao into Malwa, where he arrived in the end of 1756, Meer Shahabodeen entered on an alliance with Rugoba;* and by his assistance soon recovered Delhi, and the control of the Emperor's person. Nujeeb-nd-dowlah must have fallen a prisoner into his hands, but Mulhar Rao Holkar, who was more friendly to all the Rohillas than any of the other Mahratta chiefs, protected Nujeeb-nd-dowlah, and aided his escape from the citadel to his own territory, situated about seventy miles to the north-east of Delhi.

Rugonath Rao remained for a time encamped in the neighbourhood of the capital, when he was summoned to a great conquest, splendid indeed, but to it may be ascribed the immediate cause of the disastrous war which first checked the progress of the Mahrattas, and distinctly marks the date of their decline.

* Rugoba is the familiar name of Rugonath, and that by which the reader will frequently find this well known personage mentioned.

Ahmed Shah Abdallee, before he appointed his son Timoor to the viceroyalty of the Punjab, gave him, as his minister and adviser, Jehan Khan, who apprised of the knowledge which Adina Beg Khan possessed of the resources of the country, applied to him, and for a time derived benefit from his management of some distant districts. Adina Beg was invited to Lahore, but suspicious of Jehan Khan's designs, he refused to go and withdrew to the mountains. He was therefore treated as a rebel, but he successfully opposed the troops sent against him by raising the Seiks who from devotees and mendicants now appeared as soldiers. He also invited the Mahrattas into the province, and Rugonath Rao, then at Delhi, embraced the proposal with alacrity, met and totally defeated the Abdallee governor of Sirhind, speedily overran the country, and entered Lahore as a conqueror, in the month of May 1758. He appointed Adina Beg Sur-soobehdar of Mooltan and Lahore,* and left Shabajee, a relation of Sindia's, to support him with a body of Mahratta troops. Rugonath Rao then returned towards Poona; but his improvidence in this as well as in most expeditions of his life was very conspicuous; the magnitude of his conquests brought no revenue to the exchequer; and upwards of eighty lakhs of rupees, over and above his receipts, were charged on the present occasion; a circumstance which as has been alluded to called forth the strictures of his cousin, and gave vent to those feelings of family jealousy with which Sewdasheo Rao Bhow was beset.

Rugonath Rao, before he quitted Hindoostan, left Mulhar Rao Holkar and Duttajee Sindia in Malwa, whilst Junkajee, the son of Jyapa Sindia, remained near Delhi at the head of a body of troops, for the purpose of collecting tribute from the Rajpoot states, and of supporting, if necessary, the troops in Lahore.†

Ranoojee Sindia, so much distinguished under the great Bajee Rao, had three legitimate and two illegitimate sons; of the former were Jyapa, Duttajee, and Jooteba; of the latter,

* It is said that Adina Beg Khan agreed to hold the provinces of the Mahrattas, paying an annual tribute of seventy-five lakhs of rupees.

† Seyr Mutuakhhereen, partly supported by Mahratta MSS.

Tookajee and Mahadajee. The whole of the five sons survived their father, except Tookajee. Ranoojee Sindia died shortly after Shao ; his sons Duttajee and Mahadajee were generally employed to command the troops with the Peishwa, whilst Jyapa was acting in Hindoostan.

In consequence of a dispute between Ram Sing and Bejee Sing, the sons of Abhee Sing, Raja of Joudpoor, regarding the

A. D. 1759. division of their father's territory after his death, the former solicited aid from the Peishwa, who directed Jyapa to support Ram Sing and settle their affairs. Jyapa was at first successful against Bejec Sing, whom he besieged in Nagour, but the latter, following the infamous example of his father in regard to Peelajee Gaekwar, engaged two persons, who, under the promise of a jagheer, repaired to Jyapa as accredited negotiators, and watching their opportunity assassinated him. Of the murderers one escaped, and Jyapa's army retired, but Rugonath Rao afterwards accomplished the object of the expedition, took Ajimere, and established a tribute over the Joudpoor territory.*

The most distinguished of the remaining sons of Ranoojee were Duttajee and Mahadajee, who first brought themselves into notice against Sulabut Jung and the French, in the war of 1751. Both of them were now left in Hindoostan, and not long after Rugonath Rao's departure, Duttajee, incited by the restless Vizier Meer Shahabodeen, advanced with a large force to reduce the territory of the Rohillas. Operations were at first directed against Nujeeb-nd-dowlah only, who being unable to withstand such numbers, took post and entrenched himself on the bank of the Ganges, until relieved by Shujah-nd-dowlah, who, although he detested the Rohillas, as much as his father had done, was yet sensible that to unite against the Mahrattas was the only chance of safety to himself. Upon the advance of Shujah-nd-dowlah, Govind Punt Boondelay, the Soobehdar

* Mahratta MSS. and Tareekh-i-Dukhin, a Persian MS. in Mr. Erskine's library, written by Boodh Sing, a native of Lahore, at the request of Major James Browne ;—a valuable little manuscript. I have not been able to ascertain the date of Jyapa's murder, nor does Sir John Malcolm's report give it.

in charge of the Peishwa's share of Bundelcund,* was directed by Duttajee to advance with his troops, and lay waste the whole territory of the Rohillas, an order which he promptly obeyed, and committed great havoc both in the Dooab and east of the Ganges, where he drove the whole of the chiefs to seek shelter in the Kumaon hills. Shujah-ud-dowlah advanced towards Govind Punt, and as soon as he came near, detached a part of his army, principally composed of Gosaeens, who attacked and routed Govind Punt with great slaughter, and drove his troops with much confusion across the river, in which many of them were drowned.

After this event negotiations having been opened with Duttajee, he was induced to grant terms, not on account of the defeat of Govind Punt, but from having received intelligence that Ahmed Shah Abdallee was advancing in great force to recover the provinces of Mooltan and Lahore. Although the Rohillas anxiously looked to the arrival of the Abdallee, and were then in communication with Ahmed Shah, they did not hesitate to give the strongest assurances of friendship to Duttajee, and confirmed their agreement on oath. Shujah-ud-dowlah joined in similar declarations, with more sincerity at the time, as he bore a personal and hereditary dislike to Ahmed Shah, which generally has much effect on the political conduct both of Hindoos and Mahomedans, and he dreaded the invasion of the Abdallee, as much as the encroachments of the Mahrattas.

Whilst these events were passing between the Mahrattas on the one part, and the Rohillas and Nabob of Oude on the other, Meer Shahabodeen, in consequence, it is said, of discovering a correspondence with Ahmed Shah Abdallee, put the Emperor, Alumgeer II., to death, together with his own relation, Intizam-ud-dowlah. He then raised to the imperial dignity a son of Kaum Bukhsh, the youngest son of Aurungzebe, by the title of Shah Jehan ; whilst Ali Gohur, or Shah Alum, the son of the late nominal Emperor, after having some time before ineffectually applied for aid to Wittul Sewdeo, one of the

* He derived his designations of Boondelay and the Jhansee-Wala from his situation.

Peishwa's officers, and to Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, was used as an instrument, by the crafty Shujah-ud-dowlah, and became the nominal head of a confederacy against Meer Jaffeir and the English, in the well-known warfare of Bengal. Meer Shahabodeen, after having perpetrated those execrable deeds, in order to await the issue of the approaching contest between the Mahrattas and the Abdallee, sought protection with Sooruj Mull, Raja of the Jaths, who, with mistaken generosity, afforded him an asylum in one of his forts.

The Mahratta officer in Lahore was speedily put to flight, before Duttajee and Holkar could advance to his assistance. Ahmed Shah crossed the Jumna with the main body of his army, for the double purpose of favouring the junction of the Rohillas, and of procuring forage and supplies with greater facility. At the same time his advanced division continued to march on, and Duttajee, fancying it was the main army, retired skirmishing. Holkar, who was in the rear of Duttajee, at some distance also retired. They had not thirty thousand men in both their armies, which appear to have been nearly equally divided. Holkar was negotiating with Sooruj Mull for his assistance, which the Jath promised, but refused to act in the field whilst the Mahrattas were so weak.

In this manner they gradually fell back along the west bank of the Jumna; but their excesses had made the peasantry their enemies, and they were unusually deficient in regard to intelligence. Whilst the Abdallee vanguard occupied their attention in front, Ahmed Shah, assisted by the local knowledge and activity of Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, suddenly crossed the Jumna, near Delhi, took the division of Duttajee Sindia in flank, completely surprised them, and scarcely one-third of their number escaped. Of that number were Mahadajee Sindia, and his nephew Junkojee, the son of Jyapa; but Duttajee and Jooteba were killed.

Holkar, on the news of this disaster, continued his retreat with great expedition until beyond Agra, where, stopping to take breath, he heard of a large convoy of supplies escorted by the troops of Ahmed Khan Bungush, and intended for the Abdallee camp. On this intelligence he crossed the Jumna,

took or destroyed a great part of the convoy, and again retired until he reached Sekundra, east of the Jumna, but south of the Chumbul, where he fancied himself secure. A body of Afghans, however, detached from their main army, overtook him by a prodigious march, and routed his troops with great slaughter.*

Accounts of these reverses reached the Peishwa when encamped on the Manjera river, after the conclusion of the treaty by which so large a portion of the Deccan was ceded to him. Sewdasheo Rao, exulting in his late victory, requested permission to accompany Wiswas Rao, recover the lost reputation of the Mahrattas in Hindooostan, and drive the Afghans beyond the Attock ; a proposal in which the Peishwa acquiesced. The natural violence of the Bhow's temper was increased by the family jealousy he had experienced, and the factious intrigues to which it gave rise. His pride was augmented by his extraordinary good fortune in the late campaign, and the spirit of military enthusiasm so dangerous in a general without experience, took complete possession of his mind. Success had inspired him with a blind confidence, which salutary reverses in a humbler sphere would in all probability have amended ; but it is unfortunate that such lessons cannot always reach individuals in high command until the interests of their country and the lives of thousands may have been sacrificed to the effects of their arrogance and indiscretion.

The Deccan army, prepared to accompany Sewdasheo Rao and his nephew, amounted to about twenty-thousand chosen horse ; besides ten thousand men, artillery, and disciplined infantry, under Ibrahim Khan Gardee, whose corps was doubled, after the late service against Sulabut Jung and Nizam Ally.

* I have, after a comparison of the Persian and Mahratta authorities, (perhaps on insufficient evidence,) rejected the former, wherein it is stated that Holkar was in the Jeypoor country when Duttajee retreated, and that it was at the Sekundra, near Delhi, where he was surprised. The Tareekh-i-Dukhin by Boodh Sing follows the Persian manuscripts, and accounts for Holkar's venturing so near Delhi, by stating that the Afghans had gone to Nagour in pursuit of Junkajee. I should be glad, though a point of no great importance, to be able to present it to my readers with more confidence.

The equipment of this army was more splendid in appearance than any Mahratta force that ever took the field.* The camp equipage which, in the former expensive campaign, had been brought back from Hindooostan by Rugonath Rao, was employed as part of the decoration. The lofty and spacious tents, lined with silks and broad cloths, were surmounted by large gilded ornaments, conspicuous at a great distance; immense parti-coloured walls of canvass enclosed each suit of tents, belonging to the principal officers; vast numbers of elephants, flags of all descriptions, the finest horses, magnificently caparisoned, and all those accompaniments of an Indian army, which give such an imposing effect to its appearance, seemed to be collected from every quarter in the Bhow's camp. Cloth of gold was the dress of the officers, and all seemed to vie in that profuse and gorgeous display characteristic of wealth lightly acquired. It was, in this instance, an imitation of the more becoming and tasteful array of the magnificent Moghuls in the zenith of their glory.

The principal officers with the Bhow's division were Bulwunt Rao Gunput Mendlee, Sumsher Buhadur, Naroo Shunkur (Raja Buhadur), Wittul Sewdeo (Vinchoorkur), Trim-buck Sewdasheo (Poorundhuree), with many of the chiefs or connections of the old Mahratta families, who were now but secondary personages in the Deccan, owing to the power of the Peishwas, and the consequent ascendancy of the Bramins.

A large army remained with Ballajee Rao; but orders were dispatched to all the Mahratta commanders to join the standard of Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, as he advanced towards the Moghul capital. Accordingly, before he crossed the Chunbul, Mulhar Rao Holkar, Junkojee Sindia, Dummajee Gaekwar, Jeswunt Rao Powar, Appajee Rao Atowlay, Antajee Mankesir, Govind Punt Boondelay, and many others of less note, had joined with their troops. Most of the Rajpoot chieftains sent parties

* Abajee Gonedeo, a highly respectable old Brahmin, now employed in the judicial department at Satara, was then in a civil situation at Sun-gumnera: he was two days in the Bhow's camp when his army was encamped on the Paira, and gives a most lively description of it.

of their horse, vast numbers of Pindharees, and irregulars of all descriptions, flocked to the increasing host ; it seemed the national cause with all Hindoos ; and Soorj Mull, through the agency of Holkar, was induced to meet the army with thirty thousand men.

The experienced Jath, however, soon perceived that the unwieldy assemblage under the Bhow, clogged with a cumbersome artillery, and suiting their movements to those of an attendant body of infantry, were ill adapted to the purpose of the war. He proposed, therefore, that the families and all the heavy equipments should be placed either in Gwalior or Jhansee, or under the protection of some of his own forts, whilst the Mahratta horse and his own could cut off the supplies ; and, by constant skirmishing, oblige the Mahomedan princes to withdraw, and compel the Abdallee to retreat. Holkar coincided in this opinion, but Sewdasheo Rao had an aversion to Holkar, the enemy of Ramchundur Shenwee, and from the connection between Holkar and the Jaths he imbibed a prejudice against Soorj Mull. Common report had spread accounts of wonders performed by Europeans ; Sewdasheo Rao himself had witnessed the effects of French discipline and artillery ; he had gained great advantages by the employment of Ibrahim Khan, and he haughtily contemned the only advice which might have ensured success.* The army proceeded to Delhi, and attempted the citadel at once. A party of the Mahrattas clambered up one of the towers, and got inside, whilst the main body was assaulting the gateway, and the besieged busy in defending it ; but the Mahrattas, who had made good their entrance, without ever thinking of opening the gate to keep possession of the place, began to plunder, for some time without interruption, but being at last discovered, the whole body, as helpless as an unarmed mob, were driven out by about twelve men.† The assault was therefore deferred, batteries were opened, and in a short time the fort capitulated.‡

* Mahratta MSS. Asiatic Researches, vol. iii. Seyr Mutuakhereen.

† Seyr Mutuakhereen.

‡ Seyr Mutuakhereen, Mahratta MSS., and Asiatic Researches.

The Bhow, on this success, proposed placing Wiswas Rao on the throne, and making Shujah-ud-dowlah his Vizier.*

As the Jumna was already unfordable, Sewdasheo Bhow cantoned his army at Delhi, where his innumerable followers consumed everything in the neighbourhood; all articles of provision and supply became scarce, but the first difficulty that appeared to the Bhow was the want of treasure. In this respect, however, he was more provident than in others, he brought two krores of rupees with him from the Deccan, and Holkar, Sindia, Govind Punt, Boondelay, and the Rajpoots furnished three more; but the prospect of want of funds induced Sewdasheo Rao to seize the gold and silver ornaments of the imperial audience chamber, and to destroy the throne; from all which he only procured the sum of seventeen lakhs of rupees.

Against this procedure both Holkar and Sooruj Mull remonstrated in the strongest manner, as they considered it both impolitic and indecorous, but Sewdasheo Rao treated their opinion with scorn, on which Sooruj Mull with his whole force quitted the army in disgust, and the Rajpoots, at the suggestion of some of their friends in the Mahomedan camp, withdrew from the confederacy.†

In the meantime Ahmed Shah Abdallee, whose camp was opposite to Anopshuhur, on the Ganges, had through Nujeeb-ud-dowlah prevailed on Shujah-ud-dowlah to make common cause with the Mussulmans against the Hindoos; but as Shujah-ud-dowlah was less inimical to the Mahrattas than any of the other confederates, Sewdasheo Rao used many endeavours to conciliate or detach him from the alliance, opened a private communication, and also made him the organ of a public ne-

* Mulhar Rao Holkar, in his account of the campaign, asserts that the Bhow placed Wiswas Rao on the throne: the account in the Asiatic Researches, said to be on the authority of Shujah-ud-dowlah, mentions that such an arrangement was intended; but it seems to be an exaggeration on the part of Holkar.

† Mahratta MSS., Holkar's letter, and Seyr Mutuakhereen: all the Mahratta accounts impute Sooruj Mull's defection wholly to the Bhow's misconduct. The Asiatic Researches say that he also was advised by the Mahomedans.

gotiation, which continued to be carried on for months between the Mahrattas and the Abdallee. Both the public and private intercourse was laid open by Shujah-ud-dowlah to his allies, and his answers were dictated at their suggestion.*

When the violence of the monsoon had subsided Sewdashee Rao raised Mirza Juwan Bukht, the son of the absent Shah Alum, to the throne of Delhi, and proclaimed Shujah-ud-dowlah vizier of the empire. He then left Naroo Shunkur (Raja Bulhadur) with a garrison in the citadel, and proceeded in person to Kunjpoora, a fortified town strongly garrisoned, which he breached and stormed. Ahmed Shah had been very desirous of relieving this post, but the Jumna was not yet fordable. He however moved his camp to the banks of that river, continued to amuse the Bhow by negotiation, and after some failures at last discovered a ford, which he crossed twenty miles above Delhi;—a great part of his army had gained the western bank before the Bhow would give credit to the intelligence,† and the whole of the Mahomedans were across by the 25th October. On the following morning the advanced guards of the two armies had a severe action, and both sides claimed the advantage; the Mahrattas intended to attack next day, but Holkar was still anxious to adopt the predatory plan, and act against their supplies. Ibrahim Khan expostulated in a very violent manner; he said it would be abandoning him and his corps to destruction, and that he would turn his guns on the first body of cavalry that followed such an advice.‡ These dissensions were with some difficulty suppressed; and during their continuance the Mahrattas retired skirmishing to Panniput where Sewdashee Rao by Ibrahim Khan's advice intrenched himself. He dug a ditch fifty feet wide and twelve feet deep, and raised a rampart on which he mounted cannon, round both his own camp and the

* Asiatic Researches.

† Mahratta MSS. One Mahratta account by Rugonath Yadow, the Baker-Nuwées of the Peishwa, states that they were opposed in fording, but all other authority is against the assertion.

‡ Mahratta MSS. confirmed by Holkar's own letter.

village of Panniput. Ahmed Shah likewise encamped with his allies, and fortified himself by placing felled trees around his army.

The Mahomedan force consisted of forty-one thousand eight hundred horse, thirty-eight thousand foot, and about seventy pieces of cannon : these were choice troops, but the irregulars not mustered were very numerous, and probably amounted to as many more. The Mahrattas have been reckoned at fifty-five thousand horse, and fifteen thousand foot, with two hundred pieces of cannon,* besides their Pindharees and followers, of whom there are supposed to have been upwards of two hundred thousand souls.

Soon after the armies had taken post, Sewdasheo Rao directed Govind Punt Boondelay to cut off the enemy's supplies, in which he was for a time very successful ; but Attaec Khan, sent out for the purpose, having come suddenly upon him when in a mango grove with only about a thousand of his men, the rest being dispersed plundering, attacked and killed him, cut off his head, and presented the acceptable present to the Abdallee King. Before the death of Govind Punt there was a probability that a treaty might be concluded, and the officers in both armies had visited each other ; but as Sewdasheo Rao declared that Govind Punt was only in quest of forage for his own army, mutual accusations of treachery inflamed both parties, and negotiation for a time ceased.† The loss of Govind Punt was followed by another misfortune ; a party of horse in charge of treasure, each man carrying a bag, were returning with it from Delhi, but having in the night mistaken the Afghan camp for their own, they were cut off with the whole of the treasure.‡ Nevertheless the Rajpoots, although they had deserted, contrived to assist the Mahrattas with money, and Sooruj Mull sent a very large sum,§ which safely reached their camp ; but the distress was soon extreme, and the battalions of Ibrahim Khan became clamorous for arrears.||

* Asiatic Researches.

† Holkar's letter.

‡ Asiatic Researches and Tareekh-i-Dukhin.

§ One manuscript says a crore of rupees.

|| Mahratta MSS.

Holkar proposed that they should attack with their horse and leave the Gardees (such was the name by which the regular infantry were distinguished) to take care of the camp; a taunt, to which the Bhow showed himself superior, by acceding to the proposal.*

This attack was made on the 29th November on the left of the Abdallee camp, wher Shah Wulee Khan, the Vizier of Ahmed Shah, was posted. The Mahrattas, in number about fifteen thousand, broke in, charged at all they met, and although the Afghans stood, they were broken, and upwards of two thousand of them killed; at last the Vizier having been supported from all parts of the camp, the Mahrattas retired with the loss of one thousand men.† Holkar led on that occasion; and although there was constant and daily skirmishing, in which the Mahratta horsemen individually killed their antagonists,‡ there was no action of importance, until the 23rd December, when Shewdasheo Bhow, Wiswas Rao, Holkar, Bulwunt Rao, Gunput Mendlee, and several other commanders came out to attack Shah Wulee Khan, who, attended by a body of horse, was proceeding to a mosque in the neighbourhood,§ and was surrounded by this host of Mahrattas. Nujeeb-ud-dowlah and many other officers came ont to support him, and a very desperate conflict ensued. Nujeeb-ud-dowlah having advanced beyond the others, towards the entrenchment, Bulwunt Rao, then acting as the Dewan of Sewdasheo Rao, an officer of courage and experience, instantly seized the advantage, and charged him furiously; three thousand Rohillas were killed, and Nujeeb-ud-dowlah for a time in great danger of being taken, but Bulwunt Rao, in the moment of victory, was shot, after the close of day, by a musket-ball, when the Bhow, greatly afflicted by his loss, thought only of retiring to his entrenchment with the body of

* Oral information.

† Mahratta MS. Asiatic Researches.

‡ Oral information; there was a large post (*a run-kham*) erected between the camps by the Bhow, where challenges and duels constantly took place.

§ Tareekh-i-Dukhin.

his friend.* Actions took place almost daily, and the Rohillas and Shujah-ud-dowlah earnestly tried to bring on a decisive action. But Ahmed Shah steadily refused,† in which he showed himself a good general, acquainted both with the minds of men and the science of war. The irritable impatience in his own camp, where the hardships were trifling compared with the Mahratta distress, told him precisely the state of his enemies, and that every day's delay in their situation, only rendered the prey more certain. The Mahrattas were starving : the improvident waste to which they had long been accustomed rendered them totally unable to bear privation, and in action gave them full time to reflect on the state to which they were reduced. Sewdasheo Bhow saw that it was now impossible to avoid a decisive battle ; and although he still negotiated, his own judgment told him it was hopeless. A vast body of his followers, whom hunger had made careless and daring, issued forth from the entrenchment in the night to procure food for themselves or their famished families, when they were discovered, surrounded, and butchered by the Afghans. The Mahrattas called to be led forth to fall by the sword, and not to be left to die in long endurance of useless misery. The chiefs applied to the Bhow, who approved of

their resolve, and with his ordinary manner, and
6th January 1761. in perfect composure, distributed the usual *pan*
and *betel* at breaking up of the assembly.‡

Orders to prepare for battle were issued to the troops. All

7th January. the grain in store was distributed, that they
might have one full meal that night, and on the
7th January an hour before the break of morning, the Mahratta

* This was the same officer that levied the contribution from the Carnatic, and with whom Mr. Pigot corresponded in 1757. It is mentioned by the author of the Seyr Mutnakhereen, that the Rohillas on this occasion penetrated into the Mahratta entrenchment ; this is not stated by Kassee Punt or Boodh Sing, and is positively contradicted by Naroo Bhugwunt, the Arla Koolkurnee. Of Naroo Bhugwunt I shall take further notice presently.

† Asiatic Researches.

‡ On the breaking up of an assembly or *levée*, or even in dismissing an ordinary visitor, rose-water, cardamoms, cloves, mace, &c., are first distributed ; when the *pan* leaves and *betel* are given, it is the signal for departure.

troops were moving out of their entrenchment, left in front; their cannon, swivels, *shuternals* or musquetoons mounted on camels, and their rockets marched first, covered by Ibrahim Khan Gardee; next came Dummajee Gaekwar's horse, followed by those of Wittul Sewdeo, Sewdasheo Bhow, and Wiswas Rao, Jeswunt Rao Powar, Shumsher Buhadur, Mulhar Rao Holkar, and Junkojee Sindia.

In this order they slowly advanced towards the Abdallee camp with every symptom of hopeless despair rather than of steady resolution. The ends of their turbans were let loose, their hands and faces anointed with a preparation of turmeric,* and everything seemed to bespeak the despondency of sacrifice prepared, instead of victory determined. Sewdasheo Rao gave over his own wife and several of the principal families to the particular care of Holkar. His reason for this is supposed to have been that Mulhar Rao was the only chief who might expect to find favour with the unrelenting Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, by whose counsel Ahmed Shah was greatly swayed, and Holkar was therefore the only person whose influence was likely to obtain their eventual protection. Sewdasheo

A. D. 1761. Rao, just before he moved out, sent a note to one of the Carcoons† of Shujah-ud-dowlah, who had been employed as an agent in their negotiation, in which was written, "The cup is now full to the brim, and cannot hold another drop," and requested that if anything could be done, it might be immediate. At the time this note was received, the scouts of Shujah-ud-dowlah brought intelligence that the Mahrattas were moving out, on which he proceeded straight to the king, whom he found asleep in his tent with his horse saddled at the door. On being awoke he asked—what news? and when informed of the exigency, mounted his horse, and rode forward about a mile in front of his lines, where he at first began to doubt the intelligence; but by this time the Mahrattas had drawn up their army in the same order as they had moved out, with Ibrahim Khan on the left and Junkojeo

* These preparations signified that they were come forth to die.

† Kassec Punt, the same whose well written account of the campaign is published in the Asiatic Researches by Mr. James Browne.

Sindia on the right; their artillery was placed in front of their line, and a general discharge of cannon announced that they were ready. Upon hearing this the king, who was sitting upon his horse, smoking a Persian kalloon, gave it to his attendant, and with great calmness said to Shujah-ud-dowlah, "Your servant's news is very true, I see." He then ordered out his army, which drew up with its artillery in front. His Grand Vizier, Shah Wuleo Khan, with the Afghans, was posted in the centre; from which Ahmed Khan Bungush, Hafiz Rehnum, and Doondy Khan Rohillahs, with Umeer Beg and Berkhor-dar Khan, formed the right wing; and on the Vizier's left were posted Shujah-ud-dowlah, Nabob of Oude, and Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, Rohillah. Shah Pusund Khan, with a choice body of Afghans, secured the extremity of the left flank. In this order the battle began with a general cannonade, and the lines drew near to each other. Ibrahim Khan Gardee, supported by Dummajeo Gaekwar, advanced resolutely on the Rohillas in the right wing of the Mahomedan army, covering his left flank from the attack of Umeer Beg and Berkhdar Khan, by wheeling back two of his battalions in an oblique direction from their right. On the right of the Mahrattas, Junkojee Sindia was immediately opposed to Shah Pusund Khan and Nujeeb-ud-dowlah. The last advanced, throwing up a succession of embankments to cover his infantry,—a most extraordinary labour, which he probably undertook with a view to ultimate defence, that in case, as was not improbable, the desperate impetuosity of the Mahrattas should break through the troops, each embankment might then prove a rallying point.

Sewdashee Rao, with his nephew, and Jeswunt Rao Powar were opposite to the Grand Vizier. The great Bhugwa Jenda, or standard of the nation, was raised in the front, and three Juree Putkas were in the field. Ahmed Shah was at some distance in rear of the Mahomedan army. When the combatants respectively had outmarched their artillery, the Mahratta cry of Hur Huree ! Hur Huree ! was distinctly heard; the battle then very soon became general, and a tremendous charge was made full on the centre, where the troops of the Grand Vizier, of which ten thousand were horse, were guilty of a

great mistake, in not advancing to meet the shock. The Mahrattas, in consequence, broke through them, but riders on both sides were dashed to the ground. The dust and confusion were so great, that combatants, whilst they fought hand to hand, and grappled in the strife of death, could only distinguish each other by the Mahomedan Allah ! and Deen ! or the incessant Hur ! Hur ! Mahdeo ! which rent the air from the Mahratta host. Shah Wulee Khan, in full armour, threw himself from his horse, and the bravest of his men followed his example ; but most of the Afghans gave way. "Our country is far off, my friends," said the Vizier, "whither do you fly !" but he was left for a time, defended only by the broken remnant of his force. Ibrahim Khan Gardee, though with the loss of more than half his men, and himself wounded, was successful ; near eight thousand Rohillas lay dead or wounded ; but the left wing of the Mahomedan army was still unbroken. This state of the battle was, about noon, reported to Ahmed Shah, who now evinced the collected decision of a great commander. He directed a chosen band of his personal guards to enter his encampment, and drive out every armed man who had retired from his duty ; an order which they promptly executed. Troops were soon sent to support the right wing, and the Grand Vizier was directed to make repeated charges with ten thousand men at full gallop, on the centre of the Mahrattas ; whilst Shah Pusund Khan and Nujeeb-ul-dowlah supported the Vizier by simultaneous attacks on the flank. These onsets were still met and repulsed ; but the physical strength of the Afghans, in the protracted and close struggle, was an overmatch for the slighter frames of the Hindoo natives of the south. The Mahrattas, however, on this terrible day fought valiantly ; and no chief was reproachable except Mulhar Rao Holkar. Of his countrymen none doubted his courage, but he did not do his utmost to support his prince ; and some do not hesitate to accuse him of treachery. A little after two o'clock in the afternoon Wiswas Rao was mortally wounded ; on seeing which Sewdashee Rao Bhow descended from his elephant, sent, as is said, a message to Holkar "to do as he had directed," and mounting his horse, a famous Arab charger,

disappeared in the confusion of the fight. The message to Holkar if it ever was sent as he alleges proved instantaneously fatal. Holkar went off, Dummajee Gackwar followed, and in a moment resistance on the part of the Mahrattas ceased. All was then flight and confusion. Thousands were cut down, and vast numbers perished by suffocation in the ditch of their entrenchment; men, women and children crowded into the village of Panniput, where they were surrounded for the night; and here it might seem that the greatest barbarians would have been touched with some feeling of mercy; but the Afghans showed none. To the eternal disgrace of themselves and of humanity, they next morning coolly took out the unfortunate victims, and divided them in their camp. They retained the women and children as slaves; but they ranged the men in lines, and amused themselves in cutting off their heads,* which

* They ranged them in lines, gave each of the unfortunate wretches a few grains of parched grain, and the Bihishee (or water carrier) went along pouring a little water into their palms, after which they were beheaded. Naroo Bhugwunt, Koolkurnee of Arla, one of the persons led out to execution, relates his escape in the following manner. He was Carcoo in charge of the accounts of a party of Afghans belonging to the Bhow's artillery at the time they left the Deccan. When the Mahrattas attacked their countrymen, the Jemadar of the Afghans, Hoossein Khan, who was a person well known, represented to the Bhow that his people were afraid to fight, as they had been assured, both by the Rohillas and the Abdallee, that they should be executed if they appeared in arms against their own king. He therefore solicited and obtained his discharge; but he assured Sewdashee Rao, that he would return when he could with safety; that he had ate his salt and regretted his being compelled to leave his service. He afterwards kept up a correspondence with the Bhow, to which the narrator was privy. The Bihishee, who poured the water into his hand, was the same that had served with Hossein Khan. He immediately ran to the Jemadar, and told him, "here is our Brahmin about to be killed." Hoossein Khan came forward, said something to his countrymen, which the narrator believed was, "he wanted him as a slave," and dragged him violently by the arm towards his tent, where he remained for a day. The Jemadar then asked him through an interpreter, if he would like to stay with him, or go back to the Deccan. To which the narrator replied, that "he would like to stay with him." "Tell him he lies," said the Jemadar; shortly after he called him on one side, told him in Hindooostanee (which he could speak very well when he chose,) that a party of horse belonging to a friend of his would escort him twenty kos from camp; the generous Afghan at the same time

they afterwards piled as trophies in front of their tents. The body of Wiswas Rao was found, and Ahmed Shah having sent for it to look at, the Afghans assembled in a tumultuous manner, calling out, "This is the body of the king of the unbelievers; we will have it dried and stuffed to carry back to Cabul."

Shujah-ud-dowlah and the Rohillas prevailed on Ahmed Shah to permit the body to be burnt by the Hindoos. Shujah-ud-dowlah also endeavoured to save Junkojee Sindia and Ibrahim Khan Gardee, who were among the wounded prisoners; but the enmity of Nujeeb-ud-dowlah to the name of Sindia was inflexible, and the crime on the part of Ibrahim Khan, of having fought on the side of Hindoos against the true believers, decided his doom. They were both put to death. A headless trunk, supposed to be the body of the Bhow, was found at some distance from the field of battle, and there is scarce a doubt of his having been slain, but his fate was never accurately known. Jeswunt Rao Powar fell in the field, but Shumsher Buhadur escaped wounded from the battle, and was one of the many massacred by the peasantry. Wittul Sewdeo (Vinchorkur), Dummajee Gaekwar, and Naroo Shunkur,* with part of the garrison at Delhi, returned to their own country. Of

gave him five gold mohurs, telling him to be careful his escort knew nothing of his having money, and thus they parted. The narrator, after they had gone some distance, bethought him of the Jemadar's advice, and conceiving it likely that his conductors might search him, put his gold into his mouth, and shortly after when they turned round towards their camp, thought his treasure quite secure. But one of their party, more cunning than the rest, had observed him put the money in his mouth; and when his companions had got to a sufficient distance he set out after the prize. Presently, the narrator, who was running on as fast as he could, heard a cry of "Ho! Bohman!" behind him, and turning round saw an Afghan with *large eyes* and a *very long* beard in pursuit of him;—he stood in terror. "Ho, Bohman!" said he in broken Hindooostanee, "what have you got in your mouth?" and obliged him to give up his gold mohurs; he then told him "to go to the devil," and galloped back to rejoin his comrades.

I believe the old man's narration to be perfectly correct, having at an interval of two years cross-examined him on all the points which I had before noted down.

* The author of the *Seyr Mutuakheren* says he and his garrison were destroyed, which is a mistake.

the fighting men one-fourth only are supposed to have escaped, and of the followers about an equal proportion ; so that nearly two hundred thousand Mahrattas perished in the campaign.

Sooruj Mull treated such of the fugitives as reached his territory with the greatest kindness, and the Mahratta nation to this day view the conduct of the Jhats on that occasion with gratitude and regard.

During the period when Sewdasheo Rao was shut up in his intrenchment, news of his situation from time to time reached the Peishwa, and in the month of November he moved to Ahmednugur, and from thence to the banks of the Godavery. In December the intelligence became still more alarming. Janojee Bhonslay joined him with a body of ten thousand men, and the army moved towards Hindooostan. In the middle of January, when crossing the Nerbuddah, a cossid (or letter-carrier) belonging to the Soucars* who was engaged to reach Aurungabad in nine days from Panniput, met the Peishwa's army, and mentioned that the Mahrattas were defeated. He was brought to the Peishwa, who opened the letter in his charge, and read its fatal contents ; "two pearls have been dissolved, twenty-seven gold mohurs have been lost, and of the silver and copper, the total cannot be cast up." From these words the fate of Sewdasheo Rao, Wiswas Rao, the officers, and the army was understood.

A confirmation of the account by the arrival of some persons from the army soon placed it beyond all doubt ; amongst the first of the fugitives was Ballajee Jenardin, nephew of Baboo Rao, and afterwards well known as Nana Furnuwees. His mother was taken by the Afghans, but his wife escaped, as did Parwuttee Bye, the widow of the unfortunate Bhow. Grief and despondency at once spread over the whole of Maharashtra. All the military families had to mourn relatives, missing or slain, and the Peishwa never recovered the shock. He slowly retraced his steps towards Poona, but his faculties

* In India the soucars or bankers are generally in possession of the first intelligence which in any way affects the state of the money market. The figurative style used in the letter which will follow is by no means uncommon in India when caution is necessary.

were much impaired ; a rapid decay of the constitution ensued, and he expired in the end of June, at the temple of Parbuttee, a conspicuous building, erected by him, in the southern environs of the city of Poona.

This event so closely following the fatal field of Panniput, contributed to increase the general gloom which overhung the country. Ballajee Bajee Rao was one of those princes whose good fortune, originating in causes anterior to their time, obtain, in consequence of national prosperity, a higher degree of celebrity, especially among their own countrymen, than they may fully merit. Ballajee Rao, however, was a man of considerable political sagacity, of polished manners, and of great address. His measures are marked by an excessive cunning which Bramins in general mistake for wisdom ; he practised all the arts of dissimulation, and was a perfect adept in every species of intrigue. A strong example of the worst species of Brahmin character is shown in the manner by which he compassed the destruction of Suckwar Bye Sirkay. The private life of Ballajee Rao was stained with gross sensuality ; but, though indolent and voluptuous, he was generous and charitable, kind to his relatives and dependants, an enemy to external violence, and to that sort of oppression which such violence implies ;—on the whole, he may be regarded as rather a favourable specimen of a Brahmin in power.

Previously to Shao's death little amendment took place in the civil administration ; but the territory, under the immediate care of the Peishwas, had been in a progressive state of improvement since the time of Ballajee Wishwanath, principally owing to the abolition of the pernicious system of letting out the revenues of districts in farm, and to the encouragement afforded to the villagers to protect themselves from the exactions of every petty chief who had the means of enforcing contribution in money, forage, or provisions. Ballajee Rao appointed fixed Mamlidars or Soobehdars, each of whom had charge of several districts, and Sur-soobehdars were placed in the more distant provinces, under whom there were several Mamlidars. There was, in the first instance, no Sur-soobehdar in the territory between the Godavery and the Kistna ; the

intermediate districts, the best protected and most productive under the Mahratta rule, were entrusted to the Peishwa's favourites and courtiers, some of whom were his relations. They held absolute charge of the police, the revenue, and the civil and criminal judicature ; and in most cases had power of life and death. They were bound to furnish regular accounts, but they always evaded a settlement. They governed by deputy, and remained at court, whether in the capital or in the field, in attendance upon the Peishwa. Their districts were of course extremely ill-managed, and in very great disorder ; the supplies furnished for the exigencies of the state were tardy, and, in comparison with the established revenues, insignificant.

The commencement of a better system is ascribed to Ramchundur Baba Shenwee, and, after his death, Sewdasheo Rao Bhow improved on his suggestions. Ballajee Rao was sensible of the advantage to be derived from bringing the collectors of revenue under control ; he had not sufficient energy for the undertaking himself, but he supported the measures of his cousin. Fortunately, Sewdasheo Rao found a fit person in Balloba Manduwagunneec, whom he appointed Sur-soobehdar over the Soobehdars and Mamliddars in question ; and, after much opposition and odium, not without the necessity, in one instance, of resorting to force, he compelled them to produce their accounts, displaced one or two, and made large recoveries on account of the government. This was a very great step towards amendment in one department, nor were others neglected. A Shastree of respectability, named Bal Kishen Gargeel, was appointed head of the Poona Nyadeish, or court of justice ; and the police, which had generally been an object of some attention in their camps, was much invigorated at the capital. The Peishwa himself had little genius for civil government, but a strong inclination to all sorts of political intrigue. Sewdasheo Rao was open to bribery, and the Mahratta nation, generally, had not obtained sufficient leisure for great improvements in civil arrangement ; they had scarcely begun to lay down rules when they were called off by some foreign war, or internal dissension. But under the government of Ballajee Bajee Rao, Punchayets, the ordinary tribunals of civil justice,

began to improve ; because power, if it did not always examine and uphold their decrees, at least did not interfere to prevent the decisions of the community. The Mahratta dominion attained its greatest extent under Ballajee Rao's administration ; and most of the principal Brāmin families can only date their rise from that period. In short, the condition of the whole population was in his time improved, and the Mahratta peasantry, sensible of the comparative amelioration which they began to enjoy, have ever since blessed the days of Nana Sahib Peishwa.

CHAP. VI.

FROM A. D. 1761 TO A. D. 1766.

Mahdoo Rao Bulal invested us Peishwa.—Death of Tara Bye.—Prospect of war with Nizam Ally.—Rugonath Rao, as regent, negotiates with the English.—Settlement of a dispute respecting the Seede of Jinjeera.—Party dissensions among the Mahrattas.—Nizam Ally attacks their territory—destruction of the temples at Toku.—Moghuls advance towards Poona—vigorous opposition—treaty concluded.—Dispute between Rugonath Rao and Mahdoo Rao—the former retires to Aurungabad, and returns supported by the Moghuls.—Submission of Mahdoo Rao—motives.—The proceedings of Rugonath Rao occasion general discontent.—Nizam Ally breaks the treaty, and assisted by Janojee, attempts the subversion of the Brarain government.—Poona is plundered and partially burnt.—Rugonath Rao makes an attempt on Hyderabad—returns to the Mahratta territory.—Janojee is detached from the confederacy.—Moghul army defeated with prodigious slaughter—peace concluded at Aurungabad.—Mahdoo Rao reproves Janojee for his treachery.—Rise of Hyder Ally—his conquests—is opposed by Mahdoo Rao.—Judicious and successful operations of the young Peishwa—defeats Hyder with severe loss.—Negotiations—intrusted to Rugonath Rao—treaty.—Offensive alliance between the Peishwa and Nizam against Janojee.—Janojee is compelled to restore three-fourths of the districts received as the price of his treachery.—State of the English in India at this period.—Many of the principal events which led to their ascendancy, blended with the Mahratta history.—Author's views in the intended description of these events.—The records of the governments of India afford the best historical materials in the world—observations.

In the end of September, Mahdoo Rao, the second son of the late Peishwa, then in his seventeenth year, A. D. 1761, proceeded to Satara, accompanied by his uncle, Rugonath Rao, and received investiture as Peishwa from the nominal Raja, who remained precisely in the same state of imprisonment under the obdurate Tara Bye, as before described, until her demise, which happened in the month of December following, at the great age of eighty-six. To the

last moment of her existence she maintained her inveteracy against Ballajee Rao and Sewdashee Rao, declaring that she expired contented, having lived to hear of their misfortunes and death. The Raja's condition was afterwards so far improved that he was brought down from the fort, and suffered to live a prisoner at large in the town of Satara. At a subsequent period he was permitted by Mahdoo Rao to appoint agents for the management of his Patell dues in several villages, and the collection of his other hereditary claims as Deshmookh of Indapoore.

Sulabnt Jung and Nizam Ally were at Beder when news of Ballajee Rao's death reached them. The latter, as nominal Dewan, had already usurped the entire powers of the government; and deeming the present opportunity favourable for recovering the lost districts from the Mahrattas, he began, under various pretences, to concentrate a large army in the neighbourhood of Anrungabad.

Rugonath Rao, naturally fond of power, contemplated, with no small satisfaction, the prospect of gratifying his favourite inclination during the minority of his nephew. When the preparations of Nizam Ally gave reason to expect a rupture with the Moghuls, he became desirous of putting an end to some existing disputes between the Presidency of Bombay and Ramajee Punt, the Soobehdar of the Concan, which had arisen in consequence of protection afforded by the English to their ally the Seedee of Jinjeera, who had been besieged the preceding season by Ramajee Punt, assisted by a corps of Portuguese. The conduct of the Bombay government on this occasion was equally judicious and spirited. They saved a petty chief, by whom they had frequently been much accommodated, prevented his throwing his island into the hands of any other European power, and compelled the Mahrattas to respect the British flag, which was hoisted at Jinjeera when Ramajee Punt, after every representation, persevered in his intention of reducing the place. Mr. Crommelin was president in council at this juncture, and an agent having arrived on the part of Rugonath Rao for the purpose of accommodating all differences, an agreement was concluded by the Bombay government, and Govind

Sew Ram on the part of the Peishwa.* A gentleman was also sent to condole with Mahdoo Rao on the occasion of his father's death; a customary form which civility requires. The agreement itself was rather an assurance of civility and friendship than a definite treaty, but Rugonath Rao, being ill-prepared to resist the expected invasion of the Moghuls, wished eventually to obtain from Bombay some European soldiers and guns, and prolonged the negotiation for that purpose by sending another wukkeel to Bombay on pretence of making some alterations in the agreement, but in reality to negotiate for military aid.

The English East India Company, from the example of their great commercial rivals the Dutch, had early been desirous of obtaining territory. Partly from this circumstance, and the representations of their servants for the last twenty years, they had been exceedingly solicitous to obtain possession of the island of Salsette and the fort of Basscin, not only on account of the advantages expected from the revenue, but as advanced positions essentially necessary to the security of the island and harbour of Bombay. The overtures of Rugonath Rao therefore met with the readiest attention; but although he offered to cede territory yielding a revenue of one lakh and a half of rupees at Jumboseer, and to make several other concessions, yet as the favourite island of Salsette was not of the number, the alliance was suspended.

As the danger from the threatened invasion increased the overtures were renewed, even Salsette was offered, and though not by an accredited agent, the President and Council were sanguine in their hope of accomplishing their object; especially, as by every succeeding day's account the Mahrattas, without aid from the English, were likely to be completely worsted.

No period indeed for the last forty years had been more favourable for the restoration of the Moghul authority in the

* It consisted of seven or eight articles regarding detention or stoppage of vessels, wrecks, deserters, and the restoration of all territory taken from the Seedee by Ramajee Punt. The Seedee afterwards took an improper advantage of the protection afforded by committing several acts of violence in the Mahratta territory, of which the English were obliged to mark their disapprobation in the strongest manner.

Deccan. The loss of the battle of Panniput was imputed by the Mahratta Sillidars solely to the misconduct of the Bramins ; the Bramins of the Desh, or country above the Ghauts, acknowledged the fact, but declared that it was to be ascribed entirely to the mismanagement of their brethren of the Concan. The violent party feelings, which arise under every government on occasions of reverses, were heightened in the loose confederacy of this nation by the prejudices of ignorance and of cast ; under such circumstances, where so very few could distinguish between misfortune and misrule, dissension was a natural consequence. Nizam Ally was not yet sufficiently apprized of those dissensions* to reap advantage from them ; but even if he had possessed the requisite information, one of his first acts, the destruction of the Hindoo temples at Toka, a village upon the Godavery, would have prevented his being joined by any party. It was nevertheless celebrated by the Mahomedan soldiery as a triumph, and Nizam Ally was pushing on towards Poona, when Ramchundur Jadow,† and most of the Mahrattas in the Moghul service, disgusted by the insult offered to their religion, deserted to the Peishwa, and carried with them Meer Moghul, the youngest son of Nizam Ool Moolk.

The Moghuls, although they continued to advance, were opposed with increasing spirit ; and after they were within fourteen miles of Poona, Nizam Ally was induced to listen to overtures, and relaxed in an original demand for the restoration of the whole territory conquered by Ballajee Rao. An

* The Bombay government appear to have been at least as well informed as Nizam Ally, and it is much to be regretted they do not oftener mention the Mahrattas. "We well know," say they, in their secret consultation of 14th December 1761, "that Nizam Ally is now near Poona, that the Bramins cannot raise a force sufficient to oppose them, from the backwardness of their own officers (who look upon the situation of Nana's family as desperate), and the low state of their finances ; Tara Boy (the Sow Rajah's widow) and all the Morattas at the bottom, are against them, and would show it at a proper occasion."

† Descendant of Dhunnajee Jadow. Jadow of Sind Kheir has, I believe, maintained his allegiance to the Moghuls since the murder of his ancestor Lookhjee Jadow Rao, by the son of Mullik Umber.

aeccommmodation took place, by which cessions to the amount of twenty-seven lakhs of rupees of annual revenue from Aurungabad and Beder were relinquished by Rugonath Rao as the price of peace; and the negotiation for European assistance from Bombay was abruptly terminated by extravagant and impertinent proposals from Ramajee Punt.

After the conclusion of the treaty the young Peishwa, attended by Trimbuck Rao Mama, maternal uncle of the late Sewdashee Chimmajee Bhow, was sent into the southern territory for the collection of revenue,* and Nizam Ally returned towards Beder, where he imprisoned Sulabut Jung in the month of July,† and about fifteen months afterwards secured his usurpation by the murder‡ of a brother, whose natural imbecility would have prevented his ever becoming a formidable rival, whilst unsupported by a foreign power.

Shortly after the return of Mahdoo Rao to Poona, disputes arose between him and his uncle, in consequence of Mahdoo Rao's desire to be admitted to a share in the administration. Rugonath Rao, as well as Sukaram Bappoo, and several other ministers, were much offended at his presumption: conceiving that affairs could not be conducted without them, they threw up their situations, but Sukaram Bappoo, whose object was to keep well with both parties, resigned, as if a matter to which he was compelled, and always contrived, as far as he was himself concerned, to keep open the door of reconciliation. Mahdoo Rao, in the promptest manner, requested Trimbuck Rao Mama to act in the situation of Dewan, which he accordingly undertook, assisted by Gopaul Rao Govind Pntwurdhum, Jagheerdar of Merich; and it is worthy of remark, as extremely creditable to the selection of so young a man, that Ballajee Jenardin

* Mahratta MSS. and Poona Records. Colonel Wilks does not mention this expedition into the Carnatic, and I therefore conclude Mahdoo Rao did not go far beyond the Kistna, if he crossed that river at all.

† 11th Zeehije A. II. 1175, according to the Mahomedan accounts, which I have adopted, because Sulabut Jung was with the army near Poona. By the English authorities he is said to have been confined on the 18th July 1761.

‡ 8th Rubbee-ul-uwul A. II. 1177.

Bhanoo, already mentioned, and afterwards well known as Nana Furnuwees, and Hurry Punt Phurkay, were at this period employed as personal Carcoons by Mahdoo Rao.

Trimbuck Rao's acceptance of the office of minister excited great jealousy towards him in the mind of Sukaram Bappo, and an irreconcileable aversion on the part of Rugonath Rao. This state of feeling, aggravated by the strongest animosity between Anuudee Bye, the wife of Rugonath Rao, a woman of a very violent character, and Gopika Bye, the widow of the late and mother of the present Peishwa, inflamed the parties to open hostility. Rugonath Rao having quitted Nassuck, to which place he had retired, proceeded to Aurungabad, where he was received with the greatest attention by Moraud Khan, governor of that city, immediately assisted with Moghul troops, and in a very short time was joined by a large body of Mahrattas. With this force he proceeded towards Poona, and half way between Poona and Ahmednugur, attacked the army of his nephew, which, being very inferior, immediately gave way. Nizam Ally was advancing to the support of Rugonath Rao; Janojee Bhonslay, without avowing his intentions, was approaching from Berar, and every appearance indicated the probability of a great revolution in the Poona government; when Mahdoo Rao, with remarkable foresight and decision, immediately resolved on throwing himself into the power of his uncle, as the only means of preventing a complete division in the state. Whilst his associates were directed to seek their own safety, Mahdoo Rao presented himself before his uncle, urged his reasons for making the concession with much propriety; and although the latter placed him in confinement, he was obliged to yield him that respect which, at the height of his prosperity, Rugonath Rao himself could never command. As the price of the Moghul alliance, he had promised to restore the forts of Doulatabad, Sewneree, Asseergurh, and Ahmednugur, and territory, from the cessions made in January 1760, yielding a revenue of fifty-one lakhs of rupees, or an equivalent to that amount. Nizam Ally, finding that a reconciliation had taken place, affected great satisfaction; and having come to Pairgaom on the Beema, a friendly interchange of civilities took place,

and orders were issued for the delivery of the districts stipulated ; but these orders, for reasons hereafter explained, were suspended, and none of the promised forts except Doulutabad were ever relinquished.*

Rugonath Rao being now uncontrolled, appointed Sukaram Bappoo and Neelkunt Mahdeo Poorundhuree, his principal ministers, bestowing on the former a jagheer of nine lakhs of rupees, and conferring on the latter the command of the important fort of Poorundhur, which, since first obtained by Ballajee Wishwanath, had been hitherto carefully retained in the Peishwa's family. Rugonath Rao's next proceeding was still more imprudent. On the demise of Jug Jewan, Pritee Needhee, he had been succeeded by his nephew, Sreenewass Gungadhur ; more commonly known by his original name, Bhowan Rao ; but Rugonath Rao having displaced him, raised his own infant son, Bhaskur Rao, to the dignity of Pritee Needhee, and appointed Naroo Shunkur, (Raja Buhadur,) the same officer who, for a time, commanded in the citadel of Delhi, to the office of Mootaliq, which was in effect conferring the office of Pritee Needhee upon him. Ramchundur Jadow, who had in the preceding year deserted the Moghul standard, was restored to the rank of Senaputtee, formerly held by his great grandfather, the famous Dhunnajee ; but, as he was disappointed in a promise made to him of receiving, as Senaputtee, the sovereignty of Guzerat, he took the first opportunity of making his peace with Nizam Ally. Kanhojeo Mohitey was appointed Sur-Lushikur, and Wittul Sewdeo (Vinchoorkur)† was also raised to high rank. The situation of Peishwa's Furnuwrees, which, since the time of Ballajee Wishwanath, had been continued in the family of Bhanoo, was taken from Moraba Baboo Rao, and conferred on Chintoo Wittul.

* Khuzaneh Amirah. Hudeeq-i-Alum. Mahratta MSS.

† He was appointed *Punt Raj Adnya*, an office created during Shao's government, about the period of the revenue arrangement. It was intended as an office of control and inspection under the Raja, but it soon dwindled into a mere sinecure ; as the latter, and with considerable emoluments, it still exists.

These changes occasioned much discontent, but when Rugonath Rao, in order to gratify his revenge towards A. D. 1763. Gopaul Rao Putwurdhun, attacked and took the fort of Merich, it caused disaffection in many persons, who were before disposed to support him in the government during the minority of his nephew; and Gopaul Rao, with several others, who had suffered by his measures, readily listened to overtures, which were made to them by Wittul Soondur, the minister of Nizam Ally.* This minister was a Bramin of the Yajurwedee tribe, who was raised to the office of Dewan, with the title of Raja Pertabwunt, at the period when Nizam Ali confined his brother. Jealous, it is said, of the arrangement concluded by Moraud Khan,† Wittul Soondur persuaded Nizam Ally that he had now an opportunity of completely reducing the Mahrattas; and that the most advisable policy was to overturn the government of the Concan Bramins, to declare Janojee Bhonslay regent, of which situation, (the Raja of Satara being incompetent to the task of governing,) it should be pretended that Janojee by the death of Tara Bye became the proper representative. To this scheme Janojee readily acceded; but Nizam Ally, whose duplicity rendered him true to no plan, whilst his minister was thus negotiating, secretly renewed a correspondence with the Raja of Kolapoor, by which he intended to have an eventual competitor in reserve in case Janojee's claims should prove inconvenient.‡ Everything seemed to promise success; Meer Moghul having been neglected by Rugonath Rao, returned to his brother; Moraba Furnuwees, Sewdasheo Ramchundur, the son of Ramchundur Shenwee, Bhowan Rao, the dispossessed Pritteo Needhee, Gopaul Rao Putwurdhun, and many other persons joined the Moghuls. The former agreement, known as the treaty of Pairgaom, was broken off before the districts were restored, and hostilities recommenced. Rugonath Rao was not prepared for this event,

* Mahratta MSS.

† Hudeeq-i-Alum.

‡ Mahratta MSS. Oral information, Hudeeq-i-Alum, and original letters from Nizam Ally, procured from the Raja of Kolapoor. The letters are addressed to Jeejee Bye, the widow of Sumbajee, who acted as Regent during the minority of her adopted son, named Sivajee.

but derived the greatest assistance from his nephew, who on this emergency, although still retained in a state of confinement, afforded his uncle the full support of his influence and counsel. Mulhar Rao Holkar and Díummajee Gackwar were both present with Rugonath Rao; the army was not sufficient to contend with the undivided force which accompanied Nizam Ally, but they were lightly equipped; and that circumstance in Holkar's opinion made them superior to the enemy. They advanced as if to give battle, but avoided an action, passed the Moghul army, and proceeded to Aurungabad, which they attempted to escalade, but were repulsed. On the approach of Nizam Ally, they went off towards Berar, entered the districts of Janojee Bhonslay, and plundered in their usual manner. They levied a contribution of sixty thousand rupees from Mulkapoore, and on being pursued, returned to Mungy-Pyetum; thence they turned off in a south-easterly direction, and committed great havoc in the Moghul territory. Nizam Ally followed them for some time, but seeing it was impossible to overtake them, he marched straight on Poona, which he determined to plunder; and Rugonath Rao, for the purpose of retaliation, proceeded towards Hyderabad.

As soon as it was known at Poona that the Moghul army was approaching, most of the people removed as much of their property as they could carry away, and fled to the hill forts, or into the Concan. The Peishwa's family and the state papers were sent off towards Singurh, but Bappoo Kurundeca, one of Janojee Bhonslay's officers, advanced so rapidly that some of the property belonging to the fugitives was taken, the village below Singurh was set on fire by his troops, and many manuscripts and state papers, illustrative of Mahratta history, were totally destroyed.

Nizam Ally encamped at a short distance from the city, and allowed his army to plunder it; after which all houses not ransomed were torn down or burned. He next proceeded towards Poorundhur, and from thence ravaged the country as far east as the Beema; but the violence of the rains was such as to induce him to adopt the resolution of cautoning his army until the opening of the season. For this

purpose he intended to have gone to Beder, but Janojee Bhonslay persuaded him to alter the destination to Aurungabad.

In the meantime Rugonath Rao had returned to watch his motions; the wall which surrounds the city of Hyderabad had prevented him from making any impression on the Moghul capital,* but he exacted a contribution of one lakh and eighty thousand rupees from the suburbs.† He had opened a secret negotiation with the Mahratta chiefs in the army of Nizam Ally, and found Janojec Bhonslay, the only one whose defection occasioned serious alarm, willing to listen to an accommodation. His ambitious hopes, formed on joining the Moghuls, had been damped from a suspicion of the duplicity of the Dewan, Raja Pertabwunt. Upon a promise, therefore, of receiving territory yielding a revenue of thirty-two lakhs of rupees, being a portion of that which was promised to Nizam Ally as the price of his assistance to Rugonath Rao, he agreed to withdraw his support, and soon found a very critical opportunity.

As the Moghul army pursued their route towards Aurungabad, Rugonath Rao followed them some marches in the rear. On arriving at the Godaverry, Nizam Ally, with a part of his force, crossed over; leaving the Dewan with the remainder, at Rakisbone, on the south bank of the river until the whole of the stores and baggage had been sent over. At this juncture, Janojee, on pretence of not receiving money to pay his troops, quitted the Dewan, and encamped at a distance. This movement was the signal to Rugonath Rao, who made a rapid march, attacked the Moghuls, and after a sanguinary conflict, finally routed them with immense slaughter. Raja Pertabwunt, the Dewan, was among the slain.‡

* Hudeequ-i-Alum, and Mahratta MSS.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ He was accidentally hit by one of his own men, before he received his death-wound from a party of Mahrattas under Dummajec Gaekwar. Moraud Khan, his rival, is accused of having hired the man who wounded him, but this accusation seems more than questionable. A party of Afghans, in Holkar's service, with their usual ferocity, cut off the Dewan's head, which they carried in triumph on the point of a spear.

The resistance was very determined on the part of the Moghuls, and continued for nearly two days. Rugonath Rao was amongst the foremost in every attack, and at one time, almost alone, was completely surrounded and cut off from his troops, but his own determined bravery, and that of his friend Sukaram Hurry, who fought by his side, enabled him to defend himself until rescued by his nephew. Throughout the battle* the young Peishwa particularly distinguished himself, both by personal energy and the judicious support which he sent, not only to his uncle, but to different points of the attack. The loss on both sides was very great, and on that of the Moghuls is said to have amounted to ten thousand men.†

Nizam Ally at first endeavoured to aid his Dewan by a cannonade from the opposite side of the river, but without effect. He thus became a spectator of the destruction of his troops, without the possibility of succouring them, and was afterwards obliged to retire within the walls of Aurungabad, lest the Mahrattas should be able to ford the river. This object they accomplished in a few days, and arrived at the city, which they again attacked without success, and a number of them were killed. Immediately afterwards Nizam Ally visited Rugonath Rao, and with that apparent contrition which he could so well affect, laid all his errors to the fault of his late Dewan, and so worked on the weakness and good nature of Rugoba, that he not only forgave all that had happened, but in consideration of the aid with which he had been furnished in his distress, he wished to bestow upon Nizam Ally such part of the cession of fifty-one lakhs made by the treaty at Pairgaom as remained at his disposal, after deducting the assignment of thirty-two lakhs promised to Janojee. His ministers, however, dissuaded him from following his inclination to its full extent, and he was induced to confine the gift to

* It is called the battle of Taindulza by the Mahrattas.

† This is the lowest computation in any Mahratta manuscript. The Moghul historians have not enumerated the loss sustained by Nizam Ally's army.

ten lakhs, so that nine lakhs* of the original cession was saved, and a new treaty was concluded with Nizam Ally in October.

At the time of delivering the deeds by which Janojee was paid for his treachery, Mahdoo Rao openly reproached him for his duplicity to both parties, and vehemently condemned the unprincipled and unworthy motives by which he had been drawn in to become a tool for the subversion of a government which had aggrandized his father's house, and raised the Hindoos to the power they enjoyed. This manly candour in a young man, educated in a Bramin court, is the more remarkable when we consider the control under which Mahdoo Rao was still held, but over which his judgment and ability were gradually obtaining the ascendancy.

Bhowan Rao was restored to his rank of Pritee Needhee upon the death of Bhaskur Rao, which happened about the period when the treaty with Nizam Ally was concluded. The fort of Merich was restored to Gopaul Rao ; and although Moraba Furnuwees was not immediately appointed to any share of the hereditary duties of his office, it was bestowed on his cousin, Ballajee Jenardin, whom I shall hereafter designate by his common appellation of Nana Furnuwees.

Whilst the Mahrattas had to maintain these struggles in the A. D. 1764. Deccan, a new power was rising on the ruins of the Hindoo dynasty of Mysore, under the celebrated adventurer Hyder Ally Khan, which to the southward promised, in a very short time, at least to confine the Mahrattas to their native boundary. Busalut Jung, still hopeful of forming an independent kingdom in the Carnatic, took advantage of the absence of the Mahrattas to plan the conquest of their southern districts, and with this view obtained the alliance of Hyder, whom he appointed Nabob of Sera, precisely in the same manner as the Raja Shao used to confer uncon-

* Mahratta MSS. Original accounts from the Poona records, and oral information. The Mahratta manuscripts state the nine lakhs of rupees withheld as territory taken, and it is only by comparison with both Mahomedan and Mahratta evidence, collated with very intricate and voluminous accounts in the Poona Records, that I have been able to find out and simplify these complicated transactions.

quered territories, the right to which, as Colonel Wilks has observed, "could only be inferred from the act of granting." Busalut Jung, and his new ally, had reduced Ouscotta, Sera, and Bura-Balapoor by the end of 1761, and Busalut Jung, soon after being apprehensive of an attack from his brother, Nizam Ally, returned to his capital at Adonee ; but Hyder prosecuted his conquests. In 1762 he reduced, or exacted tribute from the Polygars of Chota-Balapoor, Raidroog, Harpoonelly, and Chittledroog. In 1763 he conquered Bednore, and confined the Ranee and her adopted son in the fort of Mudgerry ; Fuzzul Oollah Khan, one of his officers, overran Soonda, and early in the ensuing year Hyder defeated the Nabob of Savanoor. He left Fuzzul Oollah Khan in that quarter, to occupy as much as possible of the Mahratta country, whilst affairs of government required his own return to Bednore. Fuzzul Oollah Khan accordingly took Dharwar, and established Hyder's posts nearly as far north as the Kistna.*

The Mahrattas were not unconcerned spectators of the rapid progress of Hyder Ally, and a large army was assembling at Poona to be directed against him. Mahdoo Rao insisted on his right to command this army, whilst his uncle remained at Poona to conduct the government ; Sukaram Bappoo joined in supporting the Peishwa's pretensions on this occasion, till at last Rugonath Rao yielded his consent, but quitted Poona in anger, and retired to Anundwelee near Nassuck.† The discussions prior to this arrangement delayed the advance of the Mahratta army beyond the time which mere preparation required, and Gopaul Rao Putwurdhun, who had crossed the Kistna in advance, was defeated with great loss by Fuzzul Oollah Khan. Early in the month of May Mahdoo Rao entered the Carnatic with an army of thirty thousand horse, and about the same number of infantry. Fuzzul Oollah Khan, leaving a strong garrison in Dharwar, fell back on Hyder's army which had quitted an intrenched camp, prepared at Anawutty, and advanced to a strong position ; where, when joined by Fuzzul Oollah Khan, the whole army under Hyder's personal com-

* Wilks.

† Mahratta MSS.

mand has been estimated at twenty thousand horse and forty thousand foot, of which one half were disciplined infantry. Mahdoo Rao's superiority in cavalry enabled him to obtain more correct intelligence than his adversary, and assisted by the experience of Sukaram Bappoo, it was determined not to attack Hyder's united force in the position he had chosen. Detachments were therefore employed in driving out his garrisons from the towns and villages north of the Wurdah. This plan of operations induced Hyder to try a stratagem for bringing on a general engagement, for which purpose he moved out with twenty thousand men, intending to retire and draw the Mahrattas towards his reserve, which remained in its first position under Fuzzul Oollah Khan. Such a shallow artifice proves how little he then knew of his enemy. The Mahrattas, as is their usual practice, showed a few men, small bodies began to skirmish and drew Hyder forward, until their parties, still retiring, but gradually thickening, at last presented solid masses of horse, moving round between him and his camp. Hyder was obliged to change his intended feint of retiring into steady dispositions for a retreat to his camp, which was not effected without considerable loss. Next day his army fell back to the entrenched position at Annawutty;* and Mahdoo Rao, as the rains had set in, fixed his head-quarters at Nurindra,† north of the Wurdah, sending his horse for shelter into all the villages twenty miles round. After the defeat of Hyder, Abdool Muzeed Khan and Moorar Rao Ghorepuray joined the Peishwa, who, as Ramchundur Jadow had rejoined Nizam Ally, formally restored Moorar Rao to his rank of Senaputtee, as the representative of the family of Ghorepuray, a circumstance the more creditable to the Peishwa, as he declared it but an act of justice to the descendant of the gallant Suntajee, so ill-requited in the reign of Raja Ram.

As soon as the season permitted, Mahdoo Rao laid siege to Dharwar, which capitulated after a breach had been made. The whole country north of the Wurdah was then in his

* Wilks and Mahratta MSS.

† Mahratta MSS. This place (Nurindra) is not to be found by that name in any map that I have seen.

possession, except Moondogoor, which continued rain prevented his investing; but when the weather cleared up it was speedily reduced. Perceiving that the war would terminate successfully, he requested Rugonath Rao to join and assume the command,—a remarkable instance of self-command in a general so young, and obviously proceeding from motives purely conciliatory, though at the same time more creditable to the heart of the individual than the judgment of the princee. Rugonath Rao accordingly left Nassuck, and arrived as the army was about to cross the Wurdah.*

Mahdoo Rao's intention was to cut away the thick woods which surrounded Annawutty, and get between
 A. D. 1765. Hyder and Bednore, which the Mahrattas had no sooner begun to carry into execution than Hyder decamped with precipitation. The country was so close that, for the two first days, the Mahrattas could only harass the rear of Hyder's army; but on the third day, the country becoming more open, a body of the Peishwa's troops were moved between Hyder and Bednore, which compelled him to stand an action.† His troops were attacked with impetuosity, and many of them immediately sought shelter in the woods. Hyder reached Bednore with only two thousand five hundred horse, and ten thousand infantry, the rest of his army being for the time dispersed, and several thousands of them destroyed. As the Mahrattas advanced, all the garrisons surrendered on the first summons, except Anuntpoor, which held out for some time, until Hyder had got together some of his dispersed army, when he entered upon a negotiation with Rugonath Rao, to whom both the conduct and conclusion of the treaty were wholly intrusted.‡ Hyder engaged to restore all districts and places wrested from Morar Rao Ghorepuray, to relinquish all claims on the Nabob of Savanoor, and to pay thirty-two lakhs of rupees to the Peishwa.§ The terms were by no means approved of by Mahdoo Rao; but having once granted full

* Mahratta MSS.

† Wilks.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ Wilks. The only Mahratta MSS. where I find any mention of the terms, states fifteen lakhs of tribute, and the expenses of the war to be defrayed by Hyder.

authority to his uncle, he adhered to the agreement, and made no objection where an attempt to remedy what was defective would have been a departure from good faith.* He quitted the Carnatic, and recrossed the Kistna in the end of February.

Mahdoo Rao, whilst anxious to conciliate his uncle, and willing to relinquish as large a share of power as was consistent with the dignity of his situation, and his duty to the state, had to contend with the intrigues of party, and to resist the counsel of his mother, Gopika Bye, who, naturally jealous, and inflamed by the violent behaviour of Anundee Bye, the wife of Rugonath Rao, advised her son, as a measure of self-preservation, to place his uncle under restraint. Mahdoo Rao, however, long entertained hopes of being able to avoid such an extreme measure. Rugonath Rao, though frequently perverse, was not untractable, except when exposed to the influence of his wife; he probably would have acceded to his nephew's views, but for the malicious and desperate woman, by whom his ambition and resentment were alternately excited. The Peishwa was sensible that Rugonath Rao could, at this period, obtain the aid either of Nizam Ally or of Janojee Bhonslay, and as affairs then existed, perhaps of both. For although Nizam Ally boiled with resentment against Janojee, on account of his treacherous defection, there was, as yet, no breach between them which could not have been speedily accommodated, for purposes of mutual aggrandizement. Nizam Ally during this year had made a successful campaign south of the Kistna, and had reduced his brother, Busalut Jung, to submission and obedience. The conquests of Hyder Ally and the Nabob of the Carnatic, or rather his supporters, the English, prevented him from extending his sway over those countries to the southward of the Kistna, conquered by Aurungzebe, and forming a part of that vice royalty which his father had seized, and to which he had succeeded by usurpation and murder.

Under these circumstances, with regard to Nizam Ally and Janojee, Mahdoo Rao deemed it his safest policy to conciliate the one at the expence of the other. He soon found that

* Maratta MSS.

Nizam Ally would readily enter on an offensive alliance against Janojee, with the ultimate hope of engaging the Mahrattas, in

A. D. 1766. co-operation against Hyder. A secret compact

was accordingly entered into about the beginning of the ensuing year, the particulars of which, if ever committed to writing, have not been discovered, but the objects of it become tolerably obvious from a variety of facts. The united armies of the Peishwa and Nizam Ally invaded Berar, compelled Janojee Bhonslay to sue for peace, and to restore three-fourths of the districts* he had gained by his double treachery during the former war; a politic moderation on the part of Malidoo Rao, who still left Janojee something to lose, but made it apparent, from what follows, that the Moghuls rather than the Mahrattas were gainers by the invasion. Of the districts which were thus restored on the 4th February, nearly two-thirds, or a tract of territory equivalent to fifteen lakhs of rupees of annual revenue, was given up to the Nizam on the 16th of the same month, and stated in the accounts of the Poona government, as ceded "for the firm establishment of peace and friendship." It is more than probable the agreement pointed to conjoint operations for the ensuing season in the Carnatic; but circumstances occurred in the meantime, which materially changed the relative situations of the contracting powers.

The English East India Company, after they had overcome their rivals the French, and found time to contemplate the situation into which they had been hurried, by national hostility, the treachery of the native powers, the ambition of their servants, and the bravery of their troops, were astonished and alarmed at the height to which they had ascended, and would have relinquished a part of their acquisitions, in order to purchase security for the remainder. But those who fully understood their situation, were convinced that they had already gone too far to recede, and that they must be prepared not only to resist, but to punish aggression.

* The amount restored was Rupees 21,50,269 10 annas and 1 pie (Poona Records).

All the states in India were inimical to Europeans of every nation, and even when bound down by treaties, they were at best but faithless friends, who would never maintain an alliance unless when controlled, either immediately or remotely, by their interests or their fears. Their jealousy, no less than their prejudice, would have prompted them to extirpate the foreigners, and the English had, therefore, only the choice of offensive or defensive war. To have adopted the latter would have lost them the advantage of all favourable conjuncture, and must have obliged them to oppose the united armies of the natives, instead of having to contend with their divided force. They might, indeed, have avoided the contest by resigning the trade, privileges, and dominion they had acquired; but those mistaken philanthropists, who imagine that the happiness of India would have been secured by such a sacrifice, required no other answer than is afforded by the series of mismanagement and devastation, which it has already been my duty to record.

It is not my province to trace the rise of the British power in India, but many of the principal events which led to our ascendancy in that quarter are blended with the Mahratta history; and these, as hitherto, I shall endeavour to describe, without favour to my own nation, and without the equally unjust bias which is apt to arise from a desire to guard against so natural a partiality.

The records of the Company's governments in India are, probably, the best historical materials in the world: there we find the reasons for every undertaking; the steady rules intended for conduct; the hurried letter from the scene of action; the deliberations of the council, the separate opinions of the members composing it, and their final judgment. The scrutiny, censure, or approval of the Court of Directors from a remote situation, and after a long interval, bring to recollection all that was done and all that was speculated; what has occurred in India in the meantime, and what opinions have stood the test of events. Many inconsistencies appear both in the orders of the Directors at home, and in the measures of their governments abroad, which frequently arose from causes irremediable or excuseable, such as the distance of the supreme

power, and the defective information at the different presidencies. The divided nature of the authority in India was also, for a long time, a source of great evil ; and even after the act of Parliament had passed, which vested a control in the president and council of Bengal, the defects, as might have been expected, were not immediately remedied; for it generally requires time, and a judicious exercise of power, to fit any new law to the end for which it is framed.

Much corruption and many reprehensible acts are to be found, especially before the affairs of India had attracted the full attention of the British legislature and nation ; but not only is every act and every deliberation, which other governments have generally the power to conceal, recorded in detail at the different presidencies, but the personal animosity of individuals, composing the governments, has given the most glaring interpretation to mere errors, and has sometimes occasioned gross misrepresentation of facts. On the other hand, many services, performed without any great degree of exertion or ability, have, in consequence of their results, been extravagantly praised, and given a tone to Indian despatches which prejudices sober judgment, and obscures the honour of toils and of virtues, to which in every department, both civil and military, our countrymen in India have founded claims as just as the instruments of any government, ancient or modern.

CHAP. VII.

FROM A. D. 1766 TO A. D. 1772.

Conquest may be too slow as well as too rapid—a middle course adopted by the English.—Proposal for expelling Janoojee Bhonslay from Kuttack.—Views of the Court of Directors on the East and West of India.—Occupation of Rajamundree.—Alliance with Nizam Ally—objects.—Mahdoo Rao enters the Carnatic, levies tribute from Hyder, and returns to Poona.—New treaty between Nizam Ally and the English.—Rugonath Rao proceeds on an expedition into Hindoostan.—Death of Mulhar Rao Holkar—his widow Aylah Bye appoints Tookajee Holkar to the command of her army.—Rana of Gohud—his rise—rebellious proceedings.—Rugonath Rao fails in an attempt to reduce him—accepts a tribute and returns to Poona—jealousy and distrust towards his nephew—retires from Poona, and supported by Holkar, Janojee Bhonslay, and Dummajee Gaekwar, rebels against him.—Curious anecdote of Mahdoo Rao.—Rebellion crushed, and Rugonath Rao placed in confinement.—Mahdoo Rao forms an alliance with Nizam Ally against Janojee—conceals his real design with great political artifice—effect on the English and Hyder—invades Berar—plunders Nagpoor—judicious conduct of Janojee—ravages the Peishwa's territory.—Mahdoo Rao is compelled to raise the siege of Chandah and return to oppose Janojee—Janojee avoids an action, and cuts off a part of the Peishwa's baggage—treaty of Kunkapoore.—The Peishwa sends an expedition to Hindoostan under Visajee Kishen Beneewalla—anecdote relative to Mahadajee Sindia.—Mahdoo Rao's endeavours to improve the civil government.—Ram Shastree—account of—anecdote—admirable character.—The practice of forcing villagers to carry baggage abolished.—Encroachments of Hyder.—The Peishwa proceeds against him—reduces a large tract of territory.—Anecdote of the rival Ghatgays at the storm of Mulwugul—obstinate defence of Nidjeeghul—operations continued.—Mahdoo Rao is compelled to leave the army from ill health.—Trimbuck Rao Mama prosecutes the war—defeats Hyder, who loses the whole of his artillery, camp equipage, &c.—Seringapatam besieged—peace concluded—motives and terms.—Proceedings in Hindoostan.—Affairs of the imperial courts since the battle of Panniput.—The Emperor seeks and obtains the protection of the English.—The East India Company appointed Dewan to the Nabob of Bengal.—Affairs at Delhi.—Visajee Kishen levies tribute from the Rajpoots—defeats the Jhats near Bhurtpoor.—Nujeeb-ud-dowlah negotiates with the Mahrattas—reference to the Peishwa—overtures admitted—death of Nujeeb-ud-dowlah.—The Mahrattas invade

Rohilkund.—*The Emperor quits the protection of the English, and is reinstated on his throne by the Mahrattas.*—*The Mahrattas overrun the territory of Zabita Khan.*—*Policy of Shujah ud-dowlah in regard to the Rohillas*—on receiving a subsidy, concludes a defensive alliance with them.—*Insolence and rapacity of the Mahratta Brahmans.*—*The Emperor assisted by Nujeef Khan, determines to throw off their yoke.*—*Death of Mahdoo Rao*—his character.—Account of his civil administration—general review of the interior management and state of the country and people, including the police—civil and criminal justice—finance—army.

WHILST universally admitted that unwieldy dominion is the forerunner of certain decline, it is not always considered that, under some circumstances, conquest may be too slow, as well as too rapid. Illustrative of this observation, we have some striking examples connected with the history of Maharashtra, particularly in the decay of the Portuguese, and the rise of the Mahrattas. The middle course, as steered by the English, and the steady march of aggrandizement which they have hitherto pursued in the East, is to be ascribed to the remarkable men who have, at various periods, directed their councils and their armies; and to the caution of a body of merchants, who, though pleased at the gain, were appalled at the venture, and who feared the loss of all they had acquired by each succeeding contest into which they were plunged.

Lord Clive, who returned from England to assume the government of Bengal in May 1765, not only perceived that it was impossible for the English to recede, but was convinced that to advance was essential to their preservation. Of the three great powers, the Mahrattas, Nizam Ally, and Hyder, the first was considered the most formidable. As early as the end of the year 1761, immediately after the death of Ballajee Rao, when Mr. Vansittart was President of the Council in Bengal, it was intended to expel Janojee Bhonslay from Kuttack; and it was proposed, not only to the governments of Madras and Bombay, but to the Emperor of the Moghuls, to Sulabut Jung,* and Nizam Ally. Although the sister presi-

* This is another reason for supposing that there is a mistake of a year in stating Sulabut Jung's confinement on the 18th July 1761, such a circumstance must have transpired at Bengal long before 11th December 1761, which is the date of the letter containing the proposal to the Bombay government.

dencies for various sufficient reasons disapproved of the expedition, it was prevented, not seemingly on account of their disapproval, but at the request of the Nabob of Bengal.

The Court of Directors were desirous of seeing the Mahrattas checked in their progress, and would have beheld combinations of the other native powers against them with abundant satisfaction: but they were apprehensive of the consequences of granting a latitude to their own servants, or of being engaged as umpires or auxiliaries; and their instructions were designed to prevent their becoming involved in hostilities, especially as principals, in any case short of absolute defence. With these cautious views, however, they were anxious to attain two objects which they deemed of vital importance to their security; the first, of old standing, was one in which the Mahrattas were directly concerned, the possession of Salsette, Hog Island, and Caranja, in the neighbourhood of Bombay, which every year tended to render more important; the second, the accomplishment of which devolved more particularly on the presidency of Madras, was the occupation of the five districts formerly belonging to the French, on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, best known as the Northern Circars. With respect to the first, the Mahrattas, though but a few years before they scarcely regarded the English, were now too jealous of their aggrandizement, willingly to relinquish the islands alluded to; besides which, they attached peculiar value to these possessions, as the fruits of their success against an European nation. In regard to the second, Gunttoor, one of the five districts in question, was appropriated as the Jagheer of Busalut Jung. Nizam Ally, having at one time offered to farm the remaining four to the Nabob of Arcot, it was hoped he might allow the Company to occupy them on the same terms. But although the Madras government offered six times more than he had ever before received, he positively refused to rent them to the English.

In consequence of this obstinacy on the part of Nizam Ally, Lord Clive determined to take possession of the districts at all events, and for this purpose obtained a grant of

them from the Emperor. The Madras government occupied Rajamundree by force, and it is not surprizing that Nizam Ally should have treated as mockery all assurances of their being actuated solely by motives of self-preservation. Encouraged by the deference with which representations were still made to him by the English, and by his alliance with the Mahrattas, Nizam Ally threatened the English with extirpation, and endeavoured to incite Hyder to invade the Carnatic. The Madras presidency, in considerable alarm, tried to form an alliance with Hyder, but he refused to receive the envoy. In this dilemma, Mr. Palk, the governor of Madras, referred to Lord Clive, who recommended a connection with the Nizam, which should have for its object the subjugation of Hyder, and an alliance for restraining the spreading power of the Mahrattas.

The prospect thus held out to Nizam Ally precisely suited his views. He wished to reduce Hyder, and to humble the Mahrattas; he knew the value of regular troops, and he readily listened to the proposals of the English; but as he had already leagued himself with the Mahrattas against Hyder, he deemed it most adviseable not to break with Mahdoo Rao, until he had effected the overthrow of the usurper of Mysore. A treaty, however, was concluded between Nizam Ally and the English, by which the Madras government agreed to pay seven lakhs of rupees a year for four of the districts, or to assist Nizam Ally with two battalions of infantry and six pieces of cannon. In case the troops should be required the seven lakhs of rupees were to be appropriated for their expences.

The Mahratta court seem to have perceived the object of
A. D. 1767. this combination, and Mahdoo Rao, without waiting for his ally, if such he could be termed, crossed the Kistna in the month of January, and before the end of March took Sera, Ouscotta, and Mudgerry, released the Ranee of Bednore,* and her adopted son, who had been confined in Mudgerry, and after levying thirty lakhs of

* She died on the way to Poona.—Mostyn's Despatches.

rupees* of tribute from Hyder, and collecting nearly seventeen† more from different parts of the Carnatic, was prepared to return to Maharashtra before Nizam Ally had made his appearance. When the English and Nizam Ally wished to have brought forward their pretensions to share in the Mahratta tribute, their envoys were treated with broad and undisguised ridicule.‡ It is not positively known whether Mahdoo Rao was apprized of the ultimate design of the alliance between Nizam Ally and the English, nor is it ascertained what agreement existed between Nizam Ally and the Mahrattas, but we have an unsupported assertion of Nizam Ally's minister, Rookun-ud-dowlah, that his master had been duped by the Mahrattas for the third time ;§ at all events, it could not have escaped the observation of Mahdoo Rao, that the English in the war against Hyder voluntarily appeared as auxiliaries to one of two contracting parties, and that, upon the subjugation of Hyder, Nizam Ally, by the English aid, could dictate, as the Mahrattas probably otherwise would have done, in any partition of his territories. This proceeding, therefore, on the part of Mahdoo Rao, which has been alluded to as ordinary Mahratta artifice to anticipate the plunder,|| was a measure perfectly justifiable, for the purpose of effecting an important political object, and disconcerting the plans of his enemies. He recrossed the Kistna, in the end of May, leaving the Moghuls and their allies to settle with Hyder as they best could.

The subsequent treachery of Nizam Ally in joining Hyder against the English, and the circumstances which induced him, by a fresh act of treachery, to desert Hyder, and renew

* Poona State Accounts. Colonel Wilks says, thirty-five lakhs, and that Sera was at that time given up to Hyder in exchange for Gurumconda. Of this last transaction no mention is made in the state accounts, or in the despatches of Mr. Mostyn, resident at Mahdoo Rao's court.

† Rupees 16,95,777.

‡ Wilks, vol. ii. page 16.

§ Wilks, vol. ii. page 15. The reader has it in his power to judge of the occasions to which Rookun-ud-dowlah alluded, first in regard to Rugonath Rao, and second, in the late campaign against Janojee Bhonslay.

|| Wilks, vol. ii. page 6.

the treaty with the English, have been elsewhere distinctly and fully recorded ;* and as they belong not to this history, it is only necessary to mention, in order to preserve a connexion with subsequent events, that a new treaty was concluded on the 23rd February 1768, between Nizam Ally and the English, which though framed on the basis of that which was settled in 1766, differed from it in some very essential particulars ; the most remarkable of which was their arrogating to themselves the right and the power to dispose of Hyder's territories. The treaty declared Hyder a usurper ; the Carnatic Balaghaut was taken from him by Nizam Ally, as Moghul viceroy in the Deccan, and the office of Dewan, for the future management of that territory, conferred upon the English Company, for which they agreed to pay an annual tribute of seven lakhs of rupees. Nizam Ally further consented to cede Guntoor, the remaining district of the northern circars, upon the death or misconduct of his brother Busalut Jung. The Mahrattas, without having applied to become parties to this absurd treaty, were, by a special clause, to be allowed their Chouth from the territory thus disposed of. The Peishwa had no interference in the warfare which continued for some time between the English and Hyder ; the line of conduct which he adopted, and which will be explained in the regular narrative of events, may be ascribed partly to policy, but principally to the internal situation of his empire.

Rugonath Rao, in the preceding year, after the campaign against Janoje, had set out on an expedition into Hindooostan accompanied by Mulhar Rao Holkar. The prosecution of an intended reduction of many places formerly in the possession of the Mahrattas, or tributary to them, was obstructed, in the first instance, by the death of Mulhar Rao Holkar. His grandson Mallee Rao, only son of Khundee Rao, and a minor, succeeded to his possessions, but died soon after, which gave rise to a dispute between Gungadhur Yeswunt the Dewan, and Aylah Bye, the widow of Khundee Rao, now lawful

* See Colonel Wilks' South of India, vol. ii.

inheritor. The Dewan proposed that some connection of the family should be adopted by the widow; but to this Aylah Bye, although her Dewan's proposal was approved of by Rugonath Rao, would by no means consent. Supported by her own troops, by the Peishwa, and by the voice of the country, she appointed Tookajee Holkar,* an experienced Sil-lidar, a great favourite with the late Mulhar Rao, but no relation of the family, to the command of her army, retaining under her own management the civil administration of the extensive family Jagheer. To the death of Mulhar Rao Holkar may probably be attributed the inactivity of the Mahrattas† during this campaign, and the failure of Rugonath Rao in an attempt to reduce the Rana of Gohud, a petty chieftain of the Jhat tribe, whose uncle rose into notice, under the Peishwa Bajee Rao, but who, upon the defeat of the Mahrattas at Panniput, rebelled against them. Rugonath Rao, after a protracted siege of the town of Gohud, accepted a tribute of three lakhs of rupees, and shortly after proceeded towards the Deccan, where he arrived in the month of August, some time after the Peishwa's return from the Carnatic. On Mahdoo Rao's intimating his intention of meeting his uncle at Toka, the latter strongly suspected that there was a plan laid for seizing him. The fact appears to have been that Rugonath Rao's views, at the suggestion of Anundee Bye, were directed to dividing the sovereignty of the Empire, and conscious that attempts to strengthen his party had been discovered, he dreaded the consequences. Mahdoo Rao intended to make a last effort to reclaim his uncle, to repeat his offers of conceding a principal share in the administration, or to give him a handsome but moderate establishment in any part of the country where he might choose to reside. It was not easy to

* Tookajee Holkar paid a Nuzur or fee to the Peishwa's government, on being appointed commander of Mulhar Rao's troops, of rupees 15,62,000. (State Accounts, Poona Records.)

† The reader acquainted with the history of British India, will recognise the first appearance of Rugonath Rao's army in Bundelcund, as that which occasioned the alarm at Korah during a period of serious commotion. See Mill's British India, page 251, volume ii.

overcome Rugonath Rao's suspicions so far as to induce him to meet Mahdoo Rao, but an interview was at length effected by the mediation of Govind Sew Ram.*

Rugonath Rao at first refused all offers, and expressed his determination to retire to Benares. Mahdoo Rao replied, that he thought such a resolution extremely proper, and indeed, that he *must* either take the share of the administration which was proposed, or have no interference whatever in the government. To this last proposal Rugonath Rao, piqued at the decided tone which his nephew had assumed, affected the readiest compliance, and gave orders to his officers, in charge of the forts of Ahmednugur, Sewneree, Asseergurh, and Satara, to obey the orders of Mahdoo Rao ;—he declared that all he desired, before renouncing the world, was the payment of the arrears due to his troops, and a suitable provision for his family and attendants. Mahdoo Rao agreed to pay twenty-five lakhs of rupees in three months, to place at his disposal a Jagheer, situated about the source of the sacred river Godavery, yielding twelve or thirteen lakhs of rupees of annual revenue, and including six forts, amongst which were Trimbuck, Oundha, and Putta ;† but Rugonath Rao was dissatisfied, and only sought a fit opportunity to assert his claim to half of the Mahratta sovereignty.

Mahdoo Rao at this period was courted by the English and Mohummud Ally on the one part, and by Nizam Ally and Hyder

* Mr. Mostyn, the British envoy at the court of Poona, says by the mediation "of Sukaram Bappoo." (Secret Despatches, dated Poona, 5th December 1761.)

Sukaram, according to his usual duplicity, was intriguing with both parties, that he might at all events be able to retain his place. He would not incur the risk of interference in a reconciliation which he foresaw would only be temporary. Mr. Mostyn also states, that "Mahdoo Rao, instigated by his mother, certainly had intentions of seizing his uncle at that interview;" but as he mentions this on hearsay evidence, respecting an intention, and that too relating to what had taken place prior to his arrival at Poona, although his opinion has been generally followed on this point, I have preferred the authority of the natives of the country, who concur in imputing such a wish to Gopika Bye, but no such design to Mahdoo Rao.

† Mahratta MSS. and Bombay records.

on the other. Mr. Mostyn was sent to Poona by the Bombay government for the purpose of ascertaining the Peishwa's views, and of using every endeavour, by fomenting the domestic dissensions, or otherwise, to prevent the Mahrattas from joining Hyder and Nizam Ally. An alliance was not to be resorted to, if it could be avoided, but if absolutely necessary, the conquest of Bednore and Soonda, regarding which the Mahrattas always regretted having been anticipated by Hyder, was to be held out as an inducement for engaging them in the English interests.

The Mahratta court evaded all decisive opinions or engagements, but candidly told the envoy that their conduct would be

A. D. 1768. guided by circumstances. The Peishwa, however, could not quit the Deccan whilst his uncle's conduct manifested symptoms of hostility; and Sukaram Bappoo's intentions, always affectedly mysterious, continued equivocal.

Towards the end of the fair season Rugonath Rao had assembled a force of upwards of fifteen thousand men, with which in hopes of being joined by Janojee Bhonslay, he encamped, first on the banks of the Godavery, and afterwards in the neighbourhood of Dhoorup, a fort in the Chandore range. It was at this period, when despairing of having another son, that Rugonath Rao adopted Amrut Rao, the son of a Concan Bramin, whose family surname was Bhooskootee. His principal supporters in rebellion were Dummajee Gaekwar, who sent him some troops under his eldest son Govind Rao, and Gungadhur Yeswunt, the Dewan of Holkar, who was not only a zealous partizan of Rugonath Rao, but entertained a personal pique against the Peishwa, the origin of which is too remarkable to be omitted. At a public Durbar in Poona, after Rugonath Rao had retired from the administration, Gungadhur Yeswunt took an opportunity of saying, in a contemptuous manner, "that in the present affairs, his old eyes could distinguish the acts of one who only saw with the eyes of a boy;" Mahdoo Rao, to the astonishment of all present, jumped from the musnud, or cushion of state, on which he sat, and struck him a violent blow on the face; a singular instance of the effects of anger in a Bramin Court, among a people remarkable for their decorum.

Mahdoo Rao, on hearing of the formidable rebellion under his uncle, in order to anticipate a design formed on the part of Janojee Bhonslay to support him, immediately marched to Dhoorup, where he attacked and defeated Rugonath Rao's troops, forced him to seek shelter in the fort, obliged him to surrender, conveyed him a prisoner to Poona, and confined him in the Peishwa's palace.

The season of the year prevented Mahdoo Rao from taking immediate notice of the hostile intentions of Janojee, but he was publicly engaged in negotiations with Nizam Ally and with Hyder, in which he had a triple object: his chief design was to punish Janojee, and his first care was to engage Nizam Ally in an alliance for that purpose; the second was to draw the tribute from Mysore without the necessity of sending Gopaul Rao's army from Merich, as Hyder, fully occupied in the war with English, might be thrown off his guard by his extreme anxiety to procure the aid of the Mahrattas; the third object was to deter the Bengal government from entering on an alliance earnestly solicited by Janojee, from the fear that Mahdoo Rao, aided by Hyder and Nizam Ally, would ruin the company's affairs on the coast of Coromandel before their forces from Bengal could join Janojee in Berar.

The governor and council at Bombay, although the agent
 A. D. 1769. then at Poona, Mr. Brome, reported precisely
 as Mahdoo Rao wished him to believe, being less directly interested than Madras, were the first to perceive the depth of this well-planned scheme; and Hyder, as soon as his eyes were opened by finding that the tribute was required as a prelude to the Mahratta alliance, improved on the deception, and endeavoured to turn the reports then in circulation to his own advantage, by drawing the presidency of Madras into an alliance with himself.*

Mahdoo Rao, when he gave out that his preparations were intended to assist Hyder, amongst other stratagems to mask his real designs, sent his fleet to cruise off Bombay harbour;

* Colonel Wilks has overlooked the Bombay letters on this point, Hyder was certainly a master at left-handed diplomacy. See vol. ii. page 117. Wilks's South of India.

but Visajee Punt, the commander from Bassein, on being called upon by the governor and council to explain his conduct, gave as an excuse that he was watching two Portuguese ships, and assured the president that the Peishwa had no intention of breaking with the English. This assurance strengthened their opinion, and was soon confirmed by reported commotions, the preparations of Janojee Bhonslay, and the advance of a combined army of Mahrattas and Moghuls, under the Peishwa and Rookun-ud-dowlah, towards Nagpoor.

Janojee laid a judicious plan for the campaign, and opposed the invaders on the old Mahratta system, in which Mahdoo Rao was less experienced than in the half regular kind of warfare to which his attention had been directed. The artillery, the Arabs, and the infantry partially disciplined, the numerous tents, and the heavy equipments of the Peishwa and Rookun-ud-dowlah, unfitted them for the active war of detachments which Janojee pursued.

The combined armies entered Berar by the route of Basum and Kurinja. Naroo Punt, the Soobehdar of the province, on the part of Janojee, attempted to oppose them, but was defeated and killed; his nephew, Wittul Punt Bullar, retired towards Nagpoor, where Janojee and Moodajee, with their families and baggage, were encamped. As the Peishwa advanced they moved off to the westward, and as no attempt was made to cut them off from Gawelgurh, as soon as Mahdoo Rao passed to the eastward, they lodged their families and baggage in that fortress, and were joined at Wuroor Zuroor, by their brother Sabajee, at the head of a large detachment. Mahdoo Rao plundered Nagpoor, Janojee made no attempt to save it, but moved to Ramteek, where his whole force united; Bimbajee, the fourth brother, having joined from Chuttees-gurh, Janojee then made a feint, as if intending to proceed towards the Peishwa's districts to the northward. Mahdoo Rao, however, was not tempted to follow him; he placed Thannas in various districts, collected the revenue all over the country, and laid siege to Chandah. Janojee, in the meantime, wheeled off to the westward, and marching with extraordinary diligence, passed Ahmednugur, and began to plunder

the country on the route to Poona. Mahdoo Rao had at one time proposed, after his capital was destroyed by Nizam Ally, to surround it by a strong wall, but this design was, on mature consideration, abandoned, lest it should ultimately occasion irreparable loss, by holding out a security to property which was best insured by a dependence on the strong hill forts of Singurh and Poorundhur. The inhabitants, on Janojee's approach, sent off their property as usual, and Mahdoo Rao, as soon as he was apprized of the route he had taken, sent Gopaul Rao Putwurdhun and Ramchundur Gunnesh with thirty thousand horse in pursuit of him; but Janojee still plundered in the neighbourhood of Poona, and Gopaul Rao was justly accused of being secretly in league with him. The Peishwa and Rookun-ud-dowlah raised the siege of Chandah; Janojee moved towards the Godavery, pretending that he was about to give fair battle to the Peishwa in the absence of Gopaul Rao, whom he left at some distance in the rear. Nothing, however, was farther from his intention; he passed the Peishwa's army near Mahoor, but detached Bappoo Kurundeea by a circuitous route, who suddenly fell upon the baggage, and succeeded in carrying off a portion of it. Both parties, however, were tired of the war, they had mutually sustained heavy loss; and Janojee, although hitherto as successful as he could have expected, was sensible that if hostilities continued they must end in his ruin; but his principal alarm was caused by some intrigues with his brother Moodajee, and he readily embraced the first overtures of pacification afforded by a message from Mahdoo Rao. A treaty, or in the language of the Peishwa, who did not admit the independence which treaty implies, an agreement was concluded, on terms extremely favourable to the Peishwa, on the 23rd March,* eleven days prior to the masterly manœuvres by which Hyder Ally dictated a peace to the English at the gates of Madras.

* 14th Zilkad, Soorsun 1169. The Bombay records mention the treaty between the Peishwa and Janojee as having taken place 23rd April; in which, if there be no error in my calculation, they have made a mistake by one month.

The agreement between Mahdoor Rao Peishwa and Janojee Bhonslay, Sena Sahib Soobeh, was concluded at the village of Kunkapoor, on the north bank of the Beema, near Brimeshwur, and consisted of thirteen articles, by which Janojee restored the remainder of the districts he had received for deserting the Moghuls at Rakisbone, and gave up certain sequestered shares of revenue, or an equivalent for what rightfully belonged to Futil Sing Bhonslay, Raja of Akulkote. The tribute of Ghas Dana, hitherto levied by the Sena Sahib Soobeh, from the Peishwa's districts in Aurungabad, was discontinued, and in lieu of such tribute due from any other district belonging to the Peishwa or Nizam Ally, a stipulated sum was to be fixed, and paid by an order upon the collectors ; but in case the Moghuls should not pay the amount the Sena Sahib Soobeh should be at liberty to levy it by force ; he was neither to increase nor diminish his military force, without permission from the Peishwa, and to attend whenever his services were put in requisition ; to protect no disaffected Sillidars, nor to receive deserters from the Peishwa's army ; to maintain no political correspondence with the Emperor of Delhi, the Soobehdar of the Deccan, the English, the Rohillas, and the Nabob of Oude. A Wukeel was permitted to reside with the English in Orissa, and at the Court of Nizam Ally, but his business was to be strictly confined to revenue affairs. Janojee Bhonslay also submitted to pay a tribute of rupees five lakhs and one (500,001) by five annual instalments.* On the other hand, the Peishwa agreed not to molest Janojee's districts by marching his forces towards Hindooostan, by any unusual route ; to pay no attention to the pretensions of his relations, as long as he continued their just rights ;—he was to be permitted to send a force against the English, who were represented as troublesome in Orissa, provided his troops were not required for the service of the state. There are a variety of other items mentioned in the agreement, but the above are the most important ; the form of the Sena Sahib Soobeh's dependance upon the Peishwa is maintained throughout ; but it seems more particularly marked, by avoiding the usual terms

* This payment of five lakhs is the only part of the agreement which came to the knowledge of the Bombay government.

of an offensive and defensive alliance, instead of which the Peishwa agrees, at the request of the Sena Sahib Soobeh, to assist him with troops in case of an invasion of his territories by any other power.

Of the advantages obtained by Mahdoo Rao, Nizam Ally received three lakhs of rupees of annual revenue ; and one lakh was conferred on his minister, Rookun-ud-dowlah.*

After the close of the campaign against the Raja of Berar, the Peishwa sent an army into Malwa, under the command of Visajee Kishen Beneewala, accompanied by Ramchundur Gunnesh, Tookajee Holkar, and Mahadajee Sindia. Their proceedings will be hereafter detailed ; but some circumstances connected with the last mentioned person, domestic affairs at Poona, and operations in the Carnatic demand our previous attention.

Mahadajee Sindia, after the death of his nephew, Junkojee, although his illegitimacy was against his succession, had, by his services and qualifications, established claims to the family Jagheer, which it would have been both impolitic and unjust to set aside, especially as there was no legitimate descendant of Ranoojee alive. His birth tended greatly to lower his respectability in the eyes of the Mahratta Sillidars, a circumstance which was a cause of Sindia's subsequent preference for Mahomedans and Rajpoots, and occasioned an alteration in the constitution of his army. Rugonath Rao, seemingly without any reasonable cause,† wished to see him appointed merely the guardian of his nephew, Kedarjee Sindia, the eldest son of Tookajee ; an arrangement of which the Peishwa disapproved ; and this difference of opinion not only widened the breach between Mahdoo Rao and his uncle, but ever after inclined Mahadajee Sindia to Nana Furnuwees, Hurry Punt Phurkay, and several others, the ostensible carpoons, but the real ministers of Mahdoo Rao.

* Mahratta MSS., and copies of original agreements from the Poona records.

† Many years after this period, in a despatch from Colonel Palmer, resident at Poona, 8th June 1798, it is mentioned that Rugonath Rao conferred Sindia's Jagheer on Mannajee Phakray ; but the Mahratta manuscripts do not allude to such a transaction.

When ordered to Hindoostan on the expedition just adverted to, after all the commanders had obtained their audience of leave, Mahadajee Sindia, presuming on the favour shown to him, continued to loiter in the neighbourhood of Poona. Mahdoo Rao, who at all times exacted strict obedience from his officers, had particularly desired that they should proceed expeditiously, in order to cross the Nerbuddah, before there was a chance of obstruction by the swelling of the rivers from the setting in of the south-west monsoon ; but two or three days afterwards, when riding out to Theur, his favourite village, thirteen miles from Poona, he observed Sindia's camp still standing, without the smallest appearance either of movement or preparation. He sent instantly to Mahadajee Sindia, expressing astonishment at his disobedience and presumption, and intimating that if, on his return from Theur, he found a tent standing, or his troops in sight, he should plunder his camp and sequester his Jagheer. Mahadajee took his departure promptly ; but this well-known anecdote, characteristic of Mahdoo Rao, is chiefly remarkable from the contrast it presents to the future power of Mahadajee Sindia at the Mahratta capital.

The Peishwa seized every interval of leisure to improve the civil government of his country. In this laudable pursuit he had to contend with violent prejudices and with general corruption ; but the beneficial effects of the reforms he introduced are now universally acknowledged, and his sincere desire to protect his subjects, by the equal administration of justice, reflects the highest honour on his reign. His endeavours were aided by the celebrated Ram Shastree, a name which stands alone on Mahratta record as an upright and pure judge, and whose character, admirable under any circumstances, is wonderful amidst such selfishness, venality, and corruption as are almost universal in a Mahratta court. Ram Shastree, surnamed Parboney, was a native of the village of Maholy, near Satara, but went early to Benares, where he studied many years, and upon the death of Bal Kishen Shastree, about the year 1759, was selected for public employment at Poona, without either soliciting or declining the honour of being placed at the head of the Shastrees of the court. As Mahdoo

Rao obtained a larger share of power, Ram Shastree was at great pains to instruct him, both in the particular branch which he superintended, and in the general conduct of administration. An anecdote related of him is equally creditable to the good sense of himself and his pupil. Mahdoo Rao, in consequence of the conversation of several learned Bramins, had for a time been much occupied in expounding and following the mystical observances which the Shasters enjoin. Ram Shastree perceived that to oppose this practice by ordinary argument would only lead to endless disputes with Mahdoo Rao, or rather with his associates ; but one day, having come into the Peishwa's presence on business, and found him absorbed in the contemplation enjoined to Hindoo devotees,* during which all other faculties are to be suspended, the Shastree retired ; but next day, after making the few arrangements necessary, he went to the Peishwa, and formally resigned his office, which is politely expressed, by intimating an intention of retiring to Benares. Mahdoo Rao immediately apologized for the apparent impropriety of his conduct the day before, by stating the cause, which he defended as excuseable and praiseworthy. "It is only so," replied Ram Shastree, "provided you entirely renounce worldly advantages. As Bramins have departed from the ordinances of their faith, and assumed the office of Rajas, it becomes them to exercise power for the benefit of their subjects, as the best and only apology for having usurped it. It behoves you to attend to the welfare of your people and your government ; or, if you cannot reconcile yourself to those duties, quit the Musnid, accompany me, and devote your life strictly to those observances, which, I fully admit, our faith enjoins." Mahdoo Rao acknowledged the justness of the rebuke, and abandoned the studies which had misled him.

The benefits which Ram Shastree conferred on his countrymen were principally by example ; but the weight and soundness of his opinions were universally acknowledged during his life ; and the decisions of the Punchayets, which gave decrees

* That sort of contemplation which the Mahrattas express by the single word Jhep.

in his time, are still considered precedents. His conduct and unwearied zeal had a wonderful effect in improving the people of all ranks; he was a pattern to the well-disposed; but the greatest man who did wrong stood in awe of Ram Shastree; and although persons possessed of rank and riches did, in several instances, try to corrupt him, none dared to repeat the experiment, or to impeach his integrity. His habits were simple in the extreme; and it was a rule with him to keep nothing more in his house than sufficed for the day's consumption.

One of Mahdoo Rao's first acts was to abolish the system of forcing the villagers to carry baggage, a custom then so prevalent in India, that when first done away in the Mahratta country by Mahdoo Rao, it occasioned discontent among the men in power, and many secretly practised it. But the Peishwa having intelligence of a quantity of valuable articles conveyed in this manner by order of Visajee Punt, Soobehdar of Basscin, seized and confiscated the whole; remunerated the people for being unjustly taken from their agricultural labours, and at the same time issued fresh orders, which none, who knew his system of intelligence, ventured to disobey.*

In the ensuing fair season Mahdoo Rao had leisure to turn his attention to affairs in the Carnatic. Hyder, after concluding peace with the English, and obtaining a promise of their eventual support, was under no alarm at the prospect of a war with the Mahrattas. He not only evaded their demands for the payment of arrears of tribute, but levied contributions upon some of the Polygars, tributary to the Peishwa; an encroachment which Mahdoo Rao was not of a disposition to tolerate. In the month of November he sent forward a large body of horse under Gopaul Rao Putwurdhun, Mulhar Rao Rastia, and the cousins of Gopaul Rao, viz. Pureshram Bhow,

A. D. 1770. and Neelkunt Rao Putwurdhun. Mahdoo Rao followed at the head of thirty-five thousand men, of whom fifteen thousand were infantry. He rapidly reduced

* Some say that Mahdoo Rao exacted a heavy fine, besides confiscating the property.

the two Balapoors, Kolhar, Nundedroog, Mulwugul,* and the greater part of the open country on the eastern boundary of Hyder's territory, including sixteen forts, none of them considered of very great importance; and twenty-five fortified villages, of which he destroyed the greater part of the defences.† The fort of Mulwugul was carried by an assault led by two rivals of the Ghatgay family, of Boodh and Mullaoree. Their hereditary disputes, known to have existed from the time of the Bahminee dynasty, had been repeatedly revived in the Peishwa's camp, but though settled by a punchayet in favour of Nagojee Raja, Joojhar Rao, the other branch of the family, the head of which was Bajee Ghatgay, being dissatisfied, both parties had solicited permission to decide the quarrel, according to the family privilege, "at the spear's point," to which Mahdoo Rao would not consent; but when the assault was about to take place, it was proposed that of the two he whose flag first appeared before the Juree Putka on the top of the rampart should be confirmed in all the hereditary privileges. One of the family who carried the flag of Bajee Ghatgay was killed; Dumdairay, the person who had charge of the Juree Putka, also fell, but Nagojee seized the standard, and planting his flag with his own hand, hoisted the Juree Putka over it amidst an enthusiastic shout from the whole Mahratta army. Unfortunately the lustre of this gallant action was tarnished by the slaughter of the whole garrison.‡

The Peishwa's progress was for a time arrested at Nidjeeghlul, a place of inconsiderable strength, which held out several months, and repulsed two assaults made by the Mahrattas, in one of which Narrain Rao, the Peishwa's brother, was wounded.§ It was at last stormed by the Polygar of Chittledroog, at the

* Wilks.

† Bombay records.

‡ Mahratta MSS., and a family legend known to every individual of the clan of Ghatgay, although, in their usual loose way, they mention different names for the fort which was the scene of Nagojee's exploit.

§ By a bullet in the hand. Mahratta MSS.

head of his Beruds* a class of people who, as already noticed, are said to be originally Ramoossees from Maharashtra.

Hyder, as the Mahrattas advanced on the east, retired to the westward, where the country being closer, their cavalry were prevented from acting against him with effect. He never ventured within twenty kos of Mahdoo Rao, as his infantry would not face the Mahratta horse on a plain; but a light force under Gopaul Rao, which was sent to watch his motions, and ravage the country, was surprised and put to flight by Hyder, on the night of the 3rd or 4th March. This affair was attended by no advantage, the Mahrattas continued to plunder and ravage his territory, and Hyder hoped that they would retire to the northward of the Kistna, on the approach of the south-west monsoon.† But he was disappointed. The state of Mahdoo Rao's health compelled him to return to Poona in the beginning of June; but he left the infantry and twenty thousand horse under Trimbuck Rao Mama to prosecute the war. Hyder offered to pay the Chouth, but would not restore the amount exacted from the Polygars, as he conceived their submission to his authority in 1762 gave him a right to the tribute he had levied.‡

Trimbuck Rao, before the season when he might expect the return of the Peishwa, gained several advantages, reduced the fort of Gurumconda, and some other garrisons.

Mahdoo Rao, as soon as the season permitted, marched from Poona, intending to have joined Trimbuck Rao, but being

* Wilks. The anecdote given by Colonel Wilks of the mutilation of the captive garrison is not preserved in the Mahratta country, therefore as a mere anecdote I am not authorized in repeating it, although it is very characteristic of the anger, the violence, and the generosity of Mahdoo Rao. There is, however, an anecdote given by Colonel Wilks, which I must remark respecting Appajee Ram, vol. ii. page 14. It might do for the licentious court of Poona at any other period, but even, if authentic, which I cannot discover, it conveys a wrong impression. Mahdoo Rao would excuse want of form, and even an ebullition of anger, but he never tolerated indecency or impertinence.

† Letters from the Bombay deputies, Mr. Richard Church and Mr. James Sibbald, from Hyder's camp.

‡ Mahratta MSS. Bombay records. Wilks.

again taken ill, he gave over the command to Appa Bulwunt, the son of that Bulwunt Rao who fell so much distinguished

A. D. 1771. in one of the battles at Pannipnt. After the

juncture of Appa Bulwunt, the Mahratta army consisted of nearly forty thousand horse, with ten thousand infantry, and some guns. Hyder, with twelve thousand horse and twenty-five thousand infantry, of whom fifteen thousand were regulars, and forty* field guns, did not at first venture to take the field, and the Mahrattas encamped a short distance to the north of Seringapatam. Trimbuck Rao, in hopes of being able to draw Hyder from his position, retired a short distance to the northward, when Hyder, who always kept up a correspondence with some of the Mahratta officers,† is supposed to have been deceived by false information, and took the field, imagining that a great part of Trimbuck Rao's force was detached.‡ He was soon undeceived, and such was his impression, whether from having been formerly beaten by the Mahrattas or from want of confidence in his army, a circumstance rare in a good officer, this man who had fought with skill and bravery against British troops, did not dare to risk a battle, and at last fled, in the most dastardly and disorderly manner, towards his capital. The whole of his guns were taken, some thousands of his men and fifteen hundred of his cavalry were destroyed; twenty-five elephants, several thousand horses, and the whole of his camp equipage were the recorded trophies of the Mahrattas, who, as usual, boasted less of their victory than of their plunder.

After this success Trimbuck Rao invested Seringapatam, but being almost destitute of men capable of working his guns, the attempt was conducted with more than the usual absurdity of a Mahratta siege. It was disapproved by Mahdoo Rao, whose object was to possess himself of Bednore and Soonda, during the ensuing season. Trimbuck Rao, after wasting five

* Wilks. Mahdoo Rao says in a letter to the Governor of Bombay, eight or ten thousand horse and forty-five guns.

† His own letters to the Bombay government.

‡ Letter from Mr. Sibbald.

weeks before Seringapatam, retired in the middle of April to Turry Ghuree,* keeping a strong garrison in Belloor, and exacting heavy contributions in various directions.

Before the roads were completely occupied, Hyder, in the beginning of June, attempted to draw a convoy of military stores with twenty pieces of cannon from Bednore to Seringapatam, but the whole, including the escort that accompanied them, were intercepted ; and at last, so effectually did the Mahrattas cut off the communication, that Hyder's *Hircarrahs* were obliged to pass through the Koorga Raja's country, and descend the Ghants in Malabar, as the only route to Bednore. On the 24th October the Mahrattas moved to Bangalore ; Hyder, with about twenty thousand men of all descriptions, remained at Seringapatam strongly intrenched.† The only success which attended his arms during the whole season was achieved by his son Tippoo, who intercepted a very large convoy of grain proceeding towards the Mahratta camp. Hyder's situation was considered critical, and a prospect of the total reduction of his country, which formed the only barrier between the Mahrattas and Madras, inclined the Bombay government to afford him their assistance, but the territory‡ and subsidy, demanded as preliminaries on the one part, and the terms proposed on the other, were out of all proportion ; besides which, Hyder artfully endeavoured to make them principals in the war, by requiring of them to attack Salsette, which at once put an end to the negotiation.

The governor and council at Madras deemed it of vital importance to support Hyder Ally, but they were prevented by the wishes of Mohummud Ally and the opinion of Sir John Lindsay, His Majesty's minister plenipotentiary, both of whom,

A. D. 1772.

in the face of the late treaty with Hyder, urged the Madras government to unite with the Mahrattas.§ But news of the increasing illness of the Peishiwa,

* Probably Turry Kaira.

† Mr. Sibbald's Reports, and Mahratta MSS.

‡ Mangalore and Pargurh on the coast were the places applied for.

§ Madras records.

which was pronounced incurable in the month of March, alarmed all the Mahratta commanders at a distance from the capital ; especially those who owed their situations exclusively to Mahdoo Rao. The design of reducing Soonda and Bednore was abandoned ; and assigning as a reason that the Mahratta Sillidars were desirous to return to their homes, which was also perfectly true, Trimbuck Rao listened to Hyder's overtures. Negotiations began in the middle of April, when the Mahrattas were in the neighbourhood of Bangalore ; and a treaty was concluded in June, by which the Mahrattas retained the ancient possessions of the father of Sivajee,* besides Mudgerry and Gurumconda. Hyder likewise agreed to pay thirty-six lakhs of rupees, as arrears and expences, and fourteen lakhs as the annual tribute, which he in future promised to remit with regularity ;—all other Mahratta demands were to cease.†

Mahdoo Rao's disease was consumption, but his health improved considerably during the monsoon, and great hopes were entertained of his recovery ; the progress of his generals in Hindoostan had been still more important than his acquisitions in the Carnatic.

The army, which crossed the Nerbuddah in 1769, under Visajee Kishen, as chief in command, consisted, when the whole were united in Malwa, of nearly fifty thousand horse. Visajee Kishen and Ramchundur Gunnesh, besides Pindharees, had twenty thousand horse, of which fifteen thousand belonged to the Peishwa. With Mahadajeet Sindia there were fifteen thousand, and with Tookajee Holkar about the same number.‡ There was also a large body of infantry with a numerous arti-

* Kolhar, Bangalore, Ouscotta, Balapoor, and Sera.

† Wilks mentions only thirty lakhs (vol. ii. page 151), which may be correct, but the Mahratta MS. is here supported by the fact of there being forty-nine lakhs and fifty thousand rupees debited to Hyder in the Mahratta state accounts, at the period of Mahdoo Rao's death, for which, as it is regularly credited, they probably had some collateral security.

‡ Mahratta MSS. This agrees pretty nearly with the statement given by Nujeef Khan to General Barker in May 1773 ; but by that time Ramchundur Gunnesh had returned with a party of the Peishwa's horse to the Decean, and the increase may be accounted for by numbers of Pindharees. See Appendix No. 21 to the Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy.

lery,* chiefly natives of Hindoostan and Malwa, including men of all casts. The Arabs, Abyssinians, and Sindians, of whom there was a small proportion, were accounted the best soldiers of the army, and were mostly obtained from the sea-ports of Cambay and Surat.

For some time after the fatal field of Panniput, the Mahrattas, in consequence of their domestic struggles, and the warfare to the south of the Nerbuddah, had little leisure to interfere with the politics of Hindoostan. Mulhar Rao Holkar, on one occasion, in the year 1764, joined the Jhats when besieging Delhi, but soon quitted them, and returned to the Deccan.

A body of Mahrattas from Bundelcund, or Malwa, took service with Shujah-ud-dowlah, in the war against the English in 1765; but, excepting the temporary visit of Holkar to Delhi, above alluded to, the Mahrattas had not crossed the Chumbul in force for upwards of eight years.

A. D. 1761. The Abdallee king, after the great victory he achieved, bestowed the throne of the Moghuls on the lawful heir, Shah Alum; but as that Emperor was then engaged in the well known warfare against the Nabob of Bengal and the English, his son, the prince Jewan Bukht, assumed the ensigns of royalty during the Emperor's absence. Shujah-ud-dowlah, Nabob of Oude, was appointed Vizier, and Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, Rohillah, was restored to the dignity of Umeer Ool Oomrah. After which, Ahmed Shah Abdallee quitted Delhi and returned to his own dominions.

Nujeeb-ud-dowlah remained with the young prince generally at the capital; but Shujah-ud-dowlah first repaired to his own government, and afterwards expelled all the Mahratta Carcoons, whom he still found remaining as collectors of revenue in the Dooab. He next proceeded to Benares, where, having been joined by the Emperor, they advanced together into Bundelcund, took Jhansee,† and would probably have driven the Mahrattas from that province; but in consequence of the flight of Meer Cassim from Bengal, Shujah-ud-dowlah, not content with affording him an asylum, espoused his cause against the English, a course of policy which led to his defeat

* Mahratta MSS.

† Seyr Mutuakhereen.

at the battle of Buxar, on the 23rd October 1764, when the Emperor for a time placed himself under the protection of the English.* A treaty with Shujah-ud-dowlah, in August 1765, restored to him the principality of Oude, which had been subjugated by the British arms, recognised his title as Vizier of the empire, and established an alliance with the Company's government.

The reader may recollect the manner in which the Moghuls, in the time of Aurungzebe, took possession of a province, and their mode of conducting its administration. To each district there was a Foujdar, or military governor charged with its protection and interior order, and a Dewan or collector and civil manager. There were also Soobehdars and Nazims, who were military governors of large provinces, but these were merely gradations of rank, to each of which there was a Dewan. The Foujdar was the active efficient officer, the superiors were mere supervisors. These military governors, when the empire fell into decay, styled themselves Nabobs,† and all who could maintain that appellation, considered themselves independent, though they embraced every opportunity of obtaining firmans, or commissions from the pageant Emperor. The English, at the period of Meer Jaffeir's death, had Bengal at their disposal, and the Emperor's person in their power. The youngest son of Meer Jaffeir was made Nabob of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, in February 1765,‡ and the East India Company, previously charged with the military protection of this territory, were appointed his Dewan in August following. The Emperor, Shah Alum, with the assigned revenues of Allahabad and Korah for his support, the only part of the conquered territories of Shujah-ud-dowlah, of which the English thought proper to dispose, continued to reside under the British protection, in hopes that they might be induced to send an army to place him on the throne of his ancestors.

* Mill's History of British India.

† To my Indian readers it is very unnecessary to explain that Nuwab is the Persian word, the plural (as more respectful) of Naib, a deputy.

‡ Mill.

In the meantime the Prince Jewan Bukht remained at the Moghul capital, where Nujeeb-ud-dowlah exercised the entire powers of administration. Soornj Mull, the Jhat Prince, was gradually extending his power and consequence : the Mahratta officer* in Agra accepted his protection and admitted a garrison of his troops: he took Rewaree and Ferohnugur from a Beloochee adventurer who possessed them in jagheer; and at last applied to Nujeeb-ud-dowlah for the office of Foujdar in the environs of the capital. These encroachments were so palpable that Nujeeb-ud-dowlah was obliged to have recourse to arms, and gained an easy and unexpected victory by the death of Sooraj Mull, who was killed in the commencement of the first action.† His son, assisted by Mulhar Rao Holkar,‡ during the short period the latter was absent from the Deccan in 1764, besieged Delhi, but Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, by means of that secret understanding which always subsisted between him and Holkar, induced the Mahrattas to abandon the alliance and return to Malwa.

Such was the state of Hindoostan when the Peishwa's army crossed the Chumbul, towards the latter end of 1769. Their first operations were directed against the Rajpoot princes, from whom they levied ten lakhs of rupees as arrears of tribute.

A. D. 1770. They next entered the territory of the Jhats, on pretence of assisting one of the sons of Saoraj Mull; as great contentions prevailed amongst the brothers. The Mahrattas were victorious in an engagement fought close to Bhurtpoor, and, after having overran the country, the Jhats agreed to pay them sixty-five lakhs of rupees, ten in ready money, and the rest by instalments. They encamped at Deeg during the monsoon, and Nujeeb-ud-dowlah, dreading their recollection "of sons and brothers slain," opened a negotiation with Visajee Kishen to avert the calamities he apprehended.§ The Mahrattas are mindful both of benefits

* I cannot discover what officer it was. † Seyr Mutuakhereen.

‡ The amount paid for his assistance is not known, but one-half of the acknowledged profits, upwards of four and a half lakhs of rupees, was credited to the Peishwa. (State accounts, Poona records.)

§ Mahratta MSS. and Bengal records.

and of injuries, from generation to generation ; but they are not more revengeful than might be expected of a people so little civilized ; and in this respect they seldom allow their passion to supersede their interest. Visajee Kishen listened to the overtures of Nujeeb-ud-dowlah with complacency ; but Ramchundur Gunnesh and Mahadajee Sindia called for vengeance on the Rohillas. On a reference being made to the Peishwa, he so far concurred in Sindia's opinion, that Nujeeb-ud-dowlah could never be a friend to the Mahrattas ; but as they were endeavouring to induce the Emperor to withdraw from the protection of the English, in which Nujeeb-ud-dowlah's assistance might be useful, the conduct of Visajee Kishen was approved.* Accordingly Zabita Khan, the son of Nujeeb-nd-dowlah, was sent to join Visajee Kishen ; but Nujeeb-nd-dowlah shortly after died when on his route to Nujeebgurh, in October 1770.† Immediately after this event Zabita Khan assumed his father's situation at the capital.

The President and Council at Bengal, although it was upon the face of their records that in 1766 Shah Alum had made overtures to the Mahrattas, were not at first apprized of his having renewed the negotiation, and were therefore at a loss to account for the conduct of the Mahrattas, in not making

A. D. 1771. themselves masters of Delhi ; instead of which they took the route of Rohileund. The Rohilla chiefs behaved with no spirit ; their country was entirely overrun ; the strong fortress of Etaweh fell into the hands of the Mahrattas ; and the whole of the Dooab, except Furruckabad, was reduced almost without opposition. The territory of Zabita Khan was not exempt from their ravages ; they likewise made irruptions into Korah, and preferred demands upon Shujah-ud-dowlah, which alarmed the English, and induced them to prepare for resisting an invasion which they deemed probable.

Shujah-ud-dowlah, however, maintained a correspondence with the Mahrattas the whole time ; and the Emperor, at last, openly declared his intention of throwing himself on their

* Mahratta MSS.

† Mahratta MSS., Bengal records, and Forster's Travels.

protection. They returned from Rohilkund to Delhi before the rains, and possessed themselves of every part of it except the citadel, where, on account of the prince Jewan Bukht, they refrained from excess, and treated him with courtesy. Zabita Khan would probably have been detained by them, but Tookajee Holkar ensured his safe retreat to Nujeeb-gurh. The Bengal presidency, at the head of which was Mr. Cartier, represented to the Emperor the imprudence and danger of quitting their protection ; but with sound policy placed no restraint on his inclination, and Shah Alum, having taken leave of his English friends, was met by Mahadajee Sindia, escorted to the camp of Visajee Kishen, under whose auspices he entered his capital, and was seated on the throne in the end of December 1771.* The Mahrattas now determined to wreak their revenge on the son of Nujeeb-ud-dowlah ; a design undertaken with the entire concurrence of the Emperor, who bore Zabita Khan a personal enmity, but it was principally instigated by Mahadajee Sindia, the chief director of the councils of Visajee Kishen, Ramchundur Gunnesh having returned to Poona in consequence of a quarrel with his superior. Shujah-ud-dowlah continued his correspondence with the Mahrattas, although he personally declined assuming his post as Vizier whilst they maintained supremacy at the Imperial court. But the principal object of Shujah-ud-dowlah, as it had been that of his father, was the subjugation of the Rohilla territory, to which the death of Nujeeb-ud-dowlah paved the way. He had no objections, therefore, to see these neighbours weakened by the Mahrattas, provided he could ultimately secure the conquest for himself ; but he also perceived that the result of a permanent conquest of Rohilkund by the Mahrattas would prove the precursor of his own destruction. The Rohillas knew him well, and dreading treachery, Hafiz Rehmut, whose districts adjoined Oude, could not be prevailed upon to proceed to the assistance of Zabita Khan, until assured by Brigadier General Sir Robert Barker, the officer in command of the British troops stationed in the

* Bengal Records. Mahratta MSS., &c. &c.

Vizier's territory, that no improper advantage should be taken of his absence from the frontier.*

Several places were speedily reduced ; an ineffectual resistance was opposed to Mahadajee Sindia and Nujeef Khan, at the fords of the Ganges, which they crossed in the face of the Rohillas, by passing many of their posts as if they had no intention of fording until much higher up the river, when, after throwing them off their guard, they suddenly wheeled about, dashed down upon one of the fords at full gallop, and crossing over, made a great slaughter. The Rohillas, in consequence, seem to have been completely panic-struck. Zabita Khan's territory was reduced with scarcely any opposition ; the strongest entrenchments, and even forts were abandoned, before a horseman came in sight.† Puttergurh, where considerable wealth amassed by Nujeeb Khan was deposited, fell into their hands, and the Rohilla chiefs were compelled to the very measure which Shujah-ud-dowlah desired ; namely, to form a defensive alliance with him against the Mahrattas, for which they paid him forty lakhs of rupees, and by which he secured himself from the Mahrattas, strengthened his own resources, and weakened the means of resistance on the part of the Rohillas, on whose ultimate destruction he was bent.

Visajee Kishen returned to Delhi for a short time in the month of June ; but the main body of the Mahrattas was encamped during the rains in the Dooab, of which they had taken almost entire possession. The constant applications of Visajee Kishen in urging demands, the eagerness with which his Bramin followers snatched at every opportunity of acquiring wealth, the sordid parsimony of their habits when absent from the Deccan, and that meanness and impudence which are inseparable in low minds, greatly disgusted the Emperor, and

* See Appendix to the Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy of the House of Commons.

† Seyr Mutuakhereen. The Mahratta MSS. give them more credit than the Moghul historian ; but although he is excessively prejudiced against any person in the shape of an Afghan, the Bengal Records are here in support of the Moghul's testimony.

all who were compelled to tolerate their insolence and rapacity. Their behaviour gave Shah Alum such extreme offence, that he was willing to run any risk to rid himself of such allies. Zabita Khan, through Tookajee Holkar, was endeavouring to recover both his territory and his father's rank at court. The Emperor would not listen to the proposal, and he at last engaged his General, Nujeef Khan, to resist the Mahrattas by force. Visajee Kishen was desirous of avoiding extremities, and referred for orders to Poona ; but an event had occurred there, which, at the time it happened, was less expected than it had been some months before ; Mahdoo Rao breathed his last at the village of Theur, thirteen miles east of Poona, on the morning of the 18th November, in the 28th year of his age.* He died without issue ; and his widow Rumma Bye, who bore him a remarkable affection, immolated herself with the corpse.

The death of Mahdoo Rao occasioned no immediate commotion ; like his own disease, it was at first scarcely perceptible, but the root which invigorated the already scathed and wide-extending tree was cut off from the stem, and the plains of Panniput were not more fatal to the Mahratta Empire than the early end of this excellent prince. Although the military talents of Mahdoo Rao were very considerable, his character as a sovereign is entitled to far higher praise, and to much greater respect, than that of any of his predecessors. He is deservedly celebrated for his firm support of the weak against the oppressive, of the poor against the rich, and, as far as the constitution of society admitted, for his equity to all. Mahdoo Rao made no innovations ; he improved the system established endeavoured to amend defects without altering forms, and restrained a corruption which he could not eradicate.

The efficiency of his government in its commencement was rather clogged than assisted by the abilities of Sukaram Bappoo. The influence of the old minister was too great for the talents of his young master ; all actions deemed beneficial were ascribed to the former, whilst the unpopularity, which

* Mahdoo Rao was born in August 1714.

with some party is inseparable from executive authority, fell to the inexperienced Peishwa, and to Mahdoo Rao in a peculiar degree, by reason of an irritable temper, not always under command, which was his greatest defect. This influence on the part of the minister, a man open to bribery, prevented that respect for Mahdoo Rao to which he was entitled, and without which the ends which he aimed at establishing were obstructed. Until after Rungonath Rao's confinement, Mahdoo Rao was unknown to his subjects: shortly after that event he privately sent for Sukaram Bappoo, told him "that he found many of his orders disregarded, and that he was but a cipher in the government: whether this proceeded from want of capacity, or diligence on his own part, or any other cause, he was himself perhaps an incompetent judge, but he would put the question to his sincerity, and begged of him to explain the reason and suggest the remedy." Sukaram immediately replied, "you can effect nothing until you remove me from office:—appoint Moraba Furnuwees your Dewan, when you can be your own minister."

Mahdoo Rao respected the penetration which read his intentions, confirmed him in the enjoyment of his jagheer, and followed his advice. He permitted Moraba to do nothing without his orders; he established a system of intelligence, of which the many exaggerated stories now related in the Mahratta country only prove that in regard to events both foreign and domestic he possessed prompt and exact information.

A review of his civil administration, if taken in the abstract, would convey an indifferent idea of his merits: it must therefore be estimated by comparison, by the state of the society in which he was chief magistrate, and by the conduct pursued in the interior management and protection of his country, whilst harassed by the machinations of his uncle's party, and constantly engaged in foreign war. The brief summary which it is here proposed to give, will scarcely allude to the administration of his predecessors, but may convey some idea of the best government the Mahratta country enjoyed under the Hindoo dynasty of modern times.

The root of all the Mahratta systems, even now in existence, however much disfigured or amended, whether on the banks

of the Myhie and Chumbul, or the Kistna and Toongbuddra, is found in the institutions of Sivajee.

We have seen that Sivajee had eight officers of state ; of them it need only be observed that the supremacy and gradual usurpation of the Raja's authority had also superseded that of the other Purdhans, as well as of the Prittee Needhee. Forms of respect instituted with their rank were maintained ; but they were only of importance in the state according to the strength and resources of their hereditary jagheers, and of a superior description of soldiery, who, on pay much inferior to what they might elsewhere have obtained, still adhered to some of them, with that pride of servitude to their chief, which, by its enthusiastic delusion, has caught the fancies of men in all uncivilized countries and dignified military vassalage. Of all these personages, at the period of Mahdoo Rao's death, Bhowan Rao, the Prittee Needhee, was the most considerable, both for the reasons mentioned, and from his warlike character.

In the different departments of the state under Sivajee, every separate establishment, when complete, had eight principal officers ; all such officers, as well as their superiors, were styled Durrukdars, and although declared not hereditary at the time of their institution, they generally descended in the usual routine of everything Hindoo. Precedent, however, that grand rule of sanction to Mahratta usurpation, soon became, whilst anarchy prevailed, a mere name for the right of the strong, and the title of Durrukdars, like every other claim, was only regarded according to circumstances.

The general distribution of revenue planned by Ballajee Wishwanath was a measure wholly political, but it was ingrafted on the revenue accounts of every village, the ordinary forms of which have been explained in the preliminary part of this work ; upon the balance of assessment, or government share, the artificial distribution alluded to invariably followed ; although seldom in the uniform manner laid down upon its first establishment in the year 1720. Separate collectors did not always realize those specific shares ; but, even up to this day, distinct claims, such as Surdeshmookhee, Mokassa, &c.,

are frequently paid to different owners, and tend to render the accounts extremely intricate. A fixed district establishment, founded on that of Sivajee, but more or less complete, was preserved until a very late period. Unless in the old jagheer districts, the appointment of Durrukdars, during the life of Shao, remained in the gift of the Raja. The patronage however of one office or Durruk was bestowed by the Raja Shao either on Bajee Rao or on Ballajee Rao immediately after his father's death ; the patronage so conferred was that of the Furnuwees ; hence in the old accounts of the Peishwa's districts, after the death of Shao, all those holding the office of Furnuwees superseded their superiors the Muzzimders ; and thus the Peishwa's Furnuwees became, under the Peishwa's government, precisely what the Punt Amat was under that of the Raja. These two, the Furnuwees and Muzzimdar, were invariably kept up, as were the Dufturdar and Chitnees ; but the appointment of Dewan was not general, nor of the Karkanees, Potnees, and Jamdar. Durrukdars were only removable by government, but a number of carcoons, in addition to the ordinary establishments, were introduced by Ballajee Rao, who were displaced at the pleasure of the immediate chief officer of the district. The useful situation of Turufdar, or Talookdar, was always preserved, but generally under the appellation of Shaikdar.

These details are enumerated, because the arrangement for the land revenue in Maharashtra is the basis of civil government ; and, indeed, the good or bad revenue management of the districts of any country in India is the surest indication of the conduct of the administration.

Under Mahdoo Rao the same heads of districts were continued as had been established by his uncle, Sewdasheo Rao Bhow ; except that upon the death of the Sursoobehdar Balloba Manduwagunnee, who effected the great reforms between the Neera and Godavery, he did not appoint a successor to that situation ; but the Sursoobehdars in the Conean, Carnatic, Candeish, and Guzerat,* were always continued. The appointment of a Mamlittdar was declaredly for the year, but he was

* There also was a Sursoobehdar sometimes in Buglana.

not removed during good behaviour : the amount of his collections varied ; generally, however, they were not above five lakhs, and seldom below one lakh of rupees annually. At the commencement of the season he was furnished by government with a general statement, which contained his instructions, and included the expected receipts, the alienations, and expenses ; which last he was not to exceed, but upon the most satisfactory grounds. In the detail of the expenses were the salaries, including not only food, clothes, and every necessary, but the adequate establishment and attendants for each of the government servants, according to their rank and respectability. Besides these authorized advantages, there was a private assessment over and above the regular revenue, at which the government connived, provided the Mamlidar's share did not amount to more than five per cent. upon the actual collections. This hidden personal emolument was exactly suited to the genius and habits of Bramins, who, by a strange though perhaps not a peculiar perversion, prefer obtaining an emolument in this underhand manner, to honestly earning four times as much.

The private assessment was supposed to be favourable to the cultivator, as well as pleasing to the Mamlidar and district officers. Mahdoor Rao prevented the excess of the abuse by vigilant supervision, and by readily listening to the complaints of the common cultivators ; as to the village officers, they all participated, and from them information could only be obtained through some of the discontented hereditary claimants, whose statements were often fabricated, and so difficult to substantiate, that the government, much occupied by its great political transactions, generally made it a rule only to prosecute the chief authorities on great occasions, to take security from interested informants before examining the proofs, and to leave minor delinquency to the investigation of Mamlidars. It might be supposed that a system so defective, with the door of corruption left open by the connivance of government, would be followed by every act of injustice, oppression, and violence ; but the evils fell more on the state than on individuals ; and at that time the Mahratta country in proportion to its fertility was probably more thriving than any other part of India.

The Mamlidar on his appointment opened an account-current with government, and was obliged to advance a part of the expected revenue, for which he received a premium of two per cent., and one per cent. monthly interest, until the periods at which the collection was expected, when the interest ceased. This advance, which was both a security and convenience to government, and all revenue transactions whatever were managed by the agency of the Soucars, or Indian bankers; but many persons employed their private property in the prosecution of such agency, in which there was often a great deal of speculation, but, with ordinary caution, large returns were obtained with very little risk. Thus the advance of money on the land-revenue became something like national funds, partaking of the benefits of prompt supply, and the evils of fictitious credit.

At the end of the season, when the Mamlidar's accounts were closed, they were carried by the district Furnuwees to Poona, and most carefully examined before they were passed.

Mahdoo Rao encouraged the Mamlidars to reside in the districts, keeping their Wukeels at Poona, but when that was impracticable, the affairs of the district were more scrupulously investigated.

The management of the police, and the administration of civil and criminal justice, were in a great degree intrusted to the Mamlidars. The police magistrates were the Patell, the Mamlidar, and, where the office existed, the Sursoobehdar. The Deshmookhs and Deshpandyas were left in the enjoyment of their hereditary rights, but their ancient power was suspended, and though permitted to collect their own dues, they were seldom referred to, except in ascertaining local usages, and occasionally in arbitrating differences. The police, except in the city of Poona, was very imperfect; but considering the defective state of the executive authority, even in the best times of the Mahratta government, and the unsettled predatory habits of so large a portion of undisciplined soldiery accustomed to violence and rapine, it is, at first view, surprising that the lives and properties of the peaceable part of society were so secure. But the military were pretty equally dis-

persed ; every village could defend its inhabitants or avenge aggression ; and members who disgraced the community were too much bound by the opinion of their family connections, their own interests, and the power of the village officers, to become entirely lawless. The Mahratta usage of generally returning during the rains preserved all those ties ; and though it might prove inconvenient to an ambitious sovereign, it greatly tended to domestic order and tranquillity. The great use which the Peishwas made of attachment to *wutun*, and the preference in promoting an officer, shown to those who could boast of hereditary rights, was in many respects a most politic and judicious mode of encouraging a species of patriotism, and applying national feelings to purposes of good government.

In the Mahratta country the most common crimes were thieving and gang robbery, murder and arson. The two first were more common to Ramoossees and Bheels than to Mahrattas, and were punished by the loss of life or limb ; murder for revenge was rarely considered a capital offence, and very often, in hereditary disputes a murder, where risk attended it, was considered rather a creditable action. The ordinary compromise with government, if the accused was not a rich man, was three hundred and fifty rupees. The facility of eluding justice by flying into the territory of some other authority was the greatest obstruction to police efficiency.

For great crimes the Sursoobehdars had the power of punishing capitally ; Mamliddars in such cases required the Peishwa's authority. The great Jagheerdars had power of life and death within their respective territories. Bramins could not be executed ; but state prisoners were poisoned or destroyed by deleterious food, such as equal parts of flour and salt. Women were mutilated, but rarely put to death. There was no prescribed form of trial ; torture to extort confession was very common ; and confession was generally thought necessary to capital punishment. The chief authority, in doubtful cases, commonly took the opinion of his officers ; and some Mamliddars in the Satara country, under both the Prittee Needhee and Peishwa, employed Punchayets to pronounce on the innocence or guilt of the accused ; but this system can only be traced to

the time of Shao ; and though so well worthy of imitation was by no means general, nor are its benefits understood or appreciated in the present day.

In civil cases the Punchayets were the ordinary tribunals, and the example of Ram Shastree tended greatly to their improvement. Excepting where Ram Shastree superintended, they were a known though unauthorized source of emolument to the members ; no doubt frequently corrupt and unjust in their decisions : but Punchayets were popular, and their defects less in the system itself than in the habits of the people.

The nominal revenue of the whole Mahratta empire at the period of Mahdoo Rao's death was ten crores, or one hundred millions of rupees ; but the amount actually realized, including the jagheers of Holkar, Sindia, Janojee Bhonslay, and Dum-majee Gaekwar, together with tribute, fees, fines, contributions, customary offerings, and all those sources independent of regular collections, which in the state accounts come under the head of extra revenue,* may be estimated at about seventy-two millions of rupees, or about seven millions of pounds sterling annually.† Of this sum the revenue under the direct control of the Peishwa was about twenty-eight millions of rupees ; in which estimate is included Mahdoo Rao's personal estate, kept distinct from the public accounts, but which seldom amounted to above three lakhs of rupees, or thirty thousand pounds sterling a-year ; he was, however, possessed

* The extra revenue, in the *village* accounts, is properly all revenue over and above the land assessment : for example, the tax on merchants, manufacturers, &c. (called *moh-turfa*) ; a tax on houses ; *enam tijace*, or one-third of certain *enam* lands ; a tax on pasturage and profits of grass lands ; the offerings of pilgrims at religious fairs (or *Jutra*), and a great many other items, which are far more numerous, and apparently vexatious, than they are important to the state or grievous to the subject. In the village settlement they were enumerated, but brought to account under one head, *Nukta-bab*. The revenue derived from the customs on the exports and imports of a village is frequently included in the village accounts, but of the country generally it is a distinct branch of revenue, as has already been explained.

† The Poona rupee is 12 per cent. inferior to the Bengal secca.

of twenty-four lakhs of personal property at his death, which he bequeathed to the state.

From the vast acquisitions of Ballajee Rao, his lavish expenditure, and the numerous jagheers and enam lands which he conferred, it is a common opinion in the Mahratta country that he had a greater revenue than any other Peishwa : but he never had time to collect the revenues in many parts of India temporarily subjugated by his armies. The average collections in any equal number of years were greater in the time of Mahdoo Rao than in that of his father ; although in the season 1751-52 Ballajee Rao realized thirty-six and a half millions of rupees, which exceeded the highest collection ever made by Mahdoo Rao by upwards of two millions. The state was much in debt at Mahdoo Rao's accession ; and although, at his death, by reckoning the outstanding balances, and by bringing to account the value of stores and other property, there was a nominal sum in its favour of sixty-five millions of rupees ; yet the treasury was exhausted, no part of this amount being available. On a complete examination* of the accounts, the government of the Peishwas seems always to have been in debt, or embarrassed from want of funds, till after the period of Bajee Rao's connection with the English.

The ordinary army of the Peishwa, without including the troops of Bhonslay, Gaekwar, Sindia, or Holkar, amounted to fifty thousand good horse. Neither his infantry nor artillery were considerable ; and, after providing for his garrisons, the ordinary number in the time of Mahdoo Rao was about ten thousand, of whom one-third were Arabs, and the greater part Mahomedans. It was usual, however, to entertain large bodies of infantry when the Peishwa took the field, but they were always discharged on returning to Poona. The Hetkurees, or Concan infantry, are said to have been preferred to the

* The late Lieut. John M'Leod was employed for several months, assisted by a great many of the most experienced Bramin revenue officers and accountants, in arranging and examining the accounts of the Peishwa's government ; and I am much indebted to him and to the Bramins who were in his office for their opinions, and for the valuable abstracts which they from time to time prepared for me.

Mawulees, perhaps on account of the attachment of the latter to the house of Sivajee.*

Calculating the contingent which Gaekwar and Bhonslay were bound to furnish, at from ten to fifteen thousand, taking the lowest estimate of Holkar's and Sindia's army at thirty thousand, and allowing three thousand from the Powars of Dhar, the Peishwa could command about one hundred thousand good horse, exclusive of Pindharees.

* By an official list, it appears that of 449 officers in Mahdoor Rao's army 93 were Bramins, 8 Rajpoots, 308 Mahrattas, and 40 Mahomedans.

CHAP. VIII.

FROM A. D. 1772 TO A. D. 1774.

State of parties upon the death of Mahdoo Rao—previous release of Rugonath Rao.—Reduction of Raigurh.—Rugonath Rao is again placed in confinement.—Narrain Rao projects an expedition into the Carnatic, and recalls the army from Hindoostan—probability of a rupture with the Berar government upon the death of Janojee Bhonslay.—Murder of Narrain Rao—particulars.—Rugonath Rao is invested as Peishwa.—Character of Narrain Rao.—Return of the army from Hindoostan—Summary of their proceedings during the campaign.—Rughojee Bhonslay is nominated Sena Sahib Soobeh.—War with Nizam Ally.—Plans of Rugonath Rao—State of the ministry.—Nizam Ally is compelled to cede a large portion of territory, which is restored to him.—Rugonath Rao proceeds to the Carnatic—the ministers conspire against him—he concludes an arrangement with Hyder—State of his army—returns to the northward—Confederacy against him—defeats Trimbuck Rao Mama—Advances on Poona—retreats towards Hindoostan—negociates with Holkar, Sindia, and the English.—Birth of Mahdoo Rao Narrain.—Rugonath Rao crosses the Nerbuddah, and is deserted by Moodajee Bhonslay.—Dissension amongst the ministers—party in favour of Rugoba—suppressed.—Hyder Ally takes Sera and Gurumcondah.—Busalut Jung makes an incursion—preparations at Poona—Rugoba renews negotiations with the English.

CONSIDERABLE relaxation in the confinement of Rugonath Rao had taken place for some time prior to A. D. 1772. Mahdoo Rao's death. As the health of his nephew declined, Rugonath Rao began intrigues with Hyder Ally and the Nizam, in order to obtain complete enlargement, and secure his succession as Peishwa.

The correspondence was intercepted by the ministers during the Peishwa's extreme illness ; nineteen persons implicated were sent into hill forts, and the confinement of Rugonath Rao would have become more rigid than ever, but Mahdoo Rao, perceiving his death was near, interposed, and observed that it was natural for his uncle to desire his liberty. With his usual sound discrimination, he foresaw that his brother

would not be able to conduct the administration, if Rugonath Rao were not effectually restrained or conciliated ; judging on the whole, therefore, that the latter course was the more advisable, and that in case of dissension the government must fall to pieces, he, in the first place, sent for Sukaram Bappoo, and reinstated him as Dewan. It should be premised that Sukaram was more favourably disposed towards Rugonath Rao than any of the other ministers : he had acted as his Dewan in different campaigns ; he respected Rugonath Rao as a good soldier, and had hitherto retained his confidence. Nana Furnuwees had as yet only acted in a secondary situation under Mahdoo Rao, his abilities had not fully developed themselves, and Sukaram Bappoo was accounted the most capable man in the empire. It had been previously settled, before Mahdoo Rao's present arrangements were contemplated, that Nana was to act as Furnuwees in the civil, and Moroba, his cousin, in the military department.

Rugonath Rao was sent for to Theur, a reconciliation took place, and Mahdoo Rao, in presence of Sukaram Bappoo, recommended his brother, in an impressive manner, to the care and protection of his uncle. He also, on several occasions before his final dissolution, in conversation with his brother and uncle, calmly entered upon the discussion of their state affairs, and represented the necessity of concord for their mutual safety and the preservation of the government.

After the usual time spent in the performance of his brother's funeral obsequies, Narrain Rao,* early in December, repaired to Satara, where he was invested as Peishwa by the Raja. Sukaram Bappoo received the clothes of prime minister, under the name of Karbaree, whilst Bujaba Poorundhuree was appointed Dewan, and Nana Furnuwees was recognized in the hereditary situation of his family. The first object of the new

A. D. 1773. administration was the reduction of Raigurh, the Havildar of which had been in rebellion against the Peishwa, for some months before Mahdoo Rao's death. It was apprehended that he had designs of giving it

* Narrain Rao was the youngest of the three sons of Ballajee Bajee Rao. Wiswas Rao, the eldest, fell, as may be remembered, at Panniput.

up to the Seede, and when required to surrender, he replied that he held the fort for the Raja of Satara, and would maintain it against the Peishwa until the Raja was released; but on an order from Ram Raja, and the payment of forty thousand rupees, Narrain Rao, in the month of March, obtained possession of the ancient capital of Sivajee.

The new Peishwa and Rugonath Rao continued for some time in apparent amity: but the mother of the one, the wife of the other, and the jealousy of the Bramin ministers, would probably have created discord between men of better temper and stronger judgment. Rugonath Rao, with the consent of all, except Sukaram Bappoo, who objected to the violence of

April 11. the measure, was again made prisoner on the 11th of April, and confined in an apartment of the same palace in which Narrain Rao, when at Poona, usually resided.*

Nana Furnuwces stood high in the young Peishwa's estimation, but Bujaba Poorundhuree and Hurry Punt Phurkay were his chief confidants. The principal state affairs continued ostensibly to be transacted by Sukaram Bappoo, but the favourites were inimical to his administration. Narrain Rao was particularly ambitious of military fame, and looked forward with eagerness to the ensuing season, when he proposed to make a campaign in the Carnatic. For this purpose troops were directed to be in readiness, and orders were despatched to recal the armies from Hindoostan. But circumstances occurred which occasioned the probability of employment in the Mahratta territories.

Janojec Bhonslay was at Theur at the period of Mahdoo Rao's death; but prior to that event he had obtained his sanction to adopt Rughojee, the eldest son of Moodajec, who was the only one of all the brothers that had issue; and Janojee not only made the adoption, but was said to have appointed Moodajee the guardian of his heir. Janojee died in the month of May near Tooljapoore: Moodajee and Sabajee each claimed the right of guardianship; but Durya Bye, the widow of Janojee,

* Mahratta MSS., and Bombay records.

resisted the pretensions of both, assumed the government, and appointed Sabajee her general and Dewan. Moodajee, unfortunately for himself and his son, had hitherto maintained a connection with Rugonath Rao, and his pretensions not being supported by Narrain Rao* or his ministers, he could only levy troops and assert his cause by force of arms. The Peishwa in vain interposed his advice; Moodajee's party were much disengaged by the defection of a considerable number of the choice troops, who carried with them the Juree Putka of the Sena Sahib Soobeh; but notwithstanding the evil presage which this created amongst his men, he attacked his brother at Koombaree near Ankolah, where he was defeated with severe loss, and compelled to flee with precipitation. The Peishwa's agent at last procured a cessation of hostilities, but the brothers had scarcely met, when Durya Bye, quitting Sabajee,† joined Moodajee. The latter again took the field, obtained the aid of Ismaal Khan Patan, Governor of Elichpoor, and renewed hostilities. Sabajee applied to the Nizam and solicited the Peishwa's assistance; Rugonath Rao exhorted Moodajee to persevere; the Nizam joined Sabajee;‡ but the attention of all India was arrested, and there was a momentary pause in the bustle of political affairs, by reports, which proved correct, of the murder of Narrain Rao Peishwa on the 30th of August.§

It appeared that, on the morning of that day, there had been considerable commotion amongst the regular infantry in the Peishwa's service, and it increased so much towards noon that after an interview with Rughojee Angria, who had just arrived from Kolabah to pay his respects, Narrain Rao, before he went to dinner, told Hurry Punt Phurkay to take some precautions in case of disturbance, meaning that he should

* The Peishwa's government acknowledged Sabajee as Sena Sahib Soobeh, as he is so styled in an original agreement of four articles, by which he becomes bound to fulfil the conditions of the agreement entered into by Janojee.

† Durya Bye was probably actuated by Sabajee's having been acknowledged as Sena Sahib Soobeh, which, if admitted, at once set aside her pretensions as guardian.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ Mr. Mostyn's Report.

secure the palace. Hurry Punt, however, thoughtlessly neglected these orders, and went to dine with a friend in the neighbourhood.* The Peishwa, in the afternoon, had retired to repose in his private apartments, when he was awoke by a great tumult in the palace, caused by a large body of infantry, who, having continued their clamours for pay throughout the day, were at last, about two o'clock, led to the palace by Somer Sing and Mohummud Yeesoof, on pretence of demanding their arrears. Khurrnk Sing, one of their number, who commanded at the palace guard, joined them; but instead of entering at the large gate on the north side, to which there was no impediment, they made their way by an unfinished door-way on the east side, which, together with the wall surrounding the palace, had been pulled down a short time before, to make an entrance distinct from that of the quarter inhabited by Rugonath Rao. Narrain Rao, on starting from sleep, neither resolved on concealment nor defence, but ran to his uncle's apartments, and being closely pursued by Somer Sing, he threw himself into his uncle's arms, and called on him to save him. Rugonath Rao did interfere, and begged of them to spare him. "I have not gone thus far to insure my own destruction," replied Somer Sing: "let him go, or you shall die with him." Rugonath Rao disengaged himself, and got out upon the terrace; Narrain Rao attempted to follow him, but Truleea Powar, one of the Mahratta domestics of Rugonath Rao, who was armed, seized him by the legs, and pulled him down, at which instant another domestic, named Chapajee Teleekur, in the service of Narrain Rao, entered the apartment, and, although unarmed, ran forward to his master, who clasped his arms about his neck, when Somer Sing and Truleea Powar despatched them both with their swords. Whilst this was passing in the interior, the whole of the outer wall of the palace was secured by the conspirators; the people in the city heard of a tumult, armed men thronged in the streets, the shops were shut, and the inhabitants ran to and fro in consternation, asking what had happened.

* In consequence probably of this neglect, Hurry Punt, it would seem, was accused of being one of the partizans of Rugoba, which decidedly was not the case.

Sukaram Bappoo repaired to the Kotwal's Chowree, or office of the police magistrate, where word being brought to him that Rugonath Rao was not only alive, but had sent out assurances to the people that all was quiet, and had even invited some of them to go inside, Sukaram directed Hurry Punt Phurkay to write a note to Rugonath Rao in his name, which Rugonath Rao answered in his own hand-writing, informing him of the murder of his nephew by some of the Gardees (regular infantry). Hurry Punt Phurkay then declared that suspicions, which he had entertained of Rugonath Rao, were confirmed; and alarmed for his personal safety, he instantly fled to Baramuttee. Sukaram Bappoo tranquillized the minds of the people by recommending them to go to their homes, and to remain quiet, when nothing should molest them. Bujaba Poorundlhuree* and Mallojee Ghorepuray had an interview with Rugonath Rao that night; and Trimbuck Rao Mama, repairing to the palace, bore off the body of the unfortunate Peishwa, and performed the funeral obsequies.

Visitors were admitted to the palace; Mr. Mostyn, the English envoy, and the different wukeels, paid their respects, but Rugonath Rao remained in confinement, detained, as was pretended, by the conspirators, as a security for the payment of their arrears. Rugonath Rao was suspected, but there was no proof of his being the author of the outrage. It was well known that he had an affection for his nephew, and the ministers, considering the extreme jealousy with which many of them viewed each other, are entitled to some praise for having adopted a resolution on the occasion equally sound and politic. They were generally of opinion that whilst there remained a shadow of doubt, it was on every account advisable to support Rugoba's right to the succession; to this Ram Shastree, who was consulted, made no objections, but diligently instituted a search into the whole transaction. About six weeks after the event, having obtained proofs against Rugonath Rao, the Shastree waited upon him, and accused him of having given an authority to Somer Sing and Mohummud Yeesoof to commit the deed. Rugonath Rao is said to have acknowledged to Ram Shastree that he had written an order to those men, authorizing them to

seize Narrain Rao, but that he never had given the order to kill him. This admission is generally supposed to have been literally true; for by the original paper, afterwards recovered by Ram Shastree, it was found that the word *dhurawè*, to seize, was altered to *marawè*, to kill. It is universally believed that the alteration was made by the infamous Anundee Bye; and although Rugonath Rao's own conduct in subsequently withholding protection, even at the hazard of his life, sufficiently justifies the suspicion of his being fully aware of it, the moderate and general opinion in the Mahratta country is, that he did not intend to murder his nephew; that he was exasperated by his confinement, and excited by the desperate counsels of his wife, to whom is also attributed the activity of the domestic, Truleca Powar,* who was set on by the vindictive malice of that bad woman.

After Rugonath Rao had avowed his having so far participated in the fall of his nephew, he asked Ram Shastree what atonement he could make. "The sacrifice of your own life," replied the undaunted and virtuous Shastree, "for your future life cannot be passed in amendment; neither you nor your government can prosper; and for my own part, I will neither accept of employment, nor enter Poona, whilst you preside in the administration." He kept his word, and retired to a sequestered village near Waee.

In the meantime the arrears were discharged, Rugonath Rao was released, and his adopted son, Amrut Rao, attended by Bujaba Poorundhuree, was despatched to Satara for the clothes of investiture, which were brought back accordingly, and Rugonath Rao was proclaimed Peishwa. Sukaram Bappoo was confirmed as Karbaree; but Chintoo Wittul, and Sewdasheo Rainchundur, the son of Ramehundur Baba Shenwee, were the most confidential of the new Peishwa's ministers.†

Of Narrain Rao little need be said, except to contradict unjust calumny. He was murdered in the eighteenth year of

* It was given out that this domestic was actuated by motives of personal revenge in consequence of having been publicly flogged by Narrain Rao's orders. He was executed for the murder of Narrain Rao several years afterwards by Nana Furnuwees.

† Mahratta MSS. Mr. Mostyn's despatches.

his age; his follies were those of a boy, but the feelings and interest of a party blackened them into crimes. He was affectionate to his relations,* kind to his domestics, and all but his enemies loved him.

There is a well known Poona anecdote, which though oftener told of Mahdoo Rao, was one from which the latter used to say his brother would become an enterprizing officer. While spectators of an elephant fight at the Gooltekree, a small hill in the environs of the city, one of the animals, when enraged, came full speed towards the spot where they sat. Most of the attendants, and all the principal people, whose fears overcame their politeness for the Peishwa, hurried off, and Narrain Rao jumped up to run with the rest. Mahdoo Rao caught his arm; "brother," said he, "what will the Ukhbars† say of you?" He instantly sat down with composure, and the danger, which became imminent, was averted by the extraordinary bravery of a Mahratta Sillidar named Appajee Rao Pahtunkur, who, drawing his dagger, sprung in front of the Peishwa, and turned the animal aside, by wounding him in the trunk.

The Peishwa's army under Visajee Kishen returned from Hindoostan, after the accession of Rugonath Rao. He left the Emperor preparing to resist their usurpation of his authority. As Mahadjee Sindia could not disguise his enmity to Zabita Khan, and disapproved of the Mahratta alliance with the Rohillas, he was employed to the westward collecting tribute from the Jhats and Rajpoot states; but Visajee Kishen and Tookajee Holkar continued in the Rohilla country with upwards of thirty thousand horse. Their absence from the capital gave the Emperor full time to prepare for resisting them, and his preparations were much more formidable than the Mahrattas had anticipated. Visajee, therefore, endeavoured by every means to soothe or intimidate him into terms, and would probably have succeeded, but for

* A few of his original letters, generally written to Parwuttee Bye, the widow of Sewdasher Rao, found amongst the Poona Records, bear testimony to that trait.

† "Native newspapers." Narrain Rao had indeed "a gazette to himself," but far different from his brother's anticipation.

the more firm counsel of Nujeef Khan. A battle took place in the environs of Delhi on the 19th December, 1772, in which the Mahrattas were victorious after an obstinate conflict. The Moghul horse, although bravely led by Nujeef Khan, behaved ill; but the Emperor's regular infantry acted with spirit; particularly two battalions of Sepoys, originally disciplined by the English, which fought under the command of a Frenchman named Madoc,* and retired in order. The terms required by the Mahrattas on this occasion from the Emperor were far from immoderate; they obliged him to nominate the Peishwa, his Bukhshee or commander-in-chief, and to appoint Zabita Khan the Peishwa's deputy; to confirm all the promises he had first made to them; to cede Serampore, lately taken from the Jhats, and to give them a grant of Korah and Kurrah, two provinces east of the Jumna, adjoining their frontier in Bundelcund, which the English government of Bengal had obliged Shujah-ud-Dowlah to cede for the Emperor's support, as long as he chose to continue under the British protection; but as he had voluntarily relinquished all the benefits of their alliance, they claimed the right of disposing of the reversion, and determined to repel any attempt the Mahrattas might make for their occupation. They resolved, however, to act strictly on the defensive, and to assist their ally, Shujah-ud-dowlah, in resisting an invasion of the province of Oude, which it was supposed the Mahrattas meditated; but after an inactive campaign they quitted Hindooostan, in the end of May,† in consequence of a positive recal by Narrain Rao, for the purpose to which we have alluded. Visajee Kishen, however, did not reach Poona till the rains were nearly over.

* Madoc was one of the earliest of those European adventurers who rose to consequence in the immediate service of the native states. He was considered by the natives a brave soldier but an indifferent officer; incapable of acting as a chief in command; and of a faithless character.

† Appendix to the Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy. Bombay records, and Mahratta MSS. The Seyr Mutnakhereen gives a very confused account of these transactions at Delhi, which does not agree with any of the authorities above quoted.

As Hyder Ally had most reason to apprehend the approach of the Mahrattas, so was he most ready to take advantage of the confusion likely to ensue from the late violent change in the state. A strong detachment was sent, under his son Tippoo, for the recovery of the districts conquered by the Mahrattas in the late war; and Nizam Ally was likewise preparing, with the hope of profiting by Bramin dissensions, in the same manner that they had encroached during the intestine broils of his own family.

Moodajee Bhonslay, with his son, and the widow of Janojee, joined Rugonath Rao, and on that occasion Rughojee Bhonslay, as the adopted son of Janojee, was invested as Sena Sahib Soobeh. Sabajee continuing the stronger party, Moodajee remained with the Peishwa; but Rughojee and Durya Bye returned towards Berar. Rugonath Rao resolved, in the first instance, to oppose Nizam Ally, and to endeavour to cripple his power; otherwise, by crossing the Kistna, he must have left his own territory exposed to the ravages of the Nizam and Sabajee Bhonslay.

At this critical period, when the army had marched, and Rugonath Rao was on the eve of departure from Poona, Ram Shastree waited upon him in the manner which has been mentioned. The other ministers were less sincere, but as Rugonath Rao showed himself suspicious and distrustful of all the experienced men who were capable of supporting his government, they soon became entirely estranged from his councils. Sewdasheo Ramchundur, Clintoo Wittul, Abbajee Mahideo, and Sukaram Hurry, the persons of whom he made choice, were ill-qualified to supply their place. In the month of November the Peishwa's army approached that of Nizam Ally, before the latter was prepared, and he was compelled to seek shelter under the walls of Beder. For three weeks there were daily skirmishes, in which the Mahrattas were generally successful; the Moghuls, when pressed, retired under cover of the cannon on the works, and the Mahrattas, although they occasionally brought up guns to cannonade,* were obliged to

* Rugonath Rao used a large brass gun on this occasion called *Maha Kalee* (the goddess of destruction), which is now at Poona, and which throws a ball a long way, as I fancy some of my readers could testify.

retire daily to their camp on the bank of the Manjera, as most of the wells* in the immediate vicinity of Beder, were within gun-shot of the walls of the fort.

From the reports of these partial actions the unpopularity of Rugoba might be read in repeated accounts of his being defeated, wounded, or at the point of death.† The Moghul army, however, soon became straitened ; and Nizam Ally could only bring on his supplies and reinforcements, by risking an action with the Mahrattas, at a great disadvantage. He there-

fore proposed to treat, and it was agreed on the December 9. 9th December, that he should give up territory, yielding an annual sum of twenty lakhs of rupees. This cession, if judiciously distributed amongst the Mahratta chiefs,

* Besides, all Hindoos are very particular in regard to water, and always prefer drinking from a running stream.

† The following extract from one of Mr. Mostyn's despatches is a specimen of the invention of the day. Since closing my address to the Committee, (the select committee of the Bombay government is meant,) "I have learnt that a party of the Nizam's foot approached quite to Rugoba's tent undiscovered, and were taken for his own guard, who by some means were absent that night. On their endeavouring to enter the tent, some of the servants found them out, and alarmed the camp. They were then obliged to fly as fast as possible ; however, one cut through the tent walls, and made a blow at Rugoba, which took just below his right shoulder, cut four inches down the arm, and half through the bone. Afterwards a firing commenced, when a musket ball grazed along his left arm, so that he is now lame of both arms, has a fever, and several ulcers about his knee. The elephant with the gold standard" (my readers will recognise the Jurec Putka) "the Moghuls carried off ; this is looked upon with these people as a most unlucky omen." Mr. Mostyn, who had not then much experience in Mahratta polities, writes all the above as intelligence which he fully credited : he might have stopped his evidence when he came to such particulars, as *the four inches*, which a good member of a Punchayet would have done, and extracted valuable evidence, not from the falsehoods spoken, but from what his judgment could clearly interpret as the object of the speaker. Strange as it may appear, it was upon the receipt of the despatch of which the above is an extract, that the Bombay government came to the resolution, in case of the death or deposition of Rugoba, to take possession of Salsette, &c. by force of arms ; and I may remark that Mr. Tayler's able letter to the Bengal government, 9th October 1775, founded on Mr. Mostyn's intelligence, is incorrect. Col. Wilks and Mr. Mill have been led into error from the same circumstance. Rugonath Rao was not defeated.

would probably have enabled Rugonath Rao to maintain an ascendancy in the state ; but after all was settled, Nizam Ally, with a show of the greatest frankness, paid him a visit, brought to his recollection their former alliance, and being well acquainted with the circumstances in which Rugonath Rao stood, assured him of his perpetual friendship on all future occasions ; he praised the wisdom of his administration, affected even to be proud of his submission to the great Rugonath Rao, and manifested entire confidence in his generosity, by placing before him his seal of state, and desiring him to add as much more to the cession as he thought fit.

Rugonath Rao, to the great joy of his domestic enemies, in an effusion of misplaced generosity, immediately restored the whole ; and although little can be said in excuse for his being thus openly cajoled by the well-known Nizam Ally, it is one of many proofs that he was still more weak than wicked.

Rugonath Rao, after peace was concluded with the Moghuls, encamped for some time at Kulburga, and detached Trimbuck Rao Mama to watch the motions of Sabajee Bhonslay, who occupied a threatening position in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad. This arrangement was precisely that which Rugoba's enemies desired, and they perceived with secret pleasure that his mind was completely occupied in planning an expedition into the Carnatic, where he projected not only the expulsion of Hyder from the Mahratta districts, of which he had possessed himself, but the punishment of Mohummud Ally and the English for having reduced Tanjore.* In prosecution of these designs he proceeded towards the Kistna, but in the meantime a cabal was forming against him, which soon obstructed his progress.

Sukaram Bappo and Nana Furnuwees had, on different pretences, withdrawn themselves from the army, and returned to Poona. They were soon followed by Gunput Rao Rastia, Babajee Naik† Baramutteekur, and several other persons of

* It was carried by storm 17th September 1773. (Madras records.)

† The nephew or grandson of Bappoojee Naik Baramutteekur, who was married to the aunt of Ballajee Bajee Rao, and who endeavoured, with the support of Rughojee Bhonslay, to purchase the office of Peishwa in 1710.

consequence. Moraba Furnuwees was the last of his old ministers that quitted his camp, except Bujaba Poorundhuree.

It was evident to all but Rugoba and his immediate dependants that there was some scheme in agitation. The principal persons of the Poona ministry at this time, of whom so much has been written, were Sukaram Bappoo, Trimbuck Rao Mama, the two Furnuwees's, Nana and Moraba, Bujaba Poorundhuree, Anund Rao Jewajee* and Hurry Punt Phurkay;†—all men raised by the present family of Peishwas, and totally, as the reader will perceive, distinct from the eight Purdhans of Sivajee and Shao.

There were a variety of conjectures in the Mahratta country as to the revolution meditated ; some said the ministers intended to release the Raja ; others, that a person assuming the name of Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, and now a prisoner in the fort of Ahmednugur, was to be set up as Peishwa in the room of Rugonath Rao. This Sewdasheo Rao, or Suddaba, according to the familiar name by which the person alluded to was known, was a Kanoja Bramin from Hindooostan, who personated the Bhow, and raised an insurrection, which had been suppressed by his capture and the dispersion of his followers. But impostors of this description obtain surprising credence in the Deccan ; and it was still a popular belief that the real Bhow Sahib, confined for state reasons, was about to be released and opposed to the unpopular Dada Sahib.‡

The developement, however, of their real plans soon put an end to surmises. It having been discovered
A. D. 1774. that Gunga Bye, the widow of Narrain Rao, was pregnant, it was resolved, on pretence of carrying her to

* Anund Rao Jewajee, commonly called the *Khasgeewala*, from having the charge of all the Peishwa's personal affairs. He was the son of Govind Sew Ram, already repeatedly mentioned.

† Hurry Punt Phurkay was of very low origin, having been a common domestic in the family of Trimbuck Rao Dixit, a banker in Poona.

‡ Rugoba and Dada Sahib were familiar or domestic names for Rugonath Rao, as Suddaba and Bhow Sahib were for Sewdasheo Rao Chimnajee. Mr. Mostyn mentions that the impostor was confined in Doulutabad, which is a mistake ; he was afterwards removed from Ahmednugur to Rutnaguiry, which I shall have occasion to notice presently.

a place of safety, to convey her to the fort of Poorundhur. But it is generally believed that the real motive was to disguise an intention they had formed, of eventually exchanging the infant of Gunga Bye in case of its proving a female, by substituting a male child. For this purpose several Brahmin women, in a state of pregnancy, are said to have been conveyed into the fort at the same time. Gunga Bye herself was carried off from Poona by Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt Phurkay, on the morning of the 30th January, but the reason of her removal was publicly announced. Parwuttec Bye, the widow of Sewdasheo Rao, a lady very much respected, accompanied her. The ministers forming themselves into a sort of regency under Gunga Bye began to govern the country in her name. All the adherents of Rugonath Rao were thrown into confinement. Negotiations were opened with Nizam Ally and Sabajee Bhonslay, both of whom agreed to support the widow's pretensions and intrigues, managed by Krist Rao Bulwunt in the camp of Rugonath Rao, were ready to burst forth in general revolt, the moment that a signal was received from the confederates at Poona.*

In the meantime Rugonath Rao had advanced beyond Bellary, and had admitted an arrangement with Hyder Ally. His pecuniary distress was so urgent that upon Hyder's paying a few lakhs of rupees, and promising to make up the sum to twenty-five lakhs, Rugoba relinquished all claim to three of the Mahratta districts, and Hyder probably then foresaw that the rest must, in the course of a very short time, fall into his hands. In a few days, on hearing of the events that had happened at Poona, Rugonath Rao was compelled to abandon his designs of levying a tribute from the province of Arcot, and concluded a treaty at Calliandroog, by which Hyder recognised his right of succession as Peishwa, and agreed to pay him, and only to him, an annual tribute of six lakhs of rupees.†

* Mahratta MSS. and Mr. Mostyn's despatches.

† Wilks. I follow the Mahratta MSS., and what can be gathered from Mr. Mostyn's despatches, in stating the payment by Hyder to have been prior to receiving the news of the revolution.

Rugonath Rao had information of the revolution before any person in his camp, and was warned to be on his guard against several of his Surdars, but especially Bhowan Rao Prittee Needhee. Uncertain what to do, where wisdom would probably have done nothing, he called upon Bhowan Rao to account for his being at the head of four thousand horse, when three hundred was the complement required to be furnished by the tenure of his jagheer lands. The Prittee Needhee would not condescend to answer an enquiry so abrupt. Rugonath Rao threatened to attack him, and ordered Moorar Rao Ghorepuray Senaputtee "to plunder his troops." Ghorepuray replied that he was ready to fight any enemy of the state, but this being a domestic quarrel he begged to be excused. A similar answer was returned by Wamun Rao Govind Putwurdham, and several other commanders. He then ordered out his household troops, and guns were brought, ready to open, in case he should still refuse an explanation; but finding the Prittee Needhee resolute, and his followers, mostly all from the banks of the Mann and the Yairla, declaring to a man that they would die with him, Rugonath Rao went himself to Bhowan Rao, and demanded an interview. He was received respectfully; but when sitting down the latter laid his sword between them, and on being asked by the Peishwa why he took such a precaution,—“It is,” said Bhowan Rao, “lest the Punt Purdhan should forget that he is about to confer with the Prittee Needhee.” After some general assurances on both sides, the visit terminated by Rugonath Rao’s agreeing to advance him a sum of money; and all resort to coercion ceased.*

The Prittee Needhee and Moorar Rao Ghorepuray continued with Rugonath Rao, who now commenced his march towards Poona. Wamun Rao, with all who openly declared for the ministerial party, separated from his army, but they always encamped a march on his left flank, with every precaution to prevent surprise, reserving attack until the approach of some of the three divisions which were moving to co-operate with them. Trimbuck Rao Mama and Sabajee Bhonslay were advancing from Purinda, Hurry Punt Phurkay was on his route

* I have this anecdote from Appajee Gonedeo, who was present.

at the head of a division from Poona ; whilst Nizam Ally was marching across the country from Kulburga to co-operate with either of these armies that might first appear, still however pretending to be the friend of Rugonath Rao. Trimbuck Rao Mama, jealous of Rugonath Rao's reputation as a soldier,* and ambitious of the honour of reducing him, finding that Sabajee, who had views of his own to answer, was very tardy in his advance, pushed on in front of his division, crossed the Beema

March. at Punderpoor on the 4th March, when Rugonath Rao, who was close in his neighbourhood,

made a sudden attack upon him, on a fine plain between Kassegaom and Punderpoor, where in less than twenty minutes, with a force considerably inferior to that of his opponent, Rugonath Rao obtained a complete victory, mortally wounded Trimbuck Rao Mama, and took him prisoner.

Rugonath Rao was one of the foremost in a charge which he made, supported only by his own division, amounting to about ten thousand horse. Gungadhir Rao Rastia, second in command of Trimbuck Rao's army, was wounded, but escaped.† Neither the Prittee Needhee, nor Moorar Rao Ghorepuray, although both in Rugonath Rao's army, were engaged ; the former withdrew, and after a short time joined Hurry Punt Phurkay, and the latter took the opportunity of the confusion to retire towards his principality at Gootee, and never more recrossed the Kistna. Hurry Punt Phurkay immediately effected a junction with Sabajee Bhonslay and the Nizam, but neither of them were in haste to bring the war to a conclusion.

The success thus obtained by Rugoba gave momentary life to his drooping cause. He was enabled to raise a large sum of money in Punderpoor, partly by contribution, and partly by

* Trimbuck Rao Mama was, as will be recollectec, the officer who defeated Hyder three years before.

† Mr. Mostyn's despatches describe a stratagem practised by Rugoba on this occasion, but it is not mentioned in any Mahratta account, and, besides from the nature of the ground where it happened, which is a very extensive bare plain, not apparently favorable to the growth of jungle, I doubt the possibility of an ambuscade such as Rugoba is said to have contrived.

pawning a portion of some prize jewels, which were brought back by Visajee Kishen from Hindoostan, and on his return, agreeably to old Mahratta usage, presented to Rugonath Rao as the head of the government.

The greatest consternation prevailed in Poona, and according to the invariable practice of the inhabitants April. on such occasions, dreading alike their friends and foes, all began to pack up their property, and fly to forts or retired villages, where they esteemed themselves secure. Troops flocked to Rugoba's standard, and he advanced for a few days towards the capital; but having no funds to support his army, which soon amounted to thirty or forty thousand men, becoming suspicious of their fidelity, and indulging hopes of more effectual support from Sindia, Holkar, or eventually the English, with all of whom he was negotiating, he suddenly shaped his course towards Burhanpoor. This resolution he adopted at a time when the ministers, jealous of each other, dreading the resentment of Rugoba, and doubting the intentions of Sabajee Bhonslay, as well as of the Nizam, were on the point of releasing the Raja of Satara, as a measure calculated to have insured them the aid of many of the Mahratta soldiery who were discontented or neutral. But the retreat of Rugoba at once turned the scale of opinion in their favor, and the design was abandoned. He was followed by the combined armies of Hurry Punt Phurkay, the Nizam, and Sabajee Bhonslay, which together amounted to fifty thousand men; but the pursuit was purposely retarded by Nizam Ally in order to obtain possession of some territory, promised by the ministers, for his treachery to Rugoba; and thus the fugitive Peishwa had leisure to levy contributions from the country as he went along. The crisis, however, was passed, he had lost an opportunity of retrieving his affairs, and the birth of

April 18. Mahdoo Rao Narrain, on the 18th April, gave a finishing blow to his ever being recognised as Peishwa. Notwithstanding the suspicions created by the scheme which was adopted for eventually imposing upon the country, there is very little doubt but that the child was the son of the murdered Narrain Rao.

Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees were deputed by Gunga Bye to receive the clothes of investiture for her son, which were sent from Satara by the Raja in charge of Mahdoo Rao Neekunt Poormundhuree, and the infant was formally installed as Peishwa, when he was forty days old. One of the first acts of the ministers under his government was to remove Runghojee, the adopted son of Janojee Bhonslay, from the office of Sena Sahib Soobeh, by conferring that dignity on Sabajee, their ally.

Rugonath Rao remained a short time at Burhanpoor in hopes of being joined by Holkar and Sindia; but at last, contrary to the advice of his friends, he crossed the Nerbuddah, when Moodajee Bhonslay and all his followers, except about seven thousand horse, deserted him. On his arrival at Indore he was met by Mahadajee Sindia and Tookajee Holkar, received with the greatest respect, and it was generally reported that these two chiefs would espouse his cause; it was also stated that the two brothers, Govind Rao and Futih Sing Gackwar, then contending for the possession of Guzerat, as will be hereafter explained, had agreed to submit their dispute to the arbitration of Holkar and Sindia, and to unite with them in supporting Rugonath Rao. Nizam Ally, staggered by these rumours, disappointed at not having received the promised cessions, and willing to sell his aid to either party, the more likely to have the power of granting his demands, cantoned for the rains at Basum; Hurry Punt Phurkay occupied a position in the neighbourhood of Burhanpoor.

The ministers very soon became jealous of each other: Nana Furnuwees was too cautious to take the lead in an infant government; but, like the generality of men who have risen by revolution, and who seldom appear in the foreground, he supported Sukaram Bappoo as the person likely to have most weight and consideration with the public. This conduct in him proceeded as much from timidity as design. Sukaram was an old, cautious, time-serving courtier, but he was a man of much more courage than Nana Furnuwees, and, in the humble and assiduous attention of his colleague and adherent, he did not foresee a future rival and a powerful foe. Such,

indeed, was the influence of Sukaram Bappoo, that his secession from the cause of the ministers, which Nana often apprehended, would have ruined them. One circumstance, not generally known, which was used by Nana as an instrument of ambition, was the power he had acquired over the mind of the regent Gunga Bye; for, although a profound secret at the time, the young widow was deeply enamoured of Nana Furnuwees, and was taught by him the best means of governing the old minister.

Moraba, the cousin of Nana, who had been the ostensible prime minister of Mahdoo Rao, was dissatisfied on finding little deference paid to his counsel, and would readily have returned to Rugonath Rao, if he could have effected it with safety, and insured his future power. Such of the other ministers as would not submit to Sukaram and Nana were soon united in common discontent. The cabal, in short, divided into two parties, and their disagreement became generally known by the discovery of a correspondence on the part of Moraba, Bujaba, and Babajee Naik, with the ex-Peishwa. It appeared, from letters intercepted by Hurry Punt, that these three had formed a plan for securing the persons of Sukaram Bappoo, Nana Furnuwees, Gunga Bye, and her son; all of whom, on account of the chilling cold frequently experienced in hill-forts during the rains, had come down from Poorundhur to reside in the neighbouring village of Sassoor; but receiving intelligence on the 30th June of this conspiracy, they instantly, with undissembled panic, betook themselves to the fort.

Hurry Punt Phurkay, leaving a detachment at Burhanpoor, countermarched on Poorundhur; and Krist Rao Bulwunt, the ministerial agent with Nizam Ally, by stipulating for the immediate cession of upwards of thirteen lakhs^{*} of jagheer territory, and promising more, induced him to move to Aurungabad to give countenance to their cause; but the discovery of their conspiracy at once defeated the designs of the feeble triumvirate, and Hurry Punt was directed to halt at the Ajunta Ghaut.

* The amount actually ceded, as appears by the state accounts, was rupees 13,23,339-6-1, of which Rookun-ud-dowlah, the minister, received rupees 1,38,269-10-1.

Hyder Ally, immediately on perceiving these commotions, seized the opportunity in order to complete his conquests of the whole of the Mahratta districts south of the Toongbuddra. He attacked Sera in person, whilst his son Tippoo besieged Gurumcondah.* At the same time Busalut Jung from Adonee entered the Mahratta country, and levied contributions as far as Hntnee and Merich. No effort could be made to save Sera and Gurumcondah ; they therefore soon fell ; but Wamun Rao Govind Putwurdhun and Anund Rao Rastia were detached for the protection of their own districts, and soon compelled Busalut Jung to retire. These chiefs received instructions to return to the capital as soon as possible ; and Bhew Rao Yeswunt Pansia, Ramchundur Gunnesh, Visajee Kishen, and Bhowan Rao Prittee Needhee were employed in raising men in the districts, who were all to be at Poona on the Dussera. Agents were employed throughout the country to blacken the crimes of Rugoba, and hold forth the justice of their cause. The ministers at the same time breathed nothing but a spirit of union and concord : they determined on obtaining the absolute submission of Rugoba ; and their active and judicious preparations for hostility showed that they understood the best means of ensuring pacification.

Rugonath Rao, in the meantime, with a force of about thirty thousand men, chiefly composed of the troops of Sindia and Holkar, advanced from Indore to the banks of the Taptec, where he expected to be joined by Moodajee Bhonslay and Govind Rao Gaekwar. In this situation he renewed his negotiations with the English government at Bombay.

* Mr. Mostyn's despatch 17th April, 1774.

CHAP. IX.

FROM A. D. 1772 TO A. D. 1775.

The Court of Directors appoint a resident envoy to Poona—intention of that mission.—Capture of Baroach.—Resolution of the Bombay government upon the receipt of intelligence from Poona during the campaign of Ruggonath Rao against Nizam Ally.—Negotiations with Ruggonath Rao.—Resolution to support him—he refuses to accede to the terms.—Capture of Tannah.—Rugoba deserted by Sindia and Holkar, renews the negotiation with Bombay.—State of the Gaekwar family after the death of Dummajee.—Treaty between Rugoba and the English.

THE Court of Directors, in a despatch to the presidency of Bombay, of the 1st of April, 1772, directed that A. D. 1772. a resident envoy should be appointed to the Peishwa's court; and Mr. Thomas Mostyn, of the Bombay civil service, who had formerly been at Poona in the situation of assistant to Mr. Price's mission, was selected by the Court of Directors for this important duty.

The declared intention of the East India Company in appointing an envoy was for the purpose of acquiring, from time to time, upon safe and honourable terms, such privileges and rights as might be beneficial to their commerce, and of security to their possessions, by maintaining a friendly intercourse with all the native powers; but carefully abstaining from active alliance with any. The resident was instructed to communicate to Madras and Bengal direct all intelligence he could procure relative to the designs of the Mahrattas, of a nature likely to affect those presidencies; but the principal objects of the mission were to obtain possession of the island of Salsette, the port of Bassein, and the small islands of Kenery, Hog island, Elephanta, and Caranja. The advantage of these islands was justly considered of great importance in order to preclude other nations from having access to the spacious and excellent harbour of Bombay; by far the most commodious port in India. It was already celebrated for its dockyard,

and was well adapted to become the mart, not only for the supply of the interior of western India, but the emporium of the trade with China, the coasts of Persia, Arabia, and the Red Sea. The occupation of Salsette likewise secured the principal inlet to the Mahratta country, for woollens and other staples of England, which are said to have been at that time supplied, to the amount of fourteen lakhs of rupees annually. The expences of the Bombay establishment far exceeded the receipts, and it was hoped that by the possession of those places, and the Mahratta share of the revenue of Surat, the balance would be nearly equal.

Permission for the envoy to reside at Poona was granted by Mahdoo Rao; and Mr. Mostyn arrived there a few days prior to that Peishwa's death; otherwise, it was Mr. Mostyn's opinion the succeeding administration would not have allowed him to remain.

Some time elapsed before any event favourable to the views of the Company occurred. The Bombay presidency, in consequence of certain claims on the Nabob of Baroach, due by right of sovereignty to the government of Surat, sent a force just before the rains of the year 1771, to enforce their demands, but as the expedition failed, preparations were made for the renewal of hostilities after the monsoon. This armament was countermanded in consequence of the arrival of the Nabob at Bombay, whose object appears to have been merely to obtain a cessation of arms, by trusting to the generosity of the English in hopes that the confidence he had shown might operate in his favour, either by inducing the Bombay government to relinquish their claims, or by affording him time to cement an alliance with the family of Gaekwar. A treaty was concluded on the 30th November at Bombay; but as the terms did not come up to the full extent of the Nabob's hopes, the English chief, at the Baroach factory, was in a short time treated with great disrespect; on which he was desired to retire to Surat. The expedition, as before projected, was carried into effect; and Baroach, with the loss of the gallant and accomplished General David Wedderburn, was taken by storm on the 18th November 1772, the same day on which Mahdoo Rao died.

When the resident at Poona was first sent for on business by the new Peishwa, the exchange, or an equivalent for Baroach, was one of the few things discussed, but no offer was made which could lead to the subject most important to his mission.

After the murder of Narrain Rao, during the progress of A. D. 1773. Rugonath Rao's warfare with the Nizam in the neighbourhood of Beder, the reports circulated by his enemies of his probable death or deposition induced the Bombay government to deliberate on what would then be the state of their relations with the Mahrattas. They concluded that the family of the Peishwa, with whom only they had existing treaties, must become extinct by the demise of Rugoba; and they conceived that their engagements with the Poona government only existed whilst that family continued at the head of the administration. Accordingly, without further scruple, they determined that, should either of the events alluded to take place, they would possess themselves of Salsette by force of arms.* The ready credit given to those unfavourable rumours at Bombay, and a subsequent hasty belief in the rising fortunes of Rugoba, are attributable to the same bias; a desire of the president and council to fulfil the object of their employers, and court their favour by possessing themselves, and that too at all events, of the long coveted islands.

When Rugonath Rao, instead of marching with bold confidence to Poona, shaped his course to the A. D. 1774. northward, he clearly exposed his situation to men less under the influence of interested hopes than the members of the Bombay government, and betrayed his alarm to the resident at Poona, by sending an agent, with hurried and indefinite applications, for a great deal of money, and a great many troops;† which only showed that he stood in much need of aid, but had a very confused idea of what plan he should follow to obtain it, or how to extricate himself from difficulty.

The Bombay government were willing to assist him with some men conditionally; but further negotiation through Mr.

* Bombay Secret Consultations.

† Mr. Mostyn's Letters. (Bombay records.)

Mostyn at Poona could not be prosecuted owing to the distant retreat of Rugoba, who continued his march as far as Malwa. There, after he had recruited his forces, he determined to recross the Nerbuddah, and accordingly advanced to a position on the Taptee, where, as already alluded to, he renewed his overtures to the English through Mr. Robert Gambier, the acting chief or civil governor of Surat. His agent informed Mr. Gambier that Rugoba was desirous of entering on a treaty for the purpose of being furnished with a sufficient force "to carry him to Poona, and establish him in the government ; for which he would defray the charges of the expedition, make very considerable grants to the Company, and enter into any terms of friendship and alliance the president and council at Bom-

September 6. bay might choose."* This acceptable proposal was received at Bombay on the 6th September, when the president and council agreed to assist Rugoba with all the troops they could spare, which, including a portion of artillery, amounted to about two thousand five hundred men, on condition that he should advance fifteen or twenty lakhs of rupees ; and, on being established in the government at Poona, cede to the Honourable Company, in perpetuity, Salsette, the small islands contiguous to Bombay and Bassein with its dependencies. The Mahratta share of revenue in Surat and Baroach was, if possible, to be obtained ; and also protection from Mahratta inroads into the Bengal provinces, and the possessions of the Nabob of the Carnatic.

The original of the above resolution is signed by Mr. William Hornby, governor and president, Mr. Daniel Draper, Mr. William Tayler of the civil service, and Mr. John Watson, commodore of the Bombay marine, who were the counsellors present on that memorable occasion. In the course of the consultation a doubt arose whether the president and members had a legal right to enter on any treaty without the concurrence of the governor-general in council, as the operation of the act of parliament of 1773, which rendered the presidencies of Madras and Bombay subordinate to Bengal, was to have effect in India from the first of August ; but as intimation

* Mr. Gambier's Letters. (Bombay records.)

had not been received of the arrival of the members appointed from Europe, without whom the supreme parliamentary council could not be constituted, their proceeding, on mature deliberation, was deemed unobjectionable.

The offers of Rugoba, however, in answer to the proposals of the Bombay government, fell very far short of what was expected. He positively refused to cede Salsette, a condition so indispensable, that Mr. Gambier without delay replied to his proposals in such terms as he conceived himself authorized to offer, without wasting the time necessary for a reference to Bombay ; of which the president and council approved. Rugoba adhered to his original declaration of not relinquishing Bassein and Salsette ; he also stated his inability to raise the large advance of cash, but offered to cede districts and claims of much greater value in Guzerat, amounting, in all, to eleven lakhs annually ; to pay six lakhs of rupees in advance, and one lakh and a half monthly, for the expense of one thousand Europeans, two thousand Sepoys, and fifteen guns. The government agreed to part of these propositions ; and, on condition of his making the cession up to eighteen and a half lakhs, they even consented to waive the grand acquisition of Salsette ; but at this stage of the negotiation they were alarmed by the receipt of intelligence from their envoy at Goa, that the Portuguese government had sent a formidable armament from Europe, for the avowed purpose of recovering their lost possessions, including Salsette and Bassein.

Offers to surrender the fort of Tannah, by the Mahratta officer in charge, for the sum of two lakhs and sixty thousand rupees, had been made to Mr. Hornby, as early as the preceding months of February or March, at a time when the greatest confusion prevailed at Poona, and with the consent of his council Mr. Hornby offered one lakh. The Mahratta authorities were disposed to betray their trust for one lakh and twenty thousand rupees, which would have been complied with, but, on considering the state of the Mahratta government, and the probability of obtaining possession by other means, the negotiation with the Killidar was suspended. On receipt, however, of the intelligence from Goa, the scheme was renewed, and

Mr. Mostyn was instructed, in case of their obtaining possession, to use every possible endeavour to reconcile it to the ministerial party, as a measure of precaution to prevent the island from falling into the hands of the Portuguese ; and to Rugoba similar assurances were to be given. In the meantime, information of the preparations at Goa had been received at Poona, and had induced the ministers to reinforce the garrison of Tannah with five hundred men ; which circumstance, and the strict watch kept up, effectually obstructed the designs of the Mahratta party disposed to make it over.

In consequence of this disappointment, and the additional obstacles with which they should have to contend, in attempting

December 9. to reduce it by force, the matter was again deliberated on the 9th December, when the president in council determined, at all events, that they ought to anticipate the Portuguese. An expedition, consisting of six hundred and twenty Europeans, including artillery, one thousand Sepoys, and two hundred gun Lascars, was accordingly prepared under the command of Brigadier General Robert Gordon ; and although the situation of Tannah was such as to preclude the employment of the larger vessels of the Company's marine, as the governor expressed a wish that Commodore Watson should superintend the naval part of the enterprize, and have joint authority with General Gordon, the commodore, on the General's acquiescence in the arrangement, cheerfully

December 12. complied. The troops proceeded on the 12th of December, and on the ensuing day a part of the Portuguese fleet anchored in the mouth of the harbour of Bombay, and formally protested against their proceedings. The president and council used many arguments in justification of their measures ; they declared they would issue no counter-

December 20. mand, and batteries were opened against Tannah on the 20th December. On the eighth day the breach was considered practicable, but it was necessary to fill up the ditch before they could advance to the assault. They

December 27. attempted this operation on the night of the 27th December, when they were forced to retire, with the loss of one hundred Europeans, including officers

killed and wounded, but next evening the fort was carried by assault, when the soldiers, exasperated by their loss, put the greater part of the garrison to the sword. Among the sufferers at Tannah was Commodore John Watson, a brave and experienced officer, who was mortally wounded* on the third day of the siege.

A separate detachment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Keating was sent to take possession of the fort of Versovah, on the northern extremity of Salsette. The island of Caranja (or Oorun according to the Mahrattas) was also occupied, and the whole of Salsette reduced, before new year's day.†

In the meantime the negotiations with Rugoba were continued, but the ministers having secretly engaged Sindia and Holkar in their interests, and collected an army of about thirty thousand men, quitted Poorundhur on the 27th November, and advanced towards the Taptee. Rugonath Rao was apprized of the secession of Holkar and Sindia, in sufficient time to escape from being surrounded, and having thrown a strong garrison into Talneir, he retired towards Guzerat; but in consequence of the advanced state of the pregnancy of his wife Anundee Bye, he left her in the fort of Dhar, where she was shortly after delivered of Bajee Rao Rugonath,‡ destined to become the last of the Peishwas.

Rugoba continued his retreat towards Baroda, at which place he arrived on the 3rd January, with about

* A. D. 1775. ten thousand horse and four hundred infantry. Hurry Punt Phurkay, after reducing Talneir, was sent in pursuit of him, but Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees returned to the fort of Poorundhur, where all affairs continued to be transacted.

Rugoba's design in retiring to Guzerat was obviously to conclude his negotiation with the English, and to obtain the aid of Govind Rao Gaekwar. The latter, at the period of

* His wounds were most painful, but rather singular to occasion death. A cannon shot struck the sand close to him, and drove the particles into his body.

† Bombay records.

‡ Mr. Mostyn's letters, Mahratta MSS., and oral information.

Rugoba's arrival, was besieging his brother Futhi Sing in Baroda, assisted by his uncle Khundee Rao Gaekwar, Jagheerdar of Neriad.

The reader may recollect that Govind Rao Gaekwar was sent by his father Dummajee to support Rugonath Rao against Mahdoo Rao in the rebellion of 1768. Shortly after its suppression Dummajee died, leaving four sons, Syajee, Govind Rao, Manikjee, and Futhi Sing. The two last were the youngest and full brothers by the third wife. Syajee was the eldest son, but by Dummajee's second wife. Govind Rao was his second son, but by the first married wife. Such a claim to succession as that of Syajee and Govind Rao always occasions disputes among Mahrattas, as there are precedents for the superiority of either party. Govind Rao was at Poona at the time of his father's death a prisoner at large, in consequence of having supported Rugonath Rao. His claim to the succession and to his father's rank of Sena Khas Kheyl does not in the first instance appear to have been disputed. Upon his paying a fine of upwards of twenty-three lakhs of rupees for his late delinquency, a nuzur of twenty-one lakhs, and other exactions amounting in all to upwards of fifty lakhs and a half,* and having also agreed to pay a tribute of seven lakhs and seventy-nine thousand rupees annually, to keep three thousand horse constantly in the service at Poona, and four thousand when

* The following is the exact account, as extracted from the Poona State papers:—

	Rs.
Tribute of last year...	5,25,000
Fine for <i>non-attendance</i> in 1768	23,25,000
Nuzur, for confirmation in the title of Sena Khas Kheyl, with the districts and jagheer, according to ancient custom	21,00,000
Babey babut ⁽¹⁾	1,00,000
On account of the amount levied, in addition to the assignment given to Mokhund Kassee	2,630
	<hr/> 50,52,630 0
On account of gold received in part	3,715 2
	<hr/> Rupces 50,48,914 14

(1) Probably on account of the districts conquered from Juwan Murd Khan Babey by Dummajee, of which Rugonath Rao promised to exact no sharo.

the Peishwa was at war, the title and possessions of his father were conferred upon Govind Rao.

Syajee Gaekwar, the eldest son, was an idiot, but his youngest brother Futih Sing urged the claim of Syajee to the succession ; and in the year 1771 Futih Sing came to the Peishwa's court, where he prosecuted Syajee's pretensions, and at last succeeded. Ram Shastree is said to have decided the suit in favour of Syajee, and as Mahdoo Rao's policy was directed to circumscribe the power of the Gaekwar family, he could not have taken a more effectual means, short of absolute reduction than that which he adopted by acceding to the views of Futih Sing in appointing him Mootaliq to his brother Syajee, now Sena Khas Kheyl, which, of course, occasioned an irreconcileable difference between Futih Sing and Govind Rao. On representations, probably of the necessity of keeping his whole force in Guzerat, to enable him to resist any insurrection caused by the partizans of his brother Govind Rao, Futih Sing was permitted to withdraw the contingent of horse, on agreeing to pay at the rate of rupees 6,75,000 a-year during their non-attendance. But Futih Sing had other views. In his own schemes for supporting Syajee, he did not overlook the motives which induced Mahdoo Rao to give him the preference as Mootaliq, and he returned to Baroda, determined to strengthen himself against any designs the Peishwa might meditate. For this purpose he made overtures to the Bombay government early in the year 1772, offering to enter on an offensive and defensive alliance, on terms advantageous to the Company ; but his proposal was rejected as at variance with the orders of the Court of Directors. Except a short contract, concluded with Futih Sing by Mr. Price, on the 12th January 1773, respecting the Gaekwar's dividend of the revenues of Bafoach, which was to continue on the same footing as when under the government of the Nabob, no other agreement of any sort existed between him and the East India Company.

After Narrain Rao's murder and Rugoba's accession to the office of Peishwa, Govind Rao's claim was again recognised, and prior to Rugoba's departure for the Carnatic, whilst his army was encamped at Kulburga, Govind Rao was invested

as Sena Khas Kheyl, and immediately set off for Guzerat in order to endeavour to wrest the government from Futih Sing. From that time the two brothers had been in a state of constant warfare until Rugonath Rao's arrival, who, as already noticed, found Govind Rao engaged in the siege of Baroda.

As soon as Rugoba came into Guzerat he renewed the negotiation with Mr. Gambier, but it was temporarily impeded, owing to a misfortune which befel his accredited agent, Nowruttundass, who was taken prisoner by Futih Sing's troops, when employed with a party of Govind Rao's horse, in raising revenues from the districts south of Surat. Various drafts for a treaty had been tendered on both sides, and much time lost by the dilatory preciseness, rather than the indecision, of the

March 6. Bombay government. The treaty when finally concluded, on the 6th March, consisted of sixteen articles, by which all former treaties between the two governments were confirmed, and neither party was to assist the enemies of the other. The Bombay government engaged to send immediately five hundred Europeans and one thousand Sepoys, with a due proportion of artillery, to assist Rugoba, and pledged themselves to make up the number to seven or eight hundred Europeans, and seventeen hundred Sepoys, with gun-lascars, artificers, and pioneers, the whole amounting to three thousand men. Rugoba engaged to pay, on account of two thousand five hundred men, one lakh and a half of rupees monthly, with a proportionate increase or decrease according to the number of men; and as a security for the payment, he made over temporarily the districts of Amod, Hansot, Versaul, and a part of Oklaseer. He ceded in perpetuity Bassein with its dependencies, the island of Salsette and the other islands, the districts of Jumbooseer, Oolpar, and an assignment of seventy-five thousand rupees annually upon Oklaseer, the whole amounting to nineteen lakhs and twenty-five thousand rupees. He engaged to procure the cession of the Gaekwar's share of the Baroach revenue, and to pay all expenses the Company might incur in obtaining possession of the specified cessions, which were to be considered as belonging to them from the date of the treaty. As Rugonath Rao was destitute

of other funds, he deposited jewels, valued at upwards of six lakhs,* as a security for the promised advance, pledging himself to redeem them. The protection of the Company's possessions in Bengal, and those of their Ally the Nabob of Arcot, as long as the latter adhered to the existing engagement with the Mahrattas, was also provided for; and all British ships, or vessels sailing under the protection of the British flag, which might have the misfortune to be wrecked on the Mahratta coast, were, as far as practicable, to be restored to the owners, together with such cargoes and stores as might be saved.

Such was the substance of a treaty between the Bombay government and Rungoba, which occasioned infinite discussions amongst the English in India and in Europe, and led to what is generally termed the first Mahratta war.

* About twenty-eight years afterwards, on Bajee Rao's restoration in 1803, these jewels were delivered to him as a free gift from the Honorable Company.

CHAP. X.

A. D. 1775.

Expedition under Col. Keating sails for Guzerat.—Defeat of Rugonath Rao—flees to Surat—is joined by Col. Keating—lands at Cambay—approbation of the Bombay government—dissent of Mr. Draper.—Instructions to Col. Keating—he forms a junction with Rugoba's troops—march to Nerial—detail of operations.—Col. Keating negotiates—his envoy derided and insulted—Rugonath Rao is persuaded to move towards the Deccan.—Battle of Arass.—Surprise at Bowpeer.—Treaty with Futih Sing.—Prospects of the belligerents at the close of the season.

THE Bombay government, before the treaty was finally settled, had prepared a force of eighty European A. D. 1775. artillery, three hundred and fifty European infantry, eight hundred Sepoys, and one hundred and sixty gun lascars, which, with their complement of officers and non-commissioned officers, made up the fifteen hundred men for immediate service. A reinforcement was to follow on the arrival of the troops expected from Madras.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Keating, commandant of the artillery and engineers under the Bombay presidency, was selected for the command in preference to Colonel Egerton, who was the next senior officer to General Gordon, but whose health was supposed to disqualify him for active service.

Lieutenant Colonel Keating's detachment sailed from Bombay February. in the end of February, but in the meantime the army under Hurry Punt Phurkay, accompanied by a part of the troops of Holkar and Sindia, amounting in all to about thirty thousand men, had entered Guzerat in pursuit of Rugonath Rao, which obliged him and Govind Rao to raise the siege of Baroda, and retire beyond the Myhie, near to which, at the village of Wassud, he was encamped, February 17. when on the 17th February the ministerial army arrived in his neighbourhood.

According to a plan suggested by the local knowledge of Futih Sing, the ministerial army, on the afternoon of the

same day, suddenly crossed the river in three divisions at separate fords ; and whilst Rugonath Rao's army was preparing to repel the centre-attack before Govind Rao and Khundee Rao Gaekwar, who were encamped on the plain at a short distance in the rear, could come to his assistance, the other divisions took him in both flanks ; a body of Arabs, whom he had lately entertained, refused to fight without pay, Mannajee Phakray* and Sukaram Hurry, two of his best officers, were wounded in the commencement, the ground was confined, the confusion universal, and Rugoba, fancying that he was about to be seized by his own troops, suddenly set off from the field of battle, and fled with about one thousand horse to Cambay. The Nabob of that place, who had before intended to unite with him, was now apprehensive of the consequences of affording protection to a fugitive. Rugoba, therefore, applied to Mr. Charles Malet, at that time chief of the English factory, who had only heard by common report of the pending negotiation between Rugonath Rao and the Bombay government, but readily assisted to get him conveyed to Bownuggur, whence he embarked for Surat, and had been four days at that place, when the vessels, on board of which were Lieutenant Colonel

February 27. Keating's detachment, anchored at Surat bar on

the 27th February. In the meantime, the defeated army of Rugoba, under Govind Rao and Khundee Rao Gaekwar, Sewdasheo Ramchundur, Mannajee Phakray, and Sukaram Hurry, retired to Kupperwunj, and thence to Pulhanpoor. For the purpose of forming a junction with those chiefs, it was proposed to disembark the British troops at Cambay. The members of the Bombay government approved of that plan, with the exception of Mr. Daniel Draper, one of the members

March 7. of council, who, at a consultation on the 7th

March, dissented, because, as no formal change or ratification of the treaty had taken place, he conceived the circumstances to be so much altered, and their means so inade-

* Mannajee Phakray was one of the legitimate Sindias of Kunneir Kheir, and in consequence was more respected among the old Mahratta families than the great Mahadjee Sindia. We shall have frequent occasion to mention Mannajee Sindia, surnamed Phakray, or the heroic.

quate to the end proposed, that delay was both justifiable and advisable, at least until it could be ascertained what number of Rugoba's party was likely to re-assemble, and what resources of money and of troops could be afforded from the other presidencies. Mr. Draper recommended that the detachment should remain with Rugoba at Surat to protect that place and Baroach, to give confidence to his cause, and, with Rugoba's concurrence, to secure the revenues of the districts to be ceded.

It so happened that the treaty was signed at Surat by Rugoba on the 6th March, the day before this dissent was made, but the president and the other members at once decided that it was more advisable to proceed; in short, that inaction would be tantamount to desertion of the cause, and equally impolitic and spiritless. Governor Hornby seems to have had an idea that his fifteen hundred men might overcome the whole Mahratta army; nor is the confidence and inexperience of Colonel Keating less apparent, for on meeting the forlorn Rugoba at Surat, he congratulates the Bombay government on their good fortune at finding the ex-Peishwa so entirely dependent on them for his future success. The British detachment, accompanied by Rugoba, proceeded to Cambay, where

they landed on the 17th March; Colonel

March 17. Keating, however, before he quitted Surat, probably in order to show their new ally his alacrity, for it could be attended with no other advantage, commenced the war by attacking a party of horse belonging to the ministerial army, which appeared in the neighbourhood. The Mahrattas withdrew and awaited his embarkation, when they took ample revenge, by plundering all within their reach who acknowledged the English authority.

Colonel Keating's instructions were far from precise, but almost exclusively of a military nature. The object of the expedition which he was appointed to command was briefly stated; he was sent, according to the words, "for the assistance of Rugoba against all his enemies, the ministerial party and their adherents; to move with his army, and to do everything for bringing the war to a speedy and happy issue, that he (Rugoba) may desire, and which he (Colonel Keating) may think the

force under his command able to effect." Strict discipline among his troops, and particular attention to the prejudices of the natives; regular and constant information both of his own proceedings, and of the views, expectations, and designs of their ally, were the leading points particularly enjoined by government.

Colonel Keating was not authorized to act in any political capacity beyond the tenor of these orders; but, from an injudicious and excessive zeal, often as prejudicial to the public service as its opposite defect, he was ambitious of distinguishing himself as a politician, and entered into a correspondence with Futilh Sing, shortly after he landed at Cambay, for the purpose of detaching him from the ministerial party, by persuading him that it was for his benefit. But those who do not perceive their real interest before it is pointed out by an enemy, are not likely to be convinced by mere reasoning. Colonel Keating had no personal knowledge of Futilh Sing, no direct overtures had been made, and the British detachment had as yet gained neither advantage nor reputation. Nothing under these circumstances was to be expected from negotiating, especially with a Mahratta, but humiliation and disappointment. Before quitting Cambay, Colonel Keating's detachment was reinforced by the arrival of two companies of European grenadiers, and one battalion of Sepoys, from Madras, which made up the stipulated complement of two thousand five hundred

men. On the 19th of April the detachment
April 19. formed a junction with the fugitive army of Rugoba at the village of Durmuj, eleven miles north-east from Cambay, where Rugoba's late followers assembled, principally, it would appear, in hopes of receiving their arrears. Manajeo Phakray and Sukaram Hurry were officers of reputation, and faithful to Rugoba's cause, but their own followers, amounting to six or eight thousand, were without pay; mutinous and clamorous: the whole multitude which assembled in their camp, estimated at upwards of twenty thousand men, were worse than useless. Colonel Keating, pleased with the formidable spectacle which the tents, and flags, and crowd of a Mahratta camp present, congratulated himself and the presi-

dency on their prospects, but in the same despatch earnestly solicits a supply of treasure, and informs the government of his having advanced what he could from his military chest; that the spirit of *such* an army might not be damped.

The ministerial party had succeeded in detaching Khundee Rao Gaekwar from the cause of Rugoba, but were considerably weakened by the return of Holkar and Sindia, with about twelve thousand horse, to Malwa, for reasons which are nowhere satisfactorily shown. Rugoba's party interpreted their departure as a secession in his favour, and it probably did proceed, on the part of Sindia, from his being called upon by Sukaram Bappoo, to account for arrears due to the Peishwa; a circumstance to which may be attributed the enmity which subsisted between Mahadajee Sindia and Sukaram ever after this period, but could have occasioned no material alteration in Sindia's policy, as both Sindia and Holkar were at Poona a few months afterwards.

It was, however, confidently asserted by Rugoba's party that Sindia intended to join them, and that Holkar would never act against Mahadajee Sindia. The whole army under Hurry Punt, when joined by Futili Sing, amounted to about twenty-five thousand men, of which five thousand were infantry. Hurry Punt, in permitting the crowd to assemble about Rugoba at such a distance from the capital, after the season when the revenues were collected, and when the rains might be expected in the course of six weeks, acted more judiciously than if he had harassed his own troops to prevent the junction of his enemies.

On the 23rd of April, the army of Rugoba, the strength
 April 23. of which lay in the British detachment, moved
 from Durumj to Wursura, and from thence to
 the Saburmattee. They then moved northward towards Kaira,
 but did not reach Mahtur, a village thirty miles north of Cam-

May 3. bay, until the 3rd May. This inactivity, in the
 first instance, was unavoidable; the reinforcements
 had not arrived, and the commissariat of the Bombay troops
 was extremely defective; the delay in advancing was attributed
 to the numerous carts, baggage, and bazar; but, no doubt, was
 partly owing to the want of arrangement on the part of the

commanding officer ; and above all to the indecision of Rugoba, who was inclined to proceed to Ahmedabad and remain in Guzerat during the monsoon, but the Bombay government disapproved of this intention, and strongly recommended him to push on to Poona at once.

Before the army arrived at Mahtur they had two partial actions with Hurry Punt ; the first took place on the 28th April, at the village of Ussauumlee, and was entirely maintained by the English detachment, with very trifling loss ; the second was four days afterwards, when fifty or sixty of Rugoba's army were killed or wounded, a loss which dispirited them ever after ; but the enemy experienced a much greater, having made an attempt on the left of the English line, where they met with a severe repulse.

Colonel Keating, at length, by positive orders from Bombay, prevailed on Rugoba to change the direction of his route, and proceed towards Poonah. They accordingly moved on the

May 5. 5th, and before they reached Neriad, on the
May 8. 8th, were again twice opposed; once in the mode

usual for Mahratta horse, and a second time in the same manner, but supported by some pieces of cannon. As Neriad was a considerable town in possession of Khundee Rao Gaekwar, Rugoba, to punish his defection, and administer to his own necessities, imposed a contribution of sixty thousand rupees : but, after wasting one week, he could only collect forty thousand. On the 14th the army crept forward three miles further to the westward, and expected to have a decisive action at the Myhie ; as it was known, in the Mahratta camp, that Hurry Punt Phurkay had received orders from Poona to attack Rugoba, in case he should attempt to pass that river.

Colonel Keating, in the meantime, had continued his correspondence with Futih Sing Gackwar, and although aware that it had been discovered by Hurry Punt Phurkay from the first, he still persuaded himself that he should be able to bring over Futih Sing. He even entered into a treaty on the 22nd April, secret as he supposed, and as Futih Sing pretended ; and Colonel Keating was so credulous as to send an agent,

Lieutenant George Lovibond, to the camp of Futih Sing, for the purpose of having it ratified. The agent was very grossly insulted, and the mission must have furnished a subject for ridicule in every Mahratta Kutha and Ukhbar* of the day. But Colonel Keating knew so little of the people as to be insensible of the derision to which his notable diplomacy exposed him. The circumstances of the mission are too characteristic to be passed over. The agent, attended by the wukeel of Futih Sing, was carried to the camp of Hurry Punt ; and on expressing his surprise at being brought there, was merely told by the wukeel that his master had joined. During the evening some inferior people about Hurry Punt and Futih Sing were sent to visit the British envoy. Early next morning the wukeel told Mr. Lovibond that a tent was pitched for his reception, where he must meet Futih Sing and his Dewan to execute the treaty. In this tent he was kept the whole day ; not without expressing his impatience, but Mr. Lovibond, by not bursting into a passion, which would be expected in a European, probably disappointed them of half their mirth. At last, at five o'clock in the evening, a single horseman rode up to the door of the tent, and desired the gentleman to follow the army to Dubhaun. On his complying, the palanquin in which he travelled was surrounded by a party of Hurry Punt's horse, and he was thus exposed as a prisoner to their whole army. At this time the wukeel coming up, with much seeming concern, confirmed the truth of his being a prisoner, and earnestly begged of him to save his master, by destroying the treaty and his other credentials. The good-natured Englishman contrived to do this most effectually, and after the horsemen had brought him to the middle of Futih Sing's camp bazar, they rode off, and there left him. The wukeel immediately urged him not to lose an opportunity so favourable, but to follow him. He was then carried to the tent of the Dewan, where, after one hour, came Futih Sing himself. He expressed great gratitude for the precaution Mr. Lovibond had taken in his favour, by destroying the treaty, which he begged to excuse himself from renewing

* Ukhbars are native newspapers ; for an explanation of Kuthas, the reader may refer to page 15, Volume I.

at that time, owing to the vigilance of Hurry Punt, and the other great officers, but that he would soon be able to elude their jealousy, and make his escape to Baroda.* The envoy of Colonel Keating, after having thus furnished subject for what would, if well told, occasion as much laughter to Mahrattas as the story of the sleeper awakened among Arabs, was escorted back to the British camp. There are certain kinds of ridicule which are peculiarly national, and the full force of this imposture, practised by two personages in such high authority as Futih Sing and Hurry Punt Phurkay, would probably, from its seeming puerility, be at that time little understood, except by Mahrattas; but the Bombay government, in their judgment, disapproved of Colonel Keating's proceedings, and ordered Mr. Mostyn to join his army for the purpose of transacting its political affairs. The troops, however, had advanced too far from Cambay, through a hostile country, to enable Mr. Mostyn to overtake them.

The army, after passing Neriad, continued their march

May 17. towards the Myhie, and arrived at Nappar on

the 17th. From Neriad their route lay through a highly cultivated country, along a narrow, deep, sandy road, which only admits one cart abreast, being enclosed on both sides by high milk-bush hedges. Numerous topes, or groves, appear in every direction; the country on both sides is generally a succession of enclosed fields, the borders of which are lined by stately trees, such as the mountain neem, the tamarind, the moura, and the mango. Guzerat, from Barreah and Godra, to Kattywar, is in general a perfect flat; between Neriad and the Myhie there are a few undulations, which add considerably to the beauty of the country, but tend to obstruct the progress of an army by confining the line of wheeled carriage to the narrow road just described. After passing Nappar about a mile and a half the country opens on a fine plain, interspersed with trees, extending from Arass to near the banks of the river, which are full of extensive and deep ravines.

Rugoba's horse, after their first skirmish on leaving Cambay, instead of acting on the flanks, and guarding the baggage, used

* Mr. Lovibond's letter to Colonel Keating is on the Bombay records.

constantly to intermix with it, and with the characteristic feeling of Mahrattas, depressed by previous discomfiture, on occasions of the smallest danger, crowded for safety towards the British detachment. Colonel Keating, at Rugoba's request, in order to give them a little confidence, had formed two guards, consisting each of two hundred rank and file, one hundred Europeans, and one hundred native infantry, supported by two guns. One of these guards was posted in the rear, and one on the reverse flank of the whole army; the front and rear of the British detachment were composed of European grenadiers; and the orders were, that in case of an attack on the flank, the rear-guard should move to its support, whilst the division of grenadiers occupied their place; but in case the attack should be made on the rear-guard, the division of grenadiers should fall back and join it.

On the morning of the 18th May, when marching in this order towards the Myhie, about a mile and a half from Nappar, a smart cannonade from six guns suddenly opened on their rear from behind a grove on the left side of the road, where a large body of the enemy were advancing. Colonel Keating immediately halted the line, rode back, found Captain Myers, who commanded the division of grenadiers, moving according to the instructions, and having ordered down another gun and a howitzer, soon silenced the artillery of the enemy, and drove back the advancing body. Two of the enemy's cannon were not withdrawn with the rest, and Captain Myers, with some of the other officers, proposed "having a dash at their guns;" to which Colonel Keating assented, and sent for the other company of grenadiers. The object of attack was in an enclosed field, the road to which was of the same kind as that already described, between two high milk-bush hedges. As soon as both companies of grenadiers were formed with the rear-guard, they were directed to advance with order and regularity, an injunction which Colonel Keating found it necessary to repeat; Captain Myers, however, again quickened his pace, until he got near the guns. He then halted, and had just formed for the attack, when a body of the enemy's horse charged him; but being supported

by the artillery which Colonel Keating directed in person, they were driven back with great slaughter. The division had reformed to prosecute their object, when another charge, more desperate than the first, was again made and repulsed, though many of the grenadiers were cut down, and among the rest, the gallant Captains, Myers and Serle. This was certainly the crisis which generally gains or loses an action ; Colonel Keating performed the duty of a good captain of artillery, but as a commander, he neglected to support his exhausted men with fresh troops. The Mahrattas took advantage of the oversight, placed two elephants to block up the narrow road, and being encouraged by a treacherous Carcoon in Rugoba's army, charged the rear of the division, thus completely cut off from the main body. But the troops, as yet undismayed, facing about, attacked and routed them. By this time a body of Arabs and Sindians, in Rugoba's army, were advancing in their irregular manner, and Rugoba's horse, by careering about between the advanced body and the British line, occasioned infinite confusion, and could scarcely be distinguished from the enemy, who, for a moment, seemed to have relinquished the attack ; when suddenly, one of the companies of European grenadiers, without any apparent reason, went to the right about, and retreated at a quick pace ; this retrograde movement, as was afterwards discovered by a court of inquiry, was partly the fault of their officer, whose word of command to face to the right, for the purpose of retiring, was mistaken “ for right about face.” Without orders from Colonel Keating the retreat was, at all events, inexcuseable ; and, as might have been expected, was attended with disastrous consequences. The Sepoys immediately fancied themselves defeated, they also turned, and the rest of the Europeans followed their example. Some order was preserved until they gained the milk-bush hedges, when, in spite of all the exertions of their officers, they broke their ranks, and ran towards the line in the greatest confusion, whilst the enemy came amongst them, sword in hand, and made a great slaughter. Colonel Keating in vain attempted to rally the grenadiers, those men who had a few minutes before fought with all the ardour and constancy

of British troops, now fled disgracefully ; but the support of the line, and the fire of the whole artillery, within forty yards, again drove back the Mahrattas, who finally sustained a severe defeat. Such was the battle of Arass ; and, notwithstanding the circumstances attending it, which are related principally from the candid narrative of Colonel Keating, it is a victory recorded by the best of testimony, the enemy, in terms highly creditable.* But it was dearly purchased. The loss on the part of Colonel Keating's detachment amounted to two hundred and twenty-two men ; of whom eighty-six were Europeans, and eleven of them officers.†

Colonel Keating arrived at Baroach on the 29th May, where
 May 29. he deposited his wounded. On the 8th June
 June 8. he again marched, intending to cross the Ner-
 buddah ; but as the proposed ford was found
 impracticable, the army on the 10th moved up the river towards
 June 10. Bowpeer. After a march of about twenty miles,
 at five o'clock in the evening, Colonel Keating
 received intelligence that Hurry Punt was still on the north
 side of the river, about eight or ten miles further on. Having
 now less respect for his enemy, and having found the simple
 secret in Mahratta warfare of always being the first to attack,
 Colonel Keating resolved on moving forward, as soon as he
 had allowed his men some refreshment. Accordingly, he was
 again in motion before one o'clock in the morning ; but the
 troops of Rugoba, like their ill-omened master, whose presence
 seemed to blight the fairest prospect in every affair in which
 he was engaged, on this occasion, for the first time since their
 former slight check, stimulated by the hope of plunder, and
 elated by having received a little pay, part of a lakh of rupees

* Mahratta MSS.

† The officers killed were Captains Myers and Serle ; Lieutenants Morris, Henry, Prosser, Anderson, and Young.

The officers wounded were Captain Frith, Lieutenant Dawson, Ensigns Denon and Torin. Rugoba's Arabs were also severe sufferers, but they wreaked their vengeance on the treacherous Carcoon, whom they seized, and contrary to Rugoba's express orders, put him to instant death, by literally cutting him in pieces with their swords.

advanced to Rugoba by the Baroach factory, showed an inclination to advance, crowded the road, broke through Colonel Keating's line of march in several places, and at last obliged him to halt till daylight. The enemy, therefore, saw him long before he could get near, struck their camp in the greatest confusion, threw their guns into the river, sent their heavy baggage across the Nerbuddah, and retreated along the north bank with the loss of an elephant and a few camels, which were plundered by Rugoba's horse.

Colonel Keating's intention of proceeding to the southward, according to repeated orders from Bombay, was now set aside, for many judicious military reasons, urged by Rugoba, of which the presidency afterwards approved; and it was therefore determined to retire to Dubhoy, nineteen miles south-east of Baroda, whilst Rugoba's troops were encamped at Bheelapoor, a village on the Dadhur, between these places.

Colonel Keating then proposed to the Bombay government, at the repeated solicitation of Govind Rao Gaekwar, to reduce Baroda as soon as the violence of the monsoon abated, to which they assented. In the meantime preparations were in progress at the presidency for the purpose of reinforcing Colonel Keating's detachment, replenishing their ammunition, and completing their stores.

Futih Sing was now in earnest in his desire to enter into a treaty; and Colonel Keating, foreseeing more advantage to the cause by admitting his overtures than by reducing him, recommended to Rugoba the conclusion of such an agreement as might reconcile Govind Rao to the measure, secure the alliance of Futih Sing, and insure relief to Rugoba's urgent necessities, by a supply of treasure.

Futih Sing agreed to furnish three thousand horse, to be at all times kept at Rugoba's service; but if required, two thousand more were to be provided, for which pay was to be allowed: a jagheer of three lakhs, which Futih Sing, by his agreement with Mahdoo Rao Bullal, was bound to reserve in Guzerat for his brother, Govind Rao, was no longer to be required; but, in lieu of it, Rugonath Rao agreed to bestow a jagheer of ten lakhs on Govind Rao Gaekwar in the Deccan. Twenty-six

lakhs of rupees were to be paid to Rugoba in sixty-one days; and the East India Company, as guarantees and negotiators between the parties, were to receive the Gaekwar's share of the revenue in Baroach and several villages, in perpetuity, estimated at (2,13,000) two lakhs and thirteen thousand rupees.

This pacification, effected through Colonel Keating's management, was, as circumstances then stood, politic; for, although Govind Rao afterwards seceded from the agreement, he declared himself satisfied at the time.*

* From Colonel Keating's reports to the Bombay government, which are my chief authority for the above, it is evident that there must have been considerable modifications in the treaty of which the following production is the only copy that I have found either in English or Mahratta. It is however from very high authority, being an enclosure of a letter of 30th January 1802, from Mr. Jonathan Duncan, when Governor of Bombay, to Sir Barry Close, resident at Poona.

" Translate of the copy of the treaty between Rugonath Bajeerao Pundit Purdan on one part, and Futty Sing and Seajee Rao Shumsher Buhadur on the other part.

That Seajee and Futty Sing Shumsher Buhadur had disobeyed and joined with the rebels, but now by the means of Colonel Thomas Keating, for and in behalf of the united English East India Company, have, by promising presents, accommodated matters with Pundit Perdan, the following are the articles of the Gaekwar's proposals.

Article I.—That Seajee, and Futty Sing Gaekwar Shumsher Buhadur, do hereby agree to pay the sum of eight lakhs of rupees every year to the Sircar.

II. That they are to attend as usual with a troop of 3000 good horse and men, which number is not to be lessened.

III. In the late Madoo Rao's time they used to pay every year three lakhs of rupees to Govind Rao Gaekwar Sena Keskel Shumsher Buhadur, which sum is settled not to be paid him in future, about which Govind Rao is to make no claim against Seajee and Futty Sing.

IV. Conde Rao Gaekwar Hemut Buhadur is to be continued on the same footing, and agreeable to the agreement made in the time of the late Damjee deceased.

V. That the government and revenue of the Pergunnahs of Baroach have been wholly ceded to the Company agreeable to the agreement made between them and Sreemunt Pundit Predan, about which Seajee and Futty Sing are not to make any dispute.

VI. The Purgunnahs Chickaly Veriow, near Surat, and Coral, near the Nerbuddah river, and about 15 coss distant from Baroach, which together make three Purgunnahs, the Gaekwar has ceded to the Honorable Com-

The war, thus waged in Guzerat, was also prosecuted by sea. The Mahratta navy in the ministerial interest, at the commencement of the war, consisted of six ships, one of forty-six guns, one of thirty-eight, one of thirty-two, and two of twenty-six guns, with ten armed vessels, mounting each from two to nine guns, besides swivels. This fleet was met at sea by Commodore John Moor in the Revenge, frigate, and the Bombay, grab. Though the Mahrattas were formidable in appearance, the commodore stood down to attack them, when they bore away with all sail set, but having singled out their largest ship, the Sumsher Jung of 46 guns, both the English vessels gave her chase, and at last the grab, being an excellent sailor, brought her to action. The Revenge came up to the assistance of the Bombay, and after an engagement of three hours the Shumsher Jung blew up, her commander, with most of the crew, perished, and the ship was totally destroyed.

On the side of Rugoba everything seemed favourable ; elated by the successful exertions of his allies, he presented the Company with the permanent cession of the valuable districts of Hansot and Amod, then estimated at 277,000 rupees of annual revenue. The whole amount acquired by the war, including cessions by Futihi Sing, was valued at rupees 24,15,000, of all which the Bombay government had obtained possession, excepting Bassein and its dependencies.

The state of the young Peishwa's affairs wore an aspect proportionally unpromising. Hurry Punt Phurkay, after the surprise at Bowpeer, left Gunnesh Punt Beeray in command of a detachment for the protection of Ahmedabad, and returned to the Deccan by a ford about one hundred miles above where his heavy baggage had crossed. Sukaram Bappoo and Nana

pany for ever, on account of the peace they have made between the Gaekwar and Sreemunt Punt Purdan.

VII. That in the court of Sreemunt Punt Purdan the Gaekwar must pay a due attention to everything that is reasonable, without having any communication with its enemies.

VIII. That for the confirmation and compliance of the above articles, the Honorable Company stand security ; and should the Gaekwars appear any way false, the Honorable Company is not to protect them. Rugoba is also to fulfil the above articles without any difference.

Furnuwrees were much disheartened in consequence of his defeat, and dreaded the consequences which generally follow disaster in India, by the defection of allies. Moodajee Bhonslay had a few months before prevailed over his brother Sabajee ; and although, whilst Rugonath Rao was a fugitive in Guzerat, the former had solicited and obtained, through Nana Furnuwrees, from the young Peishwa, a confirmation of the rights and honours of Sena Sahib Soobeh for his son Rughojee, together with such privileges for himself as pertained to the guardianship, yet the ministers were apprehensive that the rising fortunes of Rugoba would ensure him the support of the Raja of Berar. Several men of consequence already began to turn their eyes on Rugoba ; and Nizam Ally, in hopes of being able to exact something additional from the one party or the other, or at least to retain what he had already recovered, opened a negotiation with Rugoba, which greatly alarmed the ministers, especially as the death of Rookun-ud-dowlah, happening about this period, obstructed their former correct intelligence of his master's real designs. Nizam Ally augmented their uncertainty by pretending to disbelieve the truth of Mahdoor Rao Narrain's legitimacy, and by proposing, as a conciliatory measure to all parties, that Amrut Rao, the adopted son of Rugonath Rao, should be made Peishwa. By this means Nizam Ally exacted a further cession from the ministers of nearly eighteen lakhs of rupees* of annual revenue. Great promises were also made to Sindia and Holkar ; nor did any sacrifice, that could ensure the exclusion of Rugoba, appear too great to the ruling Bramins at Poona. The cause of Rugoba was extremely unpopular ; of the generality of the Bramins in Poona, even those who were disposed to acquit him of the atrocity of having conspired against the life of his nephew, remembered with indignation the criminal opposition he had always shown to the wise and virtuous Mahdoo Rao ; they reflected with regret on his losses to the state, and on the unfortunate issue of all his measures ; the weakness and folly of his whole conduct they viewed with contempt ; and his present connection with the usurping and impure Europeans

* He obtained rupees 17,84,576-8-0. (State Accounts, Poona records.)

they regarded with jealousy and detestation. Others, and such were probably the majority of the Mahratta nation, true to no party, and guided by no principle, hitherto considered Rugoba as an unfortunate person with whom it was unwise to be connected; but the defeat of Hurry Punt, the subsequent discomfiture of his deputy Gunnesh Punt by Ameen Khan, an officer of Rugoba, the siege of Ahmedabad carried on by the same officer, the preparations of the English, the doubts of the young Peishwa's legitimacy, and the desire of many of the Mahratta chiefs to become independent of the Bramin ministry, occasioned a revolution in the opinions of many, and an anxiety in the minds of all. In short, such was at this period the state of the Mahratta country, that it is generally believed that any success of equal importance to that at Arass, on the opening of the expected campaign, would have brought the ministry into the terms of Rungonath Rao; and as the fact of Mahdoo Rao Narrain's legitimacy would have been proved to the satisfaction of the English, Rugoba appeared certain of being established as regent. But fortune was preparing a change far different from such a prospect.

CHAP. XI.

FROM A. D. 1774 TO A. D. 1778.

The Supreme Council in Bengal assume the powers of general administration.—Correspondence with Bombay relative to their late proceedings—disapprove of the connection with Rugoba.—Death of Sabajee Bhonslay.—Violent condemnation of the Bombay measures—peremptory orders in consequence.—Lieut. Col. Upton despatched to Poona as envoy plenipotentiary.—Remonstrances of the Bombay government—they vindicate their conduct—their belief in Rugoba's innocence accounted for.—Reflections on the precipitate interference of the Supreme Government—evils of which it was the cause.—Mr. Hastings' opinion—letter to Sukaram Bappoo.—Colonel Upton's negotiation broken off—proceedings at Bengal on receipt of this intelligence.—The ministers in the mean time sign the treaty of Poorundhur—its conditions—disappointment and indignation of the Bombay government.—Offers of Rugoba—reprehensible conduct of the Bombay government.—Insurrection of the impostor Suddaba—The Bombay measures approved by the Court of Directors—resolutions in consequence—dissent of Mr. Draper—motives which appear to have actuated the Directors.—Progress of Suddaba—defeat—seizure—and execution.—Colonel Upton recalled.—Mr. Mostyn re-appointed resident.—Evasive conduct of the ministry.—An agent of the French government is received with distinction at Poona.—The Concan restored to order.—Conquests of Hyder.—Retrospective view of the history of Kolapoort—depredations and piracies.—Progress of Hyder—successful artifice of Hurry Punt Phurkay.—Death of Ram Raja, and of the Pritee Needhee.—Affairs of Moodajee Bhonslay—and of Futih Sing Gaekwar.—The son of Trimbukjee Raja Bhonslay is selected as Raja of Sulara.—Curious artifice of the Bramins with regard to the intermarriage of the imprisoned Rajas.

THE supreme council in Bengal assumed the powers of general administration in the affairs of British India, on the 20th October 1774; and during the ensuing month addressed a letter to the Bombay government, requiring an account of the state of that presidency. This letter was received at Bombay on the 7th December, but as the president and members were then in the midst of preparations for the expedition to Salsette, they deferred the consi-

deration of the Bengal letter, until after the troops had proceeded on their destination, and sent no reply until the last day of the year.

Three months afterwards, or on the 31st March, the Bombay government further reported to Bengal their proceedings up to that date. But early in February intelligence of the siege of Taunah reached the governor-general in council, by the way of Tellicherry and Madras, before they received the reply from Bombay of the 31st December. The delay on the part of the Bombay government, certainly, to say the least, wore the semblance of a premeditated evasion, and, as new authority is generally tenacious, the governor-general and

A. D. 1775. council addressed another letter on the 3rd February, censuring the Bombay presidency for having gone to war with the Mahrattas, and peremptorily requiring immediate and special information of the causes and motives of their conduct. On the 21st May the Bombay government received the reply to their first letter of the 31st December, wherein the supreme government offered no opinion respecting the capture of Salsette, but disapproved of the intention of joining Rugoba, not because Rugoba was making war against his lawful prince, and was generally obnoxious in the Mahratta country, or because the Bombay government had unjustly espoused the cause of a man branded with the crime of murder; circumstances, of which the Bombay government, it is justice to them to say, were never well informed, and of which the supreme government were ignorant; but they disapproved, because, to use their own words, "it was inconsistent with your negotiations with the ruling powers at Poona, and with the authority of this government." They also expressed apprehensions that the measure might involve them in hostilities with Sabajee Bhonslay, the enemy of Rugoba, and their neighbour. To which the Bombay government replied, that they neither have, nor ever had any negotiations with the ministry at Poona, and that they need be under no apprehension in regard to Sabajee Bhonslay as he had been killed in action by Moodajee, the friend of Rugoba, who was now the acknowledged guardian of Rughoojee, and the ruler of

Berar; all which was perfectly true,—victory had declared for Sabajee; Moodajee was surrounded by his brother's troops; and, on the point of being made prisoner, when Sabajee, in the exultation of the moment, drove his elephant up to that on which Moodajee was riding, and called out to him to submit. Moodajee replied by the discharge of a pistol, which laid his brother dead, and left him undisputed regent and guardian of the young Rughojee, who, it will be remembered, was his son.*

To the report of their proceedings up to the 31st March, the Bombay government, on the 12th of August, received a reply from Bengal, dated on the 31st May. Long before that time the minds of the president and members of the supreme government were in a state of strong excitement, caused by those well-known controversies between Warren Hastings and his council, which afterwards occupied so much of the time and attention of the British Parliament. But on the present occasion, president and members united in a violent condemnation of the Bombay measures; they declared the treaty with Rugoba invalid, and the Mahratta war, "impolitic, dangerous, unauthorized, and unjust;" they protested against the Bombay government for all consequences, and peremptorily required them "to withdraw their forces to their own garrisons, in whatsoever state their affairs might be, unless their safety should be endangered by an instant retreat." The governor-general and council also intimated their intention of sending an agent of their own to open a negotiation with the ruling party of the Mahratta state, and desired the Bombay government to retain possession of Salsette and Bassein, but on no account to form any treaty without their previous sanction.

The Bombay government stated in reply, that the negotiations, which led to the measures thus hastily condemned, had been begun before the controlling administration was formed; they defended their conduct on the grounds of the necessity of determining with promptitude, and recapitulated their reasons for deciding and acting in the manner they had done; pointed

* Mahratta MSS. Where I do not expressly acknowledge my authorities from A. D. 1774 to 1783, I beg the reader to understand that I write from the records of the Bombay government.

out the evils prevented by the capture of Salsette, and the fair and honourable advantages secured to their employers and their country by the treaty with Rugonath Rao. They dwelt on the shame and degradation which must be the consequence of retracting a solemn treaty in support of an object equally just and practicable, and pledged themselves, on their own responsibility, to fulfil their engagements. They sent Mr. William Tayler, a member of their council, to Bengal, who advocated their cause with much ability ; and his report on Bombay affairs, dated 9th October 1775, displays, at that early period, a very considerable knowledge of the history and character of the Mahrattas.

The supreme government, however, adhered to their opinion of the expediency of the orders which they had transmitted. Lieutenant Colonel John Upton, of the Bengal establishment, was selected by Mr. Hastings as envoy plenipotentiary, and instructed to repair to Poona, and conclude a treaty between the Mahratta state and the Bombay government. The president and council of that establishment, being excluded from all participation, strongly remonstrated against this proceeding as a wanton degradation of their authority, and their representations were supported with energy by their deputy at Bengal. "I trust," says Mr. Tayler, "that it will appear to your Honors, &c. that at the time it pleased the wisdom of parliament to arm you with controlling powers over the presidencies, it was by no means their intention that they should appear so much degraded, and so contemptible in the eyes of the native government as the presidency of Bombay must be, unless you will commit the treaty of peace to their management."

"Our honorable employers, and the whole British nation, may be naturally led to suppose that, in your opinion, the members of that government are devoid, in every degree, of integrity and abilities ; which would be the most cruel and unjust of all imputations ; for I can dare to affirm, not a person who concluded that treaty was actuated by any other motive than their obedience and duty to their employers, whose interests appeared to them to be most materially benefited by their engagements."

Such was the language then held by the Bombay government, with apparent sincerity as well as spirit, and, as far as we have yet detailed of their conduct and prospects, certainly with no inconsiderable degree of reason. It must be recollected that the president and members, throughout the whole of the rise and progress of their connection with Rngoba, were strongly impressed with the belief of his being innocent of the murder of his nephew. Many of our countrymen, who, by long residence in the Deccan, have become acquainted with the notoriety of the fact, although, perhaps, represented with exaggeration, have, from this circumstance alone, entertained strong doubts of the integrity of Mr. Hornby and his council ; and some inveigh, with a feeling far from reprehensible, against Englishmen who could seek by such an instrument to attain their ends and gratify their ambition. But to account for this belief, on the part of the Bombay government, it is necessary to state that Sukaram Bappoo was originally concerned in Rugoba's conspiracy against the liberty, though not the life of Narrain Rao. After the murder, as it was deemed, by the ministers generally, a measure of prudence to affect a disbelief of Rugonath Rao's participation, of course Sukaram Bappoo had stronger reasons than any of them for professing that opinion. It was this impression, from the reports first circulated at Poona, which the members of the Bombay government received from their envoy, Mr. Mostyn ; and before it was possible for them to ascertain the real circumstances, they were engaged as a party hostile to the ministers, when it was as much the interest of the one to uphold Rugoba's innocence, as it was of the other to aggravate his guilt. Parties so influenced diverge from the truth in all countries, more especially in India, where an evidence is so apt to suit the word to the wish of his auditor. The same reasons operated in creating a belief that the child named Mahdoo Rao Narrain was supposititious.

The Bengal presidency, where they had Mahratta connections, received their first information through the government of Sabajee Bhonslay, a partisan of the ministers. They were also, no doubt, irritated at the neglect of their orders, and the

apparent contempt of their authority ; and as we find men, in all situations, too often influenced by their feelings when they should be guided only by their judgment, we may suppose that they saw, in their full force, the evils of inordinate ambition, and the wisdom of that parliament which had so opportunely vested them with power to control such an unjustifiable enterprize, by interposing in behalf of justice and moderation. The clause in the act of parliament was not sufficiently specific ; the intention of establishing a uniform plan of action with respect to peace and war required, at a distance so remote as India from England, the strongest authority in the supreme council ; but, as their powers were not clearly defined, the members of government should have perceived that a firm but calm exercise of power for a long period was the best way of establishing an efficient control, unless they could obtain an amendment of the statute. But they violently stretched their power in support of what they deemed propriety, and issued mandates, characteristic of an inexperienced and arbitrary government, which, to gratify temporary resentments, or forward its impatient selfish will, weakens much more than it strengthens the efficiency of distant authority.

Mr. Hornby and his council were not blameless, even in what has already been mentioned, and their subsequent conduct accelerated rather than averted the misfortunes which ensued. But the precipitate interference of the governor-general and council was attended by effects pernicious to the interests of their country ; effects which but for the weak government of France might, together with the loss of the American colonies, have proved a fatal blow to Great Britain. Confining reflections, however, to the boundary of Maharashtra, suffice it to say that it depressed the Bombay presidency, lowered its political importance, and obstructed that advancement and prosperity which, from its situation and maritime advantages, it would otherwise naturally have attained ; it immediately tended to strengthen the hands of the Ministers at Poorundhur, and it ultimately cemented the tottering confederacy of the Mahrattas, under the administration of Nana Furnuwees.

The president and council of Bombay, on receiving the Bengal order of the 31st May, directed an immediate cessation of hostilities; and as soon as the roads permitted, Colonel Keating, accompanied by Rugoba, returned towards Surat. But instead of strictly retiring within the Company's districts, Colonel Keating, on the earnest recommendation of Rugoba, was permitted by the Bombay government to encamp at Karod, a village about twenty-five miles east of Surat, which, although a deviation from the orders of the supreme government, was afterwards acknowledged as a useful support, in facilitating

their negotiations at Poorundhur ; at which place
December 28. Colonel Upton arrived on the 28th December.

Mr. Hastings was sensible that the condemnation of the Bombay measures was unnecessarily violent, but he had been one of the first to recommend a controlling authority in India, which, in that remote empire, considered of itself, was an object in the highest degree important. The mandate issued was now irrevocable ; Sukaram Bappoo had been informed, by a letter from the governor-general, that the conduct of the Bombay government was contrary to the Company's order, " because they have directed all their officers not to make any war, nor enter on any dispute. My employer, the King of England," says the governor-general, " has directed that all the Company's governors in India should obtain mine and my council's permission, as King's governor and council of Bengal, either to make war or peace." In short, that he had therefore issued orders to desist from hostilities, requested of the ministers to do the same, and intimated his intention of sending an envoy to negotiate a peace. If the governor-general of British India had then said " to dictate a peace," and shown a determination to maintain that ground, however bold the words may sound, he would probably, at that moment, have succeeded with Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees.

After the despatch of the first letters, the supreme government, even for the sake of consistency, would have been obliged to regulate their future measures by the tenor of those orders. Advices having been received of the successes in Guzerat, it seemed not improbable that a revolution might

have taken place before Colonel Upton's arrival at Poona. Adopting, therefore, the same equitable principle with which they had professed to set out, that a substantive state has a right to make any change in its internal government which only affects itself, the envoy was instructed to negotiate a peace with either party whom he might find the acknowledged authority in the empire. But the governor-general and council had in effect already become parties ; and the members of the Bombay government, who felt and wrote as if the supreme government had ranged themselves on the side of their enemies, remark, with some justice, in one of their despatches to the Court of Directors, "they have acknowledged the legitimacy of the government of the ministers, before they could have any competent knowledge of the justice of their pretensions."

The ministers soon perceived the advantages thus placed in
A. D. 1776. their hands, and as Bramins, in politics, mis-
construe moderation, and attribute concession solely to fear ; they assumed a high tone of demand and menace, which Colonel Upton, judging by himself, believed to be firm and sincere. The supreme government were under a mistake in imagining that Bassein as well as Salsette was in possession of the Bombay presidency. The envoy was enjoined to require the cession both of these and of the islands in Bombay harbour, and also of the Mahratta shares of revenue in the city of Baroach, with such other advantages for the Company as circumstances might enable him to obtain.

Colonel Upton's correspondence bears ample testimony of sincerity and moderation ; but he was ill qualified to conduct a negotiation with Mahratta Bramins. The ministers greatly extolled the just and honourable motives which "had determined the great governor of Calcutta to order peace to be concluded." But when Colonel Upton proposed retaining Salsette, &c., the cession of Bassein and the revenues of Baroach, they affected to consider such an application as perfectly unauthorized, and pertinently asked the envoy, "how the Bengal government, who had so justly condemned the war, could yet be so ready to avail themselves of its advantages." The only reply to this was, that Salsette had

been taken possession of as a precautionary measure, long deemed necessary to the safety of Bombay, and the prosperity of its commerce; but the ministers persisted in their language, and expressed a wish "that they had not, on a supposed confidence of the power of the governor of Calcutta over the people of Bombay, suspended hostilities, and thereby, at an enormous expense, maintained a vast army inactive, with which they should otherwise long since have settled the business." They demanded the immediate surrender of the delinquent Rugoba, and the entire restoration of the territory occupied by the Bombay government since the commencement of the war, on which they would, as a favour to the governor-general, agree to pay twelve lakhs of rupees, in order to re-imburse the East India Company for the expenses incurred by the Bombay government. They seconded their arguments with threats, and mistook the mild remonstrances of the envoy for timidity. Colonel Upton conceiving the negotiation at an end, expressed this opinion to the governor-general and council in a letter, dated 7th February, when they immediately determined to support the cause of Rugoba with the utmost vigour. They prepared troops for embarkation, ordered a large supply of treasure to be transmitted to Bonibay, and directed troops to be sent from Madras. They wrote letters to Rugoba, to Nizam Ally, and Hyder; and endeavoured, in the same manner, to induce Moodajee Bhonslay, Mahadajee Sindia, and Tookajee Holkar to embrace their cause, or at all events, to engage their neutrality.

The favourable change in the sentiments of the Bengal government towards himself reached Rugoba almost as soon as it got to Bonibay, and raised his spirits and expectations; but the ministers, almost immediately after they had carried their menaces to the highest pitch, acceded at once to the greater part of Colonel Upton's original demands; and before accounts had time to reach Calcutta that the negotiation was broken off, the treaty of Poorundhur was settled. It was signed on the 1st March, and consisted of nineteen articles, but two of them were afterwards erased by mutual consent, and an additional clause signed. The treaty was made by

Lientenant-Colonel Upton on the part of the Company's government, and by Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees on that of the Peishwa's ; but the titles of Rao Pundit Purdhan are only mentioned in the treaty, the name of the Peishwa having been omitted.

The substance of the articles was a general peace between the English East India Company and the Mahrattas. Salsette to be retained or restored at the pleasure of the governor-general and council ; if restored, the Peishwa's government agreed to relinquish territory worth three lakhs of rupees of annual revenue as an equivalent. To this exchange the supreme government could not be expected to accede, although Nana Furnuwees afterwards pretended that it had been referred with perfect confidence as a question of equity, from a reliance upon the justice of Mr. Hastings. All claims on the revenue of the city of Baroach, together with territory in its neighbourhood, producing three lakhs of rupees, was ceded, as the treaty states, " by way of friendship to the English Company." Twelve lakhs of rupees were also yielded in payment of the expences incurred by the Bombay government. The cessions made by Futil Sing Gaekwar were to be restored to him, provided it could be proved that he had no authority to make such alienations without the consent of the Peishwa's government. The treaty between the Bombay government and Rugola was formally annulled. The English troops to return to their garrisons, and the army of Rugoba to be disbanded within a month. A general amnesty to be proclaimed to all the followers of Rugoba, four only excepted, whom the ministers knew to be particularly implicated in the murder of Narrain Rao. If Rugonath Rao should refuse to disband his army, the English agreed not to assist him. On condition of his assenting to the prescribed terms, the Peishwa and his ministers consented to afford him an establishment of one thousand horse, to allow him two hundred domestics, to be chosen by himself, and to pay him twenty-five thousand rupees monthly for his other expences, but his residence was fixed at Kopergaon on the Godavery. It was particularly specified that no assistance should be afforded to Rugonath Rao, or to

any subject or servant of the Peishwa, who should excite disturbance or rebellion in the Mahratta dominions. The treaties of 1739 and 1756, and all other agreements, not suspended or dissolved by the present articles, were confirmed. It was mutually agreed to assist the crews and restore the wrecks and cargoes of vessels of the respective nations, thrown on each other's coasts.

Nothing could exceed the disappointment of the Bombay government when they learnt the terms of the treaty. They seemed to consider their own interest and dignity sacrificed to a jealous assumption of authority. They had no power to protest, and could therefore only vent their indignation by entering dissents on their own records against almost every article, with the view of ultimately submitting their objections to the Court of Directors. They certainly had cause for irritation in the manner which their conduct had been condemned, and their power in a great degree suspended ; but they seem to have been determined to find objections, and even petulantly hinted that Colonel Upton must have been in bodily fear, or he never would have consented to terms so derogatory to the English nation : they, however, "with more propriety ask, Who is this Rao Pundit Purdhan ? why is his name omitted ? if Colonel Upton has had proof of the legitimacy of the child, said to be the son of Narrain Rao, why is that circumstance left in doubt ? or if not proved, why is Rugonath Rao, the rightful Peishwa, wholly excluded?"*

Rugoba could never entirely comprehend the nature of the interference on the part of the governor-general and council ; but under a supposition that it arose from their deeming the advantages he had granted inadequate, he proposed, not only to confirm the treaty of Surat, by a new agreement with the Bengal government, but with the single exception of Viziadroog (Gherialti), to cede the whole Concan, to put the Company's troops in possession of one of the passes in the Ghants, to

* Although the circumstance is nowhere explained by the Mahrattas, the omission, on the part of the ministers, of the name of Mahdo Rao Narrain was most likely a precaution, as in case of the child's death, it probably was their intention to get Gunga Bye to adopt a son.

purchase annually ten lakhs of rupees' worth of their woollens and metals, at an advance of fifteen per cent. on the prime cost including all charges ; he also proposed that they should unite to subdue Nizam Ally ; and made several other offers, of which, as none could be accepted, a further enumeration is unnecessary, but one inducement was too remarkable to be passed over, as, with his Mahratta ideas, it must have appeared irresistible. Rugoba offered to cede ten per cent. of all the jagheers in the Mahratta empire ; including, of course, the Mahratta possessions in the Deccan, and those of Holkār, Sindia, and Gaekwar, in Hindoostan and Guzerat ; which would have placed the East India Company with respect to those jagheers precisely on the footing of Surdeshmookh.

Rugoba, on hearing of the terms stipulated for him by the treaty, declared that he would rather maintain the war himself than submit to them. He pretended to have received overtures from Bhowan Rao, Pritee Needhee, and Dhonsa,* one of the officers of Nizam Ally. Mahadajee Sindia had always sent the most friendly assurances to Rugoba, to which he was induced, partly from enmity to Sukaram Bappoo, but principally, in order to preserve his own consequence, and place himself as umpire between the Bramin factions ; a situation to which Mahadajee Sindia with remarkable political sagacity early aspired. After the terms of the treaty were promulgated he continued an intercourse with Rugoba, not avowed but sufficiently known to alarm the ministers ; Rugoba, however, whatever he might pretend, was not deceived by these professions ; none of his Indian allies afforded him any substantial aid, excepting Hyder, who sent him eighty thousand rupees as a present.†

* The bye-name by which Ibrahim Beg, Zufur-ud-dowlah Sabit Jung was best known. Dhonsa is the Hindooostanee name for one of the drums usually carried by parties of horse.

† Large sums are said to have been sent by Hyder Ally to Rugoba, but except the 80,000 rupees above mentioned, no other money appears by the Bombay records to have been received, and it could hardly have escaped the vigilance of that government, at a time when they had the greatest difficulty in supplying even a pittance to Rugoba.

The Bombay government magnified everything that could tend to forward their own views, or verify their predictions. Instead of submitting as became them;—instead of using every endeavour to give effect to the spirit of the orders from the supreme government, and to a solemn engagement under the constituted authorities of their country, every symptom of commotion, and every prospect of obstructing the treaty of Poorundhur, was hailed with a satisfaction which they had the caution not to express, but scarcely the decency to conceal.

An impostor, already mentioned, who had assumed the name of Sewdasheo Chimnajee, eight or nine years after the battle of Panniput, was made prisoner during the life-time of Mahdoo Rao, and after being confined in different places, was finally delivered over to the custody of Ramchundur Naik Paranspey, Soobehdar of Rutnaguiry, in the Concan. Paranspey, perceiving the distracted state of affairs at Poona, the dissensions among the heads of the state, and the probability of attaining a sovereignty for himself, released his prisoner, and proclaimed him, as Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, unjustly imprisoned by the traitorous ministers. The impostor is known to have been a Kanoja Bramin from Hindoostan, a man of some abilities, and of the same cast as the famous Kuvee Kulus of Sumbhajee. His story obtained immediate credence, and the Bombay government, to whom he very soon sent wukeels and addressed letters, received the overtures of *Suddaba*, as they called him, with complacency, and were evidently hopeful that this fresh insurrection would work in their favour.

Rugoba, from the date of the treaty, was allowed the space of one month to disband his army, a period which was afterwards prolonged, but perceiving that there was no immediate chance of inducing the governor-general to assist him, he asked and obtained an asylum from the Bombay government in Surat, where he was admitted with merely his baggage and two hundred domestics. From Surat he appealed to the Court of Directors, and following the example of his brother Ballajee Rao, addressed a letter to the king of England. Colonel Upton remonstrated against the breach of treaty occasioned by the protection afforded to Rugoba. The Bombay govern-

ment declared it no breach of the treaty : they justified their conduct on a former letter from Bengal, dated in the preceding October, which permitted them to afford an asylum to Rugoba, in case his personal safety should be endangered; and they declared, that nothing but absolute necessity should compel them to give up the unfortunate man to his persecutors ; that Colonel Upton must know little of Asiatics in the situation of the ministers if he was not aware that until they had rid themselves of so just an object of dread, they would never consider themselves safe, and that common humanity, as well as the law of nations and good policy, dictated the propriety of what they had done, even if unsupported by authority from Bengal.

The army of Rugoba, before it disbanded, encamped, for a short time after the final period allowed had expired, close to Surat, waiting, as they said, for the payment of their arrears. Hurry Punt Phurkay, in a letter to Poona, intimated his intention of attacking them ; but from the position in which they were allowed to remain he could not but apprehend that the English intended to support them. The Bombay government, on the plea of apprehending danger from the contiguity of the contending Mahratta armies, but in reality to await events, threw their field army into Surat and Baroach.

It was in vain that Colonel Upton complained, or the ministers threatened in consequence of these proceedings ; the Bombay government paid little attention to the one, and they treated the other with scorn ; they expressed their astonishment and surprise that the envoy of the British nation should suffer the Mahratta ministers to declare that they should be induced to follow the example of Hyder, who had secured a peace on terms very honourable to himself, and that, in case of a renewal of the war, they would carry fire and sword to every part of the Company's possessions in India. Such a menace was indeed derogatory to the British character, and highly discreditable, not to Colonel Upton, but to those of his nation, who, by a perverse conduct, provoked the threat, and compelled their envoy to admit that the measures they pursued were not regulated in that spirit of good faith,

which should certainly have actuated them from the moment a treaty was concluded.

The language used in vindication of the protection afforded to Rūgoba was specious. The measure had its supporters in the council at Bengal, but the majority condemned it, as well as the pernicious nature of the opposition which was practised by the Bombay government.

Mr. Hastings, although he ratified the act of his envoy, did not approve of the treaty of Poorundhur, as terms more suitable might have been obtained. Several of the articles were certainly far from specific, and the ministers afterwards took every opportunity, not merely of putting the most constrained interpretations on doubtful passages, but of contravening what they must have known was really intended, in the articles to which they had subscribed. The consequence was that though hostilities had ceased, peace could not be considered as established.

Whilst affairs were in this unsettled state, a despatch was received at Bombay, on the 20th August, from the Court of Directors, dated 5th April 1776, in which they approved, "under every circumstance," of the treaty of Surat; and recommended that the Bombay government should retain possession of the districts ceded. It being likewise known that prior to the date of that despatch the Court of Directors had received information of Colonel Upton's being deputed to treat with the ministers, the president and council of Bombay at first came to a resolution of keeping possession of all such districts as were not given up. This determination was tantamount to a renewal of the war, and several of the members stating their belief that very great commotions were about to take place, in which their own safety would require them to bear an active part, expressed their satisfaction at having obtained this sanction to their measures, and recommended a vigorous prosecution of their former intentions. But Mr. Draper, who was not present at the first consultation, entered a dissent, which gave a different interpretation to the Court's despatch, and induced the government to alter their resolution. Mr. Draper was of opinion, that the Court of Directors only

meant that they should retain possession whilst the negotiation by Colonel Upton was pending, but that, after a treaty was concluded, under the sanction of the governor-general and council, it could never be intended that the terms should not be exactly fulfilled.

The Court of Directors could not be insensible to the advantage of a supreme authority in India; but the control over themselves, established by the new act of parliament, had not perhaps quite ceased its operation on their minds; their feelings were enlisted against the innovation, and the natural bias, occasioned by a prospect of great advantages on the West of India from the treaty with Rugonath Rao, prevented their fully perceiving the dangerous tendency of supporting men in the situation of the Bombay government. They might have withdrawn censure from them, and condemned the precipitancy of the governor-general and council, but they should have supported constituted authority, and insisted on an adherence to one plan and one interest. The Court by their approval of the first measures of the Bombay government encouraged the members to persevere in their covert opposition, when the circumstances, by the conclusion of the treaty of Poorundhur, were entirely changed.

Before the opening of the season the pretended Suddaba was at the head of twenty thousand men, and had got possession of upwards of twenty forts in the Concan. A very great proportion of the vulgar among the Mahratta population, with whom impostors of that description are always dangerous, believed that he was the real Sewdasheo Chimmajee, and the Bombay government were equally convinced of the reality. They countenanced his cause in various ways; and, although they did not actually join in the insurrection, they permitted one of their surgeons to attend and accompany this Suddaba, and Mr. Dick, the commercial resident at Fort Victoria, waited upon him to pay his respects. After the impostor had possessed himself of the greater part of the Concan, he ascended the Ghauts in the month of October. He was opposed at the Bhoro Ghaut, and his troops were temporarily checked, when he headed them himself with spirit, and speedily carried the

pass.* The fort of Rajmachee shortly after sent him offers of submission. Pretended overtures of accommodation were made to him by the ministers, by which he was for a short time amused, until Ranjee Patell, one of Sindia's officers, and Bhew Rao Phansay, came suddenly upon him in the neighbourhood of Rajmachee, when his whole force fled precipitately into the Concan, closely pursued by Sindia's troops. Some of the insurgents were sheltered under the walls of Tanna, and the impostor having embarked at Bellapoor, fled to Bombay, where he would have been allowed to land, but as Mr. Hornby was absent on Salsette at the time, the pretended Sewdasheo Rao, who probably judged it better to make another effort, before finally abandoning his party, excused himself from landing, promised to come back on the return of Mr. Hornby, and repaired to Kolabah. On his arrival at that place he was seized and confined by Rughoojee Angria, to whom the Bombay government made an unsuccessful application for his release; but Angria conveyed him as a prisoner to Poona, where he was bound to the foot of an elephant, and trampled to death.†

The countenance shown to the impostor naturally occasioned complaints from the ministers, but their remonstrances became

* Letter from Dr. Blakeman who saw the action.

† The Bramins of Poona have two stories respecting the fate of this criminal, both intended as apologies for the execution of a Bramin, under a Bramin government. One is, that the impostor was not a Bramin, but a goldsmith; and the other is, that he was secretly removed and immured in a dungeon at Ahmednugur, where he was starved to death, and a condemned criminal, by trade a goldsmith, substituted to deceive the populace. Starvation, insufficient, unwholesome food, and a damp dungeon, was really the dreadful execution frequently reserved for Bramins, and practised by the Bramin government by way of evading the inexpiable sin of depriving one of that sacred class of life. Amongst other stories raised by the Peishwas to prejudice the vulgar against the race of Sivajee, it was pretended that the boon of the goddess Bhowance, the truth of which no one could deny, which granted the Mahratta sovereignty to his lineal descendants for twenty-seven generations, had been taken away because Sivajee killed two Bramin spies with his own hand, having shot them with arrows, by means of that unerring aim which was one of the gifts of the goddess, and impiously hit them in the forehead, right through the distinguishing mark of their cast.

still more strong, when they received information that Rugonath Rao had, on the 11th November, repaired to Bombay, where he had been received, and an allowance settled upon him of ten thousand rupees a month. Rugonath Rao had, in the month of August, refused a fresh offer of five lakhs of rupees annually with permission to reside at Benares, which was made through Colonel Upton; and it appeared that he had quitted Surat as if he had intended to join the pretended Sewdasheo Rao, but, having been obliged to seek shelter in the fort of Tarrapoor, he requested of the commander of one of the Company's cruisers to give him a passage to Bombay, which the officer did not consider it proper to refuse.

At last, Colonel Upton having received an order of recall from Bengal, and the Bombay government having been directed to send a resident envoy to Poona, Mr. Mostyn was selected by them for this purpose. The ministers objected to that gentleman's appointment, as they conceived that he was the person who suggested the capture of Salsette, and that he was their enemy, but this objection was overruled.

Mr. Mostyn was of opinion that the Poona ministers were A. D. 1777. able to maintain themselves in power, that the object of the British government should therefore be directed to keep well with them whilst they could support an efficient authority. He appears to have had a sincere desire to fulfil the conditions of the treaty, and to settle every point in an equitable manner, but the ministers were prejudiced against him, and he was determined to uphold the dignity of his situation. He repaired to Poona about the middle of March, and immediately entered upon the adjustment of the articles, which remained nearly in the same unsettled state as when the treaty was signed.

It was evident that "a country of three complete lakhs of rupees" as expressed in the treaty, meant territory producing annually a revenue amounting to three lakhs of rupees complete; but the Persian word *Kumal* or *Kamil*, which was employed to express complete, is also a revenue term, which, though variously explained, may be said to signify the highest assessment ever known to have been fixed; and to this interpretation the ministry adhered, although the Bombay govern-

ment offered to accept the cession, at an average of a certain number of years.

The article, in regard to Futih Sing Gaekwar, was artfully designed, on the part of the ministers, to induce the Gaekwar to declare not only his dependance on the Peishwa, but his having no right to make any alienation, or to conclude any treaty without the express approbation of the Mookh Purdhan. Futih Sing readily acknowledged his dependance;* but as he perceived the design of the ministers, he evaded the other concessions, and claimed restitution from the Bombay government, not as the ministers wished, but because Rugonath Rao had failed to perform the agreement for which the cessions were made; these and some other points continued in dispute; the ministers offered to settle five lakhs of rupees to be paid annually to Rugoba, through the governor-general and council, provided he would retire to Benares. But a new impediment soon presented itself.

The mere suspicion of a French intrigue always awakened the most active vigilance of the English government in India, and an ostensible agent of France, received with distinction by the ministers at Poona, a distinction more pointedly marked by studied neglect towards the British envoy, aroused the attention of the governor-general; and as a war with France was expected, the circumstance naturally excited very considerable anxiety.

A French merchant ship arrived at Choule in the middle of March with a cargo consisting of military and marine stores, cloth, and other staples of European exportation. From that ship several Frenchmen landed and proceeded towards Poona. One of the strangers had announced himself as ambassador from the court of France, and in that character he was received by the Mahratta court in the beginning of May.† But before

* This acknowledgment on the part of Futih Sing was not an admission that he had no right to alienate the districts; one of the agreements produced by the ministers, rather inferred that the Gaekwar's share of Guzerat was at his own disposal.

† Bombay records, and the Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, from which last, for the ensuing five years, there is very complete information, as far as the British government was concerned.

entering on the object or proceedings of this mission, which are interwoven with the progress of the British nation in India, and are reserved for a future chapter, it is requisite to mention a few circumstances relative to Mahratta history, both to account for what may immediately follow, and to preserve a link in the chain of other events which will be explained at a future period.

The peace of Poorundhur was of the greatest consequence to the ministers, and the suppression of the insurrection, under the pretended Sewdasheo Rao, A. D. 1776. added materially to the stability of their government ; they detached Bhew Rao Yeswunt Phansay into the Concan, who speedily reduced the forts garrisoned by the forces of the late insurgent ; but their affairs to the southward were in a less prosperous state. Hyder had occupied the whole of the Peishwa's districts south of the Toongbuddra ; Bellary, in possession of a chief originally under the authority of Busalut Jung, had been taken by treachery ; Gootee, after a respectable defence, was also acquired in a dishonourable manner, and Moorar Rao Ghorepuray was shamefully immured in the noxious atmosphere of an unhealthy hill fort, where he perished. Under a pretended authority from Rugonath Rao,* Hyder advanced for the purpose of taking possession of the whole Mahratta country to the southward of the Kistna ; and before the rains of 1776, he had pushed his conquests as far as the territory of the Nabob of Savanoor, but withdrew the greater part of his army to the south of the Toongbuddra during the monsoon. The ministers sent a small force under Konier Punt Putwurdhun to drive Hyder's garrison from Savanoor ; but his troops were defeated, and Pandoorung Punt Putwurdhun,† the second in command, was taken prisoner by Mohummud Ally and Bajee Punt Burway ;‡ the former, one of Hyder's officers,

* Colonel Wilks mentions that Hyder sent Rugonath Rao sixteen lakhs of rupees at different periods. I can only find 24,000 pagodas, and, as before remarked, I scarcely think that such receipts could have escaped the notice of the Bombay government.

† Father of the present Chintamun Rao.

‡ He was a near connexion of Rugonath Rao's by his first wife, whose surname was Burway. Anundee Bye, his second wife, was of the family of Oak.

the latter, the agent of Rugoba, in command of a body of auxiliary Mahrattas,* who acted in concert with Hyder's troops. In the ensuing season, the troops of Nizam Ally, under Ibrahim Beg (Dhousa) and those of the Mahratta ministers under Pureshram Bhow Putwurdlmn, took the field for the purpose of co-operating against Hyder; but the former was bribed, and the latter recrossed the Kistna without risking an

A. D. 1777. action. Hurry Punt Phurkay, after the rains of 1777, was detached into the Carnatic with the greater part of the disposable force, but met with no success. Mannajee Phakray, who had joined the army of the Poona ministry after the troops of his master Rugoba were disbanded at Surat, was induced by Bajee Punt Burway to unite with Hyder, and many of the Mahratta Mankurees had engaged to accompany him;† but Hurry Punt defeated a part of the scheme for corrupting his army, by an able retreat,‡ and shortly after extinguished the treacherous intrigues of his officers, by seizing Yeswunt Rao Manay, the Deshmookh of Muswar, a powerful chief, and blowing him from a gun.§ But, besides the war with Hyder other disturbances to the southward demanded the attention of the ministers.

Sumbhajee, Raja of Kolapoore, the last of the lineal descendants of the great Sivajee, died in December 1760 without issue. About two years afterwards, his widow Jeejec Bye, adopted as her husband's heir, a boy named Sivajee, the son of Shahjee Bhonslay, Patell of the village of Kanwut, in the district of Indapoore, and having placed him on the musnud, conducted the affairs of the principality in his name. Great irregularities took place during the minority of Sivajee, both by sea and land. Piracy prevailed to an extent before unknown on the coast, which induced the English to send an expedition in 1765, and reduce both Malwan and Rairce, the former belonging to

* Mahratta MSS. Wilks.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ Wilks. Hyder himself, in a letter to the Bombay government, the known friends of Rugoba, gives Hurry Punt no credit for his retreat, but takes abundance to himself, by representing it as a victory he had gained.

§ Mahratta MSS.

Kolapoore, and the latter to Sawuntwaree. The reigning Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Bullal, was exasperated against Kolapoore, both on account of plundering incursions into his territories, and the hereditary connection which the Kolapoore state maintained with the Nizam. In order to circumscribe its power and punish its aggressions, Mahdoo Rao dispossessed the Raja of several districts, and added them to the jagheer of his own relations, the family of Putwurdhun; but during the late disturbances, the Kolapoore state, having embraced the cause of Rugonath Rao, recovered the districts, and one of the ministerial officers, named Ramchundur Hurry, in attempting to re-occupy them, was defeated by Yessajee Sindia, an officer of the Raja's. Mahadajee Sindia was therefore sent to support Ramchundur Hurry, and succeeded in restoring order.

In the meantime Hyder reduced Kopaul and Buhadur Benda, A. D. 1778. and in the end of April formed the siege of Dharwar. Hurry Punt proceeded to Merich, apparently with the design of forming a junction with Mahadajee Sindia at Kolapoore, and advancing in concert to attack Hyder. Nothing could be more distant from their real intentions; but the report was credited by every person, excepting Hurry Punt, Mahadajee Sindia, and Nana Furnuwees. Hyder fully believed it; and as Hurry Punt's army was now more to be depended upon, the former foresaw that he should be compelled to recross the Toongbuddra as soon as the Mahratta generals advanced. He therefore used every endeavour to bring about an armistice; but Hurry Punt pretended to be inflexible, until Hyder paid him a large sum of money,* and purchased the return of the Mahrattas to their capital, a measure which on their part had become absolutely necessary; and on this occasion Hyder was outwitted.

This artifice on the part of Hurry Punt is connected with a stroke of policy which ranks high in Brainin estimation, and which will appear in the course of our narrative; but in the meantime, that we may not lose sight of the other Mahratta

* Mahratta MSS. I could not discover the amount in the state accounts, nor is the sum specified in the Mahratta manuscripts.

authorities, in following more interesting events, it may be mentioned, that the pageant prince, Ram Raja, worn out with years and infirmities, died at Satara, on the 12th December 1777. Bhowan Rao, Pritee Needhee, also died about the same time, and was succeeded by his son, Pureshram Sree Newass, the present Pritee Needhee, born on the day of his father's death.

In regard to affairs in Berar it has been already shown that Moodajee, after the fall of Sabajee, in 1775, was acknowledged regent. But Ibrahim Beg (Dhonsa), the intimate friend of Sabajee, was sent by Nizam Ally, as was pretended, to avenge his fate, but in fact to take advantage of a strong party against Moodajee, who, conscious of inability to oppose the force sent against him, surrendered the forts of Gawelgurh, Nurnalla, Manikdroog, and Chunderpoor, as the price of peace. Nizam Ally, however, restored those forts shortly afterwards, on the occasion of his coming to Elichpoor, when Moodajee, accompanied by his son, Rughoojee, Sena Sahib Soobeh, manifested the humblest submission, entered into an agreement of faithful co-operation, and bound himself to suppress the depredations of the Goands,* who were at that time troublesome in the districts of Nizam Ally. A like submissive demeanour towards the Poona Durbar, and a bond for the payment of ten lakhs of rupees, obtained a confirmation of the regency, through the favour of Nana Furnuwees. Sabajee had always kept a wukeel at Calcutta; and the same custom was observed by Moodajee, as it was convenient on account of his possessions in Kuttack. The governor-general, however, both misunderstood the relative situation of Moodajee in the Mahratta empire, and over-estimated his power.

Futih Sing Gaekwar, in February 1778, after having paid up arrears, ten and a half lakhs of rupees of tribute, one lakh as a present to Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees, besides an offering to the state of five lakhs of rupees,† was appointed Sena Khas Khcyl.

* A savage race inhabiting the wilds of Gondwanch.

† Poona State Accounts.

Ram Raja, a short time before his death, had adopted the son of Trimbukjee Raja Bhonslay a Patell of the village of Wawee, and a descendant of Witoojee, the brother of Mallojee, and uncle of Shahjee, the father of the great Sivajee. Trimbukjee Raja commanded a body of two hundred horse, with which his son served as a Sillidar, when selected as heir to a throne, and tenant of a prison. He was styled Shao Maharaj. During the time of Ballajee Bajee Rao it had been artfully contrived that there were only a few families, old, but of no power, with whom the Raja of the Mahrattas could intermarry. To this day the Raja of Satara would think himself degraded by a marriage with the daughter of Nimbalkur, and of Jadow, although from them Sivajee was descended in the maternal line. This artifice, which may have been managed by bribing the Oopadhees and Shastrees, explains the reason why it is scarcely known that Shao was married, in Aurungzebe's camp, to a daughter of Sindia of Kunneirkheir.

Records of facts, except receipts and accounts in their own favour, would often have proved inconvenient to faithless, shifting, time-serving Bramins ; but it is not improbable that their prejudice against all other historical record may originate in causes of very remote date connected with the foundation of their religious institutions.

CHAP. XII.

FROM A. D. 1777 TO A. D. 1779.

Mr. Hornby's minute respecting Mahratta affairs.—French envoy, St. Lñbin—account of his proceedings at Poona.—Orders from the Court of Directors in case the Poona ministry should not fulfil the terms of the treaty of Poorundhur.—Dissensions of the ministry.—Application for the restoration of Rugoba from the party of Moraba Furnuwees.—Bengal government assent to that measure.—Six battalions of Bengal Sepoys ordered to march overland to Bombay.—Terms on which the Bombay government agree to support Moraba's party.—Consummate artifice of Nuna Furnuwees.—Moraba's party decline the restoration of Rugoba.—Return of Mahadajee Sindia and Hurry Punt Phurkay—faction of Moraba crushed—unshaken constancy of Sukaram Hurry.—Observations respecting the march of the Bengal troops.—Further explanation of the motives which actuated the Bombay government—resolve to attempt the restoration of Rugoba.—Preparations of Nana Furnuwees.—The governor-general intimates his intention of forming an alliance with Moodjee Bhonslay.—The Bombay government adhere to their resolution.—Zeal of Mr. Carnac—judicious counsel of Mr. Draper.—Colonel Charles Egerton, account of.—Field committee appointed—dilatory preparations—advanced detachment crosses over to the continent, and occupies the Bhore Ghaut without opposition.—Perverseness of Rugoba.—Embarkation—troops land at Panwell—extraordinary conduct and ignorance of Colonel Egerton—unparalleled dilatoriness of the advance.—Mahratta proceedings—manifest but slight opposition—appear in force at Tullygaom—burn the village—and retire before the British troops.—The English determine on retiring from Tullygaom—are attacked on their retreat to Wurgaom—gallant conduct of the rear-guard under Captain Hartley—disgraceful convention of Wurgaom.—Misconduct of the committee.—Mr. Carnac and Lieut. Col. Cockburn are dismissed from the service.—Distress of the Bombay government—observations on their late conduct—jortitude and ability of Governor Hornby—his review of their affairs—revert to the proceedings of the Bengal troops.—Colonel Leslie removed from the command—but dies before the order of supersession is received.—Colonel Goddard assumes the command and continues his march—treacherous conduct of the Mahrattas at Sagur—hospitality and kindness of the Nabob of Bhopaul.—Negotiation with Moodjee Bhonslay—declines entering on the alliance.—General Goddard, on learning the disaster at Wurgaom, decides on marching straight for Surat—grateful acknowledgements of the

Bombay government.—Mr. Hornby submits a plan of operations.—The negotiations with Poona confided to Colonel Goddard.—Conduct of the Bengal government—judicious observations of Mr. Hastings with regard to the members of the Bombay council.—Goddard appointed Brigadier General—remonstrances of the Bombay government.—Goddard instructed to negotiate a peace, or eventually to follow the plan proposed by Mr. Hornby.—Policy of Mahadajee Sindia—he allows Rugoba to escape—sacrifices Sukaram Bappoo and Chintoo Wittul to the jealousy of Nana Furnuwecs.

ON the 10th of October 1777, Mr. Hornby, in a minute of A. D. 1777. council, entered on a review of the Mahratta affairs, and remarks, “that they were fast verging to a period which must compel the English nation either to take some active and decisive part in them, or relinquish, for ever, all hopes of bettering their own situation on the West of India.” He laments the control by which the Bombay presidency was fettered, remarks the secret divisions among the Mahratta ministers, the views of Sindia and Holkar to their own aggrandizement, the successes of Hyder, the defection of the Mahratta chiefs, and the demise of Gunga Bye, the young Peishwa’s mother, who had been the cause of her own death.*

The French ambassador was discovered to be an adventurer named St. Lubin, who, after imposing on the English government at Madras, went home to France, where he so far succeeded in deceiving the French ministry as to obtain an authority to proceed to Poona, and ascertain what advantages could be gained by an alliance with the Mahrattas. St. Lubin endeavoured to obtain the cession of the port of Choule, with the fort of Rewadunda; and, in order to induce Nana Furnuwecs to enter upon an offensive and defensive alliance, he offered to bring two thousand five hundred Europeans to support the ministry, to raise and discipline ten thousand Sepoys, and to furnish abundance of military and marine stores.

* This event, on which the President expresses some doubt, was really true. Gunga Bye was the cause of her own death, by having taken medicine for the purpose of concealing the consequence of her illicit intercourse with Nana Furnuwecs.

He affected the utmost horror at the conduct of the English in supporting Rngoba ; a painting had been executed under his direction in France, to represent the cruel and barbarous murder of Narrain Rao ; and this picture he exhibited himself, before the Durbar, in a burst of grief, which drew tears from some of the spectators, whilst in others it excited ridicule or contempt. A cheat in the character of a European gentleman was new to the Mahrattas, but the discernment of Nana Furnuwees could not have been even temporarily obscured by such superficial artifice. It is probable that, in the great encouragement he affected to give St. Lubin, and in various petty indignities offered to the British envoy, that he had no other object than to excite the jealousy of the English, without being aware of the dangerous nature of the experiment on which he ventured. Nana Furnuwees was inimical to all Europeans ; but the despicable conduct of St. Lubin must have tended to lower the French nation both in his estimation and that of the Mahrattas in general. Mr. Bolts, originally in the Company's service in Bengal, who was in Poona at the same time as an avowed agent of the house of Austria, received no such civilities. Nana probably perceived that St. Lubin was a fitter tool ; and Mr. Bolts, who was early dismissed, might have viewed that circumstance as complimentary to his character. The credulity which prevailed on the continent of Europe respecting India, and an uncommon plausibility of address, had enabled St. Lubin to impose on several young men, one of them an Englishman, and some of them of good family in France, whom he persuaded to embark in his enterprize. But unprincipled men, however superior they may fancy themselves, have generally foibles which speedily discover their true character ; and those of St. Lubin seem to have been egregious vanity and excessive irritability of temper.

Most of his companions were estranged from him ; suspicion soon brought on altercation, and St. Lubin would have murdered them* to prevent exposure in India, and obstruction

* The attempt in one instance is clearly proved ; he fired a brace of pistols one after the other, at M. de Corcelle, within a few yards ; one ball penetrated his clothes, but missed him.

- to his hopes from France, but they sought and obtained protection from Mr. Mostyn's assistant, Mr. Lewis, during the absence of the former at Bombay.*

* Mr. William Gamul Farmer, of the Bombay Civil Service, happened to be at Poona for the benefit of his health, and took that opportunity of ascertaining the views of the French, which he communicated to the governor probably for his private information, but as it contained useful intelligence, it was put upon record, the letter was dated Poona, 11th November 1777.
" This St. Lubin is a most perfect adventurer, and I believe has cheated
" even the ministry of France in this business. He introduced himself to
" the confidence of Monsieur de Sartine, as to Indian matters, by a memorial
" he presented relative to this country, which Monsieur de Corcelle assures
" me he has frequently seen. In this memorial he has not forgot himself.
" He has made himself the generalissimo at one time of Hyder's army, the
" very man who framed the treaty between him and the Mahrattas, for
" which he the next day received two lakhs of rupees; but what chiefly
" introduced him to this business was his particular intimacy with the Raja
" of the Mahrattas. He was the constant companion of his children, used
" to learn them to ride, in short, he had not in the world a better friend
" than the Raja. There certainly could not be so fit a man in France to
" send out to sound the ground here to form an alliance with the Mahratta
" state, if circumstances should prove favourable. You may perfectly judge
" from this, of what the character is capable of in the way of representation.

" Drunk and sober, jointly and separately, I have examined all the
" Frenchmen with whom we have yet had connection, that is, Madjett,
" Monsieur de Corcelle, who was to have been made engineer by St. Lubin;
" and Monsieur de Coronet, the captain of the ship, whom I found means
" to get to eat soup with us. They are all in such a situation with respect
" to Monsieur St. Lubin, that it is the first wish of their lives that he may
" prove totally a counterfeit, and not be supported by the ministry of
" France; for in fact their lives may perhaps depend on Lubin's reality,
" and the justifying his conduct. I have turned the matter every way to
" persuade them that he was a counterfeit, in order to fish out their argu-
" ments to the contrary; but they are all perfectly convinced of the facts
" mentioned in Madjett's letter. The captain of the ship confirmed to me
" repeatedly what Madjett had often mentioned, that his owner had given
" him his orders relative to St. Lubin, in consequence of recommendations
" from Monsieur de Sartine. They all agree perfectly with regard to the
" ideas entertained of him at Bourdeaux: that it was first talked of sending
" out a body of men under Monsieur Dumas. The fact of the intelligence
" the captain and supercargo received at Cochin, of Lubin's destination, the
" captain confirmed to me. Picot and Briancourt acknowledged him, and
" Briancourt has gone so far as to request the consulship of Choul. The
" Count de Mendave, a man of good family in France, who has been seeking

The encouragement given to St. Lubin by Nana Furnuwees might have had the effect of alarming the Bombay government, and inducing them, in the subordinate situation they had been taught to consider themselves, to accept the stipulations of the treaty of Poorundhur, under the disadvantages which the ministers would have imposed, had they not been uniformly supported by the Comt of Directors. In a letter from that body, of the 16th April, 1777, which was received exactly seven months afterwards, and was a connterpart of a despatch previously sent to the Bengal government, a repetition of the approval of their conduct, and of regret at the great and unnecessary sacrifice made by the treaty of Poornndhur, was still more clearly expressed than in the preceeding year. The Court, to be sure, repeat their determination to adhere to that

“ his fortunes in this country, and is now with Busalut Jung, heard of him,
 “ has offered to join him, and makes interest for a good employment under
 “ him; you will observe, Sir, that although it seems de Belcombe disavows
 “ him as an ambassador from the king, yet he takos no effectual measures
 “ to remove him; and it is a known fact that St. Lubin sent by a French-
 “ man a despatch to Belcombe in the month of July or August last. They
 “ all perfectly agree in the circumstance of the summons given to attend at
 “ the Nanah’s to witness the treaty. Nanah was sworn by his Bramin,
 “ and St. Lubin by his Padre, and Nanah kept the book. The despatch of
 “ Monsieur Pascal due Santy to Surat, in order to carry from thence his
 “ despatches for France, is certain. We have learnt by a Frenchman, lately
 “ arrived here, that he has been seen at Briancourt’s; his destination via
 “ Suez. This Frenchman says that he wanted to take his passage in an
 “ English Snow, I suppose Barrington, but that it was refused, and he is
 “ now to go in a vessel belonging to a black man.

“ You see, Sir, how much Lubin has at stake by the total defeat of all
 “ his schemes, perhaps the loss of life, or imprisonment, if these fellows
 “ find that he is an impostor ; everything, therefore, with him depends on
 “ his being able to persuade the minister to hurry out a body of men instantly
 “ on the receipt of his despatches, or order them from the islands. I leave
 “ you, Sir, further to judge what he is capable of, when he has wrote that
 “ they are in perfect possession of the port and harbour of Choul; and to
 “ make the possession more valuable, he wanted the gentleman who took
 “ the draft of it for him, to put seven fathom water where there were only
 “ three and a half. The flourishing state of this country, the power of
 “ Nanah, the certain destruction of the English, the great advantage to
 “ France, all these he has dwelt on, as I am well assured, in a manner
 “ that cannot fail to make great impressions in France.”

treaty ; but should its conditions not be fulfilled by the ministers, they authorize an alliance with Rugoba, on the terms of the treaty of Surat, which they considered more for the honour as well as the advantage of the Company, than that which was concluded by Colonel Upton.

In the meantime, dissensions among the parties at Poona A. D. 1788. continued to increase. Nana Furnuwees despised the abilities of his cousin, but, with a Bramin's caution, he was at more pains to conceal his contempt than his enmity. Moraba was supported by all the partizans of Rugoba, particularly Buchaba Poorundhuree, Sukaram Hurry, Chintoo Wittul, and Wishnoo Nerher. This faction gained Tookajee Holkar, whose defection from the cause of the ministers became avowed, by his excusing himself when ordered to support Hurry Punt Phurkay in the Carnatic. The English envoy attributed the confidence he could perceive in Nana to an assurance of support from France. Immediately after the death of Gunga Bye, Sukaram Bappoo began to be jealous of his hitherto humble colleague, and now united, but cautiously and with no decision, in a plan for the restoration of Rugoba. Moraba made the proposal to Bombay, and requested that the government would immediately bring Rugoba to Poona. Preparations were accordingly begun, and the president and council determined to afford their assistance without delay. Their resolve was approved by the Supreme Government; and it was determined at Bengal, in consequence of the war in which they were about to engage on the west of India, as well as the apprehended schemes of the French in the same quarter, to support the Bombay presidency with six battalions of Sepoys, and a proportionate artillery from the Bengal establishment, to which some cavalry were afterwards added. This force was directed to assemble on the Jumna opposite to Kalpee ; the command was given to Colonel Leslie, and he was directed to march across India towards Bombay, and place himself under the orders of that presidency.

But although the Bombay government agreed to aid the scheme of Moraba, it was with a proviso that Sukaram Bappoo, the principal authority in signing the treaty of Poorundhur,

should state in writing that the invitation was made at his desire. This decided declaration, Sukaram, unfortunately for himself, refused, and the plan was in consequence suspended, but it was the deliberate opinion of the Bombay government that their own safety depended on their effecting a change in the Poona administration. The complex political machine which Nana Furnuwecs managed on this emergency with consummate artifice, was at first a little deranged by a premature attempt to apprehend Moraba, who made his escape from Poona. This exposure would have disconcerted most men; but Nana, through Sukaram Bappoo, persuaded his cousin to return, and it was agreed that a new ministry should be formed, including Moraba and Bujaba Poorundhuree, but Bujaba was not so easily persuaded, and Sukaram Hurry nobly declared that nothing should ever induce him to abjure the cause of a generous master who had been his protector from youth to manhood; that Rugonath Rao was a soldier; and Nana, a cunning, cowardly courtier.

Moraba's party, by the aid of Holkar's troops, obtained the complete ascendancy; and Nana, who was obliged to retire to Poorundhur, pretended to acquiesce in the plan for conducting Rugoba to Poona, on condition of obtaining security for himself and property. The Bombay government again received notice to prepare; but the weak Moraba imagined that he had attained his object, and fancied himself at the head of the administration. Nana affected his usual deference for Sukaram's opinion, and was scrupulously respectful to his cousin. Consultations took place respecting the restoration of Rugonath Rao, and Moraba began to perceive the force of Nana's objections. He could not but recollect that when *he* was minister, under Mahdoo Rao, the conduct of Rugonath Rao had invariably tended to dissension, loss, or dishonour. He, therefore, though still pretending to be desirous of re-instating Rugoba, began to evade the question when pressed by his English friends.

A majority of the council in Bombay, seeing that their hopes from Moraba's party had vanished, soothing themselves with the hope of a continuance of peace with France, and with an

idea of being able through Moraba to destroy the influence of the French at Poona, came to a resolution, on the 22nd April, of countering Colonel Leslie's detachment; but on the 3rd of the ensuing month they reversed this resolution, for reasons which will be explained, and directed Colonel Leslie to advance.

Moraba had given Mr. Mostyn assurances that St. Lubin should be dismissed; but his departure was delayed from day to day; and it was soon discovered that St. Lubin, by Nana's contrivance, had been able to persuade Moraba to enter into his views. But, in effect, notwithstanding appearances, Nana Furnuwees, unless when under the immediate influence of fear, would have been the greatest obstacle to the French views, had they ever attempted an establishment in the Mahratta country. His jealousy of Europeans would never have admitted a French force sufficiently strong even for the expulsion of the English from the small settlement of Bombay, unless he could have been certain of crushing them afterwards. Nana Furnuwees never entirely believed that St. Lubin could bring troops; and one deception, which the impostor adopted to obtain credit, by writing to Goa and Damann for permission to pass two French regiments through the Portuguese territories, seems only to have succeeded where he least wished it;—with the English by whom his letters were intercepted.

All the events that have just been detailed had occurred by the time Mahadajee Sindia and Hurry Punt united at Merich. Both these officers were in Nana's interests; and the well concerted plan of threatening Hyder, during Nana's danger, deceived both Hyder* and Moraba; nor did Moraba awake from his dream of security, until Hurry Punt and Mahadajee Sindia, arriving by different routes, united at Poorundhur on the 8th June. Nana re-assumed his former power, occupied the principal passes in the country with his troops; and through Sindia's influence, seconded by a bribe of nine lakhs of rupees, detached Holkar from the confederacy. Moraba

* This circumstance already noticed is well known in the Mahratta country, but is not mentioned in any English record, and has escaped the notice of Colonel Wilks.

once more resorted to negotiation with the English, (the detail of which will require more particular notice,) but the opportunity was lost.

On the 11th July Moraba July 11. was seized by a party of horse belonging to Mahadajee Sindia, and shortly after made over to Nana, by whom he was thrown into confinement in the fortress of Ahmednugur. The whole of his party were arrested except Sukaram Bappoo, whose confinement was only reserved because his being ostensibly at liberty was essential in regard to the treaty with the English. Bujaba Poorundhuree was thrown into the fort of Wundun, and the others into different hill-forts in the Ghauts. The unshaken constancy of Sukaram Harry to his master Rugoba deserved a better fate. He was chained in irons so heavy, that although a very powerful man, he could scarcely lift them ; his food and water were insufficient to allay his hunger or to quench his thirst ; but he survived fourteen months : and when so emaciated that he could not rise, " My strength is gone, and my life is going," said the dying enthusiast ; " but when voice and breath fail, my fleshless bones shall still shout Rugonath Rao ! Rugonath Rao ! "*

The deep artifice of Nana Furnuwces had succeeded in baffling the designs of his own countrymen, but he had still to encounter the intellect and vigour of Englishmen. The national jealousy he had ventured to awake, rose with an aspect which terrified him. The application of the resident at Poona to the ministers, and to Sindia and Holkar, for passports to facilitate the march of a body of British troops from the east to the west of India, for the declared purpose of counter-acting the designs of the French, seems at first to have been viewed by the Mahrattas as a threat. They probably considered that if it had been intended to send troops to Bombay, they would have been embarked from the coast of Malabar or Coromandel, and replaced from Bengal ; an opinion in which many competent judges, among our own countrymen, coincided ;

* Sukaram Hurry was a Purvoe, and is not a singular instance of the unshaken fidelity of that class in the history of Maharashtra. His daughter is alive in Satara.

but the unfavourable season of the year, the ill-treatment to which the Bengal Sepoys had been invariably exposed on board ship ; and perhaps, though never avowed, the grandeur of the enterprise, together with some idea entertained by Mr. Hastings, from the first, of forming an alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay, were the motives which influenced the governor-general in choosing the overland route.

Although the choice was more than questionable in regard to the mere military aid they could afford, yet the political effect was very considerable ; and had the Deccan become, as the Coromandel coast had been, the theatre of war with France, this enterprizing march would have proved of much importance, in raising friends to the English, and in spreading opinions of their power, essential to their preservation. In England, however, in the language of the day, it was considered one of "the frantic military exploits" of Mr. Hastings;* but had the English councils in India not been, at various periods, guided by men whose views and genius went far beyond the ordinary opinions of their contemporaries, the British Empire in India might never have existed ;— nor is it too much to suppose that we should, at this moment, have lamented our errors in the overgrown prosperity of our European rival, the exhaustion of our resources, or, perhaps, the annihilation of our power.

When the president and council at Bombay accepted the first invitation of Moraba's party, the supreme government approved of their having done so, because the principal person who had signed the treaty of Poorundhur, the articles of which still remained unfulfilled, was one of those who had joined in the application ; and the other party, Nana Furnuwees, not only obstructed the fulfilment of the articles of the treaty, but was supposed to be negotiating, if he had not actually concluded, a secret agreement with the French, which threatened the existence of the Company's possessions on the west of India. Under these circumstances, in a despatch dated the 23rd March, the governor-general and council authorized the Bombay government "to assist in tranquillizing the dissensions

* Mr. Dundas's Speech, 1782.

of the Mahratta state ;" they directed that, in whatever manner the ruling party should choose to conduct the administration, personal security should be demanded for Rugoba, and the expenses of any military expedition that might be required should be borne by the Mahratta government. Bassein, and some territory in its neighbourhood, were to be demanded in exchange for Baroach, whilst, in order to defeat the designs of the French, it was ordered that there should be an express stipulation, preventing all European settlements within the Mahratta territories, unless sanctioned by the supreme British government in India ; and they announced that, lest the French should obstruct these objects, Colonel Leslie's detachment would take the field for the support of the presidency of Bombay.

The first plan, however, having been defeated, as we have seen, by the apparent reconciliation of the ministers, the Bombay government, for the reasons already enumerated, had dropped their intentions ; but, upon receiving the orders of the 23rd March, they deemed themselves authorized to call upon the new administration, to know whether or not they held the Mahratta state bound by the treaty of Poorundhur, and to demand explicit answers on the points still in dispute. Instructions to their envoy were addressed to that effect, and they directed him to remonstrate on St. Lubin's being still kept at Poona. Nana Furnuwces perceived that, in regard to the English, he had committed himself farther than he had intended or might be enabled to retract, and his enmity had been too actively exercised against Rugoba, ever to hope for reconciliation with him or his friends. St. Lubin was dismissed early in the month of July before Moraba was placed in confinement ; but Nana, on St. Lubin's taking leave, although he entered on no absolute agreement, was at that moment sincere in his assurances, when he declared that, if the envoy could bring a French corps to his aid, he would grant his nation an establishment in the Mahratta territories.

Sindia and Holkar, as Mr. Hastings had foretold, granted passports for Colonel Leslie's detachment, because, as their territories were exposed during their absence, it was their object that the British troops, if they came by that route,

should pass as friends. The ministers, however, observed to Mr. Mostyn, that, as the detachment was sent on account of the French by the dismissal of the envoy, both their advance and their passports were no longer necessary; Nana at the same time sent secret orders to the Mahratta officers, and to the Rajas in Bundelcund, to oppose Leslie's progress.

It was at this conjuncture that Moraba's party made a specific application to Mr. Mostyn, which that gentleman intended to carry to Bombay himself, but postponed doing so in hopes of receiving answers to the demands which had been formally made on the Mahratta government, agreeably to the authority from Bengal. A part of Moraba's proposals contained satisfactory assurances on every point referred; but Nana, who was fully apprized of all that was going forward, in order to create delay, kept back the replies of the acknowledged and executive authority of the state, until Mr. Mostyn at last set out on the 6th July, when Nana sent them to his assistant, Mr. Lewis, who transmitted them to Bombay.

These replies positively denied having entered on any treaty with the French, but in general they were merely a brief summary of the arguments they had before used in their interpretation of the articles of the treaty of Poorundhur. In regard to the important question of whether or not the new ministry held themselves bound by that treaty, they observed, "the English should keep that treaty faithfully, when they should do the same."

About the time that these evasive answers were received in Bombay, intelligence arrived of the war with France, and the president and council after deliberating upon the replies, and the proposals from Moraba's party, were of opinion that the former were a violation of the treaty of Poorundhur; and that they in consequence, under the authority granted by the supreme government in their despatch of the 23rd March, were at liberty to pursue such measures as might be expedient for the subversion of a party in the Mahratta state decidedly hostile to the English nation; and extremely dangerous to their interest, in the event of any attempt on the part of France against their possessions on the west of India.

They therefore resolved to make equitable stipulations for placing Rugoba in the regency, but with an express proviso that the government should be conducted in the name of the young Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Narrain, and that the entire powers should be surrendered to him on the expiration of his minority.* The whole was to be kept secret until the opening of the season, when it was intended to carry their plans into effect with the utmost vigour; and in the meantime they directed Colonel Leslie, who had been before instructed to proceed to Surat, to alter his route and march on Joonere.

But they had scarcely signed their resolution when they received accounts of the seizure of Moraba and his friends, and the defection of Holkar; circumstances which destroyed the party of Rugoba, but made no alteration in their plan, which they determined to prosecute at all hazards.

Nana Farnuwees perceived the gathering storm, and his preparations to meet it were in progress, whilst those of the Bombay government were only resolved. To prevent obstruction from Sukaram Bappoo, he was, on the plea of great age, removed from the administration, and guarded by a body of Sindia's troops, who were placed over his person and house, though Nana Farnuwees and Sindia still occasionally pretended to be guided by his advice. Sillidars were recruited all over the country, and directed to assemble at the Dussera. Vessels in the different ports were refitted, the forts were provisioned and repaired, fresh instructions were despatched to harass Leslie's march, but positive orders were also sent not to avow that the opposition was made by authority from Poona. An agent was sent to Bombay to amuse the government by making overtures to Rugoba, but the vigilance of Mr. Lewis had apprized them of the intention.

In the end of August, the Bombay government for the first time received some general information from the governor-general and council, of their intention of forming an alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay, and they were directed to enter on no engagement hostile to the government at Poona, excepting

* By Hindoo law the age is sixteen; with the Mahrattas the usage is from sixteen to twenty years of age.

such as was absolutely defensive. But on this the president and the majority of the members of council observed, that Mcodajee was so wholly unconnected with their design of establishing Rugoba in the regency, that this intimation ought not to be allowed to interrupt their proceedings. However, up to the 12th of October no preparations had been begun at Bombay, and Mr. John Carnac, one of the members of council, and the declared successor of Governor Hornby, in consequence of the delay, submitted a minute, urging the necessity of vigorous preparation, and representing all the evils of procrastination. Mr. Carnac, though best known on the west of India in his civil capacity, was originally a military officer on the Bengal establishment, where he had risen to the rank of brigadier-general, and been distinguished by his services. Mr. Draper, with his usual deliberation, and in this instance with the clearest judgment, dissented from Mr. Carnac's proposal, because it was impossible for them to judge what might be the object of the governor-general and council in treating with Moodajee Bhonslay ; he perfectly agreed in the propriety and expediency of removing Nana Furnuwees when it could be effected with certainty, but circumstances had materially altered at Poona since their first resolutions. Their own force, particularly in Europeans, was very weak, and Colonel Leslie's strong reinforcement was still at a great distance ; he was therefore of opinion that a delay of about two months ought to be their object. All these suggestions were sound, and apparently too evident to be disputed ; but the majority of the members of the Bombay government in regard to Rugoba were precisely as described by Mr. Hastings, "their passions were enlisted in his cause, it was in effect their own." Mr. Carnac, whose peculiar situation in having superseded Mr. Draper ought, on every view, to have ensured delicacy and forbearance, scarcely concealed his contempt of Mr. Draper's caution, and strenuously supported the proposals of Governor Hornby. It was the opinion of the majority that no time should be lost ; the French might probably arrive, an incident, the truth of which Mr. Draper admitted, and that too, he observed, "with their garrison drained of troops and Bombay at their mercy," but

his voice was overruled, and Mr. Carnac's zeal was rewarded, in the first instance, by being appointed president of a committee to settle the preliminaries with Rugoba.

The Bombay government had lost a respectable counsellor in the death of General Robert Gordon, the commanding officer of their forces. He was succeeded by Colonel Charles Egerton, an officer who had been brought up in the army at home, and had served on the continent of Europe ; but a man extremely weak, and totally unacquainted with India, its natives, or its warfare. His health was so infirm as to render him unfit for active service, but as he had been before set aside in favour of Colonel Keating, Mr. Hornby on the present occasion assented to his being appointed to the command. In a regular service, however, it sometimes happens, that men whose rank is their only recommendation may be convenient commanders, but if their intended directors prove deficient in ability, or should they happen to fall under an influence contrary to what has been designed, the misfortune and disgrace that may result from such selections ought in justice to be attributed to those on whom the choice depends.

Many officers of rank, who at that time entered the Company's service at an advanced period of life, came to India, less with an idea of attaining rank or honour, than of making fortunes by any means. Their pay was inadequate, and as the manner of regulating the supplies, carriage, and equipment of an army, was without system, the shameless corruption and embezzlement which frequently prevailed, excited the jealousy of the governments, without either suggesting efficient checks, or engaging by high confidence those better feelings, which, with the ideas common to their profession, they would perhaps in most instances have retained.

This jealousy was, on the present occasion, one cause of the appointment of two members of council, who, together with the commanding officer, formed a committee, in whom was not only vested the political authority, but every other arrangement for conducting Rugonath Rao to Poona ; leaving the mere detail of duty and of march, as the sole occupation, separately entrusted to the senior military officer of their army.

On the first proposal of a committee Colonel Egerton assented to the measure, conceiving, as he afterwards explained, that it was intended solely for the purpose of settling the preliminary arrangements with Rugoba, but he afterwards made repeated objections, and protested against the measure, as contrary to the orders of the Court of Directors, and derogatory to his situation as commanding officer.

The basis of the new agreement with Rugonath Rao differed little from the treaty of Surat, as far as the Company were concerned; but in regard to Rugoba it was most expressly stated that the English were to place him at Poona as regent, and in other respects, the articles were nearly in conformity with the instructions from Bengal. As the Bombay government had decided contrary to the advice of Mr. Draper, it might have been expected that they would have used despatch in sending off their troops, but their preparations were extremely dilatory. At last an advanced party, consisting of six companies of native grenadiers from different corps, with a small detail of light artillery, embarked from Bombay

Nov. 22. on the evening of the 22nd November, landed at Aptee, and moved forward under Captain James Stewart, who took possession of the Bhore Ghaut without opposition, and encamped at the village of Kundalla. The advance had embarked before the treaty was signed; and at this moment an unexpected cause of delay arose from the perverse conduct of Rugoba, who perceiving that the Bombay government had gone too far to retract, and that his concurrence was indispensable, started objections and pertinaciously adhered to them until a part of his demands were granted. This disposition to take every possible advantage of those friends who had done so much to uphold his cause, occasioned considerable vexation; but for the present this disappointment was forgotten, in the animating bustle of expected service, and the brilliant hopes entertained of the result.

The troops embarked at Bombay for Panwell on the 23rd; took possession of the small fort of Bellapoor, and disembarked at Panwell on the 25th of November. Including the advance under Captain Stewart, and a detachment of sixty rank

and file left at Bellapoor, the army was composed of five hundred and ninety-one Europeans, two thousand two hundred and seventy-eight native infantry, and five hundred gun Lascars; the whole, officers included, amounted to three thousand and nine hundred men. Preparations sufficient to have enabled the commanding officer to move from Panwell were not completed for several days; but the delay which afterwards took place in making roads, and in the observance of various formalities, was equally unnecessary and inexcusable.

A proclamation declaring the objects of the expedition was issued in Rugoba's name, and probably intended to be disseminated through means of his people. When the troops first entered the village of Panwell, the carcoon in charge of it, on the part of the ministers, retired. Colonel Egerton immediately occupied his house; and as he had received two copies of the proclamation, he assembled the inhabitants, whom he describes as well satisfied with the change of government when he had read the proclamation; and he was, therefore, not a little surprised on finding intelligence had reached Bombay that the inhabitants were retiring from the village, and that a complaint had been made against him for occupying, and of course defiling, a Bramin's house. This accusation Colonel Egerton repelled, by declaring that he was actually living in the government-house, it never appearing to enter his mind that the government agent was a Bramin. It may seem frivolous to record such absurdities, or the petty disputes of Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, which commenced regarding the military honours to be paid to the former. Unfortunately, Mr. Mostyn, the person best qualified to direct the expedition, was taken ill, and without once attending the committee, returned to Bombay, where he died on the 1st of January. Mr. Carnac was fully sensible of his loss; and at an early period expressed apprehensions of the great discouragement his illness might prove to the Mahratta party, still inclined to the cause of Rugoba.

Colonel Egerton, on Mr. Mostyn's being taken ill, declared that the powers of the committee were suspended; but his objections were overruled by an order from Bombay, although by this decision, there being only two members, Mr. Carnac,

as president with a casting vote, became virtually commander of the army.

The whole force accompanied by Rugoba, Amrut Rao, his adopted son, and a few straggling horse that had joined them,

December 23. ascended the Ghauts by the 23rd of December; by that time some partial skirmishing had taken place between Captain Stewart and small parties of the enemy, in which the Sepoys showed great zeal. Colonel Egerton, at the top of the Ghauts, divided his force into two brigades; the one commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Cay, the other under Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, still reserving the advance as a separate corps under Captain Stewart. These three divisions advanced alternately at the rate of about three quarters of a mile daily, the march rarely exceeding two miles, and the one division always occupying the ground which the other had quitted. In this manner, in eleven days they reached Karlee, a village eight miles from the ground which Captain Stewart had first occupied. This extraordinary mode of warfare, which the commanding officer afterwards declared was owing to want of provisions and carriage in the commissariat, and which Mr. Carnac describes as what Colonel Egerton might have seen in Germany, encouraged the enemy, who brought down infantry, rockets, and guns to harass them; but they were attacked and driven back on every occasion with the greatest spirit. During the march from Kundalla the army lost Lieutenant Colonel Cay, an excellent officer, who was mortally

wounded by a rocket, on the 31st of December; December 31. but at the village of Karlee, on the 4th of 1779. Jan. 4. January, Captain Stewart, who, on the present

and several other occasions, had distinguished himself, was killed by a cannon ball, to the general regret of the army. "He was," says the Bombay government, "a most active, gallant, and judicious officer, and possessed of the true military spirit." It is a remarkable fact that his name is to this day familiar in the Mahratta country, by the appellation of *Stewart Phakray*, which expresses something more than the gallant Stewart, a circumstance that marks the strong impression made by his conduct; and what soldier, wherever he may fall,

could desire a nobler epitaph, than that such a tradition should be preserved by his enemies.

The dilatory preparations at Bombay afforded Nana Furnuwees and Mahadajee Sindia ample time to assemble the army. Sukaram Bappoo's restraint was, at this crisis, deemed impolitic, probably from the same cause as before, on account of the situation in which he stood with the British government as one of the two ministers who concluded the treaty of Poorundhur; a reconciliation had therefore been brought about, and he ostensibly resumed his office as minister. The principal part of the military operations were intrusted to Mahadajee Sindia, Hurry Punt Phurkay, and Tookajee Holkar. But they took care to place Holkar, of whom Nana was justly suspicious, in a situation from which he would have found it extremely hazardous to effect a junction with Rugoba. The whole Mahratta army, on the approach of the English, advanced to Tullygaom. Bhew Rao Yeswunt Phansay, with seven guns, four thousand infantry, and five thousand horse, had been sent on some time before, to oppose the Bombay troops; and it was with Phansay's party that the skirmishes had hitherto been

January 6. maintained. On the 6th of January Colonel Egerton,

Egerton, in consequence of sickness, was obliged to resign the command of the army, which devolved on Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn; but Colonel Egerton continued a member of the committee, as a party of the enemy's horse had cut off the communication with Bombay.

On the 9th of January the army reached Tullygaom, where the Mahrattas made a show of resistance; but when the line advanced in order of battle, they retired. The village had been destroyed by order of Nana Furnuwees, and the committee heard that similar orders had been given for burning Chinchore and Poona. On receiving this intelligence, instead of pushing forward eighteen miles, the distance between Tullygaom and the capital, the apparent determination of the enemy alarmed them; and Rugoba's assurance, that no person of consequence would declare for him until some advantage had been obtained, had quite a contrary effect from what he had intended, and instead of being animated to exertion, the committee sank

into despondency. With eighteen days' provisions for their troops, they in the same breath came to a resolution, first, of negotiating with some of the chiefs, and then of retreating. Mr. Lewis, who had remained at Poona till the last moment, and had made good his way to Bombay, was with the army, and at this moment assured the committee that a party of horse in the interests of Moraba were in the Concan, and might soon be expected to join their army ; but this circumstance was disregarded. When Mr. Carnac proposed a retreat to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, Captain Hartley, and Mr. Holmes of the civil service, were present, and both these gentlemen ventured to suggest that it would be better to await the result of the negotiation where they then were. Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, on being called upon for his opinion, said he had no doubt that he could carry the army to Poona, but apprehended the impossibility of protecting the baggage, provisions, and cattle ; of which last, of bullocks alone, there were 19,000. The committee, however, determined to adhere to their resolution of retreating. Rugoornath Rao, whose advice at such a moment was of great importance, earnestly begged of them to defer their resolution ; but the man who had led fifty thousand horse from the Nerbuddah to the Attock was equally odious to his countrymen, and despicable among his allies ; not one day would the committee delay in deference to his opinion, and at eleven o'clock on the night of the 11th of January, the heavy guns having been thrown into a large tank, and a quantity of stores burnt, an army of two thousand six hundred British troops began its retreat, secretly as was supposed, before fifty thousand Mahrattas.*

It was vainly imagined that they could make one march before being discovered ; and when the advanced guard, under Captain Gordon, was fired upon by a party of horse at two o'clock in the morning, Colonel Cockburn conceived that the

* Mr. Lewis seems to have estimated them at about ten thousand infantry and twenty-five thousand horse. Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn declares there were above one hundred and twenty thousand men. The Mahrattas themselves say at least a lakh, and I believe there may have been above one half of that number.

enemy must have obtained the intelligence from Rugonath Rao. The army, as already noticed, was divided into two brigades, besides six companies of grenadier Sepoys, which were kept distinct as a reserve. On the present occasion the two brigades were united under Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, having a strong advanced guard at some distance in front, with the six companies of grenadier Sepoys and two guns, considerably in the rear.

On the death of Captain Stewart, Captain James Hartley was selected to command the reserve. Captain Hartley was a young man, who had been in the Company's service fourteen years ; he was well known to the Sepoys, who have much discernment in the character of their officers, and are very different under different men ; but in the hour of need, where they have experienced kindness, and seen their commanders worthy of confidence, there probably never was an instance of misconduct. An officer, even in a subordinate rank, has often a charge not only difficult in itself, but of higher national importance when leading the natives of India, than is likely to fall to the lot of a junior officer in any other branch of the British service. He has not merely to do his duty, not only to animate, or, what is often more difficult, to restrain, but to support the minds of his men, and infuse his own spirit, when he may perceive them despondent or discontented.

As soon as Colonel Cockburn heard the firing in front, he ordered Major Frederick with two companies of Europeans to support Captain Gordon ; but the Mahrattas had succeeded in plundering a part of the baggage, and in a very short time the rear was also attacked. The army, however, continued to move on till daylight, when they found themselves completely surrounded, and large bodies of horse coming on as if to charge the main body ; the troops were immediately halted, and the line formed; but the strength of the attack, as had been the practice in Deccan warfare since the days of Shah Jehan, was made upon the rear. Hartley's Sepoys received them with the greatest animation and steadiness, drove them back, and were with difficulty restrained from pursuing them. Shortly after sunrise the attack on the rear was renewed by the main body

of the Mahratta army, consisting of both cavalry and infantry ; and their guns, having been brought up, opened on the line, but the heaviest fire, and the brunt of the onset, was still in the rear. The gallant band of Sepoys, though now sore pressed, had excellent European officers, and not only stood their ground with spirit, but fought with perfect enthusiasm.

Captain Hartley sent an officer to Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, requesting him to bring up the main body to his support ; to this Colonel Cockburn objected, as a large body of horse threatened to charge his left in case he quitted his position ; but he directed five companies of Europeans and two companies of Sepoys to support Captain Hartley. With this reinforcement, Hartley, holding possession of a rising ground, sustained the whole weight of a persevering attack with the steadiest intrepidity. About ten o'clock Colonel Cockburn had sent him peremptory orders to retreat, but, fortunately, Lieutenant Dawson, who was charged with this message, met, by the way, Lieutenant Rattray, an officer* in Captain Hartley's confidence, to whom he communicated his errand, when both concurring in the fatal consequence that must attend such an order, Rattray took the risk of stopping the messenger, of explaining to Colonel Cockburn, as if from Captain Hartley, the effects of retiring under such circumstances, and of begging that he would allow Captain Hartley to await a more favourable opportunity. To this proposal Colonel Cockburn consented ; before noon, however, he sent Major Frederick from the advance to the rear, desiring him to take the command, but not to depart from the disposition previously made by Captain Hartley.

During the whole of this time the main body was partially engaged : principally occupied in returning the fire of the Mahratta artillery, or cannonading such of their horse as ventured within range of the guns. The loss hitherto, except at the position occupied by Hartley, was very inconsiderable, and the fire from the enemy had slackened, when, about one o'clock in the afternoon, Major Frederick was ordered to retire

* Lieutenant Rattray, of the Bengal establishment, served as a volunteer with one of Hartley's companies.

to the main body, which he effected in a creditable manner ; and the whole moved towards the advanced gnard, which had halted at the village of Wurgaom.

The baggage, bazar, and camp-equipage, so useful to the comfort of an Indian army when successful, becomes quite the contrary in adversity ; and, on the present occasion, the proportion was immoderately great. The followers had quitted the flank and crowded in between the divisions of the troops, so as greatly to impede the retreat ; about three o'clock in the afternoon, when they got sufficiently near the village, the followers ran forward and pressed towards it, to seek shelter from the enemy's rockets, which were now showered upon them. This press created the greatest confusion, the enemy's horse took advantage of the circumstance, charged through the baggage and the ranks, and when entering the village of Wurgaom, considerable loss was sustained. The troops, however, soon extricated themselves, the horse were driven off, the guns placed in commanding situations, and by four o'clock in the afternoon the army had some respite. Early

January 13. on the ensuing morning the enemy's guns opened on the village, and a body of infantry advanced to attack it. They were repulsed, but the troops were supposed, by some of the officers, to be dispirited ; doubts of their being able to retreat began to be expressed,—the commanding officer, instead of crushing such dangerous despondency, if whispered in his presence, was himself infected by the spreading contagion. Some desertions had taken place, and alarming reports of many more were circulated. It is under such circumstances that a good officer of Sepoys is proved. Captain Hartley addressed his men collectively and individually ; there are times to assume the officer, and moments where the officer must be the acquaintance and friend. Hartley was both respected and beloved ; he spoke to his men ; his officers seconded him ; and the desertions from his corps ceased. On the thirteenth, the total loss of fighting men in the preceding day was found to amount to three hundred and fifty-two, of which fifty-six were killed, one hundred and fifty-one were wounded, and one hundred and fifty-five were missing ; many of

the last were supposed to have deserted. Among the killed and wounded fifteen were European officers, whose presence, even on occasions of success, is of great consequence, but, at such a time, it is invaluable to native troops.

A further retreat was deemed impracticable, and Mr. Farmer, the secretary of the committee, was sent to negotiate with the ministers. They at first demanded the surrender of Rugonath Rao, which the committee would have complied with, but they were saved from this disgrace by his having entered into a separate agreement with Mahadajee Sindia, to whom he afterwards gave himself up. Sindia was aiming at an ascendancy which Nana Furnuwees was studiously endeavouring to prevent; yet each was so necessary to the other in the Mahratta empire, that although their ultimate views were at variance, their present interests were in union.

The ruling party, of which Nana and Sindia were now the real authorities, insisted on the committee's entering on a treaty for the surrender of the whole of the territory the Bombay government had acquired since the death of Mahdoo Rao Bullal, together with the revenue possessed by the Company in Baroach and Surat, which the Mahrattas never had possessed. Mr. Farmer, who was compelled to write mysteriously, as his letters to the committee passed through the hands of Nana and Sindia, expressed himself by saying, "they seem to me to feel themselves in that situation with respect to us, which the Turkish vizier felt himself, in regard to Peter the first, at the time the Empress Catherine sent her jewels to the vizier." Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn was then called upon for his opinion in writing, when he declared that a retreat was impracticable, and that he could not charge himself with such a responsibility. Captain Hartley, who was present when the declaration was made, not only differed from Colonel Cockburn's opinion, but showed him a plan by which it might be insured; Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, however, adhered to what he had stated. Mr. Carnac, as he afterwards proved, expressed an opinion at the time, that he thought the retreat might be accomplished, and that it ought to be attempted rather than submit to the humiliating terms insisted upon; but

he did not choose to press it. As such was Mr. Carnac's opinion, the plea of delicacy, or deference towards the military authorities, unfortunately for him, can little avail; for, as he ordered the retreat from Tullygaon, he ought to have adhered to that order, which, however injudicious or disastrous, could not have proved disgraceful. The committee replied to Mr. Farmer's communication, by desiring him to inform the ministers that they had no power to enter on any treaty without the sanction of the supreme government. "Show us then," said Mahadajee Sindia, when this message was delivered, "the power by which you have taken upon you to break the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton."

But, immediately after the committee had dispatched the reply alluded to, which was, at least, dictated in the language of fair dealing, they sent Mr. Holmes to Mahadajee Sindia, invested with full power to conclude a treaty. Mr. Carnac reconciled himself to this measure by the former message through Mr. Farmer, from which he argued, that if the ministers submitted to be duped, it must be their own fault; and so far from intending the good faith which he pledged, he afterwards declared that he granted the powers to Mr. Holmes, under a *mental reservation* that they were of no validity.

The separate negotiation thus opened with Sindia flattered him exceedingly, and accorded most fully with his plans of policy; but no ebullition of joy prevented his taking every advantage of the English, as far as was consistent with the control he now had, and was determined to preserve over Nana Furnuwees. Mr. Holmes settled that everything was to be restored to the Mahrattas as held in 1773. The committee were obliged, on the spot, to send an order countermanding the advance of the Bengal troops, and Sindia's favour was purchased by a private promise to bestow on him the English share of Baroach, besides a sum of forty-one thousand rupees, in presents to his servants. The committee were so completely humbled that they viewed with gratitude the kindness of Sindia in suffering the army to depart; they were obliged to give two hostages, Mr. William Gamul Farmer, and Lieutenant Charles Stewart, as a security for the performance of their

engagement ; but their first act on descending the Ghauts was to suspend the countermand they had addressed to the officer commanding the Bengal detachment.

On the return of the troops to Bombay the immediate object of attention was the measure of reward and punishment throughout the army. Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn were suspended from the service by the government; no opinion as to the personal conduct of Mr. Carnac was then passed, but in anticipation of the order of events, as the characters are in future quite undistinguished, it is merely necessary to observe, that when the whole of the proceedings came before the Court of Directors, after a deliberate investigation, they addressed a despatch to Bombay, in which they enumerated the particular demerits of the parties blamed, passed a just censure on the behaviour of Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, and dismissed them from the Company's service. They also dismissed Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, the justice of whose sentence was certainly not questionable, and the occasion called for example ; but we may lament the errors of an officer whose reputation was deservedly considerable, until chance raised him to a station above his abilities. Four years before, Colonel Cockburn's character had been recorded by General Gordon in the following words : " Cool, clear, steady, and determined as an officer ; he has twice within these two years led our troops to assault,* which have been attended with glory and success to him and the troops, and much advantage to our employers. I do not know a better regimental officer."

But, although some were thus punished by the judgment of the Directors in England, others were dismissed at Bombay, and many were applauded and promoted for their conduct on the 12th January. The gallant and judicious behaviour of Hartley was represented in its true colours, and his merit was, at first, universally acknowledged ; but the governor and council having raised him at once to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, although he might have merited the distinction, such promotion being unprecedented in the Company's service, was deemed

* General Gordon alluded to Baroach and Taunah.

so improper and injurious, that every officer, before senior to Colonel Hartley, represented the injustice and degradation to which he was personally subjected. Some time after, when an answer arrived from the Court of Directors, it proved a source of mortification to Hartley, as although he was not deprived of his rank, his further promotion and his pay as Lieutenant Colonel in the Company's service were suspended until the whole of those, formerly his seniors, should, in the usual routine, be promoted over him.

The Bombay government were reduced to a situation of great distress; their measures had been obviously imprudent and impolitic, ill-concerted, and badly executed. Success, that grand apology for statesmen's blunders, had not attended the schemes which they had been labouring to be permitted to attempt. From the time the supreme council exercised their first authority by a precipitate interference, the majority of the members of the Bombay government endeavoured by argument and artifice to bring about their own designs, and instead of taking an enlarged and dignified view of the national interests and government in India, which would have been an honour to themselves, and a reproach to their opponents, they lost the commanding ground on which they stood, by following a course that brought about its own undoing. The character of their proceedings bears strong marks of personal interest and personal resentment.

In Bengal, whatever their practical errors, the views of men accustomed to think as great statesmen are always apparent in their consultations and transactions; but in Bombay the spirit of commercial adventurers still lurked at the council table. Their contracted policy was directed merely to carry their point in favour of Rugoba, and to aggrandize their own presidency. In sending off their expedition it would seem as if they had been actuated by the puerile desire of showing the Bengal government what *Bombay* could do without their assistance. The excuse, subsequently made on this point, of expected assistance from the Bengal detachment, cannot be admitted, as it would appear in their replies to Mr. Draper's dissent, and in the means taken to ascertain the

progress of the Bengal detachment; but the importance of its co-operation seems scarcely to have been considered, until some time after their own army had taken the field. In short, the Bombay government neglected opportunity, they overlooked changes of circumstance, they desperately sent a handful of men against the strength of the Mahratta empire, and committed the conduct of an enterprize, practicable only by celerity, address, and resolution, to men totally unfit for such a charge. Their army had returned defeated, their treasury was exhausted, their credit insignificant, and their reputation sullied. But under these discouraging circumstances, the merit of fortitude, ability, and vigour is justly due to governor Hornby. There was no consolation in a retrospect, the present misfortunes were chiefly to be attributed to misconduct ; and in anticipation there was censure for what was past, and danger in what was to come. Mr. Hornby, in the first place, judiciously recommended to the members of his government to abstain from all recrimination, to allow their motives and their measures as recorded, to await the judgment of their superiors, and that every one should bend his mind to the consideration of the future, for the purpose of preventing, and if they did come, surmounting, the impending perils they had so much reason to apprehend. He took an unreserved and full view of their situation, and although evidently humbled, he displayed the strong mind of an English chief, and convinced his council that, whilst they acted with the unanimity and firmness which became their country, they were not only above contempt, but might soon overcome their difficulties, and retrieve their affairs. He disavowed the validity of the disgraceful articles of the Wurgaon convention ; for although Mr. Carnac had ostentatiously intimated to Nana Fur-nuwees, probably to enhance his own consequence, that he was intrusted with the Company's seal, and with full powers, he had no authority to conclude a treaty, nor could the Bombay government have delegated such a commission. Mr. Hornby determined, at all hazards, to resist the cessions made by the committee : but as every point was indispensably referred to Bengal, there appeared no necessity for publishing a defiance

to the Mahrattas. The intentions of the Bombay council were, however, sufficiently declared by their preparations, and every effort was made to recruit and improve their army.

On the 19th February Mr. Hornby laid an elaborate minute before his council, in which he took a view of February 19. Mahratta polities, and the line of conduct which he thought the most expedient for the British authorities to pursue. The end he proposed to attain was that of securing a peace, so as to exclude the French from the Mahratta dominions, and to retain the territory then in possession of the English. He assumed, as matter of certainty, that Sindia had indicated, by several parts of his conduct, an aversion to the French, and a desire to form an alliance with the English, against Nana Furnuwees. In the supposition thus adopted, Mr. Hornby was not wholly wrong ; for, had Nana by any means, foreign or domestic, become too powerful, Mahadajee Sindia might have sought assistance from the English ; but whilst Nana Furnuwees held the reins, principally by the support of Sindia's power, it was completely the interest of the latter to uphold Nana's administration. The president was of opinion that the sum of forty-one thousand rupees promised to Sindia's servants ought to be paid ; and that Baroach, or an equivalent, should be given to him for the act of kindness, humiliating as it was, in permitting their army to return. All these suggestions were submitted to the supreme government ; but in the mean time the principal hope of retrieving their affairs was in the near approach of the Bengal army, to the progress of which a retrospect is now necessary.

Colonel Leslie crossed the Junna in May 1778, and notwithstanding professions of friendship made A. D. 1778. by the Mahratta officers, they manifested an opposition which induced him to take possession of the fort of Kalpee. It was expected by the Bengal government that the army would have crossed the Nerbuddah before the rains ; but some of the Rajpoot chiefs in Bundelcund, instigated by the Mahrattas, attempted to cut off the supplies, murdered an officer, and frequently killed foragers and followers. Colonel Leslie, however, instead of steadily pursuing his route, entered

on a war with those chiefs, took part in their feuds, and thus engaged in a task equally endless and unavailing. He attacked and carried with little difficulty their principal post at Mhow, three kos west of Chatterpore; he drove a large body of men from a strong position on the banks of the Kaine, and notwithstanding repeated orders to proceed, he wasted the whole monsoon in this unaccountable manner. In five months he had not advanced more than one hundred and twenty miles; and in the fourth month the estimated expense of his army amounted to twelve lakhs of rupees.

Mr. Hastings did not hastily withdraw his confidence from Colonel Leslie, but he was at length compelled to admit that his conduct was indefensible. He was therefore recalled, and Lieutenant Colonel Goddard was appointed to succeed to the command of the army, but prior to the date of the order of recall Colonel Leslie had died of a fever, on the 3rd October 1778.

Colonel Goddard immediately assumed command of the troops, and a few days afterwards commenced his march from Rajegurh, in Bundelcund, towards the Nerbuddah. His route lay by Mooltan, Khemlassa, Beilsah, Bhopaul, and Hoossingabad; at the last mentioned place he forded the Nerbuddah on the 2nd December. Before Colonel Goddard had quitted the Bundelcund territory, Ballajee Punt, the Mahratta officer stationed at Sagur, by whose machinations Leslie's progress was at first arrested, after many professions of friendship, made a perfidious attack on the baggage of the army, in which he was completely foiled. The conduct of the nabob of Bhopaul was precisely the reverse of that of the Mahratta officer; he treated the English with the greatest confidence and hospitality, furnished them with every supply and every possible assistance at the risk of incurring future enmity from the Mahrattas, without the support of his new friends. This generous behaviour on the part of the nabob was never forgotten; and it laid the foundation of a friendship, which, in modern times, has been laudably extended to his descendants by the British government.

After Colonel Goddard had crossed the Nerbuddah he halted on the south bank of the river to await some communications

from Moodajee Bhonslay, particularly connected with his future operations.

The views of the supreme government in contracting an alliance with the ruler of Berar were intimated to Bombay in the month of August, but merely in a general manner. The execution of the plan was intrusted to Mr. Elliot, a gentleman eminently qualified for any embassy, but the design was formed on defective information. It had for its object an alliance with Moodajee against the Poona ministers, for the purpose of attaining permanent peace and complete security to the Company's possessions against the attempts of France, by establishing and upholding Moodajee Bhonslay as Raja of all the Mahrattas. Mr. Hastings in this plan was precisely adopting the scheme originally suggested by Wittul Sondoor, the minister of Nizam Ally.* He was not aware that Moodajee had no claim to the Mahratta sovereignty; but even had such been the case, as the British government so long acknowledged the Peishwa's supremacy, as the Bombay presidency had concluded an authorized treaty with Rugonath Rao, declaring him regent during the minority of the young Peishwa, the measure was in the one view unjust, in the other inconsistent, and on the whole complicated and injudicious. Had Moodajee really been heir to the throne of Sivajee it would have been very impolitic to have afforded the means of uniting an Empire, hostile to all the world, which was of itself falling to pieces. The scheme was first interrupted by the death of Mr. Elliot, which happened on the 12th September, when on his route towards Nagpoor. The governor-general in consequence of that event directed the secret instructions addressed to Mr. Elliot to be made over to Colonel Goddard, whom Mr. Hastings empowered to treat according to their purport; and about the same time, as the new plan required that they should retain the means of carrying it into effect, the governor-general and council suspended the power of the Bombay government over Colonel

* It seems to have been first suggested to Mr. Hastings by Beneeram, the wukel of Sabajee. See letter from the Bengal government to the Court of Directors, 19th December, 1771. App. 5. Report from the Committee of Secrecy.

Goddard's army, on the plea of a failure in the original plan for which the power had been granted. It was also resolved to strengthen Colonel Goddard by a reinforcement of two additional battalions of native infantry, which were directed to assemble on the western frontier of the province of Bengal under Major Jacob Camac.

Moodajee, in the first instance, would have acceded to the governor-general's views, but before any explanation had taken place, he had received intelligence of the designs at Bombay in favour of Rugoba, and of the vigorous preparations of his own countrymen, at Poona ; both of which for obvious reasons tended to deter him from entering on any immediate alliance. The favourite ambition of his family was however roused, and in a conversation with Lieut. Watherstone, the agent deputed by Colonel Goddard, Moodajee admitted the great desire he entertained of embracing the proposal at a fit time ; but whilst he wished to prolong the negotiation, he declined embarking in any enterprize at that period. Moodajee's plan, which was not disclosed till some time after, differed from that of Mr. Hastings ; it was similar to what Rughoojee seems to have intended on the death of Bajee Rao, in 1740, and was more practicable than the one proposed.* Moodajee foresaw that opposition would be made to pretensions in his own person, but he knew there would be much less difficulty, and a powerful party against the Bramin administration, by his assuming the character of protector at Satara, (his authority in Berar was nothing more,) and declaring that his sole design was the restoration of the imprisoned Raja's authority.

About the same time that Moodajee declined Colonel Goddard's overtures, through Lieutenant Watherstone, urgent applications were received from Bombay, dated 6th and 19th December, requesting Goddard to advance with all expedition in order to support their army which had taken the field in the cause of Rugoba.

* "Let," says Moodajee in his own proposals to Mr. Hastings, "a lineal descendant of Maha Raja Chutter Puttee Sivajee Bhonslay, continue on the musnud of the Satara Raja; but, till the power and authority of the Raje (sovereignty) is established, nothing is done." (See Appendix, No. 191, 5th Report, Committee of Secrecy.)

Although Colonel Goddard, prior to the receipt of this requisition, was in possession of the order which withdrew him from the authority of the Bombay government, he considered the interest of his country so much at stake that without hesitation he resolved to march straight to the west coast. This decision was extremely creditable, as Colonel Goddard had not merely to fight his way through the Mahratta army, but he incurred the serious responsibility of acting on his own judgment where failure might be ruin in every sense of the word, and where he personally risked nothing by waiting for orders at Hussiaingabad. He commenced his march about the 26th January, and arrived at Burhanpoor on the 30th of that month. The contradictory letters written by the field committee during and subsequent to the convention, though they afforded no information of the state of affairs, and might have perplexed most men, only induced Goddard to quicken his progress. After refreshing his men at Burhanpoor, he resumed his march on the 6th February, and in twenty days reached Surat, a distance of three hundred miles, and by the expedition thus used avoided a body of twenty thousand horse, which were despatched from Poona to intercept him.

The Bombay government expressed the liveliest gratitude for the honourable and generous motives which had induced him to hasten to their relief; and they showed their sense of it by immediately offering him a seat in their council, and recommending that he should be appointed their commander-in-chief. Colonel Goddard had gained on their esteem by his repairing to Bombay in person, and communicating with all the respect due to them, and to his own situation, joined with the becoming courtesy and frankness of a soldier.

On the 17th March the Bombay government first received
March 17. a copy of the instructions intended for Mr. Elliot; the first copy had been sent from Bengal in November, but had unfortunately miscarried. The state of the negociation with Moodajee Bhonslay they now learnt from Colonel Goddard, who seemed still to be of opinion that an alliance would take place. The Bombay government were not sanguine on this subject, and as Mahadajee Sindia had

shown none of those favourable intentions towards the English, imputed to him in Mr. Hornby's minute of the 19th of February, they now perceived that they were on the eve of being compelled to engage as principals in a war, to maintain which their absolute want of funds was the first and most alarming consideration.

In this exigency, making allowance for defects in the original information on which some of his calculations were made, Mr. Hornby submitted a very judicious plan of operations in

March 30. a minute laid before his council on the 30th March ; he there pointed out a method of at

once obtaining resources and distressing their enemies, by entering into a treaty with the Gaekwar family on the terms solicited by Futih Sing in 1772 ; reconciling the brothers, releasing them from tribute and dependance on the Poona state, and conquering the Peishwa's share of Guzerat for the Company. But in all their schemes they soon found themselves more dependant, and more than ever controlled by the governor-general and council.

The Bengal government, before they received intelligence of the disgraceful proceedings at Wurgaom, upon hearing that the Bombay presidency had sent an army into the field, had decided on sending Colonel Goddard to their support, but they would not again relinquish authority over his army. Even before they heard of the convention they vested Colonel Goddard both with the separate charge of their army, and with distinct powers as their envoy plenipotentiary at the court of Poona. The governor-general, upon receipt of further intelligence, without waiting to learn the result of Goddard's bold and judicious march, sanctioned the proceeding, however it might turn out, by recording his approbation and applause. The whole conduct of the majority of the Bengal government was on this occasion admirable. Their first determination on hearing of the disastrous news was to place their military power, offensive and defensive, in the best possible state, without betraying either a weakness or alarm that might have encouraged other native states to rise against them. A brigade was ordered to the banks of the Jumna, and Sir Eyre Coote, the commander-in-chief, proceeded to inspect and prepare their

military resources on the north-western frontier, the quarter most likely to be invaded. Mr. Hastings, whose after conduct made amends for his earlier errors, and whose difficulties had tended to improve and exalt his mind, showed at this trying period all the great qualities of which he was possessed, and prudence and ingenuity, vigour and moderation, are alike conspicuous in the measures which he suggested. Superior to the inveteracy of Mr. Francis, and entirely exempt from the impatience of Sir Eyre Coote, which were displayed in a particular manner in regard to the measures of the Bombay government, Mr. Hastings applied his knowledge of mankind to the art of good government; and fortunately, by the support of Mr. Barwell, and his own casting vote as president, he commanded the majority in council. Become wiser by the past, though his present words were a severe censure on the hasty exercise of authority he had formerly supported, Mr. Hastings observes, "To mark our want of confidence in them, (alluding of course to the Bombay council,) by any public act, would weaken theirs in us; to load them with harsh and unoperating reproaches would indispose them to our authority, at the same time that it would absolve them from its effects; and to bind their deliberations by absolute and indiscretional orders, might eventually disable them from availing themselves of any fortuitous advantages, which the confusion of the Mahratta government is more likely to offer them than any plan which we could prescribe to them, or which they could form on the letter of our instructions. In a word, such a conduct, by inflaming the passions of men whom we are not to regard as exempt from the ordinary infirmities of humanity, would prove the surest means of converting the powers which were still left in their hands into the instruments of opposition, and even of the defeat of the measures which require their agency, and cannot be accomplished without it. Let us rather excite them to exert themselves for the retrieval of their past misfortunes, and arm them with means adequate to that end; restricting their powers, where the object is determinate, and permitting a more liberal extension of them in cases which are too variable and uncertain for positive injunctions."

Colonel Goddard was appointed a brigadier-general by the Bengal government during the service on which he was employed ; and a recommendation to the Court of Directors, in support of an application for his being appointed commander-in-chief of the Bombay presidency, was forwarded to England. But the Bombay government, although they highly approved of the distinction conferred on General Goddard, remonstrated against bestowing the rank, except through them, or on his being separately appointed to conduct the negotiation with the Poona state. They also objected to having any military force stationed within the limits of the Bombay presidency, independent of their authority, as they deemed such a circumstance an invasion of their rights, and highly unconstitutional ; yet soothed by the respectful consideration shown to them by Mr. Hastings, and the judicious behaviour of General Goddard, they determined that their disapproval in those particulars should not prevent the utmost exertions of their ability and means to forward the views of the supreme government.

On the 15th of April General Goddard was directed to endeavour to negotiate a peace with the Poona state, on the terms of the treaty of Poorundhur, but with an additional article expressly excluding the French from any establishment within the Mahratta dominions. In the end of May, when the supreme government had received and taken into consideration Mr. Hornby's minutes of February and March, they sent more detailed instructions for their envoy's guidance, and if peace on the terms proposed could not be obtained, he was then, if he thought proper, to adopt Mr. Hornby's plan of an alliance with the Gaekwar, in which case alone the authority of General Goddard as the governor-general's agent was to be blended with, and guided by the instructions of the Bombay government. The only alteration in the authorized from the proposed plan was a restriction preventing the British authority from being engaged as a party between the brothers Futili Sing and Govind Rao Gaekwar. The alliance was, therefore, to be formed with Futili Sing, the acknowledged head of the Baroda state, and no pledge given for reconciling their domestic differences.

This mode of operations would not have materially interfered with the projected alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay, as the political connection between his father Rughojee and Dummajee Gaekwar might have paved a way to a union of the sons ; but after the convention of Wurgaom, Mr. Hastings immediately perceived, and the result was a proof of his penetration, that Moodajee could no longer be accounted an ally ; though, if judiciously managed, he might safely be reckoned neutral. It was desirable, however, that the British authority should be left unfettered in case Moodajee persisted in procrastinating ; and therefore General Goddard was instructed to tender explicit conditions, by a rejection of which he would have it in his power to declare the negotiation at an end.

In regard to an alliance with Sindia the governor-general was disposed to concur in opinion with Mr. Hornby, in supposing that Sindia had some secret design of connecting himself with the English. Mr. Hastings also concurred in the propriety of giving up Baroach, as had been privately promised ; but Sindia's conduct had been such as to preclude their deigning to bestow this mark of acknowledgment. General Goddard, however, was instructed to treat separately with Sindia in case he should at any time find him disposed to espouse the interests of the Company ; but the dependance of Nana Furnuwees on Mahadajee Sindia was at this time best seured by war, and whilst his wukeel at Bombay was professing his master's regard, an attack, instigated by Sindia, was made on Bancoote, with no other design than to blow the flame, and excite the English to hostilities.

As a further hold on Nana Furnuwees, whom Sindia governed by his fears, he caused the settlement of a jagheer in Bundelcund to be made on Rugonath Rao, of twelve lakhs of rupees, of which ho became the guarantee in behalf of Rugoba, and at the same time security to Nana for Rugoba's never molesting the government. He had thus got the latter into his power ; but the unpopularity of Rugoba made the custody of his person of little consequence as an instrument of aggrandizement : Nana Furnuwees was perhaps secretly pleased to observe Sindia connecting himself with a man more likely to be shunned than

followed, and only dangerous as a political instrument in foreign hands. Soon after the arrangement was made, Rugoba was sent off towards his jagheer in Bundelcund, for the purpose, as Nana believed, of being confined in the fort of Jhansee, until Sindia might find it convenient to release him ; but Rugoba's usual escort and even his guns were suffered to accompany him, whilst the troops which were sent as his guard scarcely exceeded the number of his own followers. Just before Rugoba reached the Nerbuddah, in the latter end of the month of May, he was secretly warned of Sindia's intention to confine him in Jhansee, on which, having watched an opportunity, which presented itself at the ford of Cholee Mheyswur, he attacked and dispersed his guard, mortally wounded the commander, and fled towards Baroach with all speed, to throw himself at the feet of his friends the English, for he could scarcely expect that they would open their arms to receive him.

Although no explanation took place between Sindia and Rugoba, there is little doubt but the whole was Mahadajee's contrivance. It widened the breach between Nana and the English, but with either party it gave Sindia an advantage, it roused the fear and jealousy of the one, and made him more dependant; whilst broken, inexplicable hints* of friendship, which he occasionally dropped to the English, might be interpreted hereafter as alluding to some scheme of co-operation connected with this design of releasing their mutual friend.

When Nana Furnuwees required and obtained the sacrifice of his rival Sukaram Bappoo, and of Chintoo Wittul, once the minister of Rugoba, it was no test of Sindia's fidelity to him ; on the contrary, his having given them up to satisfy Nana at that time is perhaps, from the artifice of his character, rather in evidence of his having been accessory to Rugoba's flight.

* As one of several instances of these hints, just after the convention at Wurgaom, when Mr. Farmer, Mr. Holmes, and Mr. Sibbald were present, Sindia was loudly extolling the conduct of their rear-guard, which he compared to a red will, " and no sooner beat down, than it was instantly built up again" (" each stepping where his comrade stood, the instant that he fell"). "I hope," said Mahadajee, whispering in Mr. Sibbald's ear, " to see these fine fellows co-operating with my own troops, by and bye."

Sukaram Bappoo was hurried to Singurh, and thence he was removed and thrown into the fort of Pertabgurh; a circumstance which leads to the remarkable reflection,—that this venerable old man, after sharing every vicissitude of privation and of grandeur, of toil and of triumph, which a leader in the camps and courts of a great empire must experience, now looked down on a scene far more awful to a mind in his situation, than the tremendous abyss of four thousand feet of black rugged rock, which formed the western wall of his prison: for, from Pertabgurh, on the eastern side, he saw the spot where one hundred and twenty years before his ancestor, Puntojee Gopinat Bhoneel, pledged to Sivajee the treacherous oath which betrayed his master Afzool Khan to the stab of the murderer. But Sukaram's death scene was not closed in Pertabgurh, the cautious jealousy of Nana Furnuwees removed him secretly from one place to another, to prevent rescue or insurrection; and the once great Sukaram Bappoo perished miserably in Raigurh. Chintoo Wittul's life was also shortened; he died in some hill fort, from the effects of unwholesome food and harsh treatment.

CHAP. XIII.

FROM A. D. 1779 TO A. D. 1782.

Hyder makes himself master of the Mahratta territory, south of the Kistna—his jealousy of the English—his connection with the French.—The English expect to be attacked by the French, on the west coast of India.—Rugoba received by the English. Report of a general confederacy against the English.—The British Government acts as a principal in the negotiation with the Poona state not as the auxiliary of Rugoba.—War declared.—Capture of Dubhoy.—Alliance with Futihi Sing Gaekwar—terms.—Siege and storm of Ahmedabad.—Sindia and Holkar advance against Goddard.—Policy of Sindia.—Negotiation.—Goddard partially surprises Sindia's camp.—Operations prolonged in Guzerat—reasons.—Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley sent down to assist the troops in the Concan.—Operations in that quarter.—Capture and defence of Kallian—relieved by Colonel Hartley.—Operations of Captain Popham's detachment.—Capture of Lahan.—Surprise of Gwalior.—Unsuccessful attempt on Mullungurh,—Distress of the Bombay Government.—War with Hyder Ally.—Admirable conduct of Governor Hornby.—Hartley opens the campaign with great spirit.—Siege of Bassein—The covering army is attacked by the Mahrattas.—Battle of Doogaur.—Reduction of Bassein.—Memoir of Colonel Hartley.—Extensive confederacy against the British Government.—Peace proposed to the Peishwa's government through Moodajee—who declines the mediation in consequence of the success of Hyder.—Proceedings at Bombay.—Goddard injudiciously takes post at the Bhore Ghaut.—Preparations of the Mahrattas—they act vigorously on Goddard's supplies.—Goddard retreats to Panwell with heavy loss.—Proceedings of the Bengal government.—Operations of Lieutenant-Colonel Cumac's detachment.—Cumac is surrounded by Sindia—retreats—surprises Sindia's camp—is joined by Colonel Muir.—Negotiation opened by Sindia through Col. Muir.—Moodajee Bhonslay sends an army into Kuttack.—Warren Hastings purchases its retreat, and detaches Moodajee from the confederacy.—Instructions to General Goddard for negotiating at Poona.—Extensive plan proposed by Goddard for carrying on the war.—Peace with Sindia.—A general treaty of peace with the Mahrattas concluded at Salbye through Mahadajee Sindia.—Delay in its ratification.—Baroach conferred on Sindia.

HYDER ALLY, though mulcted and duped by Mahadajee Sindia, and Hurry Punt Phurkay, was amply compensated by the opportunity afforded when they were called away, in the end of May, 1778. Dharwar

was taken, and the whole tract, as far north as the Gutpurba and Kistna, submitted to his arms. He also took Chittledroog, and extended his territories to the eastward by the reduction of Kurpa. During his stay in that neighbourhood he was joined by Monsieur Lally, a military adventurer, who had been for some time in the service of Busalut Jung, at Adonee, and afterwards with Nizam Ally, but he now came over to Hyder with his corps.

Prior to this event Hyder had become thoroughly jealous of the English; and had he not been deterred by fears of a Mahratta invasion, he would, probably, at an early period have gone to war with them, and declared himself an ally of the French. He had for some time encouraged a close intercourse with that nation, and was supplied with arms, warlike stores, and occasionally with men, from the island of Mauritius. The

A. D. 1778. capture of Pondicherry, on the 18th October,

1778, could not fail of occasioning regret to Hyder; and when the governor of Madras intimated the intended reduction of the French settlement of Mahé, the port through which Hyder drew his supplies, he formally protested against the attack of a settlement, which, being situated in his territory, was, he pretended, under his protection. The expedition however went forward; Hyder, during the siege, hoisted his colours on the works by the side of the French; but the fort fell to a detachment of Madras troops under

A. D. 1779. Colonel Braithwaite in the month of March.

The governor-general and council, in consequence of having received intelligence that the French meditated an attack on the English settlements on the west coast, made an application to Madras for the assistance of some troops to reinforce Bombay, including Colonel Braithwaite's detachment; and accordingly, after demolishing the works of Mahé, these troops were held at the disposal of the Bombay government, and intended, if necessary, to join General Goddard after the monsoon.

The fugitive Rungoba was received, though at first scarcely welcomed, by the English; and, on the 12th June 12. June, accompanied by his sons Amrut Rao and Bajee Rao, the latter a child of four years old, visited General

Goddard in his camp, from whom he received an allowance of fifty thousand rupees a month, which the governor-general and council totally disapproved, and condemned as a lavish and unnecessary expenditure. General Goddard had been sufficiently prudent to avoid entering on any terms of alliance with Rugoba : it was considered very impolitic to attempt forcing a person into the Mahratta government, to whom the whole nation had manifested indifference or aversion ; and therefore, acting upon the terms of the Poorundhur treaty, if all accommodation were rejected, the English, in support of their national honour, could do no less than engage in the war as principals.

The negotiation between General Goddard and Nana Furnuwees continued for several months ; but towards the end of the monsoon Goddard communicated to the Bombay government some intelligence he had received of a general confederacy of the Mahrattas, Hyder, and Nizam Ally, against the English, on whom it was said they meditated an attack at all the three presidencies. General Goddard, prior to the receipt of this information, had sent to demand explicit answers from Nana Furnuwees, which were obtained sooner than was expected, by his declaring that the surrender of Salsette and the person

of Rugoba were preliminaries to any treaty
October.

which the English might wish to conclude with the Mahratta state. An immediate requisition was made for Colonel Braithwaite's detachment on the first intelligence of a confederacy ; but, in consequence of an attack of the Nairs,* secretly instigated by Hyder, against both Mahé and Tellicherry, the services of the detachment could not be immediately spared ; the Madras government, therefore, who then foresaw no impending danger to their own presidency, prepared another detachment, under Lieutenant Colonel Browne, of one hundred artillery, a regiment of five hundred Europeans, and a battalion of Sepoys ; but, before they joined Goddard, the campaign of the ensuing season was nearly at an end.

* There were two chiefs in Malabar known by the appellations of prince of Cherika and king of Cartinadee, who were leaders in the hostilities alluded to.

When General Goddard obtained the answer from Nana Furnuwees, he evaded giving an immediate reply, embarked for Bombay, where he arrived on the 1st November, and immediately consulted with the government respecting the plan of operations, particularly in regard to the proposed alliance with Futi^h Sing. His principal motive, however, for repairing thus promptly to Bombay was to urge despatch in preparing and sending off a reinforcement. Accordingly, although the Bombay government recommended delay, they acceded to his desire, and a detachment, under Colonel Hartley, of one hundred European artillery, two hundred European infantry, two battalions of native infantry, one of them a battalion of grenadier Sepoys volunteer drafts from different corps, principally those who had before served under Hartley on the rear-guard at Tullygaom, were speedily embarked for Guzerat.

On the side of Bengal a detachment of two thousand Sepoys were in readiness to follow General Goddard's route, but, on hearing that the war was inevitable, and might have broken out before they could have reached their destination, their march to Surat was countermanded. Mr. Hastings, desirous it would seem of embracing any proposal for effecting a diversion, and perhaps of giving the country a rallying point of insurrection against the Mahrattas, entered into an alliance with their turbulent tributary, the Rana of Gohud.

Meanwhile, General Goddard, on his return to Surat, dismissed the wukeels of Nana Furnuwees, put his army in a state of readiness, and opened the negotiation with Futi^h Sing. A treacherous correspondence was about this period intercepted by General Goddard between the wukeels of Nana Furnuwees and Mr. Vandegraaf, the Dutch chief and director at Surat, from which it appeared that the Dutch had engaged in a plot for assisting the Mahrattas to surprise Surat castle; but Mr. Boddam, the English chief, took effectual precautions to prevent the perfidious design.

Futi^h Sing, on the receipt of the proposals, attempted to procrastinate, and showed every disposition to evade a definite

engagement with the English. General Goddard therefore put his army in motion, crossed the Taptee on Jan. 1, 1780. the 1st January, but advanced very slowly to the northward, until his battering train and stores had joined him from Baroach, when he marched to attack the fort of Dubhoy, which was in possession of the Peishwa, and garrisoned by about two thousand men. Whilst General Goddard moved forward, Mr. Boddam occupied the Peishwa's districts near Surat. Mr. Robert Gambier, and the gentlemen of the civil service at Baroach, having enlisted irregulars, also took advantage of General Goddard's being in their neighbourhood, drove out the Peishwa's thannas, and took possession of Oklaseer, Hansot, Desborah, and Amod. Jumbooseer had not been restored by the Bombay government.

The army arrived before Dubhoy on the 18th January.

January 18. The Bramin commandant, on being summoned to surrender, answered by a vaunting discharge of matchlocks, and kept up a continued fire during the ensuing day, which did no other mischief than that of wounding one subaltern of the Bombay army, Lieutenant Charles Reynolds, the same person who was afterwards surveyor-general.

By day-break of the 20th, a battery of three eighteen-

January 20. pounders was ready to open within two hundred yards; but the garrison had evacuated the place in the night, and Mr. James Forbes* of the civil service, with a company of Sepoys and a few irregulars, were placed in charge of the new acquisition. Futih Sing now began to negotiate in earnest; met General Goddard, seemingly with as much cordiality as alacrity, and concluded a treaty

January 26. of offensive and defensive alliance, which was signed on the 26th, on the terms proposed by Governor Hornby, and approved by the supremo government.

The Peishwa's share of territory, north of the Myhic, was to be given up to Futih Sing, in lieu of which he agreed to cede

* The author of the Oriental Memoirs.

his share of revenue south of the Taptee, or those districts known by the appellation of Uthawees Mahal (or Attaweesee), his share of the revenues of Baroach, the district of Sinnore on the Nerbuddah, and his villages in the Baroach district. The usual tribute to the Peishwa was to be remitted at all events during the war, but three thousand horse were to join Goddard's army. The Company were to be put in possession of the districts ceded, from the day that Futi^h Sing's troops were put in possession of Ahmedabad. For that place General

February 10. Goddard marched with expedition, and arrived before it on the 10th February. The walls of Ahmedabad are of immense extent, and, for so vast a city, were remarkably strong. Though this ancient capital was considered in a comparatively deserted condition, even at this period it was supposed to contain upwards of one hundred thousand inhabitants. The Bramin in charge on the part of the Poona government, being summoned to surrender, expressed his willingness to give up the place, but desired a little time to persuade his garrison, composed of six thousand Arab and Sindee infantry, and two thousand Mahratta horse, to comply with the general's desire. This is the ordinary language of Mahrattas when they intend a firm resistance; but General Goddard had afterwards reason to believe there was truth in what the Bramin asserted.

Next day, some of the troops having ventured too near the wall suffered for their temerity, and amongst the February 11. rest, an officer, the second in command, Lieutenant Colonel Parker, was wounded. On the 12th, however,

February 12. General Goddard opened a battery, by which a breach was effected, and reported practicable by the evening of the 13th. From motives of humanity, and the

February 13. fear of excesses in the city, the assault was next day delayed, in hopes that the garrison might be induced to surrender; but the endeavour was unavailing, and the storming party was formed on the morning of the

February 15. 15th February, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley. The advance was composed of volunteers from the Bombay division. Two unfortunate

individuals,* of those who had been dismissed for misbehaviour in the preceding campaign, came forward to General Goddard, and earnestly solicited permission to accompany the forlorn hope, which was humanely granted, and both survived, after proving themselves worthy of being restored to the service. The command of the party, however, was intrusted to Serjeant Fridge of the Bombay European regiment, a corps always celebrated for gallant volunteers on such occasions. The grenadiers of the Bombay division followed the forlorn hope, with a strong reserve of chosen men from the army. On the preconcerted signal the whole moved off at a brisk pace, rushed up the breach where the garrison stood ready to receive them, and for a short time made a very determined stand, until three hundred of them lay dead, when resistance ceased. The most honourable part of this gallant assault was the subsequent steadiness and good conduct of the troops. No excesses were committed, and two only of the inhabitants, not composing the garrison, lost their lives. Of the British troops one hundred and six were killed and wounded, among the latter were ten European officers and four gentlemen volunteers, three of whom died of their wounds.†

The capital of Guzerat was scarcely reduced when General Goddard heard of the approach of Mahadajee Sindia and Tookajee Holkar, with a body of fifteen thousand horse, to which were to be united seven thousand horse, then engaged in plundering the villages about Baroach.

* Their names were Fraser and Clancey. Fraser was dismissed for abandoning his post at the Bhore Ghaut, on hearing of the defeat at Wurgaom. But the infamy was rendered particularly striking and ridiculous, as it was from him that the first intelligence was received in Bombay of the disaster ; and, writing from recollection, his note is on the Bombay records, in these words : “ Dear Sir,—Our army is cut to pieces ; I can effect my retreat, but I scorn it, at the risk of my honour. This is the last you shall hear from, yours truly, W. Fraser.” Fraser, however, lived not only to retrieve his honour, but to distinguish himself on several occasions, and to be much esteemed throughout the army. This last I mention on the authority of Major-General Baillie, who knew him intimately.

† Major Spaith, Bombay Engineers; Captain Gough, Bengal Native Infantry ; and Volunteer Wright.

After the escape of Rugoba there was some coolness between Sindia and the minister, but they were speedily reconciled; and although Mahadajee did not wish to quit the capital at that time, yet as he had Nana under command by causing him to apprehend an alliance with the English, he at last consented to oppose Goddard in Guzerat; and it is necessary to apprise the reader that Nana Furnuwees was without reserve informed of all the subsequent proceedings of Sindia: a report, however, was spread of Sindia's being on the eve of a rupture with Nana, which was speedily followed by another report of his intention to make a desperate effort to recover possession of Rugoba's person by assaulting Surat.

Rugonath Rao had been persuaded by General Goddard to remain in that city when the army took the field, a circumstance which Mahadajee from not exactly comprehending that the English were at war as principals, did not expect, and which may have disconcerted the scheme he was hatching. The momentary alarm, however, occasioned by his threat, was dissipated on the arrival of the European part of the Madras detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, which had disembarked at Surat, before the Mahratta army had passed Candeish.

Sindia and Holkar forded the Nerbuddah on the 29th February, with upwards of twenty thousand horse, and proceeded to the neighbourhood of Baroda, where they halted. Goddard crossed the Myhie on the 6th

March 6. March at Fazilpoor to give them battle; but on his advancing towards Baroda, they retired in the direction of Pawnngurh. Sindia, so far from convincing hostile intentions, professed the greatest friendship for the English. The two hostages, Mr. Farmer and Lieutenant Stewart, who were still in his camp, and whom he had treated with much hospitality, were restored to liberty, and joined

March 9. General Goddard on the evening of the 9th. This act of kindness was followed by the appearance of a wukeel, Abajee Shabajee, who gave assurances of his master's friendship for the English, and enmity to Nana Furnuwees, declaring that his master had experienced from

the latter the greatest ingratitude and treachery. But Goddard, without being drawn in to make proposals for an alliance, which, allowing Sindia to have been sincere, would have afforded him a grand advantage, made suitable answers, by assurances of a reciprocal regard on the part of the English ; but with respect to the terms of a treaty he left Sindia to be the judge of what would prove mutually advantageous, as the British governments in India had no other view than a permanent peace, which they were determined to obtain on terms honourable, defined, and secure.

Sindia's object was to waste the time in negotiation, and keep Goddard inactive during the fair season ; but Indian chicane is no match for European honesty. General Goddard was sincere in assuring Sindia of his desire for peace, but he limited the negotiation to a certain time, and allowed Sindia three days from the time his wukeel quitted the British camp

March 16. to offer his proposals. Accordingly, on the 16th

March, the wukeel returned, and submitted the following terms from his master :—“ That, formerly when Rugoba was at Tullygaom, after the return of the English army to Bombay, an agreement had been entered into between him and Sindia, and written engagements mutually exchanged for its performance, when the former consented to relinquish all claims to any share in the administration at Poona, and to retire towards Jhansee, where he should receive an allowance of twelve lakhs of rupees per annum ; that the siccā should continue in the name of the young Peishwa, Mahidoo Rao Narrain, and that Bajee Rao, the son of Rugoba, should be appointed the Peishwa's Dewan, but as he was too young to transact the business of the office himself, being only four years of age, the care and management of it should be left entirely to Sindia. He now, therefore, proposed that Rugoba should retire to Jhansee, and that the young Bajee Rao should accompany him to Poona.”

Such were his proposals, without declaring himself further respecting the English, whose part he still reserved for Goddard to propose ; but General Goddard merely objected to what was wrong, declared that no force should be put on

Rugoba's inclination, that he had sought the protection of the English, and that his quitting it should be voluntary ; that even allowing the English did assist Sindia to acquire the entire powers of the state, for the sum of his proposals amounted to nothing less, Sindia, on his part, in name of the Peishwa, should previously consent to certain conditions favourable to the British interests, as well in consideration of the benefits he was to derive, as in compensation for the wars of the Mahratta state in which they had been compelled to engage. The negotiation was thus brought to a point within seven days, which Sindia probably intended to have spun out into as many months ; when it would have been his study to balance Bramin fears and jealousy against the policy of the English, and that sanguine temperament of Europeans which is usually accompanied by credulity.

Mahadajee Sindia continued to profess his friendly regard, but perceiving that Goddard was not to be duped, he opened a negotiation with Govind Rao Gackwar for putting him in possession of Guzerat ; and Goddard had now no other desire than to bring on an action, which the Mahrattas as carefully avoided. Sindia apprehending a surprise, sent his heavy baggage under the protection of the hill-fort of Pawungurh, which was in his own possession, and threw out a number of small parties of horse to retire on the first alarm, and enable him to avoid any sudden attack that might be meditated.

In this manner, fancying himself secure, he allowed the

March 27. British army to encamp on the 27th March

within six miles of his main body, in which situation they lay watching each other for a week ; but God-

April 2. dard, on the night of the 2nd April, prepared a detachment of ten companies of grenadier Sepoys,

headed by the two European grenadier companies of the Bom-bay regiment, two battalions of Bengal, and one of Bombay native infantry, with the regiment of Bengal cavalry, and a small body of horse belonging to the nabob of Oude, the whole being supported by twelve pieces of artillery. This force he disposed in two lines ; the first line was commanded by

Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Baillie, the second by Major

Hopkins, and at two o'clock on the morning of
April 3. the 3rd, the time when the guards of irregulars

begin to be overpowered by drowsiness, they moved off silently under General Goddard's personal command: Lieutenant Colonel Hartley remained in camp in command of the rest of the army. The detachment passed the Mahratta out-parties without being discovered,—came upon their grand guard of several thousand men,—pushed on for their camp, still a mile and a half in front, without firing a shot; but the day dawned, the alarm had been communicated, and the main body were ready mounted. They stood for a short time, and even advanced, as if to charge, but they were received with a heavy fire, on which they turned their horses until they were beyond reach of the guns; a spirited charge by the body of cavalry belonging to the nabob of Oude, distinguished from the regiment of Bengal cavalry by the name of the *Candahar horse*, on a body of the Mahrattas, completed the rout, and drove them beyond the reach of pursuit.

Of the regular troops not a man was touched, but fifteen of the Candahar horse fell in the charge. The loss of the Mahrattas was supposed to be considerable; and General Goddard imagined he had gained a victory; but as soon as he had encamped, Sindia took up the same distance as before, observing a greater vigilance in guarding against surprise. On the

April 14. 14th, Colonel Browne, with the Madras troops,

joined, and General Goddard on the 19th made another attempt on Sindia's camp, but the Mahrattas only waited until he came within sufficient distance, when they let off a flight of rockets, and retired as before.

The Bombay government expressed some impatience at General Goddard's allowing himself to be thus amused, as they imagined that his army might have been better employed in reducing the fort of Bassein, which they considered of value as a permanent acquisition: but General Goddard was constrained to this mode of operations; the time would not have admitted of his forming a regular siege, and to quit Guzerat at that period was to leave their ally Futil Sing at the mercy

of the enemy. It was evident that Sindia wished to draw him into a long pursuit ; and although no decisive advantage was gained, the mere circumstance of forcing Sindia and Holkar to decline a battle, and retire before his army, was of importance in the neighbourhood of the new acquisitions. At the request of the presidency, however, Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley was

ordered down to Bombay, and quitted the army
May 8. near Baroda on 8th May. The presence of this reinforcement in the Concan was very necessary.

The greater part of the provisions for the consumption of the inhabitants of Bombay being drawn from the neighbouring continent, in order to prevent the Mahrattas from cutting off the supplies, in which they had partly succeeded, detachments were sent from Salsette and Bombay, which had seized and occupied several posts, and one party, consisting of two companies of Sepoys headed by four European subalterns, pushed on to the Ghauts, occupied one of the passes where they established a post, got up three pieces of cannon, and were reinforced by a small detail of European artillery. But the principal acquisition was the town of Kallian, where a captain's post was established under Captain Richard Campbell. Nana Furnuwees, who set a high value upon that place, assembled a large force for the purpose of recovering it, and driving the English from the continent : the post at the Ghauts was attacked before it could be withdrawn ; the party was cut off or dispersed, and the guns were taken. Three of the officers were killed, and one of them was made prisoner. The Mahrattas, elated with this success, advanced towards Kallian, threatened to exterminate the garrison if they dared to resist, and forced their prisoner, Ensign Fyfe, to write* to the commanding

* The following is a copy of the letter :—

" DEAR SIR,—I am now a prisoner in the Mahratta camp, with seven European artillerymen, one Subedar, two Jimmadars, and fifteen Sepoys. They are encamped within a very little distance of Callian, and are about sixteen or eighteen thousand fighting men. They have eight guns and one howitzer. This is the best account I can give you. I write this at their desire, to demand that you will immediately deliver up Callian and Ballapore, otherwise they threaten to kill every one of us, to storm both those places, and

officer, Captain Richard Campbell, to demand the surrender of the town. To all which Campbell replied, "that they were welcome to it if they could take it," and made a most spirited defence. Colonel Hartley fortunately arrived from Guzerat just in time to prevent the assault which was to have taken place on the morning of the 25th May; but on the night of the 24th Hartley surprised the Mahratta camp, followed them up for several miles, killed a great number, but could not succeed in taking the guns. They retired, however, from the Conean, and left the British troops unmolested during the remainder of the fair season.

General Goddard in the mean time being incommoded for want of forage, was obliged to send to a distance to procure it; a covering party was briskly attacked, but repulsed the enemy, and shortly after this event Goddard moved to the Nerbuddah in order to place his troops in convenient stations during the approaching rains.

He received a pressing application from the Bombay government to endeavour to seize Parneira, a hill fifteen miles north of Damaun, fortified by Moro Punt Pingley in the time of Sivajee; but their wishes had been anticipated. Gunnesh Punt, a Mahratta officer, who had been stationed in the Conean, quitted that quarter, plundered such parts of the

put every man to the sword. You may act as you think proper, but I beg you will return the bearer, as I have pledged my head you will not hurt the messenger; so be sure to return an answer soon. Our situation is none of the most agreeable. I should be obliged to M'Lean for a few clothes, as I have none.

"I am, Dear Sir,
"Your most obedient humble servant,
(Signed) "THOMAS FYFE.

"Camp, near Callian, 12th May 1780.

"To CAPTAIN CAMPBELL."

"P. S.—This does not please Mr. Bappoojee, the Bura Surdar; he also demands he may be paid for all the batty (rice) that has been taken, and a tribute for the expense of his army. He also says that General Goddard, with the grand army, is at present surrounded in the Guzerat, and if you will peaceably comply with the above terms, he will get the grand army released, and further threatens us on refusal."

Attaveesy as did not acknowledge the ministerial party, and advanced close to Surat, where he had committed great devastations.

Lieutenant Welsh, an officer of the Bengal cavalry, having been sent forward by Goddard at the requisition of the civil authorities in Surat, with the regiment of cavalry, the Candahar horse, and a body of infantry, surprized the camp of Gunnesh Punt at four o'clock on the morning of the 23rd April, killed upwards of a hundred of the Mahrattas, mortally wounded Gunnesh Punt, the commander, took his guns, three in number, and the whole of his baggage.* Lieutenant Welsh went on to the southward, and greatly distinguished himself by reducing Parneira, Bugwara, and Indergurh, three forts in the neighbourhood of Damaun, of which the Bombay government were very anxious to obtain possession. A detachment of the Bengal Sepoys, under Major Forbes, also distinguished themselves by attacking and routing one of Sindia's detachments near Sinnore, on the banks of the Nerbuddah, which insured tranquillity to the newly acquired districts in Guzerat during the approaching monsoon.

In the Concan, after the rain fell, the Mahrattas in small parties returned to molest the different posts; but Major Hopkins and Captain Abington, who were stationed with the

* Lieutenant Welsh's despatch to the chief of Surat. Mahratta Letters.

Lieutenant W. does not seem to have been aware that Gunnesh Punt was mortally wounded, which the Mahratta letters mention. The following is a copy of the dispatch :

DEAR SIR,—I have the pleasure to acquaint you that I rode on at the head of the regiment and Candahars, and reached Gunnesh Punt's camp at four o'clock this morning, when I took his camp standing, bazar, and three guns, killed ninety, and wounded fifteen. I have only lost one Duffedar, and two troopers wounded, one Candahar killed. In short, there was nothing wanting to complete this matter, but sending you in Gunnesh Punt's head. I don't think he has much to brag of now. The inhabitants of the villages seem exceeding happy, and are coming in from all quarters.

" I am, Dear Sir,

" Your very obedient humble servant,

(Signed) " THOMAS WELSH."

eighth* and ninth battalions at Kallian, prevented any attempt upon that place.

In regard to the affairs of Bengal the treaty on the part of Mr. Hastings with the Rana of Gohud was opposed by some of the members of the Bengal government with more reason than is always to be found in their objections; such an insignificant ally, without troops, resources, or extensive popularity, was more likely to embarrass than to aid a regular army, unless in regard to supplies whilst actually within the Gohud territory. A diversion, by attacking the Mahrattas on the north-east part of Malwa, by passing through Gohud, was strongly recommended by Goddard, and supported by Sir Eyre Coote. The latter, however, disapproved of sending a small force; and when at the requisition of the Rana, Captain Popham was ordered to cross the Jumna, Sir Eyre Coote deemed the measure extremely injudicious.

The detachment under Captain William Popham was composed of drafts intended to recruit the Bengal battalions serving with General Goddard, but in consequence of the renewal of the war, they were not allowed to march across India, as had

* The grenadier Sepoys, who accompanied Hartley to Ahmedabad, were formed into a separate corps, but on their return lost their name of the grenadier battalion, and were called the eighth battalion; a circumstance which nearly created a mutiny in the corps. To restore the name to men who remonstrated in a manner so unsoldier-like was deemed improper; but they afterwards behaved with such extraordinary valour, that their name of grenadier battalion was restored in 1783. They distinguished themselves during the arduous campaign in the Concan, which will be presently detailed. For their conduct in the battle of Panjany by the side of the 42nd regiment they received the highest compliment ever paid to a Sepoy regiment. "The Royal Highlanders," says Colonel M'Leod, in his despatch of the 29th of November 1782, "evinced the ardour which always inspires their countrymen in battle. The eighth battalion of Sepoys showed themselves equal to any troops in courage, coolness, and discipline." They then petitioned, through Colonel M'Leod, to have their name restored: but it was refused. In the following year, however, the eighth battalion formed part of the garrison which maintained the heroic defence of Mangalore, and their name was restored, as the only reward which the sickly, famished men, on their return to Bombay, solicited. They were long fortunate in a succession of excellent commanding officers; and on every occasion of service the spirit of Stewart and of Hartley has lived in their ranks.

been originally ordered, and were now selected for this service. The whole amounted to two thousand four hundred men ; they were formed into three battalions of equal strength : a small body of cavalry, and a detail of European artillery, with a howitzer and a few field-pieces accompanied them. Captain Popham crossed the Jumna in the month of February ; he immediately attacked a body of Mahrattas, who were plundering in the neighbourhood of Gohud, drove them from the country, and at the request of the Rana marched against Lahar, a fortified place fifty miles west of Kalpee, in possession of the Mahrattas. Having summoned the fort, which refused to surrender, he was obliged to commence an attack, although he found it much stronger than had been represented, and that battering guns were necessary to insure its capture. But the determined bravery of the troops overcame every difficulty ; long before the breach was, in the ordinary sense of the word, practicable, Captain Popham, foreseeing that field-pieces might never effect the purpose, determined to storm. Lieutenant Logan and Cornet Gardiner led on the advance ; both fell in the breach ; but Mr. O'Dell, a volunteer, rushed forward to supply their place, mounted the works, gallantly followed by the party, and, after a persevering assault, the place was carried, although with the heavy loss of one hundred and twenty-five men of the storming party. This success was entirely unexpected by Sir Eyre Coote, who, on hearing of the attack without battering cannon, only anticipated disaster ; and in consequence of his representations, another detachment of four regular battalions, with a battering train, was held in readiness to cross the Jumna, under Major Jacob Camac. But if the successful assault of Lahar was unexpected, the capture of the strong hill fort of Gwalior without the loss of a man excited the utmost admiration. Captain Popham, after his return from Lahar, was encamped during the rains within five kos of the celebrated fortress of Gwalior, expecting to be relieved as soon as the season permitted. Gwalior was in possession of Mahadjee Sindia, and in Hindoostan, where the stupendous fastnesses of the west of India were little known, it was accounted one of the strongest forts in Asia.

Captain Popham, with equal enterprise and prudence, was employed for about two months in laying his scheme; and at last, assisted by spies, furnished through the Rana of Gohud, he determined to carry his plan into execution. Every preparation had been made with the utmost secrecy, and on the night of the 3rd August he formed his party. The command of the advance was conferred on Captain Bruce, who had before distinguished himself in the attack of the Mahratta horse, upon the first arrival of the detachment in the Gohud territory. The advance on this occasion consisted of two companies of Sepoys, chosen grenadiers and light infantry. They were led by four lieutenants, Wilson, Scott, Allen, and Paterson; and as the surprise of natives was intended, twenty Europeans followed the Sepoys; a judicious disposition, as they were near enough to gain the head of the column if necessary, and where they were placed, less likely to lead to discovery; two battalions of Sepoys followed: scaling ladders applied to the foot of the scarped rock, which was sixteen feet high, enabled them to mount with ease. Thence they had to climb a steep ascent of about forty yards to the foot of the second wall, which was thirty feet high. The spies ascended, made fast ladders of ropes, by which the Sepoys mounted with alacrity, and each man as he got inside squatted down. Twenty of the Sepoys, with Captain Bruce, had entered the fort, when three of them so far forgot themselves as to shoot some of the garrison who lay asleep near them. This indiscretion occasioned an immediate alarm; but the Sepoys stood their ground, their comrades mounted to their support, the garrison became intimidated, and the sun had scarcely risen on the 4th August, when the assailants had obtained possession, almost without resistance, of the celebrated fortress of Gwalior.

On that very night a similar attempt was made with different success on the western side of India. Captain Abington, afterwards so well known from his gallant defence of Tellicherry, made an attempt to surprise the strong fortress of Mullungurh, or as it is frequently termed Bhow Mullun, one of the most conspicuous objects of the beautiful view to the eastward of the island of Bombay. Captain Abington suc-

ceeded in possessing himself of the lower hill ; but the garrison, before his men could get sufficiently near to mingle with them, took the alarm, and made good their retreat to the upper fort : an enormous mass of perpendicular rock that defied all attempts at an assault.

During the rains the Bombay government had full leisure to contemplate the state of their affairs. Their greatest distress was their total want of funds. They looked to Bengal for a supply of treasure ; but the hostility of Hyder, which the supreme government had doubted, and which the majority of the Madras rulers disbelieved, burst with appalling certainty on the province of Arcot, which was invaded in the month of July with the most formidable army that had ever opposed the British power in India. This new difficulty superadded to their own distress, induced the supreme government to declare that they could afford no assistance to the Bombay presidency. "We have no resource," says Governor Hornby in his admirable minute of the 1st August, "but such as we may find in our own efforts ;" and in this strait his measures showed much judgment and vigour. To raise funds was the subject of immediate deliberation, and the difficulties are best expressed in the means taken to obviate them. A quantity of copper in the Company's warehouses, valued at ten or twelve lakhs of rupees, was disposed of to the highest bidder ; loans in Bengal, on the credit of the Bombay government, were proposed to be negotiated, and a plan laid of seizing as much as possible of the enemy's resources, by anticipating them in the collection of their revenue.

General Goddard was to besiege Bassein as soon as the season permitted : the European part of his army was sent down to Salsette by sea, the battering train was prepared in Bombay, and the Sepoys were to march by land. Early in October the whole of the disposable force at Bombay and in the neighbourhood, consisting of five battalions, were placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley, who was instructed to drive out the enemy's posts, and cover as much of the Concan as possible, so as to enable the agents of the Bombay government to collect a part of the revenues, and secure the rice

harvest, which is gathered at the close of the rains. There is perhaps no part of Mr. Hornby's minute more expressive of the distress under which that government laboured, than that where, alluding to the field force they were preparing, he observes, "Our troops will better bear running in arrears when employed on active service, and subsisting in the enemy's country," for it is a principle with the British government and its officers in India, than which nothing has more tended to the national success, always to consider the peasantry under their strictest protection. As General Goddard advanced to invest Bassin, it was intended that Colonel Hartley should then take up a position a little to the east of that fortress, and prevent the Mahratta army from attempting to raise the siege.

Hartley, however, in the first place was required to march to the relief of Captain Abington, who still occupied the lower part of the fort of Mullungurh; but a large body of upwards of three thousand of the enemy, principally infantry, had cut off his communication with Kallian, so that he was attacked by the garrison from the works above him, and surrounded by

the body in question. This service Colonel
October 1st. Hartley effected on the first of October without loss; and another corps under Captain Jameson joined the party at Mullungurh, which now consisted of the 2nd and 8th battalions under Major Hopkins. The enemy, however, were also reinforced, and pitched their camp next day on the south-east side of the hill, where they began to lay waste the country. Colonel Hartley immediately prepared to attack them, and for this purpose marched from Kallian with the Bombay European regiment and the 1st battalion of Sepoys, directing Major Hopkins to send down the 8th battalion, under Captain Jameson, to assist in the attack. The Mahrattas were apprized of Colonel Hartley's advance, and met him at the foot of the hill. Thence they gradually retired towards their camp, which was left standing in the confidence of perfect security, and maintained a running fight, as if they had intended to draw the troops into an ambuscade; but all at once, Captain Jameson's corps, advancing from the hill, came upon the whole body, and without waiting for the rest of the

troops, instantly attacked them ; to use the words of Colonel Hartley, "with the utmost eagerness and spirit pursued them to their camp, (of which they took possession,) and were shortly afterwards joined by the rest of the troops." This spirited success, which was effected with the loss of only a few men of the 8th battalion, put the troops into high spirits, of which Hartley took immediate advantage, followed up the enemy's parties with alacrity, drove them out of the Concan, occupied a position not far from the Bhore Ghaut, and thus for a short time enabled the Bombay government to carry their plan of collecting the revenue into effect.

General Goddard having before sent down the Europeans by sea, commenced his march from Surat on the 16th of October. For the protection of Guzerat six companies from the Bengal and two of the Bombay detachment had been left with Futih Sing Gaekwar to strengthen his garrison at Ahmedabad ; that party was accordingly directed to remain there for the present. In Baroda Futih Sing had a considerable force of his own, and Dubhoy was guarded against all but a regular siege. Two Bengal battalions were stationed on the Nerbuddah at Sinnore ; two battalions of Bombay Sepoys, one of which was held ready at Surat, and the other at Baroach, to act conjointly or separately, were placed under the orders of Major Forbes, a Bengal officer of approved merit, to whom the charge of the general defence of the Guzerat province was assigned, and Futih Sing Gaekwar's quota of three thousand horse were to join Major Forbes if necessary.

General Goddard arrived before Basscin on the 13th of November, and having carefully reconnoitred it, he found the north face the only side on which it could be attacked by regular approaches, a mode which, owing to the great strength of the place, although it might require more time, he determined to adopt.

He accordingly opened trenches, and completed his first battery on the 28th of November, at the distance of nine hundred yards ; other batteries were opened at the distance of eight and five hundred yards successively. He had a very powerful artillery, principally twenty-four pounders, and one

battery of twenty mortars, at the distance of five hundred yards, which did great execution.

In the mean time Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt Phurkay were making every preparation to recover the Conean, and raise the siege of Bassein. The horse did not arrive until the Dussera, and the guns and equipments which had been before furnished, principally by Mahadajee Sindia, were not in sufficient readiness to enable them to take the field. Ramchundur Gunnesh, Pureshram Bhow, Anund Rao Rastia, and several other officers were sent forward, and as fast as the Mahratta troops were assembled, they were sent down to join them in the Conean.

The division under Colonel Hartley were for upwards of a month engaged in daily skirmishes; a great deal of their ammunition was expended, and the sick, many of whom were wounded, amounted to six hundred, which, with his detachments, reduced his number to little more than two thousand effective men. Having heard that the enemy intended to throw succours into Bassein, and cut off his communication with that place, it being no longer possible to cover the country, Colonel Hartley judiciously moved to Titwalla on

December 8. the 8th of December, from thence he continued

his march towards Doogaur, nine miles east of Bassein. The Bombay government, over-anxious to recover the revenue, disapproved of his quitting the neighbourhood of the Bhore Ghaut, but they were not fully aware of the strength of the Mahratta army, or the experience and enterprise of the principal commander, Ramchundur Gunnesh. Finding that the precautions of Goddard had effectually prevented an attempt to succour Bassein, the Mahrattas had determined to make amends for its loss by the destruction of the covering army. On the 10th December their united force, amounting in horse and foot to upwards of twenty thousand men, thrice attacked the Bombay division in front and rear, but were each time steadily repulsed. Five thousand of their horse made a spirited charge on the left of Hartley's line, but they were so well received that no impression was made, and the troops sustained but little loss, having only eighteen killed and wounded; two, however, were

officers, Lieutenants Drew and Cooper. On the ensuing day December 11. the attack was renewed, the horse did not charge, but the Mahratta guns did considerable execution, and the division lost Lieutenants Cowan and Peirson, with upwards of one hundred men; the troops, however, though weakened and harassed, during a period of nearly six weeks' constant fighting, behaved most gallantly, and "their conduct," says Colonel Hartley, in his spirited but modest despatches, "only confirms me in the high opinion I shall ever have of them."

On the right and left of Colonel Hartley's line there were two eminences, which, when well secured, completely covered his flanks. These heights were guarded by strong pickets, and Colonel Hartley having observed that the enemy's skirmishers came very close to the right in the action of the 11th, with that judicious anticipation which always gave the Bombay Sepoys so much confidence in Hartley, he strengthened those points by directing the field engineer to throw up a small breastwork, and a gun was sent to each eminence during the night both to the right and left. Ramchundur Gunesh perceived the advantage of carrying one of these points, and next day intended to direct his principal attack on the right flank, as Hartley had foreseen. Orders were given to the Mahratta officers to advance in front and rear; Ramchundur in person, by a circuitous route for the purpose of storming the height, led on a body of Arab foot, and a thousand regular infantry under Signior Noronha,* a Portuguese officer in the Peishwa's service. A body of the best horse supported the infantry, and Ramchundur was determined to carry this post or perish.

Taking advantage of a thick fog, by nine o'clock December 12. in the morning they had approached close to the picket, but the mist suddenly cleared away, the sun shone

* I find this Portuguese officer mentioned in very high terms by Captain Bonnevaux, of the Madras establishment, in a letter dated, Prison in Poona, 25th February 1781. Captain Bonnevaux, intrusted with an overland despatch from the Court of Directors, was taken near the coast of India, carried into Viziadroog, and thrown into the fort of Russalgurh. After enduring great hardship he was conveyed to Poona, where his sufferings were humanely relieved by Signior Noronha.

forth, and both parties, having now a near and full view of each other, paused for a moment, when a brisk fire opened at once, and the guns did surprising execution; the storming party advanced with great ardour; guns from the right of the line were brought to bear upon the assailants, and committed great havoc among the horse; but the Mahrattas still persevered, when suddenly their fire slackened, and a body was seen borne off towards the rear; it was Ramchundur Gunnesh, who fell with the well-earned reputation of a gallant and skilful officer. Signior Noronha was wounded, when the enemy, dispirited by the loss of their leaders, retired precipitately and with heavy loss. In the action of the 12th the Bombay troops suffered very little, and their whole conduct appears to have been much more justly appreciated by the Mahrattas than by their own government;* the fact is, that military service in India seems always to have been commended rather in proportion to the result than to the duty performed, and this trying and well-fought campaign is scarcely known, even to the gallant army by whom it was maintained.

Bassein surrendered on the 11th December, and General Goddard, hearing that the whole army had attacked the Bombay division, set off in person at the head of the cavalry, and the assembled grenadiers of the Bengal and Madras troops, with whom he reached Colonel Hartley's camp on the thirteenth. He expressed his admiration of the judicious position which had been chosen, and of the fortitude shown by the troops on that and on every occasion, where harassing service and great privation, from want of their pay, had been borne not only without a murmur, but with the greatest cheerfulness. The whole army was now united under General Goddard; and it unfortunately happened that the orders from the Court of Directors, before alluded to, which made Hartley the junior Lieutenant Colonel on the Bombay establishment until all those formerly his seniors should be promoted, was at this time promulgated, Lieutenant Colonel Baillie, of the

* Mahratta MSS., and letters. The Mahrattas never mention Colonel Hartley's name, and always attribute the defeat of their army and the capture of Bassein to the same person, Goddard.

Madras establishment, though just promoted to that rank, immediately claimed his right, and of course superseded him. Hartley represented the peculiar mortification to which he was subjected ; but the order was irrevocable. He quitted the army, repaired to England, and laid his case before the Court of Directors, who, sensible of his merit, although they could not alter the constitution of their service, recommended him to his Majesty, by whom he was appointed Lieutenant Colonel of the 73rd regiment. Although no longer engaged in Mahratta warfare, he was afterwards distinguished on many occasions in India ;* and though hitherto best known as Major General Hartley, his real merit is not less conspicuous in the military annals of our country, when holding the rank of Captain of Sepoys.

The reduction of Bassein, and the defeat of the army in the Concan, were severely felt by Nana Furnuwees.† The judicious operations of Goddard had secured that important fortress, with an inconsiderable loss of thirteen men, of whom was one officer, Lieutenant Sir John Gordon, who died of his wounds. On the same day that General Goddard joined Colonel Hartley, the Bombay government received a letter from Bengal, dated 9th October, informing them of their intention to make peace with the Mahrattas : ordering, that upon the Peishwa's intimating that he had commanded a cessation of hostilities, that they were immediately to desist in like manner ; but, until such an intimation was received, they were urged to prosecute the war with vigour.‡ Similar instructions were transmitted to General Goddard.

To account for these orders it is necessary to explain that the supreme government had received information that all the Mahrattas, except Futi Sing Gackwar, (whose communication was in a manner cut off from his countrymen by the British troops, and whose interests strongly bound him to the Company,) were combined with Hyder and the Nizam against the English, and that Nizam Ally, although he had not commeneed

* Bombay records.

† Mahratta MSS., and letters.

‡ Bombay records. Sixth report.

hostilities, was the contriver of the whole confederacy. The immediate cause of the enmity of Nizam Ally towards the English originated in a treaty concluded by the Madras government, in April, 1779, with his brother, Busalut Jung, Jagheerdar of Adonee, by which they received him under their protection, on condition of their being allowed to rent the district of Guntoor, which was, at all events, to come into their possession after the death of Busalut Jung. The alliance alarmed Nizam Ally, whose jealousy of Busalut Jung was extreme; and Hyder, some of whose late acquisitions would have been cut off from the rest of his territory, would not suffer the British troops to take possession of Guntoor, and opposed their march even before the war broke out. The treaty of the Madras government with Busalut Jung was illegal, because it never received the sanction or ratification of the governor-general and council, who, therefore, when it came to their knowledge, in February, 1780, disavowed and annulled it, a measure which tended considerably to appease the resentment of Nizam Ally; but, from the time of the Wurgaom convention, he had adopted a tone of overbearing insolence, which, towards the British authorities, he had not before ventured to assume. Hyder, in addition to those motives of jealousy already described, had a very strong inducement for engaging in the confederacy. The conquests he had made as far north as the Kistna had been ceded to him by Rugonath Rao, whom he affected to consider the legitimate Peishwa; and the confirmation of this cession on the part of the Poona ministers was preliminary to his becoming a party in the alliance; his right to the Mahratta territories south of the Kistna was admitted, and the future tribute for the whole of his possessions was fixed at the inconsiderable sum of eleven lakhs of rupees.

Mr. Hastings, although Moodajee Bhonslay had acquiesced in the scheme of a general confederacy against the English, perceived that he might still ultimately indulge the hope of an alliance with them at some favourable period; but, from the crisis to which events were hastening, he began to doubt whether the neutrality privately professed by Moodajee could be

lasting. The governor-general was sensible of an influence, which Nizam Ally, although in reality an enemy, possessed over the ruler of Berar, through his (Moodajee's) dewan, Dewakur Punt, without whose counsel Moodajee decided on no political measure. The power of Hyder Ally was such that peace with the Mahrattas seemed necessary to the safety of the British in India; but, in the adversity which threatened them, it seemed less difficult to engage Moodajee as a mediator than as an ally. Under these circumstances Mr. Hastings offered peace to the Peishwa's government through Moodajee, early in the month of October, on the following terms ;—Ahmedabad to be retained for Futih Sing; Gwalior for the Rana of Gohud; and Bassein, if in possession of the Company at the time, to be kept by them; but the whole of the other acquisitions made since the 1st January, 1779, to be restored; a provision to be made for Rugonath Rao during his life, and a place of residence fixed wherever he might desire, except in the neighbourhood of Bombay; at all events, no assistance to be afforded by the British government in re-asserting his pretensions. Such were the conditions offered, provided the Peishwa's government agreed to enter on an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Company, against Hyder Ally and the French nation; but if the alliance thus tendered should not be accepted, a peace was proposed by each party retaining its respective conquests. Moodajee Bhonslay was to be the declared mediator and guarantee; the subordinate governments in India, and all officers commanding divisions of British troops were to desist from hostilities upon the Peishwa's intimating that he had sent like orders to the commanders of his armies. But before these proposals reached Nagpoor news had arrived of the disastrous affair where Colonel Baillie's detachment was destroyed by Hyder Ally, near Conjevaram, on the 10th September,* on which Moodajee, concluding that the Company's affairs were desperate, hesitated in becoming mediator, unless on terms to which the governor-general and council would not accede.

Moodajee did not send answers to the proposals from Bengal for upwards of two months, but the offers made to him account

* See Wilks, vol. ii.

for the orders already mentioned, which were received on the west of India in December. Although the wants of the Bombay presidency had been partially relieved by an unexpected supply of money from Bengal, the prospect of peace, notwithstanding the sacrifices they must make, was hailed by the members of that government with satisfaction ; but as no intimation from the Peishwa arrived, they proposed to secure the Concan, reduce the forts, and then act only on the defensive.

General Goddard was detained for some time by the fort of Arnaul, situated on a small island, ten miles north of Bassein, the Killidar of which refused to give it up until a force appeared before it ;—he then surrendered on the 18th January. It appeared to General Goddard that an advanced movement, so as to threaten Poona, was more likely to facilitate the negotiations of the governor-general with the Peishwa, than wasting time in attempting to reduce hill-forts, the greater part of which seemed totally impregnable. Although General Goddard, by order from the Court of Directors, was now commander-in-chief of the Bombay army, he was still intrusted with his former powers from Bengal, and at liberty, in a great degree, to follow his own plans. The orders from Bengal, although they desired that the war should be vigorously prosecuted in the event of receiving no intimation from the Peishwa, were yet of a nature to unsettle any steady plan of the authorities acting in subordinate co-operation ; and from Madras, where all their evils were attributed, with some justice, “*to Rugoba Dada and the Mahratta war,*” every despatch to Bombay, teemed with regrets on this subject, pressed the necessity of peace with the Mahrattas, and an attack on Hyder’s possessions on the Malabar coast.

Under these circumstances Goddard adopted the half measure of threatening, without being prepared to carry his threat into execution ; and this excellent officer committed his first error by a departure from a rule which common observation inculcates even in ordinary life. He advanced towards the passes of the mountains ; Hurry Punt, then in the Concan, retired to Poona, but left the Bhore Ghaut guarded. It was gallantly attacked

by Colonel Parker at the head of the advanced party of Bengal troops on the night of the 8th of February. He forced the pass with ease, and the troops were encamped at Kundalla on the same spot which Captain Stewart had occupied about three years before, where they were soon joined by the greater part of the force; although Goddard,* with the head-quarters, remained at the village of Campoly, at the bottom of the Ghauts.

Their appearance gave Nana Furnuwees no alarm, for his political boldness was contrasted in an extraordinary, but amongst Bramins by no means a singular manner, with his personal timidity, and the only effects produced on him by the advance to the Ghauts were additional efforts to increase the army, and the most vigorous preparations for rendering the country a desert and Poona a ruin. He however tried to amuse General Goddard by sending an unauthorized agent to treat with him, which induced Goddard to make overtures on the terms proposed through Moodajee Bhonslay. Of these Nana affected ignorance; Goddard sent him a copy of the terms, and thus subjected them to positive rejection; for Nana Furnuwees observed that proposals had been tendered by the governor-general, but that Moodajee had refused to forward them; that these now sent could not be listened to, nor at that time would any terms whatever be admitted in which Hyder,

* Nana Furnuwrees, as appears by his letters, had very exact intelligence of everything; but in stating Goddard's force at ten thousand fighting men he greatly over-estimates it.

The following is the exact number, exclusive of European officers :—

Present for duty.

Total ... 6152

the ally of the Mahratta state, was not included.* It is probable that General Goddard's own judgment disapproved of such unavailing concession, but he was urged to it by letters from Sir Eyre Coote at Madras, who, in the month of October 1780, had been solicited by the governor-general to repair to the coast and retrieve the fortunes and honour of his country; a call which was as gratifying to the feelings of the general as to the army of Fort St. George.

Nana Furnuwees had sent the Peishwa, now in his 7th year, to Poorundhur; Hurry Punt Phurkay and Tookajee Holkar commanded the main body of his army, with which Nana himself advanced towards the Ghauts, and Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun was sent down into the Concan with a force of twelve thousand men to harass Goddard's detachments, and obstruct the communication with Bombay.† An opportunity soon presented itself; a detachment of two corps, the 1st Bombay and 5th Bengal battalions, under Captain Mackay, when returning from Panwell as an escort to a convoy of grain for the army, were very briskly attacked by Pureshram

Bhow. On the night of the 15th March,
March 15. Captain Mackay had brought up his convoy a distance of twelve miles, to the village of Chouke, when

* The reply which I have expressed, as above, is couched in the following smooth terms, after explaining that Moodajee had refused to forward the terms. Nana observes, "the copy of the proposals which you have sent has been read from beginning to end by your friend; and it is certain that the contents therein written are not proper or fit for the approbation of this government. If you be sincere in your desire of friendship, it is incumbent on you to make proposals, which shall include those persons who at this time are allied to, and connected with the counsels of this state." (Extract of a letter from Nana Furnuwees to General Goddard, 5th March 1781.)

† Letter from Nana Furnuwees to the Peishwa at Poorundhur. The letters which I shall from this time have occasion to refer to, both from Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt Phurkay, are all translated from originals in their own handwriting. They were found amongst the records in the Peishwa's palace, recovered by Captain Henry Robertson, collector of Poona, and the late Lieutenant John M'Leod, resident at Bushire, when assistant to Mr. Chaplin, commissioner, and by those gentlemen they were made over to me, by special authority, from the Honourable M. Elphinstone.

early on the morning of 16th March he was suddenly assailed by the whole force of Pureshram March 16. Bhow, which he repulsed though not without difficulty ; but Pureshram Bhow's loss was comparatively very severe. Both battalions behaved well, and the Bengal Sepoys, who had never before been so closely engaged, showed very great spirit. One company, however, in charging a body of horse with the bayonet, after having routed them, were drawn forward in the eagerness of pursuit, when the Mahrattas, than whom, if no troops sooner fly, none are so speedily rallied, wheeled about, charged, and overpowered them, but the contiguity of the line saved them from total destruction. Captain Mackay had still twelve long miles to march before he could reach the bottom of the Ghaut : the face of the country in the Concan has already been described, and although the road was the best in the country, it was a mere path-way, through a tract exceedingly rugged, full of deep ravines and dells, strong jungles on his right and left, and frequently high rocks and precipices within musquet shot on both sides. Captain Mackay renewed his march as soon as it was dark, and advanced before morning to within a few miles of Campoly, whence General Goddard sent out a reinforcement, with carriage for his wounded, and enabled him to bring in his men and the whole convoy without further molestation.

The movement towards the Ghauts, from which Goddard calculated advantageous political results, had completely failed, and the Bombay government, in the prospect of keeping Guzerat and the Concan, did not regret that an end was put to the negotiation ; even Mr. Hastings in that view considered the rejection of his proposals as a circumstance by no means unfortunate. The opinion of the Bombay government in regard to a system of defence, and sending back the Madras troops to the assistance of their own presidency, was now adopted by Goddard ; but as the season for taking forts was nearly at an end, he proposed raising a work and establishing a strong garrison at the Bhore Ghaut, of which Mr. Hornby disapproved, and judiciously observed that a large garrison left at the Bhore Ghaut, a pass which experience had shown

they could at any time carry with ease, would be but a waste of money and of men. The capture, as Mr. Hornby observed, of Rajmachee, a fort a little to the north of the Bhore Ghaut, which might have been easily reduced, would, with a very small garrison, have served both to form a dépôt and to distress the enemy.

After some deliberation it was resolved in council that the army should return to canton for the rains at Bombay and Kallian ; that the Madras troops should be sent back to their own presidency, and two of their own battalions sent down to assist in the defence of Tellicherry, which they had intended to abandon until they received some treasure from Bengal ; but this ancient possession they now determined to defend. After all had been thus settled, General Goddard found it impracticable to march without sacrificing a great part of his

stores and equipments. About the 1st of April

April 1. he had sent down to Panwell a strong escort of three battalions of Sepoys, ten guns, and the whole of the cavalry, for the purpose of bringing on another convoy of grain and stores. On the road to Panwell, this escort, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, was attacked by Pureshram Bhow, and although every exertion was made to save the cattle, the Mahrattas, whose dexterity in driving off un-loaded bullocks is remarkable,* carried away a considerable number of them. The escort would have been sufficient to bring on the convoy through the whole force of Pureshram Bhow, but Holkar was sent down the Ghauts by Nana Fur-nuwees to strengthen him ; when Colonel Browne, on hearing of the great army which lay in his route, deemed it impractical

* The usual way is, for two or three horsemen to steal forward quietly, get the bullocks' heads turned to a flank, when a few on each side gallop at them with their spears ; two or three goad them from behind, and off they go at full speed, guided in any direction with great facility. The Madras followers, who are by far the most active of all camp people, (though the practice is not confined to them,) tie the bullock's load to his head, so that when the animal throws his load in any way, he is, as it were, anchored ; and whilst the rope holds, he cannot get away ; but when unloaded, or let loose to graze, they are very apt to be carried off, even from within the camp guards.

ble to advance without a reinforcement, in which opinion General Goddard coincided. Unfortunately, the greater part of the cattle of the army had been sent down to assist in transporting the supplies, so that Goddard could not march with his whole force without sacrificing a great deal of public property, and with a part he was sure of being cut off by the enemy; he therefore represented his situation to Bombay, and entreated the government to send every disposable man of their garrison to reinforce Colonel Browne, a request with which they instantly complied, and the escort advanced without delay. The Mahratta force amounted to upwards of twenty-five* thousand horse, besides several bodies of rocket men, and infantry; they attacked the escort during their march for three days, but were constantly baffled and repulsed by the skill of Colonel Browne, whose conduct was the theme of very great praise.

He brought in his convoy safe,† but with the loss of one hundred and six men killed‡ and wounded, during the three days on which he marched.

The junction of this detachment on the 15th April enabled

General Goddard to prepare for his retreat. By
 April 15. the 19th he had sent down his guns and bag-
 April 19. gage to the bottom of the Ghauts, unobserved, as he supposed, by the enemy; but the Mahrattas had correct information of the least stir in his camp, and were silently but anxiously watching the result. Tookajee Holkar, with fifteen thousand men, without any baggage, was at the bottom of the Kussoor Ghaut, and Pureshram Bhow, with twelve thousand, was also below the Ghauts near Bheema Shunkur. Hurry Punt Phurkay was above the Ghauts between Kundalla and Karlee, with above twenty-five thousand horse, four thousand

* Letter from Nana Furnuwees. Colonel Browne reported them only twenty thousand.

† Nana Furnuwees states that they took from one hundred to a hundred and fifty bullocks, chiefly laden with sugar.

‡ Of this number there were five officers, namely, Captain Bowles, Lieutenants Wheldon and Tindall, of the Bombay Infantry; Ensigns Gibbings and Richardson, the former of the Madras, and the latter of the Bengal establishment.

foot, and several light field pieces. General Goddard's information represented Holkar and Pureshram Bhow as about to

April 20. ascend the Ghauts, but on the 20th, the moment that Goddard marched, Hurry Punt's force poured down into the Concan,* took a considerable quantity of baggage, consisting of tents, boxes of musquet ammunition, and two thousand cannon shot.† On the 20th Goddard halted at

April 21. Kalapoor, and renewed his march on the 21st.

His rear had scarcely cleared the ground of encampment, when the first shot from Hurry Punt's guns struck a tumbril full of ammunition, which instantly exploded, and although it did very little mischief, the Mahrattas were greatly encouraged by the circumstance, and harassed the troops during the whole of their march to Chouke. The nature of the ground gave their irregular infantry every advantage, as they were enabled from the cover of rocks, bushes, and ravines, to take deliberate aim, and Holkar and Pureshram Bhow made their appearance in front about nine o'clock in the morning. At one o'clock in the afternoon, when Goddard pitched his camp, the enemy retired, Hurry Punt to Kalapoor, and the others to some distance in the rear of the right flank of the British army. The loss on the 21st, which was severe, fell principally upon the Bengal Sepoys, who were stationed in the rear, and behaved with much gallantry. On the 22nd General Goddard halted, and again marched on the 23rd, when the attack was renewed, but the baggage having been sent forward at two o'clock in the morning, he was thus enabled to get on a considerable distance before the enemy came up. The attack on the rear was at one time very determined, and the 6th Bengal and 13th‡ Bombay battalions, particularly distinguished themselves under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Parker, of the Bengal establishment, an excellent officer, who fell whilst bravely exerting himself at head of the rear-guard. General Goddard observing that the enemy always

* General Goddard's and Hurry Punt's despatches. † Hurry Punt.

‡ The present 6th regiment, and lately the 2nd battalion, 3rd regiment, was formerly the 13th battalion.

retired when they saw him established in his camp, made a show of pitching his tents, the manœuvre succeeded, and being the last march was judicious. The army arrived at Panwell on the

evening of the 23rd April without further molestation. April 23.

On this retreat, which the Mahrattas consider one of their most signal victories, General Goddard's army sustained a heavy loss of four hundred and sixty-six killed and wounded, of whom eighteen were European officers.*

Although the Mahratta troops, particularly the infantry, and that part of the horse under Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhum, behaved well, it may be here remarked as a symptom of the decline of military spirit, that the despatches of Hurry Punt are written in a style of the most vaunting gasconade, in which Bramin commanders before this period were less apt to indulge than either Mahratta or Mahomedan officers. The loss of the English was estimated by the Mahrattas at fifteen hundred men, one gun, several tumbrils, and a great part of their baggage ; both Hurry Punt and Nana Furnuwees acknowledged that they too have sustained a heavy loss, both in men and horses.†

The reinforcement for Tellicherry and the Madras troops were embarked and sent off as predetermined ; but the European privates were drafted into the Bombay regiment, a measure against which the Madras government bitterly inveighed. The remainder of the army, after they had remained encamped for some weeks at Panwell, marched to Kallian, where they were cantoned for the monsoon under com-

*Killed.**

Lieutenant-Colonel John Neville Parker, Bengal Native Infantry.

Captain Sambers, Bombay Native Infantry.

Lieutenant Gibson, and Surgeon Penny, Madras Artillery.

Wounded.

Lieutenant William Rattray, Bengal Artillery.

Lieutenant F. W. Rutledge, Madras Artillery.

Lieutenant Duncan, Major of Brigade, Madras Native Infantry.

Lieutenants Hall, Taylor, More, and Smith, Bengal Native Infantry.

Captain Bannatyne, Lieutenants Taylor, Mills, and Reynolds ; Ensigns Read and King, of the Bombay Native Infantry ; and Mr. Fleming, Surgeon General of the army.

† Original letters.

mand of Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie.* Ten thousand Mahrattas were sent towards Guzerat under Mahdoo Rao Ramchundur, the garrisons in the Concan were strengthened, and the main body of the Peishwa's army returned, as usual, to their homes.†

Whilst these events were passing on the west of India, the governor-general and council in Bengal having disapproved of the Bombay defensive system, were endeavouring to create a powerful diversion, by carrying hostilities into the heart of Sindia's territory ; that he, the principal promoter, should become the greatest sufferer by the war ; and Mr. Hastings was at the same time engaged in an intricate negotiation, for the purpose of detaching Moodajee Bhonslay from the confederacy.

It has been already mentioned that a division of troops under Major, now by regular promotion Lieutenant-Colonel, Camac had been prepared to assist the Rana of Gohud ; and as the brilliant successes of Captain Popham, who was appointed a major for his gallant enterprize on Gwalior, had cleared the Gohud territory of the enemy, Colonel Camac invaded Malwa, reduced Sippree, and advanced to Seronje, where he arrived on the 16th of February. Mahadajee Sindia, who was marching from the westward to oppose him, came up with his division at the latter place, and Colonel Camac, having taken post, allowed himself to be surrounded. The want of provisions and forage soon reduced him to great distress. Perceiving the mistake he had made, and the great danger to be incurred by retiring, he sent off the most pressing letters to Colonel Morgan, commanding in the Oude territory, to send on a reinforcement to his relief. Lieutenant-Colonel Muir was detached accordingly with three battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and a company of artillery. But in the meantime Lieutenant-Colonel Camac was attacked by Sindia, and cannonaded in his camp for seven days successively, when he determined to attempt a retreat at all hazards. At midnight on the 7th March, with great skill, he commenced his march, and was not discovered till day-break, March 7, 8, 9. but on the 8th and 9th he was constantly harassed, until his arrival at the town of Mahautpoor, where he

* Bombay records.

† Original letters.

forced the inhabitants to supply him with provisions, and then turned and fronted his pursuers. Sindia encamped every night at the distance of five or six miles from the British troops, in a state of instant readiness, having his heavy baggage at an equal distance in his rear. This disposition to guard against surprise continued for several nights, until Colonel Camac, by his seeming want of enterprise, had thrown the wily Mahratta off his guard; when, on the night of the 24th of March, he entered Sindia's camp, attacked and routed his force, killed numbers of his men, took thirteen of his guns, three elephants, his principal standard, twenty-one camels, and many horses. This achievement, which deservedly ranks very high, and marks a military genius, was suggested by Captain Bruce, the same officer who led the escalade at Gwalior. It was of the utmost importance, not only in raising the fame of the British arms, but in particularly affecting Sindia, whose reputation had suffered, whilst that of the Bramin party supported by Holkar was greatly increased by the supposed victory over General Goddard. Colonel Muir's detachment did not join that of Colonel Camac until the 4th of April, when the former assumed the command; but although their united forces kept the field, and encamped during the rains within the territory of Sindia, they obtained no further advantage, and were frequently straitened for supplies by numerous bodies of horse from Sindia's camp, which continued in the neighbourhood of their own. Endeavours were ineffectually used by the English to excite active co-operation on the part of the Rajpoot princes in the neighbourhood against the Mahrattas; and Gwalior was restored to the Rana of Gohud, in hopes, by this act of good faith, to wean him from a disposition he had evinced of making terms for himself with Mahadajee Sindia; but the Rana was not inclined to bring forward the slender resources which he possessed; and matters remained in this situation until the commencement of a negotiation on the part of Sindia with Colonel Muir, in the month of August. But although the governor-general's scheme of stirring up those petty princes against their Mahratta superiors failed, his negotiations with the Raja of Berar were productive of more beneficial consequences.

Moodajee, to support appearances with the confederates, had sent forward an army of thirty thousand horse towards Kuttack, in the month of October, 1779, under his second son, Chimnajee; but in order to convince Mr. Hastings that his real design was not hostile to the English, they were seven months in reaching their destination; this favourable symptom, however, did not induce the Bengal government to relax in their vigilance, or to circumscribe their efforts. It had been determined at Calcutta, on the news of Hyder's invasion of Arcot, to send a division of six battalions of Sepoys to assist in the war against him, as soon as the season permitted of their marching along the coast towards the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut. This force was to have been assembled in the month of October, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pearse, and it was hoped that Moodajee might be induced to aid them with a body of cavalry, but as Chimnajee's army lay in the route, it was deemed advisable to suspend Colonel Pearse's march until Moodajee's answer was received.

When the replies did arrive, on the 9th January, it was determined to send on the detachment, and Colonel Pearse, on entering the territory of Moodajee, was instructed to observe an exact discipline, to protect the country, and to consider the Raja of Berar as a friend, until any attempt was made to obstruct his march, when he was commanded to force his way against all opposition. To reconcile Moodajee, however, to this measure, the governor-general deputed an agent, Mr. David Anderson, to Kuttack, for the purpose of explaining the reasons, and obtaining, if possible, a body of two thousand horse to co-operate with Colonel Pearse. Before Mr. Anderson reached Ballasore, Chimnajee had proceeded with his army to attack the fort of Dhikanall, the Raja of which had neglected to remit the tribute, and refused to pay the arrears. Mr. Anderson, however, proceeded to Kuttack, and thence returned to Calcutta. Chimnajee, in the meantime, had quitted the hills, and come down with his army to the open country. Colonel Pearse had not only been allowed to pass without molestation, but assistance was afforded in procuring supplies through the province of Orissa; and the most friendly assurances were continued on

the part of Chimnajee. The position of this Mahratta army was threatening : the government of Berar had behaved liberally to General Goddard, and civilly to Colonel Pearse : Moodajee had been so situated as to be compelled to join the confederacy, or at once declare his alliance with the English ;—the last a daring, a doubtful, and a generous policy, too great for any Mahratta to adventure. The governor-general had secretly promised to advance Moodajee the sum of sixteen lakhs of rupees, in order to engage his aid, either in the alliance or mediation proposed ; for it is not very clear how this bribe was originally tendered. Twelve lakhs were now offered to Chimnajee if he would withdraw his troops and return to Nagpoor, at the same time it was carefully expressed that the money was not given in a manner to enable them hereafter to demand it as a right, or to expect it in future, but merely to bespeak their friendship, and engage them against Hyder, who was represented to have at this period received sunnuds from the Emperor for the whole Deccan ; at the subjugation of which, including the complete peninsula of India, he was said to be aiming. The son of Moodajee observed that on payment of fifty lakhs he would be happy to afford the British government a proof of his friendship, by retiring to Nagpoor, and uniting against Hyder, especially if it should appear that he had procured sunnuds for the Deccan. This fictitious report obtained credence, especially with Nizam Ally, and it tended greatly, once more, to turn his versatile and treacherous mind against Hyder, whom as a rival Mussulman and an upstart eclipsing him, he hated and feared.

After some discussion, conducted with much ability on the part of Mr. Anderson, Chimnajee at last observed that of the sixteen lakhs originally promised, three lakhs had been paid ; but if the balance of thirteen lakhs were now tendered, he would withdraw ; that two thousand horse, at fifty thousand rupees a-month, should be sent to join Colonel Pearse against Hyder, provided the governor-general and council would assist the Berar state in raising a loan of ten lakhs of rupees, and aid Moodajee in reducing Gurrah Mundelah : districts which, the reader may recollect, had been taken by Ballajee Bajee

Rao during his first campaign in 1742, before the return of Rughojee from the Carnatic, and which, from their vicinity to their northern frontier, had ever since been an object of the greatest jealousy to the Bhonslays of Berar. The tenders were accepted, and thus by an objectionable policy, justifiable only by the peculiarity of the circumstances, Mr. Hastings temporarily detached the eastern Mahrattas from the confederacy, and turned them against both Hyder and the Peishwa, at a moment when, with thirty thousand horse, it is scarcely to be doubted that they might have pillaged Bengal, and burnt the towns from Burdwan to Point Palmyras. But, in this negotiation, no credentials from Moodajee were given or demanded; and shortly afterwards copies of letters from Nana Furnuwees to Moodajee were transmitted to Bengal, representing the retreat of General Goddard as a great victory, and threatening Moodajee with the utmost vengeance of the Peishwa's government, for seceding from the confederacy, and his allegiance to his prince. In consequence of these letters it was not altogether convenient for Moodajee to avow the agreement to its full extent; he wished, however, to mediate a peace, and to engage with the English in a general confederacy against Hyder. For this purpose he intended sending Dewakur Punt to Poona; but many circumstances rendered it desirable that this minister should first meet Mr. Hastings. An interview was to take place at Benares; but in the meantime orders by the supremo government were despatched to General Goddard to negotiate a peace nearly on the terms formerly proposed; retaining the fort of Bassein if possible, but if not, to give it up, if he could thereby ensure an honourable pacification, which was now the sole end in view.

These instructions were not received by General Goddard until the month of August; various plans were in the meantime proposed at Bombay: that, by General Goddard, of making an increase of eight battalions of native infantry, drawing out the old, and leaving the new levies in garrison; calling on Futihi Sing Gaekwar, the nabobs of Surat and Cambay, to assist with their utmost means; permitting Rugo-nath Rao to assemble horse; bringing down Colonel Muir's

force from Malwa ; forming a junction with his (Goddard's) army ; and carrying the war, first into the heart of the Deccan, and then into Mysore, was very extensive, and with funds it would have been practicable ; but the lowest estimate of the required monthly disbursement was seven lakhs of rupees, an expense which, to the members of the Bombay government, was quite appalling at this season of unprecedented distress. Goddard, however, in hopes of aid from Bengal, proceeded to Guzerat, for the purpose of conferring with Futilh Sing and Rungoba. Several schemes were proposed for the ensuing season ; but one, which was suggested to the Bombay government, is too remarkable to be omitted. Certain dispossessed Mahratta Deshmooks,* and men whose ancestors had held jagheer lands under the Mahomedan governments, came forward, and offered, on certain conditions, to put the English in possession of the Concan, and of the whole of the forts in the Syhadree range ; provided the British government would, on obtaining possession of the country, recognise their ancient rights ; grant them, on the delivery of each fort, fifty thousand rupees for each of the larger fortresses, and ten thousand for the smaller ; allowing them to retain whatever plunder in money, jewels, gold and silver ornaments, and mares, they might acquire ; but everything else, of whatever description, they agreed to relinquish. Their proposals were fully considered,† but finally rejected.

On the opening of the season Goddard returned from Guzerat, after some satisfactory explanations with Futilh Sing, and obtaining a positive promise of being assisted by five thousand good horse. If recovering the revenue had been the only object, General Goddard observed that the defence of Guzerat should have rather been secured than that of the Concan ; but until it could be ascertained whether the force in Malwa would be sent to join him, it was agreed to maintain defensive operations in the Concan, preserving as

* Arjoonjee, and Jeewajee Bamlay, and Suntajee Naik Surkunday, seem to have been three of the chiefs who came forward ; but their native villages are not recorded.

† Bombay Consultations, 29th June 1781.

much as possible an appearance of action. Early in November accounts reached Bombay of a separate treaty between Mahadajee Sindia and Colonel Muir, concluded 13th October 1781, by which Sindia agreed to return to Oojein, and Colonel Muir to recross the Jumna ; and that Sindia had further agreed to negotiate a treaty between the other belligerents and the British government, but he, at all events, bound himself to stand neutral. His territory, west of the Jumna, was restored ; but the Rana of Gohud was not to be molested in the possession of Gwalior, as long as he conducted himself properly. The first overtures, as already mentioned, were made by Mahadajee Sindia, who, after his defeat by Colonel Cainac, perceived that he had everything to lose by maintaining a contest in the heart of his own dominions, which would probably end in his being driven a fugitive across the Kerbuddah, without lands or friends, and probably to the secret satisfaction of his rivals at Poona.

Mr. Hastings was particularly pleased at the opening of this channel to a general pacification, as the plan of a mediation through Moodajee was obstructed by the death of Dewakur Punt, who did not live to meet the governor-general at Benares, as had been agreed upon ; Moodajee, however, afterwards wrote to General Goddard, assuring him of his readiness to interpose his best endeavours for the attainment of peace, and even to repair in person to Poona for that purpose. About the same time, on the arrival of Mr. John M'Pherson at Madras, a letter was addressed to the Peishwa, dated 11th September, 1781, in the joint names of Lord Macartney, Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes, and Mr. M'Pherson, forwarded to the wukeel of Mohummud Ally, at Poona, stating their wish for peace, the moderation of the Company's views, the desire of the British nation to conclude a firm and lasting treaty, which no servant of the Company should have power to break ; and assuring the Peishwa, upon their own honour, and that of the king, the Company, and the nation, that just satisfaction should be given in a sincere and irrevocable treaty.

Amid all these authorized pacifiers, General Goddard, who as yet considered himself the accredited agent on the

part of the supreme government, also opened a negotiation, and assumed, what was privately agreed though not expressed in the treaty between Colonel Muir and Sindia, that the latter should use his endeavour to obtain a cessation of hostilities between the Peishwa and the English, until the terms of a general peace could be adjusted.

Captain Watherstone was deputed to Poona in January, but shortly after his arrival there official intelligence was received of the appointment of Mr. David Anderson, as agent of the governor-general, with full powers to negotiate and conclude a treaty with the Mahrattas; for which purpose Mr. Anderson was deputed to the camp of Mahadajee Sindia. Upon this news Captain Watherstone was recalled, a circumstance which both Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt regretted, for although they were not fully prepared to treat, they could have wished to conclude the pacification without the mediation of Sindia. The terms to which Mr. Anderson was authorized to accede, differed little from the conditions before tendered, except that as the Rana of Gohud had by his conduct forfeited all claims to the benefits of the alliance, and had besides secretly endeavoured to conclude separate terms for himself with Sindia, it was deemed unnecessary to include him as a party in Mr. Anderson's negotiation. A principal obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty was the restoration of the Peishwa's share of Ahmedabad, which had been apportioned to Futili Sing. This point, however, was at last conceded, and a treaty was concluded at Salbye on the 17th May by Mr. David Anderson on the part of the East India Company, and by Mahadajee Sindia on that of the Peishwa, Nana Furnuwees, and the whole of the chiefs of the Mahratta nation; Mahadajee Sindia being at the same time plenipotentiary of the Peishwa, and the mutual guarantee of both parties for the due performance of the conditions. The treaty consisted of seventeen articles: the whole of the territory conquered since the treaty of Poorundhur was restored, together with the three lakhs promised near Baroach. The territory of the Gaekwar, and the whole of Guzerat, were to remain precisely on the same footing as they had been prior to the war of 1775;

so that the Baroda state was thus secured from dismemberment, and no claim of tribute was to be preferred by the Peishwa against Futih Sing during the period of the late hostilities. Rugonath Rao was to be allowed twenty-five thousand rupees a month, and to be permitted to choose a place of residence.

It was settled that Hyder should be obliged to relinquish the territories lately conquered from the English and the Nabob of Arcot; and the Peishwa, on the one part, and the English on the other, agreed that their allies respectively should maintain peace towards each other. A free trade, the restoration of wrecks, and the exclusion of all European establishments, except those of the Portuguese within the Mahratta dominions, also form part of the substance of the treaty of Salbye, which was ratified at Calcutta on the 6th June following; but the adjustment on the part of the Peishwa was delayed by Nana Furnuwees, for reasons which will be hereafter explained, until the 20th December, nor was it finally exchanged until the 24th February 1783.

During the period when the ratification was in suspense, the governor-general in council agreed to fulfil the former intention in regard to the cession of Baroach; and that valuable district was bestowed on Mahadajee Sindia in testimony of the sense entertained of the conduct manifested by him to the Bombay army at Wurgaom, and of his humane treatment and release of the English gentlemen who had been delivered as hostages on that occasion.

CHAP. XIV.

FROM A. D. 1773 TO A. D. 1781.

Affairs at the imperial court.—Nujeef Khan.—Sujah-ud-dowlah—dies—is succeeded by his son Asoph-ud-dowlah—Mujl-ud-dowlah—his intrigues against Nujeef Khan frustrated.—Nujeef Khan establishes a paramount authority, which he upholds till his death—His adopted son, Afrasiab Khan, obliged to relinquish the succession to Mirza Shuftee—disputed by Mohummud Beg Humadanee—Mirza Shuftee assassinated.—Afrasiab Khan resumes his situation, and contests the succession with Mohummud Beg.—Treaty of Salbye—Reasons for the delay in its ratification explained.—Mahadajee Sindia and Nana Furnuwees—their respective views—Hyder Ally.—Proposal for invading Bengal.—Sindia's reasons for desiring the friendship of the English.—Policy of Nana Furnuwees.—Death of Hyder Ally.—Ratification of the Treaty.—Outrage committed by the Peishwa's Admiral.—Capture of the English ship Ranger.—Tippoo professes to acquiesce in the terms of the treaty, but continues the war against the English.—Mahadajee Sindia threatens him in consequence.—A separate treaty concluded between the English and Tippoo—disapproved—but confirmed by the Governor-General.—The court of Poona affect to consider the separate pacification a violation of the treaty of Salbye.—Views of the Poona and Hyderabad courts.—A conference—claims discussed.—Offensive alliance against Tippoo proposed.—Seedee of Jinjeera.—Tippoo insults Nizam Ally.—Probability of a rupture.—Hostilities postponed.—Death of Rughonath Rao.—Intrigues in favour of his son Bojee Rao.—Mahadajee Sindia—his proceedings.

For some years, whilst the Mahrattas were engaged in domestic dissensions, or in war with the English, A. D. 1782. the imperial court was not subjected to their busy and rapacious intrusion; but, as the affairs of Delhi soon resume a considerable influence on their politics, we must not lose sight of the principal events that had occurred in that quarter.

On the retreat of the Mahrattas, in 1773, Nujeef Khan A. D. 1773. regained his lost authority at the imperial court, and immediately directed his arms against their garrisons. Husham-ud-dowlah, the rival of Nujeef Khan, who had been secretly subservient to the Mahrattas, was removed

from the administration. Shujah-ud-dowlah likewise took advantage of the retreat of the Mahratta army, to expel their garrisons from his neighbourhood ; and, after possessing himself of Etaweh, advanced towards Agra, for the purpose of assisting Nujeef Khan, who was besieging it ; but the fortress having surrendered, Nujeef Khan placed Mohummud Beg Humadancee, one of his own dependants, in command of the garrison. The nabob vizier, to conciliate Nujeef Khan, appointed him his deputy at the imperial court ; and these two might have become formidable enemies to the Mahrattas north of the Nerbuddah, had not the vizier's attention been for a time fully engaged in prosecuting the Rohilla war ; and shortly after its termination,

death put an end to all his schemes. His demise
A. D. 1775. occurred in January, 1775, and his son, Asoph-ud-dowlah, after some delay on the part of the Emperor, was confirmed in his father's title and possessions.*

Nujeef Khan carried on various military expeditions with success. Although the Emperor did not sanction the measure by remaining in the field himself, Nujeef Khan took part with the English, and Shujah-ud-dowlah in the war against the Rohillas ; he was afterwards successful against the Jhats ; the imperial arms were again respected, and his own authority acknowledged throughout the province of Agra. But whilst thus employed at a distance he found a domestic enemy in the person of one from whom he had a right to expect fidelity and friendship. As his own deputy, in the imperial presence, he had chosen Abdool Ahud Khan, to whom he confided the care of the court and capital, together with the general administra-

tion of civil affairs. The new Dewan was shortly
A. D. 1776. afterwards honoured with the title of Mujd-ud-dowlah ; but the first use he made of his power was to establish his own influence over the imbecile mind of the Emperor, to the prejudice of his patron. Nujeef Khan did not remain ignorant of the progress of the intrigues against him, but he continued in the field, and vigorously prosecuted the measures he had undertaken.† Much of his success, it may be observed,

* Francklin's Life of Shah Alum.

† Scott's History, and Bengal records.

was owing to some regular infantry, the better part of which were originally disciplined by the English, when the Emperor resided under their protection ; but there were now two distinct bodies in the service of Nujeef Khan : the one under Sumroo, a German,* and the other, commanded by Madoc, a Frenchman.

Mujd-ud-dowlah was unsuccessful in military expeditions. Foiled by Zabitah Khan, and harassed by plundering irruptions of the Seiks, who laid waste the country, but still more alarmed at the rapid power which his rival's successes had gained him in the provinces, he sought to crush him, by involving the emperor in a war with the Rajpoots, which he hoped might prove fatal to his progress ; but the result was contrary to his anticipations, for, although the war was brought on, and Nujeef Khan actively employed, it terminated advantageously for the emperor, and creditably for his general.† In this situation Mujd-ud-dowlah began a negotiation with Mahadajee Sindia, from which he hoped to free himself from all difficulties, and attain the entire control in the state, by the ruin of Nujeef Khan ; after which, in hopes of freeing himself from the Mahrattas, he intended to accede to a scheme, proposed by Sindia, for invading the English provinces in Bengal ; and promised, as soon as they could be spared, to lend both the authority and the army of the emperor in aid of Sindia's design.‡ But these schemes were at once overturned by his removal from the administration, which Nujeef Khan, with the emperor's concurrence, at last effected. No obstacle now interfered with that paramount authority which Nujeef Khan

* The history and character of the infamous Walter Reinhard, generally known by the name of Sumroo, the instrument of the barbarous massacre at Patna, in 1763, is sufficiently public. He entered the imperial service after that event, having in the interval served principally with the Jhats.

† Scott's History. Letters of Nujeef Khan. English records.

‡ Original Mahratta letters from Sindia's camp, written by Ramajee Amunt, the Peishwa's Dewan, with Mahadajee Sindia. His letters and papers were brought to me by his great grandson, who now resides at Poona. Conjoined with other materials, those letters throw considerable light on the Mahratta views and transactions of the period.

established. He became Umeer Ool Oomrah, with the title of Zoolfikar Khan, and continued, till his death, which happened 22d April, 1782, to rule both the emperor and his territory with judgment and firmness.* His adopted son, Afrasiab Khan, was at first acknowledged his successor, but he was for a time obliged to relinquish his new dignity in favour of his relation, Mirza Shuffee, who was himself opposed by a powerful faction, headed by Mohummud Beg Humadanee, the governor of the province of Agra.

An opportunity seemed thus afforded to the emperor for ridding himself of all parties, by a vigorous effort, which he at first seemed disposed to make ; but he suffered the opportunity to pass, and his friends became the victims of his imbecility. A scene of contention and treachery soon took place amongst the competitors ; Mirza Shufree was assassinated by Ismael, the nephew of Mohummud Beg Humadanee, so that Afrasiab Khan only remained to contest the supremacy.†

Such was the state of affairs at Delhi when the treaty of Salbye was pending ; and now, to account for the long period which elapsed between its conclusion by Sindia, and its ratification by the Peishwa, it is necessary to unfold the motives which then actuated the leading parties in the Mahratta state.

Notwithstanding the increasing jealousy between Mahadajee Sindia and Nana Furnuwees, though the former sought to establish a kingdom virtually independent, and though each was desirous of extending his control over the whole Mahratta nation, both continued sensible of the necessity of preserving the strength of the empire undivided. By the progress of the war with the British government, Nana's influence and reputation had increased whilst those of Sindia had diminished. Yet, by the treaty of Salbye, Sindia, whilst his fortunes seemed on the decline, had attained one main object of his policy, a sovereignty virtually independent, without any apparent break in the great link of interest which bound the Mahratta confederacy. Although both Mahadajee Sindia and Nana

* Scott, Francklin, and English records.

† Francklin's Life of Shah Alum.

Furnuwees were desirous of a general peace, yet each of them had secret intentions of soon breaking it, in such partial instances as suited their respective schemes of aggrandizement. Nana aspired to the recovery of all the territories south of the Nerbuddah that had ever belonged to the Mahrattas, whilst Sindia projected the re-establishment of their power in the provinces of Hindoostan. Although the terms of the treaty of Salbye were so much more favourable to the Mahrattas than any that could have been anticipated before the war between the English and Hyder broke out, yet Nana, being jealous of the prominent part which Sindia acted in the negotiation, and hoping that he might, by temporizing, recover Salsette from the English, maintained, in all communications with the British authorities, an appearance of steadfast alliance with Hyder,* whilst to the envoys of the latter he affected to be satisfied with the treaty of Salbye, and declared that its immediate ratification by the Peishwa could only be prevented by Hyder's restoring the Mahratta possessions south of the Kistna, which would ensure their co-operation; but, if not restored, the Mahrattas would unite with the English against him.† Nana's ulterior views, in case the pending treaty should be ratified, were hostile towards Hyder, as he, in that event, projected an offensive alliance with Nizam Ally, against the usurper of Mysore, from which the English were to be carefully excluded.‡

With regard to Sindia's particular views of aggrandizement, in order fully to understand the reasons which operated in inducing the British government passively to view the growth of such a power as he acquired in Hindoostan, it may be requisite to explain that Mahadajee Sindia, even before his campaign against Goddard in Guzerat, had suggested a plan of attacking the English in Bengal, and when his own territory was invaded he renewed the proposal to the Peishwa, requesting that Tookajee Holkar might be sent to support the design.§ To the whole of this scheme Nana Furnuwees at first objected, until he saw a probability of its recalling Goddard, but he was afraid to

* Original letters, records, oral information, and Mahratta MSS.

† Wilks.

‡ Mahratta MSS., and letters.

§ Original letter from Mahadajee Sindia.

detach Holkar from the Peishwa, not only from being apprehensive that Goddard might not be withdrawn, but lest Sindia should allay the existing jealousy on the part of Holkar towards himself; which Nana, for his own security, was solicitous to foment. In giving, therefore, a tardy acquiescence to Sindia's plan, he proposed, instead of Holkar's quitting Poona, that Sindia should augment his army by a body of Sillidars from the Mahratta country, whom he offered to assist in raising. Sindia gave various reasons for declining this suggestion; but the most important one was the removal just at that period of Mujd-ud-dowlah from the administration, and that Nujeef Khan would not lend his support.* Hyder Ally, who had been apprized that such a design was at one time in agitation, endeavoured, when he broke with the English, to engage Sindia to prosecute the enterprise;† but the negotiations which Sindia was carrying on with Mr. Hastings, the death of Nujeef Khan, and the subsequent contentions amongst the Mahomedan factions at Delhi, opened a prospect to Sindia of realizing those schemes which he had long cherished, and made it of more consequence to him to court the favour of the English, than to excite their hostility. Mr. Hastings, if supported by his council, would probably, on the death of Nujeef Khan, have anticipated Sindia by interposing the British influence at the imperial court; but instead of that course, the policy of which might certainly have been questionable at such a crisis, Mr. Hastings turned the circumstance to advantage, by giving Sindia to understand that he would not interfere with his views at Delhi,‡ and thus not only engaged his interest in obtaining the ratification of the treaty, but secured him against the gold of Hyder, which was liberally proffered in support of the scheme for invading Bengal.§ After the treaty of Salbye was signed, an envoy from Hyder

* Copy of an original letter from the Peishwa's Dewan with Sindia to Nana Furnuwees.

† Original letters from Sindia's camp.

‡ English records.

§ Mahratta MSS., and letters. I am not certain if it be twenty lakhs of rupees, or pagodas, that are mentioned in an original Mahratta letter, from Sindia's camp, which is my principal authority for this fact.

was permitted by the court of Poona to proceed to Sindia's camp; and Nana Furnuwees, in prosecution of his own views on Salsette, which he hoped the British government might be induced to cede, in order to propitiate his favour, gave out that the Peishwa had engaged in a new treaty with Hyder, to which the French were parties. But the death of Hyder, which happened on the 7th of December 1782, had a speedy effect in deciding the measures of the Mahratta minister, and the ratification of the treaty of Salbye was the immediate result. As already noticed, the treaty was ratified by the Peishwa on the 20th December 1782, formally exchanged on

the 24th February 1783, and the term for restoring the districts on the Bombay side limited to the 24th April. Before that date an outrage was committed, which, had it happened at a time when peace was less essential to the British government, might have occasioned a renewal of the war. The Ranger, a small ship of the Bombay marine, on her voyage from Bombay to Calicut with several

military officers of distinction as passengers on April 8.

board, was unexpectedly attacked by the fleet of Anund Rao Dhoolup, the Peishwa's admiral, consisting of two ships, one ketch, and eight gallivats; and after a very gallant defence, in which most of the crew and passengers were killed or wounded, she was at last overpowered and carried as a prize into Viziadroog. Colonel Humberston and Major Shaw were killed, and besides Lieutenant Pruen, the commander of the vessel, three of the passengers were desperately wounded. Of this number was Colonel Norman M'Leod, who, being disabled in one arm, continued to fight on, hand to hand, with the other, until shot through the body, when he fell, as was supposed, mortally wounded; but though carried into confinement at Viziadroog, where the prisoners had neither medical attendance nor ordinary necessaries, all the wounded officers recovered. This violation of the treaty produced a strong remonstrance from the British government, and the surrender of the Peishwa's districts was suspended; but upon an apology for the outrage, and the restoration of the vessel, the terms of the pacification were carried into effect.

The war, however, was not at an end with the successor of Hyder Ally. Tippoo, although to the Mahrattas he professed his acquiescence in the terms of the treaty of Salbye, continued hostilities against the English. Mahadajee Sindia called upon him to desist, threatening him, in case of refusal, with an immediate attack from the united armies of the English and the Mahrattas. Tippoo, however, persisted ; and in consequence, Sindia, on the 28th October, concluded a new treaty with the English, for the purpose of enforcing compliance. It was as much the wish of Nana Furnuwees as of Sindia to oblige Tippoo to conform to the terms of the treaty of Salbye, in order that he might appear to the other powers of India a Mahratta dependant as well as a tributary ; but Nana's jealousy of Sindia's assumption of authority, and his own projected alliance with Nizam Ally, impeded the scheme of this league, in which Sindia and the English would have borne parts so prominent.

A. D. 1784. In the meantime a separate treaty was concluded by Tippoo and the English presidency at Fort St. George. Mr. Hastings had authorized the Madras government to negotiate a treaty, of which that of Salbye was to be the basis. But instead of following their instructions, from an over-anxiety to terminate the troubles and distresses in which they found themselves involved, they were led into a train of most injudicious proceedings ; in the course of which they were systematically insulted by Tippoo, their representatives treated with indignity, the British nation held

up as supplicants for peace, and finally, on the March 11. 11th March, the treaty of Mangalore was signed, in which even allusion to the treaty of Salbye was omitted ; a circumstance than which nothing could have been more gratifying to Tippoo or more offensive to the Mahrattas. The strongest disapprobation of this omission, and of many other points of that humiliating pacification, was expressed by the governor-general, and he was only prevented from disavowing and annulling it, by the confusion which must have resulted to the Company's affairs, in consequence of the fulfilment of a part of the terms, before it could have been possible to obtain their ratification. The Poona government affected to disbelieve

that any treaty could be settled without their concurrence, and declared that such an agreement would be a violation of the treaty of Salbye. But Mr. Hastings had previously apprized Mahadajee Sindia, through Mr. Anderson, of the instructions sent to the Madras government, and he now explained the departure from his orders of which that government had been guilty, stating likewise some part of the motives which had operated to induce him to ratify their proceedings; in consequence of which, as the leading parties in the Mahratta state were anxious to prosecute their respective views, there was little difficulty in reconciling them to a measure which had become irrevocable.* The first proceeding of Nana Furnuwees in his designs on Tippoo was a formal demand on that prince for arrears of tribute; Tippoo admitted the justice of the demand, but offered various excuses for not immediately complying with it. At the same time that the demand was made on Tippoo, a like formal application was preferred to Nizam Ally for the outstanding Mahratta claims to Chouth and Surdeshmookhee within his territory. But a secret understanding existed between the courts of Poona and Hyderabad. They were on the best terms, in so much, that a short time previous to making this demand, Nana Furnuwees had assisted the latter state to suppress a formidable rebellion, which was headed by Ihtisham Jung, the Jagheerdar of Neermul. Nizam Ally, in reply to the application, proposed, as had been secretly agreed in order to cover their designs on Tippoo, to hold a conference with the Poona minister on the frontier. Accordingly each of the parties, attended by a large army,† set out from their capitals, and in the month of June had a meeting at Eedgeer, near the junction of the Beema and Kistna. Many points of importance regarding their mutual claims were discussed, some of which had existed for a long period, but it was agreed that such of the Mahratta thannas as had been displaced by Nizam

* English records, Mahratta MSS., and letters.

† Nizam Ally had sixteen thousand horse, twenty thousand infantry, and seventy-five guns. The Mahrattas, eight thousand infantry, fifty thousand horse, and forty guns. (Official reports from Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt, to the Peishwa.)

Ally since 1774 should be re-established in the Moghul territory ; and that the claims for Chouth and Surdeshmookhee of the two past seasons should be put into an immediate train of payment, adopting, as a rule in all cases, the practice usual in the time of Mahdoo Rao Bullal. Where any considerable doubt existed, the demands were to lie over until a general settlement could be made upon the admitted claims in the time of Nizam Ool Moolk ; according to which Nizam Ally bound himself to pay up all arrears. Thus far the result of this conference was publicly known, but the principal object, as already alluded to, was an offensive alliance against Tippoo, for the recovery of the districts which both states had lost by the encroachments of Mysore. Nizam Ally, who over-estimated the value of his own alliance, demanded, as a preliminary article of the agreement, the restoration of Ahmednugur and Beejapoort. Nana Furnuwees promised to give up Beejapoort after they should recover the territory north of the Toongbuddra, but after a prolonged discussion, neither party being very well satisfied, nor as yet by any means prepared to prosecute their scheme, the conference terminated in a general treaty of alliance, the particulars of which were to be specified as soon as they found themselves prepared to enter upon its execution.* After levying the tribute due by the Naik of Sorapoor,† both parties returned to their respective capitals in July, and Nana Furnuwees took this opportunity of endeavouring to possess himself of the ever-coveted island of Jinjeera, but the mediation of the British government prevented the attack, until events of greater moment diverted all immediate designs from the Seedee.‡

Nizam Ally had scarcely reached his capital, when Tippoo, probably apprized of what had taken place, with premeditated insult, set up some absurd pretensions to the sovereignty of Beejapoort, and called on Nizam Ally, in consequence, to adopt

* Poona records.

† Official letter from Nana Furnuwees. The Naik of Sorapoor is the descendant of the Berud Naik, of Wakinkerah.

‡ Bombay records.

his standard of weights and measures.* Nizam Ally took little pains to obtain an explanation, until, in the month of October, Tippoo was said to have taken the field for the purpose of invading that part of the Moghul territory which lay south of the Kistna. An envoy from Hyderabad was immediately despatched to Tippoo's camp, for the purpose of temporizing, and another to Poona, in order to hasten the projected operations of the alliance. Nana Furnuwees, however, was not only unprepared, but various affairs of internal government prevented him at that moment from supporting his ally. Nizam Ally, therefore, was glad to prevent hostilities through his envoy at Seringapatam, which he effected, not so much by any forbearance of Tippoo, as by his want of preparation for war.

The principal reason which induced Nana Furnuwees to suspend the design he had so long contemplated, was the reported progress of a conspiracy, said to have for its object the deposition of Mahdoo Rao Narrain and the elevation of Bajee Rao, the son of the late Rugonath Rao, to the Peishwa's musnud. Rugonath Rao, after the treaty of Salbye was ratified, seeing no other alternative, accepted the terms there specified, and fixed on Kopergaom, on the banks of the Godaverry, as his place of residence. He only survived this last humiliation a few months. His widow Anundee Bye was pregnant at the time, and shortly after, in April 1784, gave birth to a son, Chimnajee Appa. Bajee Rao, at the period of his father's death, had scarcely completed his ninth year; but the partizans of Rugonath Rao, and many who were dissatisfied with the existing government, began to stir up a faction in his favour. It is creditable to Nana Furnuwees that in adopting measures for smothering these indications, which were soon accomplished, he placed no additional restraint on the family at Kopergaom,

* Bombay records. Tareekh-dil-Ufroz, &c.

It is scarcely worth enquiry how Tippoo arrogated to himself this right; but as Hyder, it was once reported, had obtained from the Emperor the sovereignty of that portion of the Deccan, comprised in the space allotted by Aurungzebe to his son Kaum Bakhsh; the insult may have been suggested by that circumstance.

but they naturally became objects of his suspicion ; mutual distrust was the consequence, and hatred grew up between Nana Furnuwees and the sons of Rugonath Rao.* Mahadajee Sindia was said to have been the secret fomenter of the intrigues to which we have alluded ; and from his usual policy of keeping Nana in perpetual alarm, there is ground to suspect his connivance ; but he could have had no design of supporting such a faction, as he was at this time fully occupied in the accomplishment of those views on the imperial territory we have before seen him projecting ; and events took place which suddenly elevated him to the pinnacle of his ambition.

* Mahratta letters, and MS.

CHAP. XV.

FROM A. D. 1784 TO A. D. 1785.

Factions at the imperial court.—Escape of Mirza Jewan Bukht.—Afrasiab Khan negotiates with the English.—Governor-General declines all interference.—Afrasiab Khan has recourse to Mahadjee Sindia.—Sindia's progress since the treaty of Salbye.—Benoit de Boigne.—Sindia accepts the invitation of Afrasiab Khan.—Marches to Agra.—Afrasiab Khan assassinated.—The whole power falls into the hands of Sindia—his policy in regard to the Peishwa.—The Emperor confers on him the command of the army, &c.—Mahomedan chiefs submit.—The Dooab taken possession of.—Agra and Aligurh taken.—Effect of the news of these events at the Poona court.—Sindia intoxicated by his success, prefers a demand on the British Government, for the Chouth of Bengal—effect.—Determination of the acting Governor-General to send an envoy to the Peishwa's court.—Sindia's objections.—Affairs in the Deccan.

At the imperial court we left Afrasiab Khan, and Mohummud Beg Hunmadancee, struggling for the superiority. The former at first obtained the advantage, owing principally to his having the control of the emperor's person, but foreseeing no probability of reducing his rival with the means at his disposal, he contemplated an alliance with some of the neighbouring states, and cast his eyes successively towards the nabob vizier, the English, and the Mahrattas. Whilst hesitating in his choice, the emperor's son prince Mirza Jewan Bukht made his escape from Delhi, fled to Lucknow, where the governor-general then was, and threw himself on his protection and that of the nabob vizier. He was promised an asylum ; but although he entreated assistance in his father's name, Mr. Hastings declined affording it. The prince's flight, however, alarmed Afrasiab Khan, and he voluntarily offered to make any arrangement for the emperor, which the governor-general and the nabob vizier might suggest, provided they would support him with a sufficient force to suppress the rebellion of Mohummud Beg. But these

A. D. 1784.

overtures being also rejected, Afrasiab Khan had recourse to Mahadajee Sindia.*

Since the ratification of the treaty of Salbye, Sindia had obtained considerable advantages. Several of the minor Rajpoot chieftains, contiguous to Malwa, had returned to their former allegiance as Mahratta tributaries. The fortress of Gwalior, after a protracted siege, was restored by the Rana of Gohud, who was constrained to surrender himself a prisoner on a verbal promise of maintenance and protection.† A body of troops was sent into Bundelcund for the purpose of endeavouring to reduce that province. These troops were under the command of Appa Khunde Rao, who was attended by a body of regulars, raised by a European gentleman named Benoit de Boigne.‡ But Sindia, whilst prosecuting those

* Scott.

† Scott.

‡ As M. de Boigne's progress in the Mahratta service will be found conspicuous, his previous history becomes interesting. M. de Boigne was born at Chamberri, in Savoy, in the territory of the king of Sardinia. He began his career as an ensign, in the regiment of Clare, in the Irish brigade, in the service of France, a corps then famous for its discipline. Seeing little prospect of advancement, and hearing that Russia, then at war with Turkey, was much in want of officers, in the Grecian Archipelago, he resigned his commission, and repaired to Turin, where having obtained letters of recommendation from the Sardinian minister, he proceeded to Greece. Soon after his arrival he was promoted to the rank of captain, in a Greek regiment, in the Russian service. Being employed on an injudicious descent made upon the island of Tenedos, he was taken prisoner by a sally from the Turkish garrison, and conveyed to Scio, where he was kept until the peace which was soon after concluded. On being released he embarked for Smyrna, at which place, happening to meet some Englishmen from India, he was so struck with their account of the country, that he resolved on trying his fortune there. He proceeded to Constantinople, and thence to Aleppo, where he joined a caravan for Bagdad; but in consequence of the successes of the Persians against the Turks, the caravan, after they had arrived near Bagdad, being under an apprehension of falling into the hands of the victors, retraced their steps to Aleppo. De Boigne, balked in his endeavours of getting to India by that route, repaired to Grand Cairo, where he became acquainted with Mr. Baldwin, the British consul-general, and through his influence and kindness, not only obtained a passage to India, but by a letter from that gentleman, to Major Sydenham, town-major of Fort St. George. M. de Boigne, soon after his arrival at Madras, was recom-

objects, was anxiously watching the confusion and contentions in the imperial territory. He had been invited to take a part both by Mohummud Beg and Afrasiab Khan, but as the invitation sent by the latter was ostensibly from the emperor, Sindia

mended to Mr. Rumbold, the governor, and appointed an ensign in the 6th Native Battalion, under that presidency. M. de Boigne's corps was, with Baillie's detachment, destroyed by Tippoo; but De B. being at the time detached on escort duty, to convey grain from Madras, escaped. A short time after this event, in consequence of an act of injustice, which he conceived he had experienced from the Governor, Lord Macartney, respecting the adjutancy of a detachment, he resigned his commission in the company's service, with an intention of proceeding to Calcutta, and thence overland to Russia. Lord Macartney, when he became sensible of the injustice, would have repaired it, but M. de Boigne appearing determined in his purpose, Lord M. gave him letters of recommendation to the governor-general, Mr. Hastings, by whom, on his arrival at Calcutta, he was kindly received, and by him furnished with letters, not only to the British authorities in the upper provinces, but to the native princes in alliance with the English government, which owing to the presents an individual so recommended would have thus received, ensured civility, together with considerable pecuniary advantage. De Boigne experienced this advantage in a peculiar degree, on his arrival at Lucknow, where the nabob made him rich presents, and furnished him with letters of credit on Cabul and Candahar for 12,000 rupees. He set forward on his journey, in company with Major Brown, at that time deputed on a mission to the Emperor; but Major Brown's progress having been interrupted by the jealousy of the Emperor's ministers, M. de Boigne, in consequence of being supposed one of his suite, was also detained, and took this opportunity of inaction to visit Sindia's camp, on the invitation of Mr. Anderson, the resident. Sindia being suspicious of De Boigne, and desirous of ascertaining his real character, which he expected to discover from the letters in his possession, caused all his baggage to be stolen by some dexterous thieves, whom he employed for the purpose; and although, on Mr. Anderson's application, the greater part of the baggage was restored, the letters and credits were not given up, a circumstance, as M. de Boigne conceived, equally ruinous to his fortune and his journey. It was then he first thought of endeavouring to get employed in the service of some native prince; and Gwalior being at this period besieged by Sindia, De Boigne formed a scheme for its relief, which he communicated to the Rana of Gohud, through an officer named Sangster, a Scotchman, who commanded one thousand well disciplined Sepoys, and a very respectable train of artillery, in the Rana's service. De Boigne proposed, on receiving an advance of 100,000 rupees, to raise two battalions within the Emperor's territory, east of the Jumna, in such a manner as to prevent suspicion, and in conjunction with Sangster from Gohud to fall on

preferred accepting it, and set out for Agra, towards which the imperial court was advancing. A meeting took place on the 22d October, but immediately afterwards Afrasiab Khan was assassinated by the brother of the late Mirza Shuffee, in whose murder Afrasiab Khan secretly participated.* As Sindia

Sindia's camp by surprize. There was little doubt but the plan would have succeeded, had not the Rana been afraid to trust De Boigne with the requisite advance of money; but in order to intimidate Sindia, he published the proposed scheme, in all his ukhbars, as about to take place. The knowledge of the circumstance excited the enmity of Sindia towards De Boigne, although he saw the merit of the suggestion.

De Boigne next made overtures to the Raja of Jeypoor, and was commissioned by him to raise two battalions; but having inadvertently communicated this circumstance to the governor-general, in an official form, Mr. Hastings, who had no objections to tolerate, although he could not sanction his being so employed, ordered him to Calcutta,—a summons with which M. de Boigne immediately complied. Mr. Hastings was so pleased by the prompt obediences shown to his commands, that he permitted him to return; but before he could reach the upper provinces, events had occurred which induced the Raja of Jeypoor to alter his intentions. This change was a severe disappointment to De Boigne; but the Raja made him a present of 10,000 rupees. At this juncture De Boigne heard of Sindia's intended expedition to Bundelkund, and proposed to raise two battalions, of eight hundred and fifty men each, for that service, to which, after some negotiation, Sindia agreed. No advance of money was granted, but De Boigne was allowed for himself one thousand rupees, and for each man indiscriminately eight rupees a month. To the privates M. de Boigne gave five and a half rupees monthly, and paid the officers proportionally from the balance. The battalions were formed, as nearly as possible, on the plan of those in the English service, and armed, disciplined, and clothed after that manner; the labour which this imposed on an individual may be easily conceived by any person acquainted with military affairs. De Boigne gradually got European officers of all nations into his corps. Sangster, from the service of the Rana of Gohud, joined him, and became superintendent of his cannon foundery.

The continuation of his memoirs will appear in the progress of the Maharratta history. What I have here stated is on the authority of General Count De Boigne himself, from notes taken in his presence.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express my acknowledgments to General Count de Boigne for the obliging manner in which he communicated various points of information during my visit to his hospitable mansion at Chamberri.

* Francklin's Life of Shah Alum.

derived most advantage from the death of Afrasiab Khan, and as the assassin sought and found an asylum in his camp, he did not escape suspicion of being accessory to the murder ; but those who knew Mahadajee best never accused him of a deed so atrocious. The event, however, vested Sindia with complete authority at Delhi, and placed him in a situation which he had only hoped to attain at some remote period. He refused the office of Umeer Ool Oomrah, but with his usual sagacity obtained for the Peishwa that of Wukeel-i-Mootluq, or supreme deputy, a dignity first conferred on the great Nizam Ool Moolk by Mohummud Shah ; and Sindia, reversing the domestic policy of the Bramins, who always endeavour to be first in power but second in name, secured for himself the appointment of deputy to the Peishwa, so that he thus held by authority the executive power in Hindooostan, and a rank, which if he ever should be able and desirous of asserting it, would supersede that of all other ministers in the court of the Peishwa. The emperor also conferred on him the command of his army, and gave up the provinces of Delhi and Agra to his management. For all which Sindia engaged to pay sixty-five thousand rupees monthly, in order to defray the expenses of the imperial household, and to that sum additions were gradually to be made, according to the increasing prosperity of the provinces.*

As Sindia appeared at the head of a powerful army, many

A. D. 1785. of the officers serving with Mohummud Beg

Humadance withdrew from his party, and paid their respects to the emperor. Mohummud Beg likewise acknowledged Sindia's authority, accepted a command, and was sent to reduce Raghogurh, in the province of Kichwara, which he effected, and remained in that country for a considerable period. The imperial districts in the Dooab were speedily taken possession of, and Ryajee Patell was sent by Sindia to besiege Agra, the governor of which at first

March 27. refused to give it up, but on the 27th March it surrendered, when the emperor's second son, Akber, was appointed nominal governor of the province, and

* Bengal records.


Ryajee* Patell real governor of the fortress. The widow and brother of Afrasiab Khan resided in the fort of Aligurh, but refused to admit Sindia's garrison, and sustained a siege until the middle of November, when they also surrendered.


The news of Sindia's success was received by the people at Poona with surprise and joy: a small body of the Peishwa's troops was sent off to join him as a measure of state policy to preserve the appearance of the Peishwa's co-operation and supremacy; but Holkar and Nana Furnuwees were jealous of his elevation, and Sindia at no period of his life was so little on his guard to prevent that jealousy from being turned against him. In the first intoxication of success he so far lost sight of his usual prudence as to make a demand, under the emperor's authority, for the Chouth of the British provinces in Bengal. To this arrogance he was probably encouraged by the departure of Mr. Hastings on the 8th February for England; but Mr. Macpherson, who had succeeded to the temporary charge of the supreme government, not only denied the existence of such a claim, but insisted on its being disavowed; and Sindia, perceiving that the acting governor-general would not submit even to temporize with encroachment, acknowledged its impropriety. Mr. Macpherson conceived that the ambitious nature of Sindia's policy was very dangerous, and endeavoured to raise some counterpoise to his progress by exciting the jealousy and rivalry already entertained towards him among the other Mahratta chiefs. Moodajee Bhonslay being at Poona when the demand for the Chonth of Bengal was made, the Bombay government, by Mr. Macpherson's desire, paid him extraordinary attention, which had the effect of gratifying Moodajee and alarming Sindia. Nana Furnuwees was encouraged in a desire he had frequently expressed of having a British resident at the Peishwa's court, and Mr. Charles Malet was chosen for that important mission. Although no part of the treaty of Salbye precluded the British

* Ryajee's surname was Sindia. He was a favourite commander of Mahadajee Sindia, and a Patell of Panoura, a village near Assee Oomra. Ryajee Patell must not be confounded with another eminent person, Ramjee Patell, whose surname was Jadow. Ramjee commenced his career in the humble capacity of Bargeer, in the service of Ryajee.

government from sending an envoy to Poona, yet as considerable delicacy was due towards Sindia, it was desirable that he should give his assent to the appointment; and it was supposed that this could be best obtained by Mr. Malet's proceeding in person to Sindia's camp; but the latter was too sagacious not to perceive the loss of influence which Mr. Malet's mission would occasion him. He observed that, after having been entrusted for three years with the management of the English affairs at the court of Poona, the appointment of a political agent of their own would naturally impress the chiefs of the Deccan with an idea that the British government was dissatisfied with his conduct, and had revoked the confidence it had previously reposed. But these objections, however plausible, were not of sufficient weight to dissuade Mr. Macpherson from the measure which he deemed it necessary to adopt. It was determined that Mr. Malet should proceed as envoy to the court of Poona; but before the arrangement was finally settled, events had taken place to the southward, which rendered the appointment still more essential to the interests of the British government.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.







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